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 As anyone who has ever written a dissertation can attest, such a project involves the 
generous assistance of many contributors. Above all, I could not have accomplished this 
work without the love and care I received from my wife, Geli. As a former executive editor, 
her advice and assistance were truly invaluable. Likewise, I am indebted to my son, Adrian 
Young, a PhD candidate at Princeton University, for his wisdom and guidance. 
 A very special thanks also goes to my dearest friend, Major General Denny Laich, 
who joined me twice a week for breakfast over many years. Together we explored a number 
of the topics covered in this narrative. 
 I am eternally grateful to the Army OE community for trusting me with their stories 
and experiences. Thanks largely to the leadership of Ms. Lynn Herrick, the “matriarch” of the 
Army OE program, this community has maintained close friendships across four decades. 
As the humanists they are, they invited me into their extended family and provided me with 
an enormous quantity of primary source documents. Their stories deserve the attention of a 
full-length book. Sadly, the confines of a doctoral dissertation precluded me from portraying 
their experiences. On the west coast, Lynn introduced me to some of the finest human 
beings I have ever met: Dr. Jerry Eppler (the “soul” of Army OE), Dr. Mel Spehn, Lieutenant 
Colonel Bob Goodfellow, Lieutenant Colonel Ron Sheffield, Lieutenant Colonel Lee 
Edwards, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Looram, Lieutenant Colonel Roy Avant, and on the east 
coast, Ms. Kay Powers and Brigadier General Mick Zais. Lieutenant Colonel Dick Powell 
and Brigadier General John Johns, as well as Lynn, were a historian’s dream come true. As 
pack rats, they provided me a treasure trove of primary source documents that proved 
indispensable in this project. Lynn and her close colleagues also facilitated contact for me 
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with many former OESOs. I truly appreciated their eagerness to share their experiences with 
me through correspondence: Colonel John Alexander, Colonel John Williams, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Byard, Colonel Richard Scherberger, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel William 
Chadwick, Lieutenant Colonel Carol Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel Mitch Kotula, 
Lieutenant Colonel Brian Ludera, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Perrault, Lieutenant Colonel 
Gary Richardson, and Lieutenant Colonel Al Wilgus.     
 Lieutenant General Walt Ulmer, Jr. graciously granted me several hours of his time 
and provided enormous insight in the “client” side of this story. When I told him that his 
OESOs loved working for him because of his strong support, he replied, “well, why wouldn’t I 
use them as I would any other weapons system?” General Ulmer also provided me 
invaluable insight into Colonel Mike Malone (his best friend) and Malone’s collection of 
writings.1  
 I am very thankful to Mr. Scott Gower, archivist of Special Collections, National 
Defense University, for providing me extensive access to the papers of General Bernard 
Rogers. My hope is that these papers will soon be declassified so that other historians may 
have access to these remarkable documents. The archivists at the Military History Institute, 
Carlisle Barracks, were likewise very accommodating in providing me access to Army War 
College resources. 
 Finally, a special thank you to Colonel Tony Nadal, the “father” of Army OE. As great 
as your leadership was in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, it was even greater in your efforts to 
promote OE. You showed us all the enormous difference one person can make in changing 
an organization. 
                                                          
1. Posted to my web site that is dedicated to the OE program: www.armyoe.com. 
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 Last but certainly not least is a strong thank you to my dissertation committee. My 
chair (and fellow humanist) Dr. Carolyn Kenny, Antioch University; Professor emeritus Dr. 
Alan Guskin, Antioch University; Dr. Jerry Martin, Chief Historian, Strategic Command; and 
Dr. Brian Macalister Linn, the Ralph R. Thomas Professor in Liberal Arts, Texas A&M 
University. Please know that I sincerely appreciate your tolerance of a very long 
dissertation. And thank you for helping me to become a better historian. 
 It is impossible to dedicate this work to any one single individual because, as I reach 
the age of sixty, I see that it is the culmination of a lifetime of education and experiences. In 
the process of researching and writing this story, my mind often focused on so many people 
who have had a transformational impact on my life. So, I would like to dedicate this work: 
 To Dr. Allan R. Millett, and Dr. Williamson Murray—my teachers, my mentors, and 
my friends—who gave a young ex-infantryman and mediocre undergraduate student the 
opportunity of a lifetime to join the best graduate program in military history in the nation. 
 To Colonel Steve Knudsen, my boss in the 82nd Airborne Division and 5th Special 
Forces Group, and Lieutenant Colonel Rob Soeldner, my boss in the 11th Armored Cavalry 
Regiment (Boeselager), the only two transformational leaders I had as commanders during 
my thirty years in uniform. Thank you for always listening and for giving me the freedom to 
speak my mind. 
 To Dr. Peggy Arnott, psychologist extraordinaire, of the Chalmers P. Wylie VA Center 
in Columbus, Ohio. Thank you for guiding me back.         
 To the soldiers of the 384th Military Police Battalion for their professionalism in 
carrying out a difficult mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and especially for making me a 
better commander and a better human being. 
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 And to the thousands of soldiers who gave their lives, portions of their bodies, and 
their minds to the conflict in Afghanistan and in the unjust war in Iraq. Thank you truly for 




In the early 1970s, following a decade of social upheaval in the US and a traumatizing 
military defeat in Vietnam, a group of progressive army officers, armed with recent 
graduate degrees in the social and behavioral sciences, created a grass roots 
movement that soon led to the implementation of the largest organizational 
development program ever conducted. Wartime atrocities and chronic careerism in the 
Army officer corps, along with President Richard Nixon’s promise to create an All-
Volunteer Force (AVF), opened up a window of opportunity for these progressives to 
promote transformational leadership theories grounded in humanistic psychology.  In 
institutionalizing OD across the Army, these officers attempted to transform the 
leadership culture throughout the institution.  However, various strategies employed to 
effect cultural change met with strong resistance from an officer corps that rejected the 
strong humanistic elements that characterized OD in the 1970s. Although 
institutionalization progressed with strong support from Army Chief of Staff (CSA) 
General Bernard Rogers, the program proved unsustainable once he vacated his 
position. By 1980, conservative views of leadership permeated the Army’s school 
system and its leadership doctrine. Concurrently, OD evolved in its theoretical 
application and shifted its emphasis from humanistic psychology to open systems. At 
that point, the Army OE Program was relegated to a far less priority and essentially 
became a process improvement  mechanism.  By 1985, a new CSA terminated the 
program. This is a history of the Army OE Program and the efforts of the progressive 
officers who implemented it. The electronic version of this Dissertation is at OhioLink 
ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd
vi 
Table of Contents 
Preface ............................................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter I: The Need for Better Leaders:  
     Vietnam and the Specter of an All-Volunteer Army .................................................. 74 
 
Chapter II: Presenting and Testing New Concepts:  
     The Early Initiatives of Army OE ............................................................................ 158 
 
Chapter III: Growing Pains and Turf Wars:  
     The Weyand Years ................................................................................................. 239 
 
Chapter IV: The Institutionalization of OE:  
     The Rogers Years .................................................................................................. 310 
Chapter V: Conclusion: Lost Victories ......................................................................... 381 
Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 414 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 419 
Appendix A: US Army Doctrinal Definitions of Leadership .......................................... 420 
Appendix B: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of  
     US Army Leadership Doctrine, 1946–2006 ............................................................ 423 
 
Appendix C: Structures of Army Ranks and Organizations for 
     Non-Military Readers .............................................................................................. 450 
 
Appendix D: A Sample of the OE Process .................................................................. 457 
Appendix E: Message from General Rogers to General Wickham 
     Reference Termination of the Army OE Program ................................................... 460 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 464  
vii 
List of Tables 
Table P.1 The Evolution of Leadership – A Proffered Framework 
     for Analyses ............................................................................................................. 47 
 
Table A.1 The Evolution of US Army Leadership Doctrine: 




List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 Army OE 4-Step Process ........................................................................... 291 
Figure 5.1 Ideal State of an Effective Organization  .................................................... 406 
Figure A.1 Army Rank Structure and Positions of Authority ........................................ 455 






No one [has] advanced a grand theory of leadership. 
For the study of leadership, the crucial distinction is between the quest for 
individual recognition and self-advancement, regardless of its social and 
political consequences, and the quest for the kind of status and power that 
can be used to advance collective purposes that transcend the needs and 
ambitions of the individual.1 
James MacGregor Burns 
 In many ways, I began this dissertation project in 2001 when, upon being notified of 
my promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel, a general officer, whom I greatly admired, 
took me aside and asked me one simple question: "Mike, why should an officer seek 
promotion?" I gave a typical response I both believed and had heard many times before, 
saying "I care about soldiers and want to serve my country to the best of my ability." My 
mentor smiled, shook his head, and replied that the only reason an officer should seek 
promotion is because the new rank will place him or her into a position where he or she can 
do more for more soldiers. He added that there are really no other reasons. I was stunned. 
He was absolutely correct. This revelation brought immense clarity and immediately 
explained my disappointment with so much dysfunctional leadership behavior that I had 
witnessed in two and a half decades of service. To truly serve soldiers before self was an 
epiphany of sorts. As a military historian fascinated with the caliber and effectiveness of 
Army organizations—or lack thereof—throughout the twentieth century, I reflected on this to 
a great degree and, in the process, re-examined my previous work on the activities of the 
West German and American armies since the Second World War.2 I came to believe that 
                                                          
1. Both quotes from James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). 
Emphases are the author’s.  
2. James M. Young, “The SPD and the Creation of the ‘Parliamentary’ Army in West Germany:  
1954–1957” (master’s thesis, Ohio State University, 1983). This was an extraordinary story of how the 




the US Army, especially the officer corps, does not understand this phenomenon called 
leadership. Digging deeper, I observed that the Army officer corps faced a serious cultural 
leadership crisis in the latter half of the Vietnam War and, despite claims to the contrary, has 
never really corrected those deficiencies nor transformed the leadership culture of the time 
to this very day.3 
Introduction and Thesis  
 The US defeat and withdrawal of all combat troops from South Vietnam in 1973 dealt 
a terrible blow to the Army's collective psyche and esteem. The loss also marked a novel 
milestone in the annals of American military history. For the first time, the US Army had 
failed to carry out its contract with society to win the nation's wars. The Army returned home 
to a hostile citizenry, with its spirit broken and its infrastructure rife with racial conflict, drug 
and alcohol abuse, and an officer corps riddled with careerism and a record of numerous 
leadership failures. 
 The society to which the Army returned was undergoing similar trauma. Social 
protests were widespread and spanned many movements. From civil rights to women's 
liberation to the violent anti-war demonstrations, these rebellions against the status quo and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of soldiers and to build an institution where even the newest and youngest voices could be heard. 
Although they did not employ OD in a direct sense, some of the methods and processes they used 
resembled OD techniques. More importantly, the Germans paid extremely close attention to the staffing 
of the officer corps. In the end, they achieved the most democratic army in the world and a leadership 
culture that truly adheres to the tenets of servant leadership. They succeeded by primarily discarding all 
assumptions and old ways of thinking—a great example of an adaptive challenge. Also, James M. Young, 
“The Dissolving of a Dream: Military Civic Action in Latin America and the US Army’s Development of a 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine: 1961–1968” (master’s thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 1988). It is an 
account of how the Army’s senior leaders resisted radical change and resented President John 
Kennedy’s infatuation with special forces, especially their use in unconventional warfare. In the end, the 
Army attempted to apply unconventional warfare to some of its conventional divisions. Vietnam, however, 
basically ended the promising use of military civic actions as US special forces were deployed into 
combat.    
3. See any issue of the Army Times in the last three years. Examples abound of toxic leadership at 
the most senior levels of command. Compounding this problem are the many examples of sexual abuse 




authority called out for radical change.4 The scope of these events, combined with their 
speed and frequency, forced national-level stakeholders to confront both planned and 
unplanned change to an unprecedented degree. The same was true for the Army's most 
senior officers. In the early 1970s, within a very short span of time, the Army had to 
withdraw from Vietnam, carry out a large reduction in force, end conscription, plan and 
implement an all-volunteer army, heal itself of alcohol and drug abuse, diffuse severe racial 
tension and integrate women within its ranks, re-write conventional operational doctrine 
after a decade of counter-insurgency warfare, and bolster its NATO commitments in 
Europe. 
 To affect these changes and heal the institution, the Army had to transform itself. 
The question was, to what end-state? Faced with so many problems, the Army was not 
opposed to large-scale changes and reforms. In fact, the stewards looked forward to 
leaving Vietnam behind and to resurrect their preference for conventional warfare. 
Unfortunately, at the time senior Army leaders did not fully appreciate that true 
transformation would require a much larger change in institutional culture than they ever 
anticipated. 
 Some of the older stewards of the institution instinctively turned to traditional 
modes of organizational improvement and redress. Viewing and anticipating these 
challenges as definable problems, they employed traditional methods such as revising 
training and operational methodologies and doctrines, reorganizing the force structure, 
and moving ahead with the adoption of advanced warfighting technologies that the war 
had largely postponed. More importantly, they were not insensitive to the radical social 
                                                          





changes that American society had endured while the Army was fighting in Southeast 
Asia. Recognizing that most Americans favored an all-volunteer armed force, the 
Army’s senior leaders began planning for its implementation several years before the 
end of the war. As they did so, some Army officers looked to academia and corporate 
America to examine recent research in the social and behavioral sciences and new 
management techniques for ideas on how to make military service attractive for a 
generation that had largely protested the Vietnam War.       
 Within this context, the Army readily questioned and reassessed its personnel 
administrative practices and its authoritarian, rank-structured behaviors. In the process 
the stewards asked themselves what practices they could alter or eliminate in order to 
create an Army that young people would voluntarily join. Planners initially viewed the 
problem primarily in economic and administrative terms. They foresaw monetary 
incentives (much higher wages and education benefits) and personal privileges (lifestyle 
amenities) as solutions to the problem. However, despite strong evidence to the 
contrary, the senior stewards of the institution saw little need to reform leadership 
practices within the Army officer corps. This was not surprising, given that in American 
military history senior Army officers have never felt compelled to fundamentally question 
the basic nature and soundness of leadership doctrine and philosophies, especially in 
terms of improving personnel and organizational performances. Reform initiatives have 
tended to focus on training and operational doctrine (not leadership doctrine), while 
planned change efforts have targeted force modernization and reorganization.5  
                                                          
5. Many insightful writings illustrate these preferences and emphases. See Robert A. Doughty, “The 
Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76,” Leavenworth Paper Number 1. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, August 1979). See also the 




 As senior leaders in the Army agreed to look at current research and literature in 
the social and behavioral sciences in planning for the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), several 
officers separately stepped forward to suggest a close look at the work coming out of 
the fields of social and organizational psychology as well as sociology. Initially unaware 
of the others’ advocacy of more humanistic leadership behaviors, these officers 
essentially created a grass-roots effort that would carry the Army in those directions. 
Some initially acted or lobbied on their own, while others “piggy-backed” on the 
experiments that the Army at large initially conducted in 1971 and 1972. These early 
advocates of bringing new organizational development techniques into the Army shared 
several similarities: they were all combat veterans, and most held graduate degrees 
from the social sciences.  
 What propelled these officers forward were a series of serendipitous events. 
Indeed, timing and context proved extremely fortuitous. The year 1970 brought forth the 
realization that leadership in Vietnam had failed. Westmoreland, although shielding the 
officer corps from further examination of its leadership health, set the conditions that 
allowed these progressively thinking officers to implement and formalize the largest 
organizational development (OD) program ever attempted in the United States.6 In 
risking their careers, these officers advocated extensive innovative and novel ideas 
about leadership that, to some, were far too liberal and threatening to the Army’s 
traditions. Why did they attempt to implement and institutionalize emerging theories of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Interwar Period (Alexandria, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Net 
Assessment, June 1, 1994). Also, Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
6. Marilyn Woody Barrett, “A Case Study of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program” (PhD 
diss., School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, 1986), http://armyoe.com. As 
stated at that time. However, in my extensive research efforts, I could find no other example of a  




OD and state-of-the-art OD technologies—young and largely unproven constructs at 
that time—into one of the most conservative institutions and insular cultures in the 
United States? How were they able to do so and for an extended time? Why did the 
Army Organizational Effectiveness program (i.e., its adaptation of OD), which 
emphasized participative behaviors between the leaders and the led, succeed on so 
many levels yet face termination in the end? Why was the failure of the 
institutionalization of Army OE significant, and what ramifications did this failed effort 
have on the Army then and now?  In short, this group of OD innovators and reformers 
sought to deliberately transform the leadership culture of the United States Army.7 
Military History and the Discipline of Leadership and Change 
 The loss of a military campaign or a war is a powerful incentive for an army to 
seek reform. However, peacetime or inter-war reforms in the military have 
predominantly taken the forms of tactical or technological innovations and adaptations. 
Rarely have such post-war changes focused on the behaviors of military leaders, that is, 
how leaders gain influence with their soldiers and win their trust in order to improve unit 
effectiveness and morale—the ultimate goal of all commanders. The absence of such 
studies is difficult to understand given that evolving generational differences drive 
cultural change over time. Each new generation of youth to enter the ranks of the Army 
                                                          
7. No historical works have appeared that recount this large program that spanned a decade and a 
half, over 2000 full time direct participants, many millions of dollars, and many more millions of man hours 
from all participants. Besides Barrett’s dissertation, only two other writers have written about the program. 
Former participant Dick Deaner wrote two short essays chronicling the demise of the program. See, C. M. 
Dick Deaner, “The US Army Organizational Effectiveness Program: A Eulogy and Critique,” Public 
Administration Quarterly (Spring 1991); 12–31; and “A Model of Organization Development Ethics,” 
Organizational Development Journal (Winter 1994): 435–446. Army officer Mike West wrote a master’s 
thesis based largely on the interviews of four former participants while attending the US Army Command 
and General Staff College in 1990. See Michael R. West, “The Army Organizational Effectiveness 
Program: A Historical Perspective,” (master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College,  




bring different or new sets of values and perspectives. To create and lead effective 
military organizations with new generations of young soldiers, leader behaviors must 
change and keep pace as well. Yet seldom, if ever, in American military history has the 
Army seriously questioned and reevaluated its concept of leadership. This observation 
also is difficult to explain given that “no other human endeavor presents such consistent 
and ferocious challenges for the human psyche as does war.”8 At the end of the day, 
war is first and foremost about people, their behaviors, and their interactions. 
 It is not by chance that the disciplines of organizational psychology, sociology, 
and social psychology provide a large backdrop to the field of leadership and change. 
Since the Second World War, numerous social scientists have contributed to the 
evolution and maturation of this interdisciplinary field. Interest in leadership grew 
exponentially in the United States, where industrial and economic power soared after 
that war, as people sought to understand the difference between management and 
leadership. While the study of leadership has existed since Aristotle’s time, 
management is largely a twentieth-century construct that evolved from the industrial 
revolution.9 Today, the growing field of leadership and change allows us to better 
understand the complexities of these important differences.      
 Without a doubt, management is far easier to comprehend than leadership. For 
many decades now, numerous theorists and practitioners have written about the 
differences. Peter Guy Northouse, in surveying the history of leadership theories, offers 
that “the overriding function of management is to provide order and consistency to 
                                                          
8. Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 9. 
9. Peter Guy Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 




organizations, whereas the primary function of leadership is to produce change and 
movement. Management is about seeking order and stability; leadership is about 
seeking adaptive and constructive change.” While managers certainly care about their 
workers, if for no other reason than to ensure productivity, their behaviors are distinctly 
different from those of leaders who must establish a climate of trust that fosters willing 
followers. This is especially true in professional organizations that are strongly grounded 
in a foundation of moral and ethical values—such as the United States Army. 
Unfortunately, the Army has always confused the two subjects.10 
 No other theorist in the field of leadership and change has inspired and 
influenced me more than political scientist and presidential historian James MacGregor 
Burns—the “father” of Transformational Leadership. I I believe that he has come closer 
than anyone to understanding the true nature of leadership. I also empathize with him 
because we both deviated from our initial groundings in traditional academic disciplines 
(Burns with political science and I with history). Whereas Burns initially focused his 
academic energies on “the great constitution makers of the world,” I was always drawn 
to the great military commanders of history. Like Burns, my field of study left me feeling 
a bit empty because “I rarely felt satisfied that we had gotten to the heart of the interplay 
                                                          
10. Ibid. As this dissertation will illustrate, the confusion as reflected in military journals between the 
two concepts has strongly persisted in the Army over time (to present day) and contribute to the Army’s 
inability to grasp the complexity of leadership and articulate its power in practice. Army officers in the 
decades since Vietnam overtly demonstrate this confusion in their many writings appearing in the Army’s 
professional journals or as the central topic of their dissertations. See bibliography for numerous 
examples. Two officers, however, who sought to understand this confusion were: John R. Combs, 
“Management Versus Leadership As Reflected In Selected Military Journals 1970–1985,” (master’s 
thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, June 6, 1986), DTIC accession number: 
AD-A172831; and Mitchell M. Zais, “Leadership, Management, Commandership and Organizational 





of environmental and personal forces that shaped the actions of leaders and rulers.”11 
Eventually, Burns looked to psychology for better answers, while I turned to leadership 
and change.12     
 Whereas social scientists have focused increased attention on the nature of 
leadership only in recent decades, military historians have studied the subject since the 
days of Herodotus and Thucydides. While military historians thus may have had a 
tremendous head start, today they both share striking similarities in their inquiries: the 
quest for causality and an understanding of how leaders influence and inspire followers. 
 For Burns, causation will always remain an elusive endeavor because there are 
too many variables in the mix, such as human motivations and ambitions, creativity, 
conflict, and power, as well as “the nature and interaction of agency and of situation.” 
Explanations of single acts taken in isolation, such as an assassination, 
might be relatively easy and perhaps valid, but events such as war and 
social transformations inevitably involve a wide array of complex causes 
that our conventional intellectual resources have been incapable of 
analyzing.13 
 
Burns believes, as do I, that no single discipline “can deal adequately with causation” 
because this subject transcends disciplines. A synthesizing process must take place 
across disciplines to create a new disciplinary approach that uses “the widest array of 
conceptual and empirical tools.”  For Burns, this new discipline is “leadership—the X 
factor in historical causation.”14 
                                                          
11. James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), 9. 
12. Burns served in the military as combat historian in the Pacific theater during World War II; he was 
awarded the Bronze Star and four Battle Stars. Throughout his military adventures, Burns noticed that 
when leadership was mentioned, it was in terms of officers and their traits and qualities, but did not 
include soldiers. 





 The second commonality we share—understanding how leaders influence and 
inspire followers—is more difficult to articulate than causation. When commanders 
command, they essentially leverage a complex, dynamic relationship with their 
subordinates. To casual observers, it largely appears authority-based. Ranks are 
displayed everywhere. However, we now recognize that the factors of authority and 
power have less impact than previously assumed, even when the consequences of 
dissent or disobedience can mean punishment. Officers cannot be effective leaders 
without willing followers, and often the influences of informal groups within a unit or 
organization are the most powerful factors of leadership.15 If this is true, then what does 
it tell us about the dynamics that take place within organizations to effect the most 
important outcomes of influence: morale and trust? 
What Is Leadership? 
 This is a question that has puzzled scholars, especially historians, for over 5000 
years. In the course of human history, people have regularly and ruthlessly settled their 
differences through violence and armed conflict. Across the many centuries, those who 
followed their leaders into battle—and often death—did so for countless reasons. As we 
explore the lives and experiences of those who led their followers, we must take care in 
drawing the appropriate lessons from these military histories.16   
                                                          
15. This is true for both positive and negative outcomes. For an exceptional example of a negative 
outcome see Hollywood director Oliver Stone’s fictional film Platoon. Also, many social science studies 
conducted in the 1970s revealed many positive and negative outcomes (many are included in the 
bibliography). Best examples are Stephen D. Wesbrook, “Morale, Proficiency, and Discipline,” Journal of 
Political and Military Sociology 8 (Spring 1980): 43–54; and Kurt Lang, “American Military Performance in 
Vietnam: Background and Analysis,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 8 (Fall 1980): 269–286.  
16. This “care” is basically a cautious warning and poses a real dilemma for soldiers wishing to learn 
from military history. The danger, explored to some degree in this dissertation, is that officers will attempt 
to adopt and mimic leadership traits of past commanders that are no longer relevant or have little 
meaning in today’s context. More importantly, as this dissertation illustrates, traits and styles do not make 




 Throughout the ages, leader-follower relationships have been relative and 
contextual. Societal norms certainly shaped those relationships and, in turn, determined 
the leadership behaviors that would define how leaders would influence their 
subordinates. In previous centuries, humanistic factors were non-existent or less 
important than blind obedience, and the threat of harsh discipline largely formed the 
basis of motivation. In turn, commanders were judged—by their troops, their 
contemporaries and, ultimately, by historians—for individual, self-centered traits and 
attributes such as personal courage, physical prowess, oratory skills, a strict but fair 
approach to discipline, assertiveness, tactical and technical competency, and the ability 
to show no emotion or hesitancy in front of their men. This is not to suggest that famous 
leaders were insensitive to the needs of their troops or were less effective or successful 
in motivating and instilling confidence and morale in their soldiers. On the contrary, 
throughout much of ancient and modern history the most successful commanders 
usually were those who cared for and fulfilled the basic needs of their troops.  
 The norms of those times enabled such results based on criteria that are not 
necessarily relevant to recent generations of soldiers.17 This is especially true for 
Americans, from baby boomers to millenials, who have enjoyed the freedoms of an 
open democratic society, high levels of education, and ready access to information, 
particularly in the Information Age.18 In American culture, especially since the Second 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
armor officers today greatly admire WWII hero General George Patton. However, in today’s environment, 
his behaviors would likely label him a “toxic” leader.    
17. See for example Gerhard Kuemmel, “A Soldier Is a Soldier Is a Soldier!?” in Giuseppe Caforio, 
Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research (New York: 
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003), 417–433. 
18. There are many recent studies of these generational differences (some are listed in the 
bibliography). See especially Steve Peck, “Postmodern Chapel Services for Generation X and Millennial 
Generation Soldiers” (master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, June 13, 2008), 




World War, from the time that we are young children and begin to join social 
organizations, we are constantly told and encouraged to be leaders. The word’s 
prevalent, everyday use now evokes strong emotions in most of us. Yet, our elders 
rarely attempted to define that term beyond “taking charge,” “leading by example,” or 
being “a good team captain.”19 In the era of the All-Volunteer Force, soldiers from our 
contemporary generations have carried these vague, nebulous notions of leadership 
into the Army only to find similar ambiguity based on outdated and vague leadership 
doctrine and, more importantly, inconsistent application of leadership behaviors by their 
senior NCOs and officers.20     
 As a military historian and retired soldier, I have spent my academic and 
professional life thus far constantly exposed to the term “leadership.” Yet, in some ways, 
I am no closer to truly understanding the core essence of leadership than I was as a 
young infantryman in 1973. In this, I stand in good company. Leadership scholar 
Warren Bennis wrote in 1959 that “probably more has been written and less known 
about leadership than about any other topic in the behavioral sciences.”21  Almost 
twenty years later, in 1978, James MacGregor Burns noted that “leadership is one of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“Leading Generation X: Do the Old Rules Apply?” Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 9, 
no. 4 (2003): 67–75; Craig A. Triscari, “Generational Differences in the Officer Corps: Sociological Factors 
That Impact Officer Retention,” (master’s thesis, US Army Command And General Staff College, May 31, 
2002), DTIC accession number: AD-A415965.  
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the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.”22   In 2014, I believe 
these statements remain valid. 
 A more discerning and important question is: what is effective leadership?  For 
this dissertation we must place this question within the social and cultural context of the 
Army’s post-Vietnam period that witnessed the termination of conscription and the 
introduction of an AVF. At that time, the social and behavioral sciences were 
experiencing tremendous growth and expansion. Leadership research that gained 
momentum in the 1950s and 1960s yielded a plethora of knowledge at a time when the 
Army turned to academia to seek ideas on how to relate to a new generation of youth. 
What Army planners found were several largely independent directions of research that 
had produced a number of leadership theories, some more mature than others and few 
ready for practical application.  
 For the first half of the twentieth century, Trait Theory, also known as the Great Man 
approach, dominated the research and literature on leadership.23  After the Second World 
War, when management flourished as the United States greatly expanded its economic 
might, researchers moved away from the theory that great men possessed leadership traits 
that were innate and began to believe that people could become great leaders by learning 
and demonstrating certain leadership skills and styles. However, these newer theories 
based on leadership skills and styles remained primarily focused on the leader. In fact, 
leader-centric theories remain active today as some researchers still believe that certain 
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people possess leadership traits, skills, and styles that may be both innate and learned.24  
The Army has always favored this direction of leadership research and in the 1990s, when 
Trait Theory enjoyed a large renaissance, it wholeheartedly re-embraced the theory to 
continue to promote leadership doctrine along traditional lines.25  Leader-centric theories 
have offered the Army two attractive benefits: they align with and foster Army traditions, 
largely based on the exploits of great commanders and, with the exception of Trait Theory, 
they encourage "leadership development" training. 
 A second direction of research expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, focusing on 
situation or context as a key to understanding the behaviors of leaders. A large amount of 
scholarship led to conclusions that varied dynamics at play between personal styles and 
situational variables shaped leadership effectiveness. Leadership researchers believed that 
effective leaders were those people who could adapt their leadership styles to the demands 
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of different situations in which they found themselves.26 Ralph M. Stogdill first suggested 
this possibility in 1948. He believed that “leadership must be conceived in terms of the 
interaction of variables which are in constant flux and change.”27 Although the role of 
followers began to receive more attention at this point, the spotlight still shone on the 
leader. During the 1950s, Stogdill expanded his research at the Ohio State University, 
where his group studied “patterns of behaviors of position holders.”28 In general, Stogdill 
and his team concluded “that an organizational position is a focus of interrelationships that 
are oriented toward accomplishment of purposes which are mutually understood by 
organizational members.”29  During those years, other researchers explored similar 
concepts. For example, in 1952 organizational theorist and future Nobel laureate Herbert A. 
Simon suggested that followers accept the leader’s position within the organization and 
their assigned roles in exchange for “inducements,” an arrangement he called “the 
employment contract.”30 In 1956, organizational psychologist Rensis Likert took this idea 
one step further and suggested that followers should participate in some manner or form in 
the organization’s goal setting process. Likert believed that if leaders allowed their followers 
some degree of participation, they would signal followers that they were valued and 
important and, consequently, workers would be more productive.31 However, the most 
widely recognized and influential of these situation/context theorists in the 1950s and 1960s 
arguably was organizational psychologist Fred Fiedler at the University of Illinois.   
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 Fiedler essentially married styles to situation. In many ways, Fiedler’s work was a 
synthesis of the first two broad directions of leadership research that accelerated in the mid-
1960s and expanded for several decades, during which many other contributors added to 
the field generally known as Leader-Match Theory. Fiedler’s Contingency Theory 
suggested that a leader’s effectiveness relied on how well the leader’s leadership style fit 
the context of the situation. The name came from the idea that “effective leadership is 
contingent on matching a leader’s style to the right setting.”  Some conservative Army 
planners in 1970 and 1971 were especially drawn to Fiedler’s work because it was current, 
offered a rationale for existing leadership doctrine, and appeared more practical and less 
theoretical than other leadership theories, such as organizational development. Fiedler also 
appealed to these Army planners because he had conducted his research in military 
organizations.32  Simultaneously, in 1967, as Fiedler generated much discussion about 
Contingency Theory, organizational change scholars Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard 
developed Situational Leadership Theory, which placed them among the first to seriously 
consider the role of followers. In essence, they believed that leaders must match their style 
"to the competence and commitment of the subordinates. Effective leaders are those who 
can recognize what employees need and then adapt their own style to meet those needs."33  
The Hersey-Blanchard work, which also received much attention at that time, complimented 
Fred Fiedler's Contingency Theory well.34  
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 Despite the promise and attractiveness of the different Leader-Match theories in 
bringing forth new knowledge and understanding of leadership, it is important to note that 
these theories largely remained leader focused. Although the situation/context researchers 
increasingly advocated the inclusion of follower concerns, the concept of “participative 
leadership,” that is, the idea that followers should participate in the decision-making process 
within organizations, was just beginning to emerge.35 By the late 1960s, it is fair to 
categorize almost all of the aforementioned theories as transactional in nature; that is, 
followers explicitly or implicitly transact a need or a want with their leaders. In short, 
followers receive some form of inducement or material reward for conforming to or abiding 
by the directives of their leaders.36     
 Finally, a third vein of leadership research actually began in the late 1930s and 
1940s but was slow to mature and received less attention than the other two directions 
during the 1950s and 1960s.37 In essence, this body of work posited that leadership was an 
inter-active behavioral process between the leader and the follower. The first of these 
theorists was Kurt Lewin, the "founder" of social psychology who today is considered the 
"father" of OD. Lewin first developed his ideas in the late 1930s when he became curious 
about group dynamics, a term he coined. Like the later situational leadership theorists, 
Lewin was interested in the environmental context surrounding groups. However, unlike the 
situational theorists, his focus was on the group as a defined entity rather than as a 
collection of individuals, which was the accepted view at that time. Lewin believed in the 
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power of synergy and the idea that the sum is greater than the parts. In the 1940s, Lewin 
became interested in change processes, trying to understand how work environments 
created leadership climates.38 Here, Lewin developed several useful methods that proved 
effective in assessing changes in organizations, most notably Action Research and T-
Groups. In 1946, Lewin advocated real-time research that would take place within an 
organizational change event or situation that would yield practical and employable results. 
In using the term action-research, he asserted that it was “a comparative research on 
the conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to 
social action. Research that produces nothing but books will not suffice.”39 Lewin 
conceived of T-Groups (training groups) as a learning technology that could affect 
change. T-Groups, a form of sensitivity training that is still used extensively today, 
include a trained facilitator (sometimes acting as a change agent) interacting within the 
group to create an experiential learning environment. “Learning comes from analysis of 
participants’ own experience, including feelings, reactions, perception and behavior.”40 
Twenty-five years later in the 1970s, Burns would build upon Lewin's concepts and adapt 
them directly to leadership theory. More importantly, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
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Army Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs) would heavily utilize these 
methods as they helped implement OD throughout the Army.41   
 Lewin was especially interested in understanding the difficulties that 
organizations experienced in creating and executing planned changes. He envisioned a 
framework he called Force Field Analysis to conceptualize and focus on the human 
aspect of change processes. Lewin saw sustained change as a shift in equilibriums 
from the state of the present situation to the level of the desired state. In essence, he 
described three stages of planned change that enable this equilibrium shift: the 
unfreezing stage, the change or transition, and the refreezing stage.42 Importantly, in 
foreshadowing the work of leadership theorists decades later, Lewin recognized 
significant egocentric or personality barriers to change, such as prejudices, 
complacency, and self-righteousness. Lewin firmly believed that for each stage to be 
established and accepted, a “catharsis” must occur from a deliberate “emotional stir-up” 
within the entire group.43 
 Similarly, Harvard professor and management theorist Chris Argyris spoke about the 
problem of the "undiscussable" as a barrier to change.44 He believed that senior leaders 
pursue "policies and practices that are contrary to their managerial stewardship" primarily 
                                                          
41. It is important that the reader understand the evolution of leadership research as it existed in the 
early 1970s. In doing so, it becomes clear that these Army officers who advocated OD were doing so on 
the frontiers of this evolution.  
42. Lewin, like many of his contemporaries of his age (and after), was significantly influenced by the 
seminal publication of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn’s conception of 
paradigm shifts and their impact on revolutions and transformations have now impacted many different 
academic disciplines. In some ways, Lewin’s force field analysis explains the process of a paradigm shift. 
In retrospect, as will be analyzed later, the OD initiative was a tool in affecting a paradigm shift in the 
institution’s leadership culture. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
43. Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts and Field Theory in Social Science (Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association, 1997): 330. 
44. Chris Argyris, “Making the Undiscussable and Its Undiscussability Discussable,” Public 




because they bypass root causes. "They equate being realistic with being simplistic" and, 
in the process, make all of the uncomfortable but necessary conversations and actions 
within the group "undiscussable."45 In many ways, T-Groups and Action Research permit 
the “undiscussables” to be discussed and facilitate and manage “emotional stir-ups” 
within the organization, as Lewin had asserted long ago. 
 Beginning his work in 1957, Argyris—like Lewin—was drawn to how organizations 
affect and sustain changes. Underlying a career that would span five decades was his 
belief that leaders who positively interact with their followers as responsible adults will 
achieve higher levels of organizational performance. He was convinced that organizations 
that experienced personnel problems did so because the leaders employed outdated 
practices. For Argyris, the key was organizational learning (not training). Argyris introduced 
the concept of "single and double loop learning" to explain why some organizations could 
achieve sustainable change while others failed. In short, he envisioned two levels of 
change. First-order change takes a mechanistic approach that “yields temporary advances 
counter-acted by resistance, sabotage, and loyalty to the status quo [that are] brought to 
the forefront by the imposed change."46 Second-order changes transform underlying 
assumptions. Here, leaders are not reluctant to question institutionalized rules, regulations, 
and conventional ways (behaviors that military leaders and organizations are very reluctant 
to demonstrate). In the late 1960s, Argyris’s and Lewin's work directly contributed to the rise 
                                                          
45. Chris Argyris, Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning (Engelwood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 6. 
46. Chris Argyris and Donald Schoen, Organizational Learning (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978) 
as cited in Jean M. Bartunek and Michael K. Moch, "First-Order, Second-Order, and Third-Order Change 
and Organizational Development Interventions: A Cognitive Approach,” in The Journal of Applied 




of organizational development as both a theory and practice.47 In many ways, they set a 
high standard for subsequent researchers and theorists who also believed that leadership 
was essentially a behavioral process between the leader and the led. 
 At the heart of Argyris’s and Lewin's writings was an emphasis on the follower as a 
participative, integral member of the group, and that the leader hold a moral imperative 
toward the follower. Others believed so as well. In 1970, Robert Greenleaf coined the 
phrase "servant leadership." He believed that "the servant-leader is servant first. . . .  It 
begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious 
choice brings one to aspire to lead. That person is sharply different from one who is leader 
first, perhaps because of the need to assuage an unusual power drive." At the heart of his 
work was the concept of moral and ethical leadership. Greenleaf asked, "Do those served 
grow as persons? Do they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more 
autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants?"48 
 During the decade of the 1960s, the fields of sociology and psychology experienced 
unprecedented growth. As the 1970s began, scholars were acutely aware that leadership 
was much more complex than previously imagined. Lewin, Argyris, Greenleaf, and others, 
by believing that leadership was a dynamic behavioral process between leaders and 
followers, essentially advocated what Burns would soon call Transformational Leadership. 
Although that term was not commonly utilized until after Burns’s 1978 publication of 
Leadership, Lewin and those who came after him promoted the ideas behind the concept. 
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They did so by contrasting their observations and theories with those who advocated 
leader-centric and Leader-Match theories. 
 One of the first to examine the different directions of leadership research in a 
broader, more comprehensive framework was psychologist and former Antioch president 
Douglas McGregor. In 1960, in an expansion of contingent reward theories, McGregor 
posited that managers perceive people in two distinct ways. Some, he asserted, believe 
that people are not ambitious and find work distasteful. Therefore, leaders must closely 
control and coerce followers in order to achieve the organization's goals. McGregor labeled 
this view as Theory X. In contrast, he suggested that a Theory Y existed whereby some 
leaders recognize that their workers are driven by esteem and self-actualization. Theory Y 
proponents link the higher-level needs of individuals with the organization's goals and 
objectives. Tapping into people’s motivations and creativity to achieve collective goals 
harness higher-order needs such as self-fulfillment. By doing so, people will seek 
responsibility.49  Like many of the theorists of his day (and since), McGregor applied his 
theory directly to psychologist Abraham Maslow's model of human motivation that 
envisioned a hierarchy of human needs. Maslow's model was pyramidal, with physiological 
and safety needs at the bottom and esteem and self-actualization forming the top. In 
retrospect, we can generally see that the early trait, skills, styles, and situation/context 
theorists (transactionalists) targeted the lower levels of Maslow's model, while the behavior 
process theorists (transformationalists) aimed for the higher levels of his pyramid.50 
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 In 1978, three years after the start of the Army OE program, a clear and more useful 
framework would come with Burns's Leadership. In defining his conception of the inter-
relationships between leaders and followers, Burns described "transformational" leadership 
as the "process whereby a person engages with others and creates a connection that 
raises the level of motivation and morality in both. This type of leader is attentive to the 
needs and motives of followers [in order to help them] reach their fullest potential."51 For 
Burns, transformational leadership had a large moral dimension. This moral dimension led 
him to contrast transformational leadership with transactional leadership, which was 
conceived as an extension of the earlier leader-centric and leader-match theories that 
accommodated the basic needs of workers. Transactional leaders motivated followers by 
rewarding or punishing worker performance or behaviors. 52 Today, Burns's transactional-
transformational conceptualization of leadership still provides a useful framework in which to 
examine the various complexities of leadership theories and practices.53 
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 Events taking place in the United States and in Vietnam between 1968 and 1972 
opened up a large window of opportunity for many in the Army to question and reassess the 
Army's overall concept of leadership. As the AVF became a reality and its start date drew 
nearer, several distinct and emotional points of view arose within the Army officer corps in 
the course of this reassessment. Indeed, in the process of re-evaluating leadership and 
management practices and experimenting with new ideas, the Army officer corps splintered 
into several camps as Army planners debated the nature of change and reform that was 
required to meet the demands of an all-volunteer army. Most understood what was at 
stake, namely a fundamental change in the culture of the institution. 
 The first camp consisted of careerists scattered throughout the Army, the senior 
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers who had soldiered for many years and 
generally accepted time-honored conventions and practices. These soldiers were the 
“Traditionalists.” Many if not most had served in the Second World War. They were 
extremely protective of the Army's traditions, customs, and courtesies. For them, 
Vietnam was an aberration, and the permissive culture of American youth posed a 
direct threat to both their authority and their institution. The Traditionalists initially 
opposed the end of conscription until they were ordered to cease their opposition. In 
preparing for the AVF, the Traditionalists passively resisted many of the initial 
experiments and changes. In their view, leadership was not broken. What was needed 
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for the post-Vietnam Army was some backbone and a return to the "brown-boot" Army of 
the 1950s and early 1960s.54 For them, the soldier-leader relationship was grounded in 
strong discipline and training and therefore authority-based. 
 The “Healers” comprised the second camp. They harbored strong empathy for 
the views of the Traditionalists and were likewise protective of Army traditions. 
However, they were also pragmatic. Whereas the Traditionalists nostalgically looked to 
the Army of the past as a model for the future AVF, the Healers looked forward to a 
postwar institution that would require a time of healing and recovery. In recognizing the 
tremendous changes that were taking place in American society, they reluctantly 
accepted the end of the draft and understood that to create an all-volunteer army, they 
had to make the Army more appealing to young people. The Healers wanted to put 
Vietnam behind and extensively reform the Army. They believed the key to this reform 
was force modernization and reorganization—especially given the size and state of 
readiness of Soviet forces in Europe. Essentially, the Healers wanted to rearm, reequip, 
re-man, and retrain the Army and "get back" to NATO. Their primary focus for the 1970s 
was on updating tactical and operational doctrine, and developing a training system that 
would align doctrine with advanced technological capabilities. In their view, leadership 
was not broken but did need some fine-tuning. In forming their concept of Army 
leadership, the Healers embraced leader-centric and situational styles that could be 
adjusted to meet the basic needs of soldiers. For them, the soldier-leader relationship 
was contractual and therefore transactional-based.  
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 Finally, there were the “Progressives.” They had little objection to force 
modernization and certainly believed that the Army needed time to recover from the 
war. However, these were Army officers who, either by experiences, formal education, 
or personal humanistic philosophies, believed that recent advances in the behavioral 
sciences held the key to both modernizing the Army and preparing for the AVF. Most of 
the Progressives held advanced degrees in the social and behavioral sciences or the 
humanities, and all were combat veterans, though few had served in the Second World 
War. Based on their wartime experiences, they believed that leadership was broken, or 
at least they expressed deep concern for the poor state of morale and lack of unit 
cohesion that they had witnessed or experienced in various Army units. Armed with the 
latest theoretical work coming out of the behavioral sciences, the Progressives strongly 
embraced the theories that leadership was a behavioral process (i.e., a dynamic, 
interactive relationship between the leader and the led). For most of the Progressives, 
leadership was more about the followers than the leaders, and therefore they 
advocated participative practices and empowerment for soldiers. For them, the soldier-
leader relationship was moral and therefore transformational-based. 
What Are Organizational Development and Organizational Effectiveness? 
 Organizational Development, which today is considered a discipline, arose in the 
late 1950s and then flourished a decade later as the earlier work of Kurt Lewin 
expanded.55  Theorists such as Chris Argyris, Edgar Schein,56 Warren Bennis, and 
                                                          
55. “OD absorbed the ‘modernist’ assumptions of scientific reason and progress from organizational 
theory and as it did so it became a well-defined discipline because it synthesized early psychodynamics 
with organismic sociology resulting in its major focus on group and organization-wide change efforts.” Jim 
Grieves, “Images of Change: The New Organizational Development,” Journal of Management 
Development 19, no. 5 (2000): 348.  
56. Edgar H. Schein studied at the University of Chicago, Stanford University (M.S. in psychology), 




others built upon Lewin’s concepts and methods of force field analysis, action research, 
and the use of T-Groups. In general, their collective goal was to understand more fully 
how to plan and manage change in organizations in order to improve an organization’s 
health and effectiveness. At its core, OD was anchored in the belief that leadership was 
an interactive behavioral process, and as such, it closely aligned with transformational 
leadership concepts.  
 During the 1960s, behavioral scientists who found great value and merit in the 
work of Kurt Lewin, developed new theories about the relationships between leaders 
and followers. These theorists, greatly affected by the social upheaval in American 
society during those years, observed that the new generation of young adults greatly 
questioned the values and materialism of the older generations. With minorities gaining 
unprecedented levels of independence and with more widespread access to new ideas 
and knowledge, these youth turned away from their collective perception of America as 
a bureaucratic authoritarian state, in which the individual was seen a production 
resource. Instead they discarded the older “values” in favor of a new set that 
underscored humankind’s individuality and centrality. Robert Tannenbaum and Sheldon 
A. Davis, two early OD pioneers, described the transition of values as such: 
 away from a view of man as essentially bad toward a view of him as basically 
good,  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
organizational development, process consultation, and career dynamics. Earlier in his career, he had 
direct experience with the Army having served as chief of the social psychology section of the Walter 
Reed Army Institute of Research from1952 to 1956. He also worked as a professor of organizational 
psychology and management at MIT's Sloan School of Management. He authored fourteen books, and 
was a co-editor with the late Richard Beckhard of the Addison-Wesley Series on Organizational 
Development which has published over thirty titles since its inception in 1969. 




 away from avoidance or negative evaluation of individuals toward confirming 
them as humans beings, 
 away from a view of individuals as fixed toward seeing them as being in 
process, 
 away from resisting and fearing individual differences toward accepting and 
utilizing them, 
 away from utilizing an individual primarily with reference to his job description 
toward viewing him as a whole person, 
 away from walling off the expression of feelings toward making possible both 
appropriate expression and effective use,  
 away from maskmanship and game playing toward authentic behavior, 
 away from use of status for maintaining power and personal prestige toward 
use of status for organizationally relevant purposes, 
 away from distrusting people toward trusting them,  
 away from avoiding facing others with relevant data toward making 
appropriate confrontation, 
 away from avoidance of risk-taking toward willingness to take risks, 
 away from a view of process work as being unproductive effort toward seeing 
it as essential to effective task accomplishment, 
 away from a primary emphasis on competition toward a much greater 
emphasis on collaboration.57 
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Having witnessed firsthand so much social change, these behavioral scientists believed 
that for organizations to be effective, organizations had to adopt these strongly 
humanistic values.  
 From these beliefs arose a new complex discipline called organizational 
development. By 1970 and 1971, OD was a body of concepts, tools, and techniques 
borrowed from anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics. In essence, OD 
was a system of three related elements: values, process, and techniques. Theorists 
Newton Margulies and Anthony P. Raia described the values of OD as 
 providing opportunities for people to function as human beings rather than as 
resources in the productive process 
 providing opportunities for each organizational member as well as for the 
organization itself, to develop to his full potential 
 seeking to increase the effectiveness of the organization in terms of all of its 
goals 
 attempting to create an environment in which it is possible to find exciting and 
challenging work 
 providing opportunities for people and organizations to influence the way in 
which they relate to work, the organization, and the environment 
 treating each human being as a person with a complex set of needs, all of 
which are important to his work and in his life   
Theorists such as Wendell French fully agreed and saw such values “as the underlying 




that OD was essentially the implementation of Douglas MacGregor's Theory Y and that 
internal resources (i.e. change agents) were necessary for effective change.58 
 At the heart of OD was the concept of continuous learning, both individually and 
collectively. However, the OD proponents of the 1970s rejected traditional university-
style learning (i.e., rote training) in favor of experiential learning and the laboratory 
(sensitivity) method. They followed Kurt Lewin in what is known as the Gestalt School of 
learning theory. The Gestalt theorists believed that learning was complex, and that it 
was cognitive and involved the whole personality. They valued the power of insight 
often occurring instantaneously in the experiential learning experience.59   
     Most of the OD theorists of the 1970s believed that the laboratory method was an 
essential component of organizational development. The laboratory method was an 
experience-based process that involved action research. Action research is basically 
applied research that combines both the research process and the learning process.  
The intent is to create “research data which can be incorporated into learning and which 
will result in social change.”60  Believing in the power of the laboratory method, most of 
the early OD proponents favored the use of Kurt Lewin's T-groups or sensitivity training. 
Chris Argyris believed that T-Groups could expose the existing values of executives that 
“unless modified would impair interpersonal relations and consequently ineffective 
organizations.”61 
                                                          
58. Newton Margulies and Anthony P. Raia, eds., Organizational Development: Values, Process, and 
Technology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 6. 
59. Leslie E.  This and Gordon L. Lippitt, “Learning Theories and Training,” in Margulies and Raia, 
Organizational Development, 87. 
60. Newton Margulies and Anthony P. Raia, “Action Research and the Consultative Process,” in 
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The T-Group experience was designed to provide maximum possible 
opportunity for the individuals to expose their behavior, give and receive 
feedback, experiment with new behavior, and develop everlasting 
awareness and acceptance of self and others. . . . [I]t is [in] the T-Group 
that one learns how to diagnose his own behavior, to develop effective 
leadership behavior and norms for decision-making that truly protect the 
[dissenter].62 
 
Robert J. House, best known for his Path-Goal leadership theory, described the T-
Group experience as “a very soul-searching process; it requires the individual to 
become introspective, to look at his own values and his own emotions, to ask himself 
whether and why he likes them, and whether he wishes to live the way he has.”63 
 In sum, the OD theorists of the 1970s believed that all organizations consist of 
three major elements or subsystems: the technical, the managerial, and the human or 
personal-cultural system. The technical or task system dealt with workflow and required 
task rules. The managerial or administrative system focused on organizational structure, 
policies and procedures, and rules, and other mechanisms of bureaucracies. The 
human system was “primarily concerned with organizational culture, values, and norms 
and the satisfaction of personal needs. Also included in the human system are the 
informal organization, the motivational level of members, and their individual 
attitudes.”64 It is important to note that these early days of OD focused extensively on 
the latter. Over time, however, the discipline would gravitate toward an emphasis on the 
technical and especially on the managerial components. The story that follows is closely 
aligned with that evolution. 
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 In 1969, as the Army began to prepare for the AVF, Richard Beckhard defined 
OD as “an effort, planned, organization-wide, and managed from the top, to increase 
organizational effectiveness and health through planned interventions in the 
organization's processes, using behavioral-science knowledge.”65 Similarly, in 1972 
Wendell French and Cecil Bell stated that 
organizational development is a long-term effort led and supported by top 
management, to improve an organization's visioning, empowerment, 
learning, and problem-solving processes, through an ongoing, 
collaborative management of organizational culture with special emphasis 
on the consultant-facilitator role and the theory and technology of applied 
behavioral science, including participant action research.66 
 
At that time, the work of Beckhard, French, Bell and their colleagues explored human 
relations in order to better understand human motivation. Collectively, they focused “on 
consent, authority and the moral responsibility of the manager to his subordinates.”67 
 As discussed in the following chapters, the Army experimented with OD in the 
early 1970s alongside other modernization and reform experiments that were part of an 
eighteen-month program entitled the Volunteer Army (VOLAR) Program.68 Initial results 
were encouraging and prompted the early proponents to successfully push for the Army 
to train and employ internal OD “consultants,” first on an experimental level and then as 
a formal process. Indeed, the promise of trained OD facilitators taken from the ranks led 
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to the startup of a formal training center two years before the Army institutionalized OD 
throughout the Army.  
 In 1975, the Army officially embraced organizational development and re-
branded it with the term “Organizational Effectiveness” (OE). The initial implementers 
had originally used the term “human resources management.” However, given the dire 
problems of racial tension as well as drug and alcohol abuse so chronic at that time, 
many feared that people would inadvertently or incorrectly associate OD with efforts to 
solve those problems.69 
 The Army did not formalize the definition and regulations of OE until November 
1977, a year after the institutionalization of OE began. OE was then defined as  
a four-step process designed to improve the functioning of an 
organization, or unit, by applying selective behavioral science and 
management concepts and techniques to the processes and structures of 
that organizational system. . . . [It] is the systematic military application of 
selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to 
improve how the total organization functions to accomplish assigned 
missions and increase combat readiness. It is applicable to organizational 
processes (including training in interpersonal skills) and when applied by a 
commander within an organization, is tailored to the unique needs of the 
organization and normally implemented with the assistance of an 
Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO). 70 
 
The story of Army OE is a story about innovation, vision, and the Progressives’ abilities 
to take leading OD theories and methods and place them into practice. In the process, 
they attempted to teach the Army the difference between leadership and management. 
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Clarifying the Terminology 
 In looking back on the work of Kurt Lewin and his successors, we can more fully 
appreciate that Lewin’s focus on behaviors in social environments was a first step into a 
complex world that would need new or refined terminologies to describe novel theories 
and concepts. While it is not uncommon for words to carry different meanings across 
academic disciplines, much of the terminology used in the interdisciplinary field of 
leadership and change poses a particular problem in recounting the Army’s embrace of 
OD. As military historians select descriptive terminology for their narratives, what is 
often unclear in historical accounts of armies that reformed themselves following a war 
are clear definitions of the terms “change,” “transformation,” and “adaptability” or 
“adaptive thinking.”  This is especially true in contemporary American military history, 
where these words are commonly used interchangeably with “innovation” and 
“modernization.” Because the US Army has focused so heavily on technology 
throughout much of its history, Army leaders also have tended to equate change with 
technological innovation and modernization. Likewise, they confuse transformation with 
reorganization or organizational realignment around those technology innovations.71  
Further, this confusion has intensified as the common, general use of these terms has 
now extended beyond technology and more broadly into the realm of tactics, 
operations, and doctrine.72   
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 Fortunately, research and discourse within the social and behavioral sciences 
have brought much clarity to these concepts and terms since Lewin’s time. Peter Vaill, 
an organizational change theorist and a leading scholar on organizational behavior, has 
described turbulent organizational and social conditions as constant change or 
“permanent whitewater.”73 Change is not an event but rather an ever-present condition. 
Change is dynamic and is happening now, all around us.   
 If change is constant, real-time turbulence within our everyday living 
environments, then what constitutes a transformation? In short, transformations are 
impactful changes that result in a paradigm shift. Within their discipline, it may be valid 
for historians to argue that “transformations” are not infrequent and are made possible 
through revolutionary technological innovations or through significant revisions of 
tactical or operational doctrine. The invention and adoption of radar, the weaponization 
of nuclear science, the mechanization of the cavalry, and AirLand Battle Doctrine are 
several examples that come easily to mind. However, the casual, general use of the 
term “transformation” dilutes or undermines the powerful meaning that it conveys in the 
field of leadership and change.74               
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Water, The Jossey-Bass Business & Management Series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996). 
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a Joint Path?” (research paper, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003), DTIC accession 
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paper, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003), DTIC accession number: AD_A416196; 
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(master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, June 17, 2005), DTIC accession 




 The key discriminating term here is “paradigm.” A transformation does not 
automatically occur simply because of an accumulation of many changes or successful 
major innovations. While many successive improvements and innovations may lead to 
effective modernization and organizational realignments, they do not necessarily result 
in a true paradigm shift (i.e., a transformation). However, innovations can help bring 
about transformations when they include mechanisms that promote and involve 
stakeholders in institutional learning, thinking, and reflection (what I will refer to here as 
the “human dimension” of organizational transformations). Unfortunately, the US Army 
has long been missing “a robust and coherent framework [that] allows officers and 
enlisted men to codify their experiences and to think clearly and systematically about 
concepts, technologies, and organizations.”75 
 Most transformations are more easily identified with hindsight. As a military 
historian enthralled with leadership and change, I have a difficult time accepting that 
military transformations transpire as frequently as some assert, largely because most 
accounts are missing the human dimension in their analyses.76 While technological and 
operational changes may bring about new ways of training and fighting, true 
transformations result in an evolution of institutional cultures.77 As we will see, for the 
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US Army in the post-Vietnam decade it was much easier to “transform” the Army in 
“how to train and fight” than in “how to lead.” The former required little or no change in 
organizational culture, while the latter would have required deep soul searching about 
leadership and the questioning of basic assumptions, something the officer corps was 
unwilling or incapable of doing on its own.78 
 It is also important to recognize that the human dimension is as submerged in 
“whitewater” as is everything else. This is why generations possess distinct collective 
personalities that are themselves constantly changing as they age. The weltanschauung 
of baby boomers differs significantly from that of succeeding “X,” “Y,” and millennial 
generations. My baby boomer generation questioned authority and those of us who 
voluntarily enlisted in the Army on the heels of Vietnam, experienced enormous friction 
with our platoon sergeants and officers. In contrast, the millennial generation not only 
questions authority but will seek out the knowledge they want very quickly and on their 
own. This generation knows no world without instant Internet access. Like the Army, 
higher education is having a difficult time in relating to millenials because today’s 
students largely reject the teachers and professors who preach—the “sages on the 
stages”—and prefer someone who will not lecture or impart knowledge but rather 
facilitate their learning.79 Effective leaders today embrace this dynamic and do not feel 
threatened by it. Traditionalists, however, view such behaviors as a threat to their 
authority, control, power, and titled positions or ranks.  
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 Finally, no other term is more misunderstood or misused than the word 
“adaptive.”  Its widespread use throughout the Army over the last fifteen years has 
placed it in the military vernacular as a synonym for “adjusting to rapid change in the 
operational or tactical environment.”80 Ronald Heifetz has offered the definitive concept 
of the word in describing how leaders approach complex problems or challenges. He 
described adaptive challenges as those challenges that  
can only be addressed through changes in people’s priorities, beliefs, 
habits, and loyalties. Making progress requires going beyond any 
authoritative expertise to mobilize discovery, shedding certain entrenched 
ways, tolerating losses, and generating the new capacity to thrive anew.”81      
 
Heifetz’s clear distinction between those types of changes that are technical in nature 
and adaptive challenges constitutes an important foundation and interpretive framework 
for the historical narrative that follows. He differentiates the two by contrasting their 
functions. For example, authorities “direct” by providing definition and solutions for 
technical problems rather than producing questions about problem definitions and 
solutions for adaptive challenges. Similarly, authorities protect their organizations in 
addressing technical challenges rather than disclosing the external threat for adaptive 
challenges. In “controlling conflict,” authorities restore order rather than exposing the 
conflict or allowing it to emerge.82 
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 For example, as we will see, there was no question that both President Richard 
Nixon and General William Westmoreland faced extensive challenges as they both 
dealt with large social change after 1968. However, I believe that Westmoreland had the 
more difficult road ahead because he faced a complex, adaptive challenge. Nixon had 
already achieved consensus among all interested parties, and his efforts were directed 
at draft reform, which was largely a technical rather than an adaptive problem. In the 
short term, this technical problem was solved, albeit with some dissatisfaction, by the 
draft lottery (and shortly thereafter with the AVF). Westmoreland, on the other hand, had 
an Army to heal, morally, physically and psychologically. As one historian has aptly 
noted, the Army had to “strengthen and rebuild itself, and at the same time to create an 
army that young people might want to join.”83      
 Unfortunately, the US Army has a long history of viewing all problems as 
technical challenges. Consequently, the officer corps has become basically immune to 
effective change. This “immunity” is not intentional, nor is it a result of deliberate 
resistance to change. On the contrary, senior Army officers are energetic, intelligent 
people with great insight. Unfortunately, the real problem is “the inability to close the 
gap between what we genuinely, even passionately, want and what we are actually able 
to do.” This gap, assert Robert Kegan and Lisa Laskow Lahey, is caused by a “hidden 
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dynamic” that prevents senior leaders from changing. This hidden dynamic is essentially 
an unconscious “devotion to preserving our existing way of making meaning.”84   
 Kegan and Lahey argue that this hidden dynamic is the “complexity” of our 
minds, how we send and receive information. In short, in a greater complex world that is 
more rapidly changing and evolving, it is not sufficient to improve or change 
organizations by “dealing” or “coping” with greater complex problems. Kegan and Lahey 
believe that the “human capability will be the critical variable in the new century.” 
Therefore, leaders must be truly open to receiving information from all directions 
because “what might have made sense today may not make as much sense 
tomorrow.”85 Kegan and Lahey warn against confusing mental complexity with IQ and 
intellect. In short, mental complexity is largely a product of thinking/reflection and 
feelings.86 Both dimensions must exist. 
 Kegan and Lahey argue that adults demonstrate three levels of mental 
complexity, a powerful force that shapes how individuals view organizational cultures or 
change initiatives. “These three multi-tiered adult meaning systems—the socialized 
mind, self-authoring mind, and self-transforming mind—make sense of the world, and 
operate within it, in profoundly different ways.”87 How people send and receive 
information through an organization significantly determines its effectiveness.88   
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 The socialized mind, at the lowest level, is largely self-oriented. Here people are 
shaped “by the definitions and expectations of [their] personal environments.” They 
align and are loyal to that which they self-identify in their relationships with people, 
schools of thought, etc. They tend to have a strong filter through which they send and 
receive information based on their perceptions of what others want to hear.  
 Those with self-authoring minds also have a filter but are “able to step back 
enough from the social environment to generate an internal “seat of judgment” or 
personal authority that evaluates and makes choices about external expectations.” They 
align their sense of self with personalized belief systems or ideologies, and are self-
directed, “take stands, set limits, and create and regulate its boundaries on behalf of its 
own voice.” Using an automobile analogy, Kegan and Lahey compare the two thusly: 
“. . . [M]ental complexity strongly influences whether my information sending is oriented 
toward getting behind the wheel in order to drive (the self-authoring mind) or getting 
myself included in the car so I can be driven (the socialized-mind).”89  
 Lastly, at the highest level is the self-transforming mind where higher mental 
complexity is achieved through deep reflection and feeling. Here 
we can step back from and reflect on the limits of our own ideology or personal 
authority; see that any one system or self-organization is in some way partial or 
incomplete; be friendlier toward contradiction and opposites; seek to hold on to 
multiple systems rather than projecting all but one onto the other. Our self 
coheres through its ability not to confuse internal consistency with wholeness or 
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completeness, and through its alignment with the dialectic rather than either 
pole.90   
      
 Mental complexity directly affects organizational effectiveness and performance. 
Because the officer-soldier relationship is basically a behavioral process based on 
information flow, these mental properties “translate into real actions with real 
consequences for organizational behavior and work competency.”91 Kegan and Lahey 
found great value in Heifetz’s distinction between technical and adaptive challenges. In 
their overall conclusions they demonstrated clearly that adaptive challenges require 
leaders who first understand Heifetz’s distinctions between technical and adaptive 
problems and, second, possess self-transforming minds.92 For example, the authors 
suggested that leaders often profess to being more receptive to new ideas (as behavior 
goals). However, in their daily activities, they often give “curt responses to new ideas” or 
speak in an “overruling tone.” In doing so, they reveal “hidden competing commitments” 
as the authority figure (and in the case of the Army, as the commander) “to have things 
done my way!”93 
 There is little doubt that Army officers seek command with good intentions in 
mind. Unfortunately, many cultural, institutional, bureaucratic, and personal obstacles 
combine to create immunity to change. Unfortunately, the senior leaders the Army tends 
to produce find themselves trapped in the third column (hidden commitments) and 
prevented from implementing real change that will achieve the goals in the first column. 
That is why all eleven versions of the Army’s leadership doctrine since 1946 (FM 22-
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100) have been “what the ideal driver should look like” manuals. Even the 2006 revision 
(now re-named FM 6-22), with its detailed emphasis on leader development, will not be 
enough to help create officers with self-transforming minds. Kegan and Lahey note that 
“. . . what passes for ‘leadership development’ will most likely amount to [simply] 
‘leadership training’.”94   
 Can innovative, insightful leaders orchestrate a transformation? Yes, but with 
extreme difficulty. Both academics and practitioners have striven (and are still striving) 
to understand how this may actually occur. We do know, however, that institutional 
transformations—by my definition a paradigm shift driven by or directed at the human 
dimension—are powerful, enduring, and usually irreversible. They result in cultural 
change. In the case of the Army, racial integration, the AVF, gender integration, and the 
recent acceptance of gays and lesbians are all powerful examples of institutional 
changes—authentic cultural transformations. The story that follows is a perfect example 
of how difficult it is for visionary innovators and change agents to transform a strong, 
insular culture.95 
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and the Jossey-Bass Social and Behavioral Science Series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 




Changing the Army’s Culture 
 An officer entering the US Army today has a less than one percent chance of 
becoming a general officer a quarter of a century later. Along that grueling professional 
development path lie a number of hurdles that this young man or woman must leap in 
order to become a senior steward of one of the world's largest, most lethal institutions in 
the world. Cultural pressures play a significant role in creating the compliance and 
conformity that are required to make this journey. Conformity starts early and takes 
many shapes and forms. In addition to careerism, fraternal loyalties are strongly 
enforced, both overtly and covertly. Compounded by historically rich unit heritages, 
“mission first” pressures have become institutionalized and are taken for granted by all 
officers. To cite a popular colloquium: failure is not an option. For officers looking to win 
the approval of the senior commander, means versus ends can become a very real 
dilemma.  
 At the top of this conservative bureaucracy sits one of the most powerful people 
in the world—the Chief of Staff of the US Army (CSA). Among the many prerogatives of 
the CSA is his heavy hand in influencing the choice of officers entering the lower 
general officer ranks and the management of general officer assignments. All chiefs 
have had patrons who brought them along as well.96 As officers become generals, all 
believe, and have been told repeatedly, that they have gotten leadership “right.” 
Consequently, each CSA has spoken extensively on the criticality of leadership, ethics, 
and values. In fact, in their published collective papers, Army leadership and character 
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(morals, values and ethics) were their most frequent topics of choice.97 Furthermore, in 
desiring to leave their mark on the subject of leadership, several chiefs have changed 
the lists of Army values and even the definition of the term leadership itself.98 Because 
these stewards seek to “own” the topic of leadership, they must also be held 
accountable for its effective assimilation (or lack thereof) throughout the institution.99  
 In March 2007, Army War College student Colonel Peggy Combs wrote a 
monograph entitled “US Army Cultural Obstacles to Transformational Leadership,” in 
which she argued that organizational culture and leadership have a symbiotic 
relationship, and that contrary to the statements of recent Chiefs of Staff, the Army’s 
culture has impeded the development of leaders that the Army needs for the twenty-first 
century. Specifically, Combs cited CSA General Dennis Reimer’s (1995–1999) call for 
the “Pentathelete” leader (i.e., by his definition a transformational leader with an agile 
mind who is innovative, flexible, and imaginative). She believes, as do I, that the “by the 
book, by the numbers, process-driven culture obstructs the development of 
transformational leaders.”100        
 Combs concluded that the evaluation of Army leadership potential appears to be 
based more on the ability to follow directives and cultural system control artifacts than to 
lead. By “cultural system control artifacts,” she does not mean bureaucratic 
                                                          
97. See John Adams Wickham, “Collected Works of the Thirtieth Chief of Staff, United States Army, 
June 1983–June 1987 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 1987), DTIC accession number: 
AD-A184564. Carl E. Vuono, A Trained and Ready Army: The Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chief of 
Staff, United States Army: June 1987–June 1991 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 1992). 
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impediments but rather the predominance of Field Manuals (FMs), Training Manuals 
(TMs), Army Regulations (ARs), Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), Inspector 
General (IG) checklists, and command policies that tell subordinate leaders what to do. 
Consequently, these directive and prescriptive “artifacts” create an organizational 
culture and climate that “defines success in terms of measurable short-term 
performances.” The Army, asserts Combs, “produces outstanding managers of short-
term results.”101 Combs’s analysis of the Army today closely describes the state of the 
Army’s bureaucratic and careerist-centric culture that emerged from Vietnam.102 
 So how do all of these elements come together to help us understand the 
historical significance of the Army OE Program? In short, when viewed together, they 
provide a framework that illustrates the growing disconnect between the rapid 
evolutionary progression of more humanistic leadership practices (based on the 
successful implementation of theories over time and distinct generational differences), 
and the resistance or reluctance of US Army leaders to embrace new ways of effectively 
exercising influence over soldiers.  
                                                          
101. In recent years, others have put forth similar assessments. See Clarke, “Changing Army 
Culture.” As a student at the Army War College in 2008, Clarke argued that Army culture, with its 
emphasis on “rewards process behavior” discourages critical and adaptive thinking.        
102. Sadly, we see the same consequences persisting well into the twenty-first century. One 
obstruction, however, particularly stands out as entrenched in US Army culture—the “myth of heroic 
management.” The myth of heroic management posits that a good leader knows what is occurring in the 
organization at all times, should be able to solve any problem that arises, should always know how the 
organization is working, and possess more technical expertise than any subordinate. See Combs, 
“Cultural Obstacles,” 16. This myth has permeated Army culture throughout most of its history and goes a 
long way in explaining why antiquated leadership theories such as Great Men and Trait Theory are still 
prevalent today. One needs to look no further than the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) to see such a 
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Note: This matrix takes each of the major leadership theories that evolved over time and 
correlates it with the evolution of Army leadership doctrine. This framework clearly 
reveals a historically selective and conservative approach.   
 
 The conclusion we can draw from the trends presented in the analytical model 
above is that the Army, since Vietnam, has predominantly and consistently preferred 
leaders who exercise transactional leadership styles that appeal to soldiers operating at 
the lower levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Exacerbating this persistent trend has 
been the Army’s poor understanding of leadership and, consequently, its inability to 
develop and promote adaptively thinking officers with self-transforming minds into the 
upper officer ranks.103    
Literature Review 
 Few scholars have chronicled fundamental changes in the US Army's leadership 
concepts, doctrine, and culture (i.e., the relational behaviors between the leaders and the 
led). Consequently, there is a large gap in the historiography. Even fewer have noticed this 
gap. One exception is military historian and University of North Carolina professor emeritus 
Richard H. Kohn. Writing in 1981, Kohn pondered the vast number of veterans in the 
United States and the absence of any history on their social experiences: "Historians have 
neglected one of the most pervasive experiences in American life, one especially suited to 
the new social history. . . . What did they think? How did they behave?" He asserted that 
such histories were needed because old myths and stereotypes about the behaviors and 
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social experiences of soldiers—largely originating in the Second World War—were still 
persistent "with remarkable durability."104  Kohn noted that throughout much of American 
military history, soldiers frequently deserted because of the way they were treated. He 
condemned generalizations and stereotypes about why men fight—an acknowledgment that 
each succeeding generation is different, serving and fighting within different contexts. 
"Understanding the true identity of soldiers means grounding them in the communities and 
times in which they lived."105 Kohn expressed dismay for this neglect, especially for the 
soldiers that are examined during the period covered in this dissertation. "Virtually the entire 
literature on the volunteer Army debate of the last decade and a half has treated the 
American soldier as an object, a unit of labor, an ‛asset’ without humanity in an historical 
sense."106 
 Kohn also suggested that the social experiences of soldiers can explain primary 
group cohesion, which is often a psychological phenomenon. He reminded his readers 
that battle is all about emotions, as this dissertation similarly asserts that leadership is all 
about emotions. On close inspection, both battle and leadership essentially share many of 
the same emotions. Certainly, most military historians would agree that battle is a contest 
where one cohesive group attempts to disrupt or destroy the cohesion of another cohesive 
group. The trust that is required to form this cohesion is achieved through the relationship 
between the leader and the led. Thus, organizational effectiveness and leadership are 
tightly intertwined.107 
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 In many ways, Kohn's concern for the lack of historical writings on the social 
experiences of soldiers was an extension of a similar view expressed five years earlier 
in an article entitled "The Present State and Development of Sociology of the Military" 
written by George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz. Published in The Journal of Political 
and Military Sociology in 1976, this lengthy article presented a comprehensive survey of 
the state of the discipline at that time. The authors found that the "sociology of the 
military still occupies a marginal and ambivalent position within academic sociology."108 
Since sociology of the military has not been able to establish a broad base 
of academic legitimacy and institutionalization, it has not provided young 
sociologists in the field a "frame of reference" similar to those provided in 
other more accepted and developed areas of sociology. This may be due 
in part to the anti-military liberal academic environment and to the semi-
closed nature of the military. The latter may tend to hinder critical 
sociological analysis.109  
 
 In surveying almost 200 publications, Kourvetaris and Dobratz observed two major 
perspectives or directions for sociology of the military. In terms of its utility, the subject was, 
first, useful for increasing "the efficiency and effectiveness of the military organization” 
(precisely the focus of the Army OE Program) and, second, to understand the military "as a 
major social institution having wide societal and political ramifications."110 The authors 
identified fresh new trends that supported a growing belief that the Army "no longer rewards 
competence in combat but rather favors the bureaucratic managerial type," and that 
"concepts such as decision-making, organizational choice, leadership, and the 
implementation of decisions are important for future analysis." Unfortunately, for their time 
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(1976) and beyond, such trends and needs, which fell into the category of this first direction, 
were greatly subordinated to the second direction—to understand the military "as a major 
social institution having wide societal and political ramifications." 111 Indeed, in the decades 
following this article, a large body of work emerged under the over-arching term "civil-
military relations," which today is practically synonymous for "sociology of the military."112 
 Still, despite Kourvetaris, Dobratz, and Kohn’s observations and concerns about the 
under-studied field of social history between the leader and the led, a large volume of 
literature has emerged since the publication of their articles that inform the thesis of this 
dissertation. These two broad areas of post-Vietnam literature may hold clues and 
explanations about the ultimate fate of the Army OE program. In general, they address (1) 
the performance of the officer corps in Vietnam, and (2) the post-war “transformation” that 
occurred. 
 In regard to the first, this dissertation examines the implementation and 
institutionalization of cutting-edge behavioral science (i.e., OD) within the entire Army. 
Army officers took this action primarily because they saw a need for planned, large-scale 
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change to address poor individual and organizational performance. Based on events in 
Vietnam, most planners believed that the Army should reexamine or reevaluate, albeit to 
various degrees, its practice of leadership, either to prepare for the practicality of an AVF, in 
this case the view of the Healers, or to question its concept and the very nature of leadership 
in order to transform the culture into a healthier and more effective environment, the 
defining view of the Progressives. Critically shaping their approaches to planned change 
was the fundamental question of the Army officer corps' behavior and performance in the 
war. Without doubt this fundamental question lies at the root of most writings on Vietnam. 
The authors of these writings are important to the story of OE not because they assessed 
the nature and concept of leadership in Vietnam (which few did) but because they set the 
conversational and contextual framework in which assumptions were formed for the 
development of post-war reforms and alleged transformations. In essence, two camps 
emerged from the writings that appeared in the 1970s. The first camp argued that the 
Army’s leadership and performance in the war was poor and that the institution had itself to 
blame. The second camp, in reaction to the first, asserted that outside influences, many 
beyond the Army’s control, handicapped Army leaders throughout the war. The starting 
point for the emergence of the two contrasting, emotional viewpoints can be traced to 
the Army War College’s Study on Military Professionalism of June 30, 1970.113  
 Prior to the study, the Army officer corps presumed that the Army’s chronic 
problems were due to the nature of warfare in Vietnam and a spillover of the social 
upheavals back home, such as a permissive, anti-authoritarian youth and their embrace 
of liberal and radical behaviors. The study debunked these perceptions and proved to 
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be an unvarnished, scathing indictment of the corrupt, self-centered, managerial-like 
behaviors of Army officers at all levels (discussed at length in Chapter I). The 
investigators found pervasive careerism to be dysfunctional and destructive. More 
importantly, however, the 1970 study concluded that the Army system was seriously 
flawed, not the nature of America’s youth. The impact of the Army War College’s Study 
on Military Professionalism cannot be overstated. The study served as the credible, 
argumentative foundation for most of the critical analyses and commentaries which 
posited that the Army imploded and self-destructed in Vietnam, and that a culture of 
careerism within the officer corps was primarily at fault. 
 The first book to appear in print that seriously questioned the leadership 
competency of the Army officer corps was Defeated: Inside America’s Military Machine 
by Stuart H. Loory, published in 1973. Loory, a former journalist and professor at the 
Ohio State University, spent the years 1971 and 1972 travelling to numerous posts and 
bases around the world to interview service members from each branch of the US 
armed forces. While much of what he wrote fueled the public’s awareness of the poor 
state of race relations in the armed forces and the chronic abuse of drugs and alcohol, 
his underlying assertion was that America’s armed services—“the machines”—were 
fundamentally broken. Written with a flair for the dramatic, Loory nevertheless pointed to 
several chronic issues that would lead to serious examination by other scholars and 
proven valid.114 Loory found ample evidence that illuminated the pervasive “CYA” 
culture of the officer corps. “Mistakes could be tolerated but not the exposure of 
mistakes. [This led to] always putting the best face on any situation, then to the 
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encouragement of cover-up and finally to the widespread practice of lying.”115  To 
support his assertion, Loory augmented his own interviews with those from the 1970 
AWC Study on Military Professionalism. 116  
 Two other books of that early period that were highly critical of the Army’s 
leadership in Vietnam were William Hauser’s America’s Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-
Military Relations in 1973, and Zeb B. Bradford and Frederick Joseph Brown’s The 
United States Army in Transition in 1974. Although both primarily dealt with broader 
issues of civil-military relations, each author argued that the Army’s culture was not able 
to adapt to change. Hauser wrote that the Army was entering into its most problem-
riddled crisis in history and that its inability to adapt was at the root of all other ills. 
Because the Army could not adapt to the changing values of society, the institution 
faced a “crisis of confidence.”  While he did not directly attack the integrity of the officer 
corps, Hauser asserted that the “self-serving careerism” of the officer corps contributed 
to this crisis. Similarly, Bradford and Brown argued that the Army’s inability to adapt to 
social changes was serious.117   
 In Spring 1976, one of the Army’s own—Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard—
published the results of a study he conducted at Princeton in the Journal of Military and 
Political Sociology in an article entitled “The Vietnam War in Retrospect: The Army 
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Generals’ Views.”118  As a respected, recently retired general officer, Kinnard was well 
positioned to ask such uncomfortable questions as “whether the war effort in general 
was worthwhile.” Most remarkable about his study was his access to so many general 
officers who had held commands in Vietnam; Kinnard, in total, surveyed 173 individuals 
who held general officer command positions in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. His intent 
was to assess elite attitudes toward the management of the war from the perspective of 
those elites who directly led operations in Vietnam. Of the 173 surveys of sixty 
questions that he distributed, Kinnard received 108 responses (a rate of 65 percent). 
The majority of the results substantiated the findings of the 1970 AWC Study on Military 
Professionalism—remarkable considering that such admissions, promised under strict 
provisions to protect anonymity, could be viewed as self-incriminating. Kinnard’s 
concluding paragraph is telling in this regard: 
One thing that the responses show is a substantial degree of introspective 
criticism of the Army's own efforts. This point is interesting in view of the 
defensiveness alleged to be characteristic of military elites. There exist 
two plausible but untested interpretations of these inclinations to criticize. 
Retrospective assessments of the war in 1974 came at a time when 
emotional aspects of the war and the exigencies of personal responsibility 
had been largely attenuated, and respondents were able to view their 
experience from a detached and presumably less idealized perspective. 
The other interpretation is that the critical inclinations which were always 
there emerged in part because of the anonymous nature of the responses. 
This latter point does raise a question as to why some of this group did not 
speak out earlier during the course of the war on such matters as the body 
count or on larger issues concerning the manner in which war was being 
fought. Perhaps the main lesson for the future that this suggests is that the 
system has to permit more dissent without the sacrifice of careers as the 
price.119     
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 At the same time (May 1976) that Kinnard publicized his study, two veteran Army 
officers, Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, emerged with several articles and a 
book that would serve as a lightning rod for the second camp’s counter-arguments.120 In 
opposing the growing and popular belief that poor behaviors in Vietnam reflected 
declining values and attitudes toward authority in society, the authors were primarily 
interested in examining indicators of disintegration that affected military cohesion.121 
They described the deteriorating socio-military process as such: first, a managerial 
disposition that had formed throughout the 1960s replaced a warrior ethos in the officer 
corps. Second, a bloated officer corps resulted in the assignment of many poorly 
qualified leaders to command assignments (exacerbated by the short six-month tenure 
policy). Finally, the destruction of primary military groups—largely a result of short 
rotation policies—prevented the formation of unit cohesion and created a tremendous 
gulf between officer and enlisted personnel. In general, the authors strongly believed 
that unit cohesion dissolved because “managerial careerism” replaced officer 
professionalism, and that this disintegration “operated independently of sociopolitical 
factors in the larger American society.”122 In addition, they asserted that poor morals 
and ethical behaviors of Army officers were the fundamental root causes for the poor 
performance and defeat in Vietnam. Gabriel and Savage concluded that only a serious 
reformation of the Army officer corps could correct poor leadership.123 Like the AWC 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
anonymity was protected. On a personal note, in my thirty years in the Army, I only worked for two 
commanders with whom it was safe to offer a dissenting view and to speak my mind. 
120. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New 
York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1978). 
121. This assertion is important because it implies that, following Vietnam, the Army was in desperate 
need of OD practices and methodologies.  
122. Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An 
Alternative Perspective,” Armed Forces and Society 2, no. 3 (May 1976), 341. 




Study on Military Professionalism, the impact of Savage and Gabriel’s Crisis in 
Command cannot be understated. The authors’ wide readership and the conversations 
they stirred throughout the officer corps fueled additional reactions from the “apologists” 
and, with their strong substantiation of the 1970 AWC study, the force of their 
arguments influenced the thoughts and reflections of more junior officers well into the 
1980s and 1990s.124      
 Then, in 1981, an anonymous author using the pseudonym “Cincinnatus” 
published a condemning critique of the Army officer corps under the title Self 
Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army during the 
Vietnam Era. Cincinnatus, a former Army officer who had served as a captain in 
Vietnam in 1968, substantiated all that Savage and Gabriel had argued several years 
before. However, his framework differed in that he wrote clearly from the perspective of 
an insider who was on the ground as a junior officer. Although much of his writing cast a 
wide net to encompass a myriad of problems and frustrations from those down below, 
his narrative was greatly enriched with the experiences of many other officers. Like 
Kinnard’s promise to protect the identities of his fellow generals, Cincinnatus obtained 
frank input from many officers from the lower and middle-grade ranks (company and 
field-grade officers) with the same pledge.125  
 Cincinnatus challenged the growing revisionist belief that the war was really lost 
at home, primarily by the military’s civilian masters, and insisted that the Army’s senior 
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leaders were to blame. His thorough treatment of this theme pointed to numerous 
examples of poor leadership and ineptitude at the senior levels of command. The senior 
leaders of the Army in Vietnam were never adaptive (within Heifetz’s definition) because 
they “ignored calls for change that came from within.” Like General Kinnard’s 
aforementioned remark that “the system has to permit more dissent without the sacrifice 
of careers as the price,” Cincinnatus believed that for the Army to ever become an 
effective organization, “it must learn to encourage suggestions and criticisms from within 
its own ranks and listen to challenges to its doctrines. . . .”126     
 Until Cincinnatus’s book appeared, strong objections and counter arguments 
came from within the Army War College. Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth, in his emotional 
article “A Critique of Savage and Gabriel,” described the authors’ assertions as 
“gratuitous libels on one of the finest professional groups in the nation: the officer corps 
of the United States Army.”127 His primary objections were that the authors relied too 
heavily on the “over critical self-appraisal” 1970 Army War College Study on Military 
Professionalism (the irony apparently lost on him) and his insistence that the Vietnam 
experience was only a portion of the entire institution.128 Any poor behaviors in the war 
zone reflected the “dissident behaviors” of the conscripts and not the professionalism of 
the institution. Wermuth concluded his list of objections by denying that careerism was 
out of control, comparing the drive and ambition of Army officers to be analogous to the 
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rest of American society. He then defended the notion that “rank has its privileges” by 
stating that senior officers had earned such status by virtue of their rank and positions. 
 In 1982, another apologist—Harry Summers—strongly struck back with a widely-
read book entitled On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Although a number 
of revisionist "histories" had appeared prior to On Strategy, most were autobiographical 
accounts of the senior leaders' experiences in Vietnam who all argued that Washington and 
political considerations greatly restrained their actions and decision-making in the war.129  
Summers, best known of the "Clausewitzian revisionists," adroitly contrasted Clausewitz's 
dictums on strategic doctrine with the US conduct of the war in Vietnam. Like other 
Clausewitzians, Summers pursued arguments that the Army could have won the war if only 
the civilian masters had not interfered. The Army officer corps loved this book. Summers, a 
retired Army colonel and combat veteran, was then a member of the faculty at the Army 
War College where his book was extensively used in the curriculum throughout the 1980s. It 
was also popular because “the US military ostensibly worships Clausewitz as the principal 
prophet of war.”130 
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 Over time, interest in “what went wrong” in Vietnam has continued. While 
numerous writings over the last three decades have examined the defeat from various 
perspectives and viewpoints, no major books appeared after the early 1980s that would 
question the viability and health of the officer corps. If anything, subsequent authors put 
forth an argument that the junior officers who observed the dysfunctionalities of their 
senior commanders in Vietnam learned from those times and, consequently, performed 
brilliantly—by almost any measure—in the First Gulf War in 1991. Most popular in this 
regard is James Kittfield’s 2009 book entitled Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of 
Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War. In this colorful 
biographical tracing of the careers of several officers who would eventually achieve 
four-star rank at the time of the Gulf War, Kittfield tells a very positive story of how these 
Vietnam-era captains and majors learned from their bad experiences and observations 
and went on to transform the Army to an unprecedented level of quality and expertise 
as general officers. While Kittfield makes a strong case that these very capable officers 
mastered their craft (operationally and technologically) and ultimately performed well in 
Operation Desert Storm, there is little critical analysis of their leadership abilities other 
than that they were engaged, caring commanders in all of their assignments. This is a 
“feel good” book that ignores other factors such as their role in creating the conditions 
that would allow careerism to reach a point in 1992 and 1993, only months after their 
superb performances in the Gulf, whereby the junior officers in the Army were leaving, 
almost en masse, largely due to a perceived culture of careerism and risk aversion 
reminiscent of Vietnam.131 Despite the title’s implication, this book has very little to do 
with leadership.132   
                                                          




 Kittfield's view is prevalent in the literature. Yet if we truly examine the combat 
experiences of the lieutenants and captains in Vietnam, we see that their greatest 
challenges were related to the poor leadership and command relationships they 
experienced or witnessed with their seniors. The plethora of personal accounts that have 
appeared in print in the decades following the war attest to these poor leadership 
behaviors. Besides giving great credibility to the findings of the 1970 Study on Military 
Professionalism, these narratives are almost universal in their observations. For example, 
the gulf between the lieutenants fighting the war on the ground and their commanders 
micromanaging them in helicopter gunships, stacked by succeeding levels of rank and 
command, above the jungles is illustrated in almost every personal account. Other themes 
include the ill effects of platoon leaders and company commanders serving only six months 
in combat, the risk aversion of more senior leaders, the widespread emphasis to lie about 
the number of enemy casualties, and the tendency to falsify reports.133 Yet, on close 
examination of Kittfield and his contemporaries' writings, the brilliant performances in 1991 
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and beyond have little to do with improved leadership behaviors and everything to do with 
the successful implementation of operational doctrine (the 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine) 
and the scores of advanced weapons systems fielded in the 1980s (including the Abrams 
tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Apache helicopter).134 
 The other major subject area that informs the thesis of this dissertation is the 
widespread belief that the Army radically and successfully transformed itself after Vietnam. 
Putting aside any debates over definitions for terms such as “transformation,” 
“revolutionary,” or “adaptive,” it is clear that the Army became a much healthier institution in 
the decade following the war. Still, becoming healthier and achieving a cultural 
transformation are two different things. While many authors of this period have written 
numerous accounts about these reforms and modernization efforts, they often attribute 
successes to excellent “leadership” within their narratives but never define the term’s 
meaning in relation to the changes they describe. Like Kittfield, they frequently praise the 
excellent and “insightful leadership” of these innovators and reformers but assign no 
definition of what leadership is or how it contributed to the improvements. Again, these 
authors assume that every reader possesses the same definition or same understanding of 
this complex term. Other than managing a reorganization of the Army or managing the 
implementation of advanced technologies, how did they actually lead in creating a new, all 
volunteer Army?135 In general, the transformation literature falls within three topical areas: 
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the revision of training and operational doctrine, the organizational transition to the AVF, and 
the implementation of advanced technologies in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. 
 The new training and operational doctrines, as integrated with new technological 
advancements, have served to impart a false impression that leadership—especially leader 
development—has proven effective over time because of the 1970s reforms. As most Army 
officers acknowledge, General William DePuy’s reconceptualization of Army tactical and 
operational doctrine revolutionized Army warfighting methodologies after Vietnam.136 The 
most thorough treatment is Paul Herbert’s Deciding What Has to Be Done: General 
William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Herbert clearly 
illustrated its impact and, more importantly, the thinking process DePuy employed (and 
authoritatively controlled) to radically reform training and operational doctrine.137  By 
tightly integrating training and training management with tactical and operational doctrine, 
DePuy (and his later successor General Donn Starry) greatly distilled the complexity of 
leadership, boiling it down to an essentially simple (but erroneous) definition of “technical 
and tactical proficiency.” This oversimplified perception of leadership has persisted over 
time because there is little doubt that the Army became a very healthy and effective 
professional fighting force as a result of these changes. Also, Robert A. Doughty’s The 
Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76 similarly chronicles this revolutionary 
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course over a longer period of time very well. Likewise, the brilliant integration of DePuy 
and Starry’s operational doctrine with new training management methods and new 
combat technologies is well illustrated in John L. Romjue’s From Active Defense to 
AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982.138 
 In sum, the post-Vietnam transformation literature essentially views the American 
military experience since the war through the trifocal lens of technology, reorganization, 
and (operational/tactical) doctrine. In many ways, this view has always defined Army 
culture, especially since the Second World War. Critical to the thesis of this dissertation 
are two key points. First, the timing of initial modernization efforts—especially the Army's 
strong embrace of many new technologies beginning in the late 1970s—helps to explain 
the sudden demise of the Army OE Program after a decade of institutionalization. Second, 
a conceptual analysis of leadership (i.e., the behavioral relations between the leader and 
the led) has largely been missing for almost four decades, despite tremendous advances in 
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our understanding of human relations and how those relations fundamentally determine 
and shape organizational effectiveness. To say that there is a gap in the literature is an 
understatement. 
 Leading the effort to redress this gap is a small group of British social historians who 
have written on the social experiences of soldiers in the First World War. The most 
impressive work in this genre, and one that comes closest to the aim of this dissertation, is 
G. D. Sheffield’s Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and 
Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War.139 Uniquely, Sheffield’s 
focus throughout this impressive work remains tightly on the behavioral inter-
relationships between the leader and the led. He first describes the existing culture of 
the pre-War British Army with its stereotypical but accurate descriptions of strict 
discipline and the great social gulf between officers and enlisted that made this 
authoritarian-based system function. All of that changed as Britain required enormous 
numbers of soldiers for attrition warfare on the western front. This need created many 
new military organizations whose ranks were largely filled by the middle class and upper 
working class, for both officers and enlisted. Consequently, the social behaviors 
between the officers and their men radically changed and significantly resulted in a new 
leadership culture, most apparent from battalion level down.  
 While Sheffield never asserts that discipline fundamentally weakened because of 
the new social makeup of these units, he does argue that the relationships were defined 
by mutual respect, largely derived from the shared experiences of all having attended 
public schools. “Applying the public school ethos to military leadership was effective. 
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Paternal, courageous, self-sacrificing officers earned the loyalty and love of their 
men.”140 In addition, such empathy, combined with a culture of paternalism within the 
junior officer corps, created “mutual understandings” within the tactical units that 
resulted in shared trust and unit cohesion. Based on a large volume of primary sources, 
specifically personal letters and testimonies, Sheffield unearths the dynamics of these 
mutual understandings. At the root of these are emotions and feelings.141 Proof of such 
effectiveness, asserts Sheffield, was the fact that the British Army experienced no 
serious mutinies (unlike the French) and held together through the end of the war 
despite many units suffering more than 80 percent casualties.  
 Other war and society historians from this group include Leonard V. Smith, who 
described similar “mutual understandings” between officer and enlisted in the French 
Army, and John Baynes, whose arguments in his work on morale in a small Scottish 
unit parallel Sheffield’s.142 Peter Simpkins, another historian of war and society, also 
shared Sheffield’s views in his Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–
16 on the positive impact of shared social identities between the leaders and the led.143  
As Sheffield has accomplished for the British Army of the Great War, hopefully this 
dissertation, despite its narrow focus, will help to fill that void for the post-Vietnam War and 
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the baby-boomer generation. Likewise, we will need another for the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars and their respective generation. 
Positionality 
 An interdisciplinary doctoral dissertation demands a clear statement of 
positionality. Thus far, I have attempted to present a strong foundation of the social and 
behavioral science dimensions that directly inform the historical narrative that follows. I 
initially struggled with categorizing this work. Is it behavioral science or history? I am not 
the only student of contemporary history who expresses concern for identity. Labels are 
important. Scholars spend lifetimes carving out areas of expertise. Much of their efforts 
are grounded in particular disciplinary learnings and methodologies. In the process of 
becoming degreed scholars, students conform to established conventionalities as they 
seek the acceptance and approval of their teachers or their colleagues with publications 
of their work in thematic professional journals. Has leadership and change now evolved 
into a full discipline? If so, is this a leadership and change monograph as opposed to a 
military history narrative? As a professional military historian, am I inappropriately (or 
even illegitimately) straying from my field? Do I risk being dismissed as a relevant 
member of my profession?   
 In May 2006, Dr. Roger Spiller, the former George C. Marshall Professor of 
Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College, delivered the 
keynote address at the annual meeting of the Society for Military History at Kansas 
State University. In his remarks, Spiller gently chastised his colleagues for being too 
intellectually conservative. The impetus for his criticism centered on the perceived 




positions in recent years across academia.144 Spiller recounted the contemporary 
evolution of the field, tracing it back to the immediate post-Vietnam years when the 
“New Military History” emerged.145 
 The “New Military History,” a much debated subject in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, was a term applied to a new generation of historians who were producing 
scholarship that greatly broadened the study of war and the military beyond traditional 
boundaries. Widespread debates and discussions on this trend led to the 1991 Fifty-
eighth Annual Meeting of the American Military Institute’s adoption of the topic as its 
annual theme. The conference “ably demonstrated [that the New Military historians 
were] interested in social and political, technology, culture, and the relationship of war 
and the military to society, the state, and international relations.”146 Although the 
participants of the conference expressed predictable views—with traditionalists 
suggesting that the New Military History was “abandoning the battlefield” and “escaping 
from war”—well-respected scholar Peter Paret reminded his audience that the New 
Military History was “not entirely new, and not all the ‘old’ military history was bad.” 
Paret shared that the New Military History was still in its infancy and had yet to produce 
great works as had the traditionalists. However, he viewed the trend as positive in that 
researchers were now formulating new problems, discovering new material, and 
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consequently asking the right questions and providing “insightful answers.”147 In the 
same year, Paret expanded on his views in an article for the Army War College’s journal 
Parameters, in which he stated that the New Military History was “an expansion of the 
subject of military history from specifics of military organization and action to their widest 
implications, and also a broadening of the approaches to the subject, [and] of the 
methodologies employed.”148   
 That this concern over identity issues would continue for another fifteen years, as 
evident by Spiller’s keynote address in 2006, is testament to a widely-held, serious 
concern for the future of academic military history. Yet Spiller offered a perceptive 
solution: ensure that your work, regardless of the period of specialization, is relevant to 
contemporary affairs. He reminded everyone that military history is a critical element in 
the education of the profession of arms. The leaders of our armed forces frequently look 
to military history for guidance, advice, and examples of past performances that might 
shed light on possible solutions to current, very real challenges in contemporary military 
affairs.  
There never was a time [like today] when the possibilities for the 
advancement of historical understanding were so promising, or so 
challenging. In a world now so beset by war, this is particularly true of the 
practice of military history, where the interrelationship between past and 
present is so acute, and where the connection between thought and action 
can sometimes be startling direct. . . . We are more than others obliged to 
look beyond our immediate interests to the world beyond—to other 
disciplines for any intellectual, conceptual, or methodological advantage 
that might advance our work. . . . [S]houldn’t we face our connection to the 
present more directly?149  
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 Whatever label is appropriate for this work, I am not deserting the battlefield. 
Military history, at its very core, has always been about leadership and change. For me, 
when Karl von Clausewitz, “the most perceptive of all theorists of war,” writes about 
“friction” in war, he is describing the “permanent whitewater” of change.150 Because 
change is a constant condition, it does not cease or begin when war ends and armies 
return home. When I look back on American military history, I see that our nation has 
been at war approximately twenty percent of the time since we declared independence 
in 1776. That means that for eighty percent of our history, our Army has been 
recovering from war and training and preparing for the next conflict. Therefore, leaders 
must continue to deal with the impact of change beyond the battlefield that is often more 
arduous than combat itself. The list of technical and adaptive challenges is endless, with 
problems such as budget battles, weapons modernization, post-war doctrinal 
development and training, force reconstitution and modernizations, reductions in force, 
military operations other than war, and more. If military history is about “the military,” 
should we not also focus our scholarship on interwar activities? If leadership is indeed 
central to quality and effective organizations (and perhaps the “X-Factor” in historic 
causation, as Burns asserted), then is it not critical that we ask about its nature and the 
effectiveness of leaders and organizations in preparing our Army for future warfare?  
* 
 In the narrative that follows, Chapter I, entitled “The Need for Better Leaders: 
Vietnam and the Specter of an All-Volunteer Army,” covers the years January 1968 to 
December 1972 and speaks to the criticality of context. Events in Vietnam set in motion 
a number of responses and actions that created the conditions for unprecedented 
                                                          




change and the potential for a true transformation of institutional culture. I explore the 
rise of the Healers and Progressives, and their early initiatives and activities that set the 
stage for the Army OE program. 
 Chapter II, entitled "Presenting and Testing New Concepts: The Early Initiatives 
of Army OE," explores the early activities of the Progressives—especially Colonel Tony 
Nadal's actions—in promoting OD for the Army. General George Forsythe, the Special 
Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA), began placing a structured approach 
in place. More importantly, large-scale OD initiatives were tried at the Army's Military 
Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) in Washington and in Europe. Between January 1973 
and mid-1975, the experiments at Fort Ord quickly evolved and resulted in the Army's 
decision to expand Army OE initiatives. Throughout this time period, the important 
"behind-the-scenes" activities of Lieutenant General Bernard Rogers were seen as a 
strong foundation of support for the OD movement. 
 Chapter III, entitled “Growing Pains and Turf Wars: The Weyand Years, covers 
mid-1974 to mid-1975 when Frederick Weyand served as CSA and Rogers commanded 
FORSCOM (Forces Command, the Army’s highest-level command for operational 
forces). With authority over the Army’s combat forces, Rogers began efforts to 
institutionalize OE. In the process he confronted resistance to change from the 
Traditionalists at large and more importantly from TRADOC (Training Command, the 
Army’s highest level command for training). Despite this resistance, Army OE surged 
forward, especially at Fort Ord with the establishment and expansion of the Army’s 




 Chapter IV, entitled "The Institutionalization of Army OE: The Rogers Years," 
covers the years when Rogers served as the Army CSA (October 1976 to June 1979). 
As CSA, he formally implemented and institutionalized OE. OETC experienced growing 
pains, refined its curriculum, and produced numerous OE products. However, in 
reaction to increasing resistance from the Army, questions of identity and relevance 
surfaced. Consequently, the program was forced to “adapt or die” despite indications of 
success in several units throughout the Army. More importantly, TRADOC succeeded 
in excluding progressive views of human relations in its leadership 
instructional/doctrinal material for the Army’s training schools. In mirroring trends in 
industry, Army OE largely jettisoned its humanistic elements and expanded the 
managerial and technical dimensions. 
 Chapter V, entitled "Conclusion: Lost Victories,” summarize the program’s “fall” 
as it existed under the stewardship of Rogers’s successors, generals Edward Meyer 
and John Wickham (1979–1985). I explore why the Army OE program failed to endure 
and what would be required for it to succeed today. I conclude that while the 
Progressives failed to transform the Army’s culture, they may have affected positive 
change in ways that are not readily apparent. The dissertation ends with an argument that 
the Army of 2014 is facing its most serious leadership crisis in forty years and prescribes the 
resurrection of Army OE to once again attempt to heal a dysfunctional leadership culture. 
 Transforming the culture of a large, conservative professional institution like the 
United States Army is like asking an aircraft carrier to pivot on a dime. The narrative that 
follows is steep in the details of a number of bureaucratic activities indicating that the devil 




have tried to reconstruct may someday provide future change agents with guideposts or 
“lessons learned” so that they may one day transform our beloved Army into a more 







The Need for Better Leaders:  
Vietnam and the Specter of an All-Volunteer Army 
Because it is easier to look for heroes and scapegoats than to probe for 
complex and obscure causal forces, some assume that the lives of the 
“greats” carry more clues to the understanding of society, history, and 
current events than the lives of the great mass of people, of the sub 
leaders and the followers. 
James MacGregor Burns 
 
 Every aspect of the US Army Organizational Effectiveness Program was about one 
thing—people. The Army exited Vietnam with “people problems.” Drug abuse and racial 
tensions had torn units apart, while their rotating officers—the "lifers"—“punched their 
tickets" for short-term combat experience necessary for promotion. Draftees sought to 
survive their one-year tour of duty in 'Nam, literally counting the days until they could return 
to “the World,” their homes as civilians. As unit cohesion throughout the Army 
disintegrated to various degrees, some people stepped forward to heal the institution. Many 
lifers, those who had not demonstrated careerist behaviors or risk aversion in the war, took 
initiatives to offer solutions—some with traditional conservative remedies, others with novel 
and progressive ideas. The latter group saw hope in recent behavioral science research. 
They advocated a new technology for improving organizations— something new called 
Organizational Development—as a way to not only restore cohesion in the units but to also 
relate to a new generation of people the Army desperately needed in a post-conscription 
America. "To relate" meant that leaders now had to form a different kind of "relationship" 
with their volunteer soldiers, their customers. Conscripts had never been customers, but the 
"be all that you can be” volunteers certainly were. The Progressives understood that this 




called "leadership." People had corrupted the system; now people had to heal it. From this 
realization came the Army OE Program. Within the tumultuous social context of that time 
period, the actors involved in this process, whether they were Traditionalists, Healers, or 
Progressives, all shared one important trait—they loved their Army and wanted to make it 
better. Their individual histories—their backgrounds, experiences, beliefs, and emotions—
are all important pieces of this post-Vietnam reformation mosaic. Individually and 
collectively, this is their story. 
The Winds of Change 
 It all started with losing the war in Vietnam. The country-wide Tet Offensive of 
late January 1968 and the later revelations about the My Lai massacre that occurred in 
March of that same year as the offensive came to an end, along with other tumultuous 
social and political events then taking place in the United States, combined to fertilize 
the future for the Army’s initial embrace of modern organizational development methods 
and techniques. While the major impact of My Lai would take time to play out, Tet 
resulted in an immediate loss of faith in the Army’s ability to successfully prosecute the 
war. On the heels of Tet, the Army lost the confidence of the Johnson administration, 
the American public, and America’s youth who would constitute the pool of potential 
recruits in the near future of an all-volunteer armed force. More importantly, in the 
aftermath of Tet, many of the youth already in uniform, especially those fighting in Army 
combat units in Vietnam, began to lose trust in the leadership of their officers. The Army 
Organizational Effectiveness Program was indirectly born from these strategic political 




 The year 1968 was violent, both in Vietnam and on the home front. On January 
31, 1968, North Vietnamese forces launched a country-wide campaign that resulted in 
attacks on more than 150 towns and villages, numerous military installations, and five 
major cities.1 By the time the city of Hue fell in May, more than 5000 Americans had 
died in the fighting, and Viet Cong dead numbered more than 43,000. In the South, 
more than 40,000 people were killed or wounded and over one million left as refugees. 
In the United States, on April 4, 1968, James Earl Ray assassinated civil rights leader Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. On April 23, the anti-war protests at Columbia University resulted in 
712 arrests and 148 people injured, which in turn spawned numerous other demonstrations 
on college campuses across the United States.2 On June 5, the nation lost another 
visionary leader when presidential hopeful Senator Robert F. Kennedy was shot and killed 
in California. These and many other tragic events of that year set the context for radical social 
and cultural change both within the United States in general and inside the Army in particular. 
Inside the Army, William “Westy” Westmoreland was at the center of almost anything 
dealing with Vietnam. Within the Army officer corps, his fellow officers were not surprised by 
his remarkable record of achievement to the top levels of leadership. Westmoreland 
graduated from the Military Academy in 1936 and, despite his relatively low overall 
academic ranking, was named First Captain of the Corps of Cadets.3 In the Second 
World War, he distinguished himself as an artillery officer in the campaigns of North 
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Africa, Sicily, France, Belgium, and Germany. After the war, he transferred to the 
infantry and held several elite commands during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. As a 
general officer, Westmoreland commanded the elite 101st Airborne Division (“the 
Screaming Eagles”), the XVIII Airborne Corps and, by 1964, the US Military Assistance 
Command in Vietnam (MACV).   
 From 1964 to 1968, Westmoreland managed the war in Vietnam. However, on 
the heels of Tet, the White House announced on March 23, 1968, that General 
Creighton Abrams, Westmoreland’s deputy, would assume command of MACV and that 
Westmoreland would replace General Harold K. Johnson as CSA. Given the extent of 
societal unrest at the time and the realization that the war was unwinnable, Johnson 
had little choice. To many observers, Westmoreland’s “promotion” to the top job in the 
Army—a career goal that he had envisioned since his cadet days at West Point—was 
seen as a relief of duty for failed leadership in Vietnam.4  
 As CSA, Westmoreland lacked credibility with the Nixon administration. Nixon 
viewed the new CSA as a “political liability,” and Dr. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national 
security advisor, “held Westmoreland responsible for the failures of the Vietnam War.”5 
More disconcerting was that the secretary of the army, Stanley R. Resor, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff believed that Westmoreland “was too invested in the war in Vietnam to 
offer strong leadership.”6 This lack of faith extended well into the Army ranks. 
Westmoreland, feeling somewhat persona non grata in Washington, believed he could 
best serve the Army by travelling throughout the country to help rebuild the Army’s 
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image. Because he was away so frequently, many senior leaders throughout the Army 
viewed his vice chief of staff, General Bruce Palmer, as the de facto chief.  
 Despite Westmoreland’s frequent absenteeism from the Pentagon, he was a 
much better steward of the institution than most have credited. Westmoreland was a 
Traditionalist placed uncomfortably into the position of “Chief Healer” of the institution. 
Indeed, his work in preparing the Army for the quickly approaching AVF was significant. 
First, while he may have felt under-appreciated in Washington, he travelled to every 
state in the Union because he saw himself as the primary “spokesman of the Army.”7 
While many have noted that he spoke often about his role in Vietnam in his speeches, 
he genuinely cared for the reputation of the Army and wanted the American public to 
“understand the military.”8 Second, in terms of civil-military relations, he strongly 
believed in the sanctity of civilian control. If nothing else, in all of his interactions with his 
senior civilian masters, Westmoreland was always subservient and loyal. This was 
especially true in bringing about the All-Volunteer Army.9 Third, although he had a 
reputation for being a non-intellectual and was not well-read, he had a strong propensity 
to initiate studies and did so quite frequently. This inclination served the Army’s 
transition to the AVF well and, importantly, opened the door for the early Progressives 
to move their ideas into the mainstream and to attempt to transform the leadership 
culture within the Army officer corps.   
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 Soon after occupying the CSA position, it had become clear to Westmoreland 
that the political winds of change supported the creation of an AVF. The idea was not 
new. Since 1964, four presidential commissions had been established to study the 
feasibility of ending conscription.10 By late 1968, with the draft becoming the focal point 
for the growing anti-war movement, both political parties favored the idea, albeit to 
various degrees. While Nixon is well-remembered as the architect of the AVF, which he 
formally announced as a campaign promise on October 17, 1968, it is significant to note 
that Westmoreland ordered a formal feasibility study of an all-volunteer army seven 
weeks earlier on September 3.  
 Westmoreland, still settling into his new role as CSA, directed the Personnel 
Studies and Research Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Personnel (DCSPERS) to conduct this study to consider the ramifications of 
transitioning to an AVF. More specifically, he asked the staff to "reexamine the Army's 
position on the subject, if such is warranted."11 The Directorate appointed Lieutenant 
Colonel Jack R. Butler to head-up this investigation. Butler was an experienced infantry 
officer and Vietnam combat veteran who possessed a master's degree in psychology 
from Tulane University. In leading the study, he sought to answer the following 
questions: Why is an AVF needed and is it achievable? Is it desirable or are there 
legitimate objections to an AVF? What must we accomplish to make it work?12 
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 Completed in December 1968, the Career Force Study (or the Butler Study, as it 
became known), offered a sober but balanced assessment.13 In retrospect, Butler and 
his group identified the core essence of the issues that would later influence the views 
of the Traditionalists, the Healers, and the Progressives, namely, the feasibility question 
that centered on the debate between quantity versus quality. The Army at large, and 
later Congress, feared that an all-volunteer force would never attract enough recruits to 
meet future personnel requirements. Given the unpopularity of the Army at the time, this 
was a legitimate concern, and one that the Traditionalists and the Healers both shared. 
For the latter, preliminary research based on pre-Vietnam manpower requirements and 
voluntary enlistment statistics indicated that there would be a significant shortfall of 
personnel in the AVF. In reorganizing the Army, especially to meet large NATO 
requirements in Europe, the math did not add up.14 For the Traditionalists, the prospect 
of an all-volunteer force conjured up emotional feelings that young American citizens 
were abrogating a fundamental imperative of citizenship. Butler acknowledged this and 
commented that "[t]hey cannot be faulted seriously for a deep dedication which has 
imbued in them a belief that all young men owe their country a military obligation."15 
Later, in looking back, Butler noted that 
[t]he older officers and noncommissioned officers were not ready for the 
dramatic changes which were thrust upon them. . . . They could not see a 
need for change, since the traditional ways of doing things had served the 
military and country well in the past [and the new] actions disrupted 
conditioned ways of doing business. This, in turn, gave rise to tensions 
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and stress; and defensive behavior patterns emerged. This psychological 
manipulation contributed significantly to hostile attitudes toward the agent 
of change [the AVF].16 
 
 The Butler Study directly challenged the Traditionalists to look beyond their 
"emotional or philosophical" orientations and to think pragmatically. In this vein, the 
most pragmatic factor highlighted in the study was the potential costs of an all-volunteer 
force. Indeed, the projected costs of the future AVF were enormous, ranging anywhere 
from three to seventeen billion dollars annually above current level of spending, 
depending on the future end-strength required of the post-war force structure. At this 
early stage, the Healers—with their eyes on how to reorganize, reequip, and retrain the 
Army after Vietnam—had yet to wrap their arms around the scope of this challenge. It 
was becoming clear to them, however, that the Army had to change, and change big, in 
order to attract enough soldiers.17 
 If the quantity factor was one artery running through the body of the Butler Study, 
the other artery was quality. Obviously, everyone wanted to fill the ranks of the Army 
with high-quality soldiers. However, in the extensive debates that soon followed—both 
in the Army and in Congress—quality took a back seat to quantity. Historically, the draft 
brought older, higher educated people into the Army. During Vietnam, however, a large 
number of enlistees were "draft motivated," that is, they enlisted for Army occupations of 
choice rather than face conscription into the combat arms and, consequently, combat 
duty in Vietnam.18 The Butler Study data revealed that "as age and educational levels 
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rise, so does draft motivation." In a post-Vietnam AVF, they expected draft motivation to 
disappear and the potential pool of recruits to consist largely of high school dropouts 
and a disproportionate percentage of economically challenged minorities. If true, the 
Army would be forced to lower recruiting standards in order to achieve manpower 
quotas, especially to fill the ranks of the combat arms.19 
 While the Traditionalists would remain skeptical, the Healers were hopeful that 
the right marketing campaign could attract quality recruits. In their minds, the 
reorganized post-Vietnam Army would finally receive significantly advanced 
technological weapons systems that would demand highly trained and skilled operators. 
The key to everything, they believed, was to make the Army more appealing to a new 
generation of youth. Because most of the Healers were very sympathetic to the views of 
the Traditionalists, the challenge was to make the Army more attractive without 
damaging traditions and sacrificing their view of professionalism. Above all else, the 
process of shaping and defining this challenge was what would separate the Healers 
from the Progressives in the decade to come. By December 1968, when Westmoreland 
received the Butler Study, these "camps" were still forming. In the following year, they 
would emerge more clearly as the first innovators initiated several independent 
experiments. 
 The Butler Study was important for several reasons. First, it dispelled the myth 
that the Army "was dragged reluctantly into the all-volunteer force era." During these 
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early years of debate and experimentation, many confused the Army's caution with 
obstructionism. "Psychologically at least the Army's leaders were thus prepared for the 
transition many months before it was officially ordered."20  Second, the study offered a 
realistic first appraisal that set an important foundation for the follow-on studies and 
experimental programs. Lastly, Butler's leadership of the project was first rate. As a 
psychologist, Butler most likely understood that the way ahead was all about human 
beings and the Army's ability to meet the needs of young people. Improvements would 
come, Butler asserted, "by paying more attention to soldiers as individuals:" 
Perhaps the most valuable byproduct of the [volunteer Army] effort is that, 
for the first time, the Army is taking a hard, scientific look at leadership and 
training. Old ways of doing things are being questioned. Human factors 
are receiving long-delayed attention.21 
 
 Nixon’s election victory over Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey on 
November 5, 1968, was hard fought. Winning with a margin of less than 0.7 percent of 
the popular vote, Nixon faced severe challenges in dealing with various social issues 
and problems. However, with the anti-war movement in full swing, he clearly received 
strong support from both political parties to address the unpopularity of the draft. On 
January 29, 1969, only nine days after his inauguration, President Nixon notified 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that he was committed to the creation of an all-
volunteer force. In a letter to Laird, Nixon asked for recommendations on potential 
members for an independent committee that Nixon intended to establish "to develop a 
detailed plan of action for ending the draft"22 Laird, who had previously advised Nixon to 
retain the draft until after Vietnam, recommended instead that the president keep such a 
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study in-house. Nixon rejected Laird's advice but allowed the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to conduct its own study. Laird wasted little time and appointed Roger T. Kelley, 
his new undersecretary of defense for manpower, to head up a study group called the 
Project Volunteer Committee. Although Laird prompted Kelley to begin working in late 
February, even before Kelley's confirmation, Laird delayed his announcement of 
Kelley's group until Nixon had formally announced the creation of his Commission on an 
All-Volunteer Armed Force on March 27, 1969. To head the committee, Nixon appointed 
former secretary of defense Robert Gates. Subsequently, the group would be known as 
the Gates Commission.23  
 Westmoreland, however, stayed one step ahead of Laird and Nixon. Having 
received a "bootleg" copy of Nixon's letter to Laird, the CSA initiated his own detailed 
study within days of Laird's letter. Although he planned to eventually utilize the Army 
study for input into the DOD study, he directed Lieutenant General Albert Connor, the 
DCSPERS, to keep their work “close hold” (i.e., confidential). At this point, 
Westmoreland had another advantage. Connor appointed Jack Butler to head the study 
group, which became known as Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE). 
In many ways, PROVIDE was a continuation of the Butler Study, completed only two 
months earlier, but much more in depth and comprehensive.24  
 Butler and the PROVIDE team started and completed their work within four 
months.25 This “broad-ranging and thoughtful effort [sought] to determine how the army 
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might stand a reasonable chance of achieving the objective of an all-volunteer army.”26 
The final report, delivered to Westmoreland in June (and only one month after the first 
meeting of the Gates Commission), concluded that an all-volunteer army was feasible 
but that it would be very expensive and still might not attract enough recruits. Indeed, 
the study anticipated that “if the draft were ended and no additional incentives were 
available, the Army would be down to a strength of 577,000 by 1979—far below the pre-
Vietnam strength of 950,000. The . . . costs estimated to maintain post-Vietnam 
strengths at 950,000 on a volunteer basis [ranged from] $2.2 billion to $8.1 billion.”27 
The Butler Report cautioned that the Army had to remove “irritants” in Army life and field 
an extensive number of recruiters, backed by an annual advertising campaign budget of 
$36 million (a twelve-fold increase up from 3 million) to attract enough enlistees. In 
terms of the former, the report offered a number of lifestyle changes that could 
potentially improve a soldier’s life in the Army.28  
 In retrospect, the original Butler Report and the follow-on PROVIDE Study did 
little to eliminate the skepticism of the Traditionalists and served to bolster the concerns 
of the Healers. In essence, it constituted the first reality check on the enormous scope 
of the transition to an all-volunteer force. In this regard, the findings were important in 
shaping the future framework of the formal experiments. For the early Progressives, 
PROVIDE offered a potential doorway to real reform, as the unilateral activities that 
were taking place at Fort Ord revealed (discussed below).      
                                                          
26. Bailey, America’s Army, 39. 
27. Lee and Parker, Ending the Draft, 53. 
28. It is unclear how much Davidson and the Fort Ord initiatives influenced the PROVIDE study. Their 
use of terms such as “irritants” and the similar recommendations would suggest some association. Note 
that this recognition of “irritants” is extremely important. It is the single core issue that lies at the center of 
all views on how to achieve an AVF and, more importantly, directly shapes the definitions of “leadership” 





 Westmoreland was more concerned about the president’s independent Gates 
Committee that was just beginning as the PROVIDE group completed its work in June 
1970. In his view, Jack Butler was doing well in defining the real barriers to the 
transition. However, this was a process that was confined to the Army and under the full 
control and protection of the CSA. The Gates Commission, on the other hand, was 
tasked with the same effort at the national level, concerned with all of the armed 
services, and under strong influence from both the president and Congress. In this 
arena, the CSA held little sway. 
 Historians have well chronicled the dynamics and inner working of the Gates 
Commission. All have concluded that the members never really addressed whether the 
United States should have an AVF but rather how the government would achieve one.29 
This occurred because the economists on the commission—Alan Greenspan and Milton 
Friedman—largely dominated the discussions. In short, the feasibility question was 
viewed as an economic problem, that is, a supply and demand problem that required a 
strong marketing effort as well as wages and other incentives that could successfully 
compete with the private sector. In other words, the AVF was very achievable; all the 
Army had to do was make soldiering more attractive by removing some “irritants” and 
paying the volunteers well.30 
 The two military members of the Gates Commission, General Lauris Norstad and 
General Alfred M. Gruenther, exercised little influence during the study. Both were 
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strong Traditionalists and highly respected former NATO supreme allied commanders 
during the Eisenhower administration. Norstad (West Point class of 1930) had retired 
from the Air Force in 1963, and Gruenther (West Point class of 1917) had retired from 
the Army in 1956.31 During the course of the study, the economists’ positions clearly 
overshadowed the generals’ views. Indeed, the majority of the commission, consumed 
with manpower and economic issues, largely ignored the generals’ input as well as the 
Army’s non-economic responses to the draft report in January 1970. However, in 
seeking a unanimous endorsement for the final report, Gates entertained Norstad’s 
argument that “the AVF would lead to inferior enlisted men,” and Gruenther’s concerns 
that the AVF would create “a military elite.” To assuage both concerns in order to garner 
their endorsements, Gates and the committee agreed to recommend a “standby draft” in 
event of a national emergency.32 By February 23, 1970, when Nixon formally received 
the final report—and endorsed it with an executive order in April to end the draft by July 
1973—it was clear to the Army that the AVF was definitely coming. The primary 
question at that point was what an all-volunteer army would look like. 
The Progressives Emerge   
 As distasteful as the AVF appeared to many of the Army’s NCOs and officers 
(the Traditionalists), some forward-thinking officers saw the handwriting on the wall and 
began to take independent action to prepare for an all-volunteer army. In June 1969, as 
his peers were testifying before the Gates Commission in Congress, Major General 
Phillip Davidson assumed command of Fort Ord, California, then a major training 
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installation of the Army. This proved to be a fortuitous assignment in terms of setting the 
foundation for the future work of the Progressives. 
 Davidson was clearly a bit of an enigma. As a close associate of Westmoreland, 
and based on his extensive military career, outwardly he appeared to be a 
Traditionalist.33 In retrospect, however, he was a Progressive and an intellectual from 
the humanities who demonstrated adaptive thinking and higher-order thinking skills by 
his strong embrace of innovation in anticipation of a future AVF. He showed a strong 
“willingness to experiment” and “over the years had developed his own system of 
organizational analysis and management that he invariably applied to any new job.”34 
Only one month after assuming command of Fort Ord, Davidson formed the Training 
Management Evaluation Committee (TMEC). Because Fort Ord was a training 
installation largely charged with preparing soldiers for tours of duty in Vietnam, 
Davidson’s interests were directed at improving the management of basic and 
advanced soldier skills.35 His overarching goal was to overhaul the entire training 
program in order to reduce the costs of training without lowering the level of 
performance (i.e., improving organizational effectiveness). Indicative of the emphasis he 
placed on the initiative, Davidson appointed some of his best commanders to staff the 
TMEC. To chair the committee, Davidson chose his 1st Brigade commander, Colonel 
Martin J. Slominski. 
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 Davidson also turned to the civilian world for expertise with the TMEC. Unusual 
for this time, Davidson had previously sought external advice and assistance to improve 
his organization when he served as the commandant of the Army Security Agency 
(ASA) School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts from 1963 to 1965. As commandant, 
Davidson had undertaken radical improvements in intelligence training and had solicited 
the help of an academic psychologist, Dr. William R. Tracey, whose work in the 1960s 
and 1970s focused on training organizations from a systems perspective.36    
 For research assistance with his initiatives at Fort Ord, Davidson contracted with 
the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO). HumRRO was founded in 
1951 by psychologist Dr. Meredith P. Crawford as an R&D center located at George 
Washington University in Washington, DC, and funded by the Department of the 
Army.37 In 1963, HumRRO relocated to Alexandria, Virginia, and in 1969 became an 
independent nonprofit corporation chartered in the District of Columbia.38 Throughout 
the 1950s, HumRRO expanded its work with the Department of Defense and became a 
significant behavioral science research asset for the Army. By 1954, HumRRO had 
conducted more than 100 studies, although the vast majority of these were focused on 
training methodologies that would assist in improving soldier skills such as gunnery, 
map reading, and the use of training devices.39 Because the Army had always believed 
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that leadership should be a function of personnel administration and management, all 
HumRRO contracts were overseen by the DCSPERS.40 By 1969, HumRRO had proven 
itself as a valuable resource for new training methodologies and improvements. 
Davidson’s strong embrace of HumRRO, specifically Division 3 under the directorship of 
Dr. Howard H. McFann, ensured that the TMEC would consider and include modern 
social science research findings in their recommendations.41 More importantly, this 
strong working relationship would later carry over into the Army’s formal 
experimentations with new programs designed to appeal to the volunteer soldier.  
 With adequate command emphasis and internal and external resources 
supporting the committee’s efforts, the TMEC acted quickly. In addition to thoroughly 
analyzing the Fort Ord Training Center environment, committee members separated 
into eighteen “task forces” to address specific topics and to conduct fact finding visits to 
the Army’s other training centers at Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Jackson, South 
Carolina; and Fort Polk, Louisiana. The majority of the eighteen task forces explored 
more deeply or expanded upon subject areas that HumRRO researchers had 
specialized in since the early 1950s. However, two subject areas targeted new and 
innovative initiatives that the Traditionalists would question or resist. The first involved a 
serious attempt to identify the numerous nonoperational or nonessential tasks that 
consumed almost every waking moment of a soldier’s service life. For example, Task 
Force C-6 explored ways to reduce the impact on training of administration 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
performed their skills and how officers rewarded or punished soldiers for good or poor performances. 
Indeed, the oldest division of HumRRO, the Training and Methods Division, would dominate for many 
decades.  
40. This responsibility is especially important to note because later this continued belief would serve 
as a critical obstacle for the institutionalization of OD throughout the Army.  




requirements associated with guard, fatigue, and burial details; kitchen police (KP); and 
medical and dental appointments. Task Force C-7 wanted to improve post services for 
soldiers by relating operating hours of post activities to the training mission (minimum 
activities they studied included the post exchange, concessions, commissary, central 
issue facility, weapons and equipment pool, clothing sales store, and clothing issue 
branch). The second subject area, Task Force P-3, worked to develop policies and 
procedures to improve trainee motivation and morale. This area had direct implications 
for the Progressives and their future advocacy for OD.42    
 In retrospect, it is clear that Task Force P-3 had the most difficult assignment. 
Fortunately, Davidson recognized this and pulled Fort Ord’s deputy chief surgeon, 
Colonel Llewellyn Legters, to lead this work. Letgers carried a lot of credibility with 
Davidson. A veteran of Vietnam with the 82nd Airborne Division and the 5th Special 
Forces Group, he was known to Davidson as someone who could “express his views in 
a compelling manner.”43    
 Letgers, a specialist in tropical medicine and viruses, realized immediately that 
he needed the expertise of a behavioral scientist and enlisted Fort Ord’s chief 
psychologist, Lieutenant Colonel William E. Datel, who had already established a strong 
reputation in psychological research. Recently, Datel had served as the chief of the 
Department of Clinical and Social Psychology at the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research where his personal interests focused on the field of achievement motivation in 
military environments. Later, Davidson would comment that Datel was a brilliant 
scientist and psychologist: “I unleashed him and sometimes wondered what the hell I’d 
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unleashed. . . . [He had] a lot of common sense and wasn’t swept away with these 
charts and things. He was inclined to give you broad interpretations and then to relate to 
the real life situation.”44   
 The most difficult elements of Task Force P-3’s work dealt with examining the 
psychological factors of motivation and morale. After much discussion, they defined 
motivation as “those forces which impinged on the individual from the environment” and 
morale as “the individual’s state of feeling, or attitude, [that] was considered to reside 
within the individual.”45 From there, the vast majority of their work employed quantitative 
research methods that resulted in the development of motivational survey tools. They 
then utilized these tools to survey the likes and dislikes of basic training graduates. In 
the final analysis, the researchers found that the training programs were culturally 
dysfunctional and rested on a strong foundation of punitive methods. In late 1970, 
Letgers and Datel published their research in the Journal of Biological Psychology. In 
their article they stated that 
military traditionalists may argue that it is necessary to "break" the recruit 
to make him into a well-disciplined soldier, fully obedient to orders, and 
totally committed to the service. It is implicit in this view that basic training 
is primarily an initiation rite. The new recruit must submit, surrender, 
abjure, and sacrifice to become a full-fledged member.    
     Ritualistic initiation rites ordinarily involve some kind of suffering, 
relinquishment, or self-abuse on the part of the initiate. In basic training, 
this requirement is apparently fulfilled by stripping the trainee of his 
personal identity, and by constant reminders of his demeaning status. The 
value or ethic seems to be that the initiation process (with its indignities 
and devaluation of self) is absolutely necessary to bind the individual to 
his new reference group. . . . If the initiation or "conversion” process is 
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foregone, the argument runs that the soldier will be less fully committed to 
the military subculture and may renege in the heat of battle.  
     Our position is otherwise. Our findings suggest that the new recruit 
already accepts the necessities of military duty and the legitimacy of 
military service. He enters the Army willingly and in good faith. It is 
superfluous—but more important, it is psychologically destructive—to 
undertake a process of forced re-education and commitment.46   
 
Real, substantive results came out of Task Force P-3’s survey work. In addition to 
finding many administrative areas of improvement, most of which were useful to the 
other TMEC task forces, the researchers discovered that the vast majority of young 
soldiers valued time off and promotion in rank above all other forms of merit and 
positive conditioning (to include military awards).  
 The most important experiment involved the creation of company trainee 
councils. The task force recommended this novel idea because such councils would 
improve communication up and down the chain of command and would thus serve to 
“de-emphasize aversions.”47 For that era, this recommendation was viewed as far too 
liberal and radical. Allowing recruits to voice opinions, let alone criticisms or suggestions 
for change, directly challenged the omnipotent authority of the drill instructors. Indeed, 
even Letgers showed “considerable trepidation” in presenting the idea to Davidson.48 
 By the end of September 1969, the TMEC had largely completed its work and on 
November 2 briefed their findings to Davidson. To everyone’s surprise, Davidson 
accepted every recommendation from all eighteen work groups. The trainee councils 
proved to be one of the first new initiatives that Davidson implemented, with a post 
regulation formally establishing the councils in February 1970. 
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 Davidson was pleased with this extensive effort, which also had caught the 
attention of his commander, Lieutenant General Stanley R. “Swede” Larsen, and 
Larsen’s boss, General James K. “Gentleman Jim” Woolnough. Both of these West 
Point–educated commanders, seasoned combat infantry officers with several wars 
under their belts, were eager to hear about Davidson’s experiments. In a briefing on 
November 10, 1969, Davidson explained to them the new ideas and experiments in 
trainee motivation and morale. While we may never know why these two strong 
Traditionalists allowed Davidson such free reign, especially given the managerial culture 
of the time and the challenges of supplying fresh combat troops to Vietnam in 1969, it is 
significant that they were open to new ideas about training improvements. Both were 
serving in their last years of very long careers, neither in positions that directly 
influenced the introduction of the all-volunteer army. Most likely, they harbored strong 
feelings at that time about the need to more effectively train soldiers. Perhaps they were 
concerned about reports coming out of Vietnam at this time that indicated deterioration 
in the quality of infantrymen. Only weeks before, the combat refusal of A Company, 
196th Infantry Brigade in Vietnam had been highly publicized in the press.49   
 The Army OE Program owed a debt of gratitude to the adaptive thinking of 
Davidson. At a time when none of the other training centers were taking risks with new 
ideas or conducting experiments, Davidson questioned some time-honored 
assumptions about the Army’s training culture and sought assistance from multiple 
sources, both military and civilian. While these training improvement activities were far 
from any OD education and practices, collectively they constituted a giant step in that 
                                                          





direction, especially in light of the work accomplished on the factors of morale and 
motivation. The most significant result of Davidson’s actions was that, though never 
formally concluded, they were allowed to progress beyond his command tenure at Fort 
Ord, which ended in June 1971. Davidson had put the Army on notice that Fort Ord was 
an innovative, forward thinking training center. His successor, Major General Harold 
“Hal” Moore, would comment in 1972 that “Fort Ord was to go on to become a sort of 
field test training center where new ideas, both self-generated and otherwise, were very 
carefully tried and evaluated.”50      
 Phil Davidson was not the only adaptive thinker taking command of an infantry 
division in mid-1969. Thirteen hundred miles to the east, Major General Bernard 
“Bernie” Rogers took the helm of the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, 
three months after Davidson’s appointment at Fort Ord. At Fort Carson, Bernie Rogers 
would begin his ten-year effort to humanize Army leadership and, in the process, 
become the “Godfather” of the Army OE program.51 
 Rogers was a unique Army officer. He had that rare ability to excel both as an 
infantry soldier and as an intellectual.52 Rogers graduated from West Point in 1943 and, 
like Westmoreland, was First Captain of the Corps of Cadets. Upon graduation, Rogers 
was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry and assigned to the 275th Infantry 
Regiment of the 70th Infantry Division, which had just been activated for deployment to 
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Europe.53 Interestingly, Rogers instead stayed at West Point as an instructor of 
economics, government, and history from 1944 to 1946, a very unusual posting for such 
a young officer. The exceptional assignments continued. From 1946 to 1947, Rogers 
served as the aide to the Commander of the Sixth Army (and US High Commissioner to 
Austria), General Mark W. Clark.54 From 1947 to 1950, he attended Oxford University, 
England, as a Rhodes scholar, where he received bachelor and master of arts degrees 
in philosophy, politics, and economics. Following his graduation, Rogers became the 
aide to the Chief of Army Field Forces for the years 1950 and 1951.55 
 Although Rogers had yet to serve in an infantry unit, he attended the Infantry 
Officers Advanced Course in 1952 and then deployed to Korea where, as a major, he 
commanded the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry (“Indian Head”) 
Division. After six months on the line, Rogers once again found himself serving at the 
highest levels when he was assigned as the aide-de-camp to General Mathew Ridgway, 
the commander in chief (CINC) of the United Nations Command, Korea.56 When the war 
ended in July 1953, Rogers remained on the Far East Command’s (FECOM) staff as an 
intelligence staff officer in the intelligence section. 
 Rotating back to the United States in 1954, Rogers spent at year at the US Army 
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth before re-joining the Indian 
Head Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. This assignment became another opportunity 
to lead infantry soldiers as commander of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry 
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Regiment. After his successful command tenure, the Army pulled Rogers into the 
Pentagon where he served as the executive and senior aide to the CSA—General 
Maxwell Taylor.57 Rogers developed a close mentorship with Taylor that endured for the 
remainder of their lives.58 The timing of this assignment also played a key role in 
preparing Rogers for more senior-level positions. Being the executive during Taylor’s 
last year as President Eisenhower’s CSA, Rogers witnessed first-hand the enormous 
friction between the two. Taylor had been a strong critic of Eisenhower’s national 
defense policy—“the New Look”—which relied heavily on America’s nuclear capabilities 
and greatly subordinated the Army’s conventional roles and missions. His disagreement 
with Eisenhower led him to retire in July 1959 and to air his arguments openly with the 
publication of his book The Uncertain Trumpet in January 1960.59 When John Kennedy 
succeeded Eisenhower, the new president leaned heavily on Taylor for his counsel and 
assistance as the Kennedy Administration adopted a new national security policy known 
as “Flexible Response.” Swimming in these political waters, Rogers gained significant 
insights into the inner workings of the top echelon of the Pentagon that would later 
serve him well.  
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 After attending the US Army War College and commanding the 1st Battle Group, 
19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division in Augsburg, Germany, Rogers returned to the 
Pentagon in late 1962 as the executive to the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Here, he 
remained for four years working again for his mentor Taylor (chairman from October 1, 
1962, to July 1, 1964) and Taylor’s successor, General Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler. Rogers 
thus was uniquely positioned to witness the growing escalation of the war in Vietnam for 
which he departed in 1966 to join the Big Red One.  
 In Vietnam, Rogers served from November 1966 to August 1967 as an assistant 
division commander in the 1st Infantry Division. During his time in Vietnam, he worked 
for major generals Bill DePuy (until 9 February 1967) and then John H. Hay, Jr., and 
participated in the planning and execution of two significant operations, Cedar Falls and 
Junction City.60 Because of Rogers’s deep involvement in both operations, 
Westmoreland requested that Rogers write the Army’s definitive account of both 
offensives. In doing so, Rogers drew important lessons on the criticality of low-level 
leadership. The squad- and platoon-sized combat that he witnessed in these operations 
was not dissimilar to his own experiences in the Korean War.61 
 In the summer of 1967, Rogers returned from Vietnam to his alma mater, the US 
Military Academy at West Point, to serve as Commandant of Cadets. Affected by his 
wartime experiences in both Korea and Vietnam, Rogers spoke often to the cadets 
about the criticality of effective small-unit leadership. For example, in his speech to the 
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first class cadets (seniors) in October 1967, he stressed decision making at the lowest 
organizational levels and the importance of trust throughout the chain of command.62 
His time at West Point also brought Rogers into contact with America’s youth, albeit 
some of the brightest in the nation, at a time when social unrest was reaching its peak, 
and the new president and commander-in-chief was calling for an end to the war and 
the draft. 
 Thus, going from West Point to Fort Carson to command an infantry division was 
much like stepping from the tranquility of a church into a rowdy bar. At that time, the 5th 
Infantry Division (the “Red Diamond Division”) was considered to be one of the most 
disorganized and unprepared units in the Army. Racial conflict and drug abuse were 
serious problems. The division also experienced a high turnover rate as soldiers rotating 
back from their tours of duty in Vietnam served out the remainder of their enlistments. 
Unlike most of the other Army infantry divisions that had enjoyed long-term stability and 
unit cohesion, the 5th had been splintered several times in recent years to augment 
other units bound for Vietnam.63       
 When Rogers took command of the 5th Infantry Division in September 1969, as 
one historian noted, Rogers inherited an organization “that suffered all of the problems 
associated with the U. S. Army of that period: high personnel turnover, crime, absences, 
drug abuse, and racial conflict.”64 Rogers commanded 26,000 soldiers, and his 
organizations experienced a 14 percent turnover rate each month. Approximately 60 
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percent of his soldiers were serving out the final few weeks of their post-combat tours of 
duty and enlistments. In short, organizational cohesion was practically non-existent.65   
 Sometime in the fall of 1969, after assessing all of the problems of his division, 
Rogers discarded the Army’s traditional methods for dealing with troublemakers—non-
judicial punishment—and abruptly changed tactics. Coincidentally mirroring the work 
that was underway with Letgers’s team on the TMEC at Fort Ord, Rogers reached out to 
the junior enlisted ranks to understand their issues.66 In bypassing the traditional chain 
of command downward—a behavior that irritated many Traditionalists—he personally 
devoted much time and attention listening to their complaints and grievances. Rogers 
quickly came to the conclusion that he needed a formal process and framework by 
which he and his leaders could listen, receive, and then act on legitimate issues. On 
February 17, 1970, Rogers issued Fort Carson Regulation No. 600-16, “Enlisted Men’s 
Council.”67  
 As a large combat unit, the organizational health issues were significantly more 
complex than those that Davidson faced at the training center at Fort Ord. At Fort Ord, 
the motive was to improve basic and advanced combat arms training for young soldiers 
who were new to the Army and would soon move on to field units around the world. At 
Carson, Rogers commanded a large combat infantry division that had a significant 
number of disgruntled soldiers, many of whom were drafted combat veterans with little 
love for the Army.  
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 For Rogers, the risks were significant. First and foremost, he risked alienating his 
subordinate officers and NCOs as he personally bypassed them to closely listen to the 
most junior soldiers in the division, a practice that they perceived as undermining their 
authority. Second, Rogers had to create a climate where soldiers would safely speak 
their minds without fear of retribution. His success depended on achieving real trust 
from both camps.  
 To earn this trust, Rogers was clear about his objectives and methods. His 
overarching goals were succinct: first, improve communications between enlisted men 
and their commanders; second, review and recommend changes in procedures, 
techniques, and policies that would improve conditions for the junior enlisted men, and 
third, “establish a means for airing complaints, suggestions, irritations, 
misunderstandings, and dissatisfaction among enlisted personnel.”68  To be fair to all 
commanders, Rogers stipulated that each level of command would create a council 
comprised of soldiers holding the rank of E4 or below (i.e., first-term enlistees). Soldiers 
were to elect members to their councils, and one member of each council would serve 
on the council of the next higher command. At the top, one member of each of the 
brigade level commands served on the Fort Carson Enlisted Men’s (EM) Council whose 
meetings Rogers attended.  
 The Traditionalists’ passive resistance was apparent from the start, so much so 
that Rogers was forced to relieve two brigade commanders and to issue a warning, via 
memorandum, to all of his commanders on February 26, only nine days after the 
regulation was published:  





It has come to the attention of this headquarters that some commanders 
are not selecting enlisted men to be representatives on referenced council 
in accordance with the Commanding General’s desires. The enlisted men 
representatives on this council will be those selected by the enlisted men 
and not those hand-picked by the commanders. In addition, the chairman 
of the council will be selected by the council itself.69   
 
To ensure compliance, Rogers, with unusual enforcement, required each commander to 
personally phone in his acknowledgement of the order.70 
 The twenty-member Fort Carson EM Council, chaired by 20-year old combat 
veteran Specialist 4 Scott M. Gray, of the 43rd General Support Group, almost 
immediately gained real traction. Within four weeks, the lower-level councils established 
themselves, met for the first time, and elected representatives to serve on the higher 
level councils. By March 27, the Fort Carson council held its first meeting, which Rogers 
personally conducted. At this initial meeting, Rogers spoke briefly about his intentions 
and strong commitment to positive change. He then spent the next two hours listening. 
By the end of the meeting, the council had identified eighteen areas for improvement. 
Rogers accepted all eighteen and directed his staff to act on each recommendation.71 
By July 27, only four months after the first meeting, the EM Council had discussed 192 
items, identified 107 improvement initiatives, and implemented sixty-nine 
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recommendations.72 In the eight months that Rogers remained in command, the council 
implemented a total of 149 improvements. Rogers reviewed every recommendation and 
kept his soldiers informed by publishing frequent progress reports. Indicative of the 
emphasis that Rogers placed on the EM Council, the group met weekly for the 
remainder of Rogers’s command tenure.73 While many of these issues reflected lifestyle 
items, it is important to note that several dealt directly with human dignity, courtesy, and 
trust that soldiers felt were missing in their relationship with leaders. 
 As a testament to the effectiveness of these outcomes, Rogers received praise 
even from his staunchest critics. For example, draftee Specialist 5 William J. 
Rosendahl, a former college campus demonstrator “with a master’s degree in urban 
organizing and political views,” told reporters that “I’m committed to social change, I’m a 
political animal. . . . I had just about given up any hope of working for change within the 
system when Bobby [Senator Robert F. Kennedy] was shot. Now General Rogers has 
given me a new faith in that at least some people in the power structure are willing to 
listen.”74  
 On November 30, 1970, nine days before Rogers relinquished command, 
Westmoreland requested that Rogers brief the Army’s most senior leaders at the CSA’s 
annual Army Commanders Conference (discussed later). Aware of the successes at 
Fort Carson, Westmoreland wanted his other leaders to listen and follow suit, all the 
while knowing that Rogers’s audience was saturated with Traditionalists. Embedded in 
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his 3600-word address are clear examples of Rogers’s behavior as a strongly adaptive 
thinker. More importantly, he espoused some of the basic ideas behind transformational 
leadership. 
We have . . . revalidated the need for enlightened order and discipline in a 
military institution. We have found at close range the extent to which 
American society has changed—and is changing—and how these 
changes in turn impact upon the characteristics, qualities and attitudes of 
our customer today, the young soldier who comes to us from that society. 
     We have found . . . impediments to morale, spirit and unit effectiveness 
which are self-inflicted and which can be largely overcome. These lie 
within the realm of policies, procedures and practices which have built up 
over the years like barnacles on the bottom of an essentially sound ship. 
Individually, and at the time of initiation, each may well have been justified; 
but today some are irritants which impede progress. Part of our approach 
has been to question each one anew, holding nothing as sacrosanct 
except the need for basic discipline and the retention of the moral fiber of 
our service. Those practices found relevant in 1970 have been sustained; 
those which seem irrelevant have been changed or revoked where it lay 
within our authority to do so. 
     As we have looked at our programs and at our day-to-day conduct of 
business, we have tried to keep in mind the societal changes and 
characteristics which affect our soldiers. . . . I speak of such qualities of 
our customer as their desire to participate in the administration and policy-
making of the institution of which we are a part . . . their curiosity, asking 
“why,” and not prepared to settle for answers based on faith, authority, or 
“We’ve always done it that way;” their being prepared to stand up and be 
counted, to speak their piece, tell it to us as it is; their being intellectually 
better prepared than was my generation. . . .75 
 
Rogers stated strongly that every leader had a responsibility to “question all our 
practices, as opposed to principles, in terms of validity in 1970,” and to “remove the burs 
from under our saddles, where indicated.” Finally, we must “develop new approaches to 
old and new problems, seeking to capitalize on the positive qualities of today’s soldiers, 
and thus to elicit their positive support of us and our mission.”  In a nod toward the 
heated debates of that time over draft reform and the AVF, Rogers cautioned that these 
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were behaviors that were required of leaders at all times “whether draft or zero draft 
[i.e., AVF], but the commitment to zero-draft makes them all the more essential.”76 
Bad News and Bad Leaders 
 The importance in the timing and substance of Rogers’s speech cannot be 
understated. By November 1970, the nation and the Army had already experienced a 
gut-wrenching year. Twelve months earlier, in November 1969, the largest anti-war 
demonstration to date was held in Washington, and from then on, the anti-war 
movement picked up tremendous momentum.77 Six months after that, on May 4, 1970, 
during an anti-war demonstration on the campus of Kent State University in northern 
Ohio, Ohio National Guardsmen shot and killed four students, sparking more than 500 
follow-on demonstrations across the country. Two weeks after the shootings, the rock 
group Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young released the popular song “Four Dead in Ohio,” 
which was immediately picked up as an unofficial anthem of the anti-war movement. 
Like others, the Kent State demonstration had been a reaction to events taking place in 
Vietnam. Despite the President’s promise to de-escalate the war and to bring the boys 
home, US forces invaded Cambodia on April 30, an operation the Johnson 
administration had always forbidden. By the time of Rogers’s appearance at the Army 
Commanders Conference in November 1970, US troop strength in Vietnam was in 
decline but still remained at more than 334,000,78 and American deaths had averaged 
more than 500 per month for the year.79 In addition to dealing with the difficult 
disengagement from the war in Southeast Asia, senior Army leaders were faced with 
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the Army officer corps’ most serious crisis in its history, brought on by the revelations 
that American soldiers had massacred 504 civilians on March 16, 1968. The 
subsequent investigations revealed that leadership in the Army was severely broken.80 
 Twenty months passed between the time the atrocities occurred and the time 
they were published by journalist Seymour Hersh. During that time, the killings went 
unreported as officers in the division involved attempted to cover up the event. It may 
have remained buried if not for the efforts of Ron Ridenhour, a Vietnam veteran turned 
journalist who had heard about the actions of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th 
Infantry Brigade of the 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division. At the center of the atrocity was 
the platoon leader of Charlie Company’s 1st Platoon, Second Lieutenant William L. 
“Rusty” Calley, the one who ordered the shootings and who conducted many of the 
killings himself. In early April 1969, troubled by the accounts he knew, Ridenhour wrote 
to thirty congressional representatives and senators describing what he had heard. His 
own congressman, Morris Udall, acted on the information by informing the Pentagon.81 
 Westmoreland received Udall’s report immediately but found it difficult to believe. 
“Despite the obvious sincerity displayed by Ridenhour, I found it beyond belief that 
American soldiers, as he alleged, engaged in mass murder of unarmed South 
Vietnamese civilians.”82 He asked MACV Headquarters in Saigon about the allegations 
and received the reply that something unusual had indeed occurred in that area during 
the time reported. At that point, the Inspector General’s office became involved and, 
soon thereafter, a formal investigation began with the Army’s Criminal Investigation 
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Division (CID). By early fall, CID investigators had uncovered enough evidence that 
indicated a possible cover-up to warrant a formal, independent inquiry. To lead such an 
inquiry, Westmoreland turned to a man who had an impeccable reputation for integrity 
within the officer corps—Lieutenant General William R. “Ray” Peers.  
 Ray Peers, with a flat boxer’s nose and always seen chomping on a cigar, was a 
warrior’s warrior long before Vietnam. Commissioned in 1938 with a degree in 
education from the University of California at Los Angeles, he served in the Second 
World War with the Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) elite Detachment 101 in Burma, 
worked for the CIA after the war, returned to Burma during the Korean War to organize 
resistance groups against Communist Chinese forces and, during the first years of the 
Vietnam War, served in several high positions within the special operations community 
before taking several command positions in Vietnam. Peers had an exemplary 
reputation within the officer corps. Since he was not a military academy graduate, “there 
could be no presumption that ties among brother officers from West Point would be 
involved”.83 
 On November 26, 1969, the secretary of the Army (Resor) and Westmoreland 
issued a joint memorandum directing Peers to conduct an investigation.84 It is important 
to note that the Peers inquiry was not established to investigate the atrocities for 
prosecution, a common misperception due to the detailed facts that it uncovered. The 
appointment memo clearly stated that the Peers Inquiry ”will be concerned with the time 
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period beginning March 1968 until Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour sent his letter, dated March 
29, 1969, to the Secretary of Defense and others. The scope of your investigation does 
not include, nor will it interfere with, ongoing criminal investigations in progress.”85 In 
other words, Peers was directed to identify leadership failures at all levels of command 
in both the actions of the participants and, more importantly, in the attempts by the 
senior leaders to cover up the war crimes.  
 Westmoreland was clearly committed to uncovering the truth. Alert to the 
damage that the atrocity inflicted on the Army’s integrity and reputation, Westmoreland 
took special care in selecting impartial members of the inquiry team and essentially 
granted Peers total autonomy and unlimited resources. Peers, sensitive to any potential 
criticism from Congress and the press as to the impartiality of the Army investigating 
itself, requested the participation of two highly respected civilian attorneys— Robert 
“Bob” MacCrate and Jerome “Jerry” Walsh.86 
 Working long hours throughout the length of the investigation, to include 
Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s Eve, Peers and his team interviewed 
hundreds of potential witnesses, including villagers living in the My Lai area. The Peers 
Report, released on March 14, 1970, almost two years after the massacre, was a 
scathing indictment of the many NCOs and officers involved in the cover-up. As Peers 
noted in the opening paragraph of his 1979 account, “in analyzing the entire episode, 
we found that the principal breakdown was in leadership. Failures occurred at every 
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level within the chain of command, from individual noncommissioned-officer squad 
leaders to the command group of the division.”87   
 The voluminous report offered indisputable evidence that a cover-up had 
occurred up the chain of command and into the general officer ranks. The most senior 
officer involved was the Americal Division commander, Major General Samuel Koster, a 
close friend of Peers, who had since returned from Vietnam to serve in the coveted 
position of Superintendent of West Point. In drafting the final report, Peers was adamant 
that it include a final chapter on how such an event could have occurred. Although his 
colleagues recommended against it, Peers “felt strongly that if we are going to include 
the details of the operation we should provide some explanation of why it had 
developed into a massacre.”88 These reasons included racist attitudes of American 
soldiers toward the Vietnamese population; lack of proper training; psychological factors 
(unnecessary fear and apprehension); organizational problems (the incoherency of the 
task force composition); inadequate plans and orders; the nature of the enemy 
(insurgents); the attitude of local South Vietnamese government officials (in believing 
that the My Lai inhabitants were all Viet Cong); and, most importantly, leadership. The 
list of leadership failures was long and included signs of careerism with the company 
grade officers of the task force competing for the highest body count. To Peers, 
“perhaps the outstanding command failure on the day of the operation was that not a 
single commander landed his helicopter to check on the conduct and progress of the 
operation.”89 
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 Peers’s outrage, at both the massacre and the cover-up as well as at the failure 
of the Army to punish those responsible (all but Lieutenant Calley), was apparent in his 
1979 writings. He recounted how he approached Westmoreland to offer up his personal 
thoughts on the entire matter, which the CSA welcomed. Dated March 18, 1970, 
Peers’s memo is a timeless testament to sound leadership:  
[T]here can be no vacillation with the truth. . . . [O]fficers who [do so] 
violate their commission. . . . [A]n officer’s highest loyalty is to the Army 
and the nation. On those rare occasions when people around him engage 
in activities clearly wrong and immoral, he is required by virtue of his being 
an officer to take whatever remedial action is required, regardless of the 
personal consequences.90    
 
 Westmoreland sent Peers’s memo to Lieutenant General Walter “Dutch” Kerwin, 
the DCSPERS, with a directive “to study it and submit recommendations based upon 
it.”91 Peers then did something that would have a profound effect on the future birth of 
the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program. He handed Westmoreland a personal 
note stating that “something had gone terribly wrong within the Army officer corps.” This 
simple act resulted in the production of one of the most significant studies to ever come 
out of the USAWC. 
Introspection 
 Jolted by the confidential note that was derived from Peers’s clear outrage over 
the war crimes at My Lai, Westmoreland moved aggressively to investigate the health of 
his beloved officer corps. In Westmoreland's mind, leadership failures of this scope, if 
true, directly threatened the professionalism of the Army. Again leveraging his power 
and authority to launch high-level studies, the CSA turned to the Army War College, the 
hallmark of Army professionalism, to conduct an independent inquiry into the state of 
                                                          





leadership and professionalism in the Army’s officer corps. Westmoreland wanted this 
study completed in ten weeks—a remarkably short time frame for a study of this nature 
and complexity. 
 To do so, the Commandant of the Army War College, Major General George S. 
Eckhardt, selected his best people to lead the study group. Eckhardt chose two up-and-
coming lieutenant colonels from his faculty: Walter “Walt” F. Ulmer, Jr., and Dandridge 
M. “Mike” Malone. Ulmer was a 1952 graduate of West Point and an armor officer who 
spent time in his career in Japan and Korea, taught at West Point, deployed to Vietnam, 
where he worked in MACV and as a senior advisor to a Vietnamese Infantry regiment, 
and served tours with the 82nd Airborne Division as a company and a squadron 
commander. A graduate of the Command and General Staff College  as well as the 
Army War College, he remained at the latter as a member of the faculty. In contrast, 
Mike Malone began his Army career as an enlisted infantry soldier and fought in the 
Korean War. After his enlistment, he earned a bachelor of science degree from 
Vanderbilt University and a master of science degree from Purdue. Malone served in 
the Army for almost thirty years and gained a reputation for his teachings and writings 
on small-unit leadership.92 
 Ulmer, Malone, and their team launched the study on April 21, 1970, only three 
days after Westmoreland drafted his written directive to do so.93 The study group 
utilized a mixture of quantitative and qualitative social science research methods. In 
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determining their methodology, they succinctly recognized the interdisciplinary nature of 
the term “professionalism.”94   
Military professionalism involves a whole panorama of disciplines of 
varying precision and sophistication. Exactly what it encompasses—either 
quantitatively or qualitatively—is a matter of widely differing opinion. But 
the focal point of the profession is clearly man himself: as an individual, a 
member of a number of groups and sub-groups, and a product of his 
culture. The behavioral sciences, with their reliance on intuitive judgment 
and their preoccupation with being as unemotional and non-subjective as 
possible, represent the primary disciplines which would be the theoretical 
framework for further and more abstract exploitations of the content of this 
report. The foundations of this study were the perceptions of the existing 
climate by members of the Officer Corps. Regardless of whether all of 
these are in accord with the facts, they appear to reflect accurately the 
widespread convictions within the Officer Corps as to what the facts are.95 
 
Consequently, they relied heavily on recent military personnel studies as well as 
academic references from the fields of social psychology, sociology, and personnel 
management.96  
 The study group quickly realized that the primary problem with the health of the 
officer corps, and central to all other issues and observations, was the large gap 
between the Army’s stated, written, and espoused standards (i.e., values and 
behaviors), and those standards actually practiced. This gap, which the group termed 
“climate,” was so large and prevalent that it defined a corrupt culture of careerism that 
permeated the entire officer corps. Standards of behavior and values were routinely 
verbalized but infrequently demonstrated because the promotion system rewarded 
perfection and statistically cited results. For officers to earn promotions, they had to 
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show perfect records of achievement. The slightest blemish or mistake could mean the 
end of one’s career. Consequently, a culture of careerism formed. 
 The culture of the Army officer corps had become dysfunctional over time. 
Vietnam did not create this poor state of affairs—the entire Department of Defense 
throughout the 1960s had adopted and institutionalized systems of quantitative 
measurements (i.e., McNamara’s systems analysis) and resource management.97 
However, Vietnam came to showcase the insufficiency and misuse of statistics to prove 
combat success. High body counts and the capture of enemy weapons and supplies 
highlighted every after action report (AAR), and higher levels of command tallied their 
subordinates’ AARs to illustrate that Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition warfare was 
working. If anything, the Peers Report had shown the worst-case example of this 
system gone awry. By 1970, however, careerism was out of control and had all but 
destroyed effective leadership throughout the institution.  
 To make best use of the short time available and to cast as wide a net as 
possible to solicit adequate participation, Ulmer, Malone, and their team visited six Army 
schools.98 Officers attending military schools were usually between military assignments 
and not typically members of any field units, thus representing participant groups of 
individuals who had recently completed tours of duty from practically every field unit in 
the Army. More importantly, the schools offered “safe” environments in which officers 
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could speak their opinions without fear of repercussions. The team conducted twenty-
five group discussions, each lasting two hours, with officers ranging in rank from captain 
through colonel. Of the 450 participants, 250 were students at the various schools, while 
the other 200 were students and faculty members at the Army War College.99       
 As articulated in the final report, fourteen themes emerged to define the climate 
of the Army officer corps, that is, the gap between the ideal and the existing values and 
standards of behavior. The ideal climate was characterized by “individual integrity, 
mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and an 
unconstrained flow of information,” almost all basic tenets of transformational 
leadership.100 However, the report concluded that the existing climate 
includes persistent and rather ubiquitous overtones of: selfish behavior 
that places personal success ahead of the good of the service; looking 
upward to please superiors instead of looking downward to fulfill the 
legitimate needs of subordinates; preoccupation with the attainment of 
trivial short-term objectives even through dishonest practices that injure 
the long-term fabric of the organization; incomplete communications 
between junior and senior which leave the senior uninformed and the 
junior feeling unimportant; and inadequate technical or managerial 
competence to perform effectively the assigned duties.101 
 
 While the surveys offered consistent quantitative data to draw such conclusions, 
the individual comments of the discussion groups qualitatively depicted the negative 
impact of the climate. These extensive comments revealed the real feelings and strong 
emotions of the participants. The consistency and pervasiveness of their experiences in this 
insular culture was striking and underscored the severe dysfunctions that the unemotional, 
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quantitative data indicated in formulating the fourteen themes.102 These themes, reduced 
to their basic foundations apparent in the officers’ comments, encompassed the following 
three areas: careerism ("zero defects," perfect statistics, “ticket punching,” and exemplary 
Officer Evaluation Reports – OERs); communication (listening, counseling, and permission 
to voice dissenting viewpoints); and standards of behavior (morals and ethics). Throughout 
almost all of the themes, many of the officer comments suggested a dire need for 
transformational/servant leadership behaviors. For example, one captain stated that “too 
many officers place the value of a high OER over the welfare of their men. . . . The 
Army should select men for command positions who have some backbone and who 
care about the unit and the men more than they care about their career.”103 One major, 
in recognizing that leadership is a social behavior that encourages open 
communications, stated that “only when a commander establishes an atmosphere of 
freedom of expression will he get accurate information and be believed when he gives 
his reasons. Training in really listening should be given to all commanders at every 
echelon. They have to hear what is being said. . . .”104 Finally, perhaps the most 
poignant comment came from one captain who believed that “the subordinate who even 
suspects that his superior "gives a damn” for him will give, without demand, more 
“followship” [sic] than a leader ever dared hope for.”105  
 Embedded throughout the report was a realization that a generation gap existed 
within the officer corps. The authors of the study specifically noted this when they observed 
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that the higher-ranking officers perceived less of a gap between espoused and practiced 
values. The “apparent grouping of officers of lieutenant through major in one group, and 
lieutenant colonel and colonel in another . . . could be considered a military "generation 
gap."106 While this gap did not reflect any major differences in the general weltanschauung of 
junior and senior officers, it did shed light on their different perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors 
as Army leaders. A major commented that “too many colonels and generals appear to want 
all junior officers to suffer like they did.” One officer commented that “I feel that many 
senior officers need exposure to modern concepts of personnel management, 
communication techniques, motivation, and the need for self-actualization that young 
officers [already] possess.”107   
 Frustration with their inability to interact and communicate with senior officers 
underscored the majority of junior officer comments. They cited many reasons why strong 
barriers existed. Some commanders, the junior officers felt, only welcomed good news 
because bad news might reflect poorly on the command. Other seniors expected and 
demanded total loyalty from their subordinates but never reciprocated loyalty downward. 
This expectation of full and unquestionable loyalty to the boss stifled risk-taking and 
innovation. A major noted that “our junior officers and NCOs are more intelligent and 
capable than ever before but they are afraid to make mistakes . . . [and] hesitate to 
make decisions because they fear they will lose respect or be clobbered by their 
seniors.”108 Suggestions or dissenting views were impossible to give for fear of career-
ending retributions and were considered a form of insubordination. One group stated 
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that if “we played devil’s advocate for about one millisecond . . . we were demolished 
immediately.”109   
 Overall, the study described a professional officer corps that, in many ways, did 
not resemble the trademarks of a “profession.” Unlike many other value-based 
professions where older and younger members routinely interact and openly share 
information with one another, professional orientations within the Army officer corps 
rested on a rigid stratification of peer year groups. Interactions occurred horizontally 
across rank structures but seldom vertically. Not only did this stratification block 
information flow, especially from the bottom up, it left junior officers feeling alone and 
isolated.110 Consequently, junior officers “learned” their profession by observing and 
mimicking their seniors.111 The authors noted that the junior officers really wanted to 
learn from their seniors. “Every junior officer group that we talked to was looking so 
strongly at their senior officers for a standard that they could follow that it almost hurt . . 
. the number of times that they felt they had been let down by looking for higher 
standards from the senior officers and not finding them.” The study summarized that 
overall 
junior officers expressed the view that they need counseling. They want it, 
they would like to be able to talk to their senior officers but they find in 
their view a lack of interest. . . . [They expressed] a real need to be 
allowed to make mistakes and to be counseled on their mistakes rather 
than have them reflected on their efficiency reports. . . . At the end of 
almost every seminar the officers would come up to us and say “thank you 
for letting us talk to a senior officer on the subject. This is the first time it 
has ever happened. And thanks for listening.”112 
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 For the senior officers who participated in the discussion group, the safe 
environment offered a rare opportunity to reflect. One colonel confessed that he and his 
peers would often fail “to pass on to junior officers results of their suggestions or outright 
ignoring them . . . [I]n some cases the upper levels of command actually are unaware 
that they are unapproachable.”113 One lieutenant colonel believed that “there is a crying 
need for majors through generals to do a better job of communicating with their 
subordinates on a very personal basis.”114 Finally, another colonel stated that “patience 
with and responsibility toward subordinates needs to be stressed at the highest level. 
We still treat our junior officers and enlisted men as things rather than as people.”115 
 Perhaps the most telling aspect of the study was the effect that the process had 
on the study group team itself—the senior officers from the USAWC. The report noted 
that 
they were impressed with the insight, energy, maturity, and outlook of the 
captains and majors particularly. And some of the team members felt that 
had they been somehow exposed to the barrage of unfiltered, 
straightforward perceptions of the junior officers a few years ago they 
would have done a better job as battalion commanders.116 
 
 The report concluded with thirty-one recommendations, some that the Army 
could implement immediately and others that would require additional study and 
resources. However, two overarching findings dominated the entire study. The first was 
the conclusion that the poor leadership climate within the Army officer corps was self-
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inflicted and did not arise from any negative influences from the “permissive” society.117 
The second conclusion was that the problem was not “self-correcting.”   
The pervasiveness of this climate, and the understandably human 
motive—such as drive for personal recognition—which tend to perpetuate 
the distortion of the professional ethic, indicate that the situation is 
probably not self-correcting. The strong desire expressed almost 
unanimously by officers to make the operative system more nearly perfect 
represents a healthy reservoir of energetic idealism. But the individual 
officer is greatly hampered in any local crusade for adherence to ideal 
methods by the need to produce results in order to remain competitive for 
future advancement. Change, therefore, must be instituted from the top of 
the Army. Admonition is not enough. The implementation of corrective 
measures must be comprehensive. . . .118 
 
 Ulmer and Malone completed their report on June 30, 1970, and personally 
presented their findings to Westmoreland during the first week of July. With a 
commanders conference underway at that time, quite a few senior officers were in 
attendance in the briefing room at the Pentagon. Several historians have recounted this 
briefing and Ulmer and Malone’s frank, professional delivery of unvarnished information 
that they knew “gored a sacred ox in the herd of [every] one of the generals present.”119 
At the end of their briefing the generals sat stunned and many expressed disbelief. 
Westmoreland himself “sat with a stunned expression. “I just can’t believe that,” he kept 
repeating, looking askance at the faces around the room.” “One three-star general stood 
and shouted, “that’s not the goddamn Army that I know!”120  
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 Obviously, this was not the message that the Army’s senior leaders wanted to 
hear. The Traditionalists and most Healers would soon discount or ignore the 
conclusion that external influences did not account for the poor climate and that the 
officer corps could not “self-correct.” At that time, though, Westmoreland was caught in 
a bind. While he personally believed that the Army officer corps was ethically sound 
(thinking that some bad officers had entered the ranks as the war demanded an 
unusually high number of lower-ranking officers), he could not ignore the report’s data 
and the participants’ testimonies. Aware that the clock was ticking on the elimination of 
the draft, Westmoreland had to act. What troubled the CSA most was the report’s first 
and foremost recommendation that the findings be released and shared with the entire 
Army. This, he concluded, he could not do for fear that the Army could not take another 
bloodbath in the media so soon after My Lai. Therefore, he informed Ulmer and Malone 
that they could brief their findings at the Army’s service schools but that the report was 
now classified “close hold”—meaning that its dissemination was strictly controlled. “Both 
Ulmer and Malone felt that Westmoreland was making a serious blunder. Without the 
study to provide a framework and context, the recommended changes would likely be 
seen as disjointed and piecemeal.”121 Subsequent events validated their concerns.  
 The 1970 Study on Military Professionalism was a milestone document that, 
historically, carries much more weight than most historians and writers have realized. It 
was the first and only time in the Army’s history that the institution examined—that is, 
questioned, scrutinized, and criticized—the integrity and ethical soundness of the officer 
corps and its leadership effectiveness. Ulmer and Malone noted this in the final report: 
“Seldom if ever has the Army looked inward to the value system of its Officer Corps 
                                                          




through the medium of organized study or empirical research.”122 In retrospect, this was 
a major turning point affecting the changes taking place that would determine the scope 
of any post-Vietnam transformation. Westmoreland, ever the cautious Healer, by 
subduing the impact of the report closed the door on any further introspection of the 
officer corps. This action allowed the Traditionalists and the Healers to focus exclusively 
on the enlisted corps as the Army headed toward the AVF. For the Progressives, 
Westmoreland’s actions served to make their work much more difficult. For the Army 
OE Program to succeed, it would need strong involvement from the officer corps in the 
years ahead.123   
Westmoreland and the All Volunteer Army 
 Despite his numerous shortcomings and cautions, Westmoreland showed strong 
stewardship of the institution with these demonstrations of pragmatism. With the Gates 
Commission report, the Butler Study, the PROVIDE Report, and now the USAWC Study 
on Military Professionalism in hand, the CSA moved assertively to formalize 
preparations for an all-volunteer army, despite harboring some private concerns and 
objections. If nothing else, all of these studies and findings strongly indicated that 
enormous change was required for the Army to move forward.  
 Westmoreland strongly signaled such change on October 13, 1970, when he 
leveraged the annual conference of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) to 
announce his full support for the AVF. AUSA was and remains a highly influential 
association comprised of current and former members of the Army, primarily officers and 
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senior NCOs, and key business executives with direct ties to the defense industry and to 
Congress. The Army has traditionally utilized this large forum to present new initiatives, 
showcase new systems and technological innovations, and promote discussions on 
operational and strategic directions. Historically, each CSA has leveraged the conference 
to articulate his current and future priorities. 
 On this day, the CSA was clear about his near-term priorities. Although he outlined 
few specifics, Westmoreland strongly stated that "the Army is committed to an all-out effort 
in working toward a zero-draft—a volunteer force." He told his audience that the Army had 
to change its personnel policies because they were damaging to recruiting and enlistments. 
The scope of these changes, he vaguely stated, would demand "dedicated and imaginative 
leadership at all levels of the Army." However, the most important—and only specific— 
action he announced was his appointment of a special project manager to lead the 
implementation of an all-volunteer army. The man he chose was well-respected Lieutenant 
General George I. Forsythe, Jr., then serving as the commanding general of the Army 
Combat Developments Command. Westmoreland considered Forsythe "to be an innovator 
and capable of independent thought and actions."124 Forsythe’s actions in the months 
ahead would prove Westmoreland right. George Forsythe was an adaptive thinker whose 
skills as a strong innovator and higher-order thinker would pave the road ahead for his 
fellow Progressives. 
 Because of his age and his participation in the Second World War, at first glance 
George Forsythe possessed the resume of a strong Traditionalist.  A 1939 ROTC graduate 
from Montana University, Forsythe was a career infantry officer who saw combat in the 
Pacific Theater of WWII in the invasion of Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands) in January 
                                                          




1944. He then transferred to the XIX Corps in England and participated in the planning for 
the invasion of Europe. Throughout the 1950s, Forsythe served in various command and 
staff positions in the United States and Germany. In June 1962, he occupied the 
gatekeeper position when he became executive officer and senior aide to the Army chief of 
staff (for both General George H. Decker and General Earle G. Wheeler). Promoted to 
brigadier general in August 1963, Forsythe went on to serve in command positions as the 
assistant division commander of the 25th Infantry Division, and later as commander of the 
1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam. In June 1969, he was appointed commandant of the US 
Army Infantry School.125 
 Like Bernie Rogers, somewhere along that successful conventional path Forsythe 
developed a reflective, humanistic mindset that genuinely viewed the Army through the 
eyes of junior enlisted soldiers. For example, in his initial address to the Infantry school in 
July 1969, he used terms that reminded everyone that the school was "an educational 
institution which is adapting to the technology of our times. . . . [W]e will always regard the 
individual officer and soldier as our greatest asset—our main point of focus. We are here to 
serve them, and you."126 The use of such terms is common today but was rare at that time.127 
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 Pulling him away from command, Westmoreland officially appointed Forsythe to the 
newly created position of Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA) on 
October 23, 1970. Forsythe told the CSA that he would accept the job but only on condition 
that he would not be a "three-star recruiter" and that he "would have a role in reforming the 
Army." Westmoreland granted Forsythe extensive autonomy and authority as well as direct 
access to the office of the CSA and the secretary of the Army.128   
 Forsythe wasted little time. In building his team from scratch, he began by 
surrounding himself with other innovative thinkers. For a short while, he had Jack Butler on 
his team (Butler had been promoted to Colonel and would leave SAMVA in June 1971 to 
attend the USAWC). Butler provided critical continuity from the Butler Study and the 
PROVIDE group to SAMVA.  More importantly, Forsythe was able to secure Colonel 
Robert M. Montague, Jr., as his first choice for "right-hand man." Fortuitously, Montague 
was currently holding a senior position under Rogers at Fort Carson and was deeply 
involved in Rogers’s initiatives there. Academically, Bob Montague had graduated number 
one in his West Point class of 1947 and later earned a master of science degree in nuclear 
physics from the University of Virginia. Montague was an artillery officer and had compiled a 
stellar record of achievement in various assignments both in the field and in Washington. In 
total, Montague served five years in Vietnam where, in one assignment, he played a key 
role in the US pacification program while working with Forsythe. Less than two years after 
joining Forsythe at SAMVA, Montague would step off the fast track to senior rank by retiring 
early as a brigadier general to become the Director of the Special Olympics, a position he 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
wrote would go out as I wrote them. That told me to do them right. I experienced some fine leaders over 
the years, but he was the best of the senior leaders, an exemplar, the helpful uncle to the willing 
colleague. But, alas, he was an exception. Many regarded by the system as leaders were, in fact, 
journeymen shouters who endorsed the ‘when in doubt, yell and shout’ principle.”   




sought without invitation.129 By his deeds and words, it is clear in retrospect that Montague 
shared the same view toward soldiers as did Forsythe and Rogers. 
 Almost immediately, Forsythe realized that he needed more time if he was to 
reform the Army in any meaningful way. Fortunately, the ongoing budget battles at the 
time of Forsythe's appointment offered up a solution. Although the Gates Commission had 
optimistically recommended that the AVF begin in mid-1971, now only eight months away, 
it was clear to the Army and the Nixon Administration that a two-year extension on the draft 
was essential not only to funding the AVF but also to supplying combat arms soldiers to the 
war in Vietnam. On January 28, 1971, Nixon informed the American public of his intent to 
ask Congress to extend the draft. Due largely to budgetary concerns, Congress debated 
Nixon's request for eight months before approving it.130 This extension created valuable 
breathing room for SAMVA and for the Progressives to promote their ideas and innovations 
(discussed in detail in Chapter II). 
 Believing that an extension of the draft was inevitable but unsure of the start date 
for the AVF, Forsythe and the SAMVA office compiled a growing list of initiatives during 
the last week of October and the first three weeks of November 1970. Picking up where 
PROVIDE left off, the SAMVA team dug its heels into the details of the "dehumanizing 
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EL%20FORT%20MYER%20VA.pdf. Accessed  July 7, 2013. This is a wonderful testament to Montague's 
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Special Olympics. Shriver, not knowing Montague, called his close friend Max Taylor to ask about him. Taylor 
was shocked and flabbergasted to hear that Montague wanted to leave the Army.  
130. Griffith, Transition, 59. A point worth mentioning is that during the budget debates, Forsythe 
fought and lost the battle to award proficiency pay to combat arms soldiers. Congress preferred enlistment 
bonuses. This is a key data point that illustrates the philosophical differences between Army officers trying 
to build a professional volunteer Army and Congress and the executive branch simply trying to attract 




practices associated with Army enlistment life."131 Additional ideas came from the work 
accomplished at Fort Ord and from Bernie Rogers at Fort Carson by way of Montague, 
who "brought with him a wealth of ideas about how to make the all-volunteer concept work. 
. . . [U]nder Rogers' leadership the division experimented with several nontraditional 
approaches to solving personnel problems that Montague would later commend to 
Forsythe as they launched the Modern Volunteer Army Program."132 Forsythe and 
Montague both strongly believed that "innovative programs often required unorthodox 
means of implementation to assure success."133 They were determined "to push SAMVA 
initiatives without regard to normal Army staff procedures [and] expected resistance not out 
of ulterior motives but due to bureaucratic inertia and traditionalism."134 For this adaptive 
challenge, the key was experimentation.  
 Thanks to Montague as well as Butler's knowledge and previous work, the SAMVA 
team had plenty of new ideas to test.135 Additional ideas were generated in the first half of 
November when Forsythe held a series of planning meetings that included Army personnel 
from the targeted installations conducting the experiments as well as representatives from 
higher education and the behavioral sciences.136 By November 23, Forsythe was ready to 
launch his program—officially termed the Modern Volunteer Army Program (MVAP). At 
first, Butler proposed testing the new ideas at one Army post. However, Forsythe wanted 
                                                          
131. From the PROVIDE Report as quoted in Ibid., 62. 
132. Griffith, Transition, 64–65. Montague was serving as the 5th Division Artillery Commander. 
Monatgue's command time had aligned with Rogers's (his immediate boss), so he was directly involved 
and closely familiar with all of Rogers's initiatives at Carson. 
133. Ibid., 65–66. Adaptive thinkers with self-transforming minds! 
134. Ibid., Griffith notes how the two leveraged their authority and direct accesses to maximum 
benefit. Whenever their new idea failed to make it through the Army staff and General Palmer, they would 
route it through the Secretary of the Army's office or a friend in Congress, and vice versa. 
135. The PROVIDE Report had identified 228 proposed actions. Willard Latham, The Modern 
Volunteer Army Program: The Benning Experiment, 1970–1972, (Washington: DC: US Department of the 
Army, 1974), http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/090/90-2/CMH_Pub_90-2.pdf, 7. 




to go big and wide. Instead, he asked Westmoreland to formally launch MVAP and its initial 
initiatives at the upcoming Commanders Conference scheduled only a week away, 
November 30. The SAMVA team planned to simultaneously launch a series of experiments 
at four Army posts. They called their eighteen-month experimental program VOLAR (for 
Volunteer Army) and scheduled the formal experimental programs to begin on January 1, 
1971.137   
 In short, SAMVA had two overarching goals: to overhaul the Army recruiting system 
and to make the Army attractive to potential recruits.138 In retrospect, Forsythe, as evident 
by his subsequent actions, accurately viewed the former as a technical problem and the 
latter as an adaptive problem. Because "he harbored grave concerns about the 
institutional health of the Army," Forsythe focused his efforts on internal improvements, 
clearly the adaptive challenge. In doing so, he picked up where PROVIDE had left off. 
While PROVIDE had illuminated antiquated practices associated with Army enlisted 
service, it had not really defined the nature and scope of such practices.  
 Realizing that the AVF concept attracted many proponents and opponents, all of 
whom emphasized various emotional and political arguments, Forsythe cleverly and 
carefully positioned VOLAR within the framework of "professionalism.” Unfortunately, the 
complex, emotional term “professionalism,” so closely associated with the term “leadership” 
in Army culture, was still very subjective and ill-defined despite the clarity that the USAWC 
                                                          
137. MVAP was the program name for all of SAMVA’s work. VOLAR was the name for the formal 
experiments that occurred from 1 January 1971 to 30 June 1972. Over time, VOLAR ursurped MVAP as 
a general term that people used to describe the Army’s early initiatives in the 1970s and, over time, it 
came to carry a negative connotation.  
138. The Gates Commission had largely identified both the problem and the solution to recruiting. 
The Army needed a “Madison Avenue” marketing campaign and lots of money to incent enlistments. No 
one knew at this point how to make Army life more attractive. This fundamental adaptive question was at 





Study on Military Professionalism presented only five months earlier. Still, Forsythe realized 
that most NCOs and officers would probably agree that, following Vietnam, the Army 
needed repair. While this framework of professionalism would unite the profession for the 
challenges faced in a post-Vietnam Army, it would also do a disservice to the work required 
to bring about a post-war transformation of the institution. Without clarity, the Traditionalists, 
the Healers, and the Progressives were left to their own interpretations of the term. This is 
exactly what occurred when the Army received Westmoreland’s “guidance” on VOLAR. 
 Certainly, Westmoreland's comments on the AVF and MVAP at the AUSA 
conference on October 13 served as a wakeup call to the officer corps that big changes 
were coming and that all discussions about preserving the draft should cease. Unfortunately, 
beyond those two points, Westmoreland did little to clarify the nature of such changes. He 
told his audience that “those of us in positions of high responsibility must attack this problem 
[of making the Army attractive] with all the vigor and imagination and enthusiasm we can 
muster. . . . [W]e must eliminate unnecessary elements and unattractive features of Army life 
wherever they exist.” At the same time, however, he stated that “military order—the soul of 
the Army” would not be sacrificed in the process.139 
 On November 23, the official start date of SAMVA’s MVAP, Westmoreland sent a 
lengthy “back channel” message to his senior commanders, forewarning them of his 
comments on VOLAR for the upcoming commanders conference only days away. 
Although the CSA intended his message to “give you my current thinking . . . to aid you in 
your preparation for the conference and to serve as guidance,” his verbiage sent 
                                                          





ambiguous, mixed messages. On the one hand, he focused on a new environment of 
trust: 
I applaud and support changes that clearly focus on increasing the 
challenge and rewards of true professionalism. . . . Today our society is in 
the throes of change and there are real pressures for immediate and 
drastic changes to the Army. In some areas we are prepared to meet this 
new environment. These are areas which involve creating conditions 
where every man can serve with dignity, where we give our individuals a 
keen sense of job challenge and satisfaction, and where we put our trust 
in those people who have clearly demonstrated their ability to merit our 
trust. These are the areas in which we will make changes.140 
 
 Yet, on the other hand and within the same paragraph, he stressed the 
importance of discipline and obedience:  
We will not make changes by reducing our proper professional standards. 
. . . Changes are not to occur in measures that maintain and develop 
proper discipline and standards of performance. I want to make very clear 
that we are engaged in a development - not a "giveaway" program. We 
want to build units around the qualities of competence, confidence, and 
teamwork. Good discipline is essential. We must insure that leaders trying 
to be "in tune with the times" do not walk a razor's edge between a 
disciplined and an undisciplined unit by moving blindly off the deep end. 
This requires the best officers and non-commissioned officers in 
leadership positions.141 
 
 All of the events from October 13 to November 30, 1970—Westmoreland’s 
speeches and announcements, and SAMVA’s fast-paced beginning—served to catapult 
the Army into a post-Vietnam mindset and the realities of an approaching AVF. Most 
significant about this time period is that Westmoreland’s actions forced and required the 
entire Army to get on board the MVAP bandwagon. Prior to this time, only Davidson and 
Rogers had willingly and seriously embraced new ideas about human relations and their 
importance to the effectiveness of organizations. Unfortunately, Westmoreland’s 
guidance served to send mixed messages. Professionalism and leadership were terms 
                                                          





assumed to have shared understood meanings. Consequently, the task of sorting out 
the CSA’s broad guidance and ambiguity fell on Forsythe’s shoulders. The result was 
an experimental program that, in order to meet the Chief’s guidance, had to include two 
distinctly different, and sometimes conflicting, goals.  
VOLAR – The Formal Experiments 
 From the formal start of the VOLAR program on January 1, 1971, SAMVA was clear 
about the overarching goals of the extensive VOLAR field experiments: first, to make "the 
Army a more satisfactory place to work in by fostering professionalism, identification with 
the Army, and greater job satisfaction among officers and enlisted men alike," and second, 
to take "actions directed toward making the Army a better place to live in by improving the 
quality of life and removing unnecessary sources of irritation and dissatisfaction." 142 
SAMVA chose five installations. Three would conduct large, extensive programs while the 
other two would initiate smaller, specific activities. In addition to the five VOLAR posts, two 
additional installations would serve as control groups in the evaluations. The primary posts 
were Forts Benning, Carson, and Ord. The secondary installations were Fort Bragg and 
Headquarters of US Army Europe (USAREUR). SAMVA identified Forts Knox and Jackson 
as control groups.143 
 In shaping each experiment, Forsythe and Montague smartly leveraged the ongoing 
work of Davidson and Rogers. Fort Ord would continue and build upon the work in 
progress on recruit training and management. Although Rogers relinquished his command 
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Experiment, 1971: Installation Reports for Forts Benning, Bragg, Carson, and Ord, and HumRRO 
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143. The other control group was the Fort Jackson Training Center, South Carolina, which served as 




at Fort Carson in December, just days before the start of VOLAR, the 5th Infantry Division 
would continue with improvements already underway, paying particular attention to raising 
the level of combat unit performance. SAMVA instructed Major General Orwin C. Talbott, 
commanding general of Fort Benning, to focus his VOLAR efforts on the development of 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and commissioned officers. 
 The linchpin post was Fort Benning, home of the infantry. Of the various subcultures 
within the Army, the infantry had largely dominated the Army's power structure since the 
Second World War. Westmoreland was an infantry officer, as were seven of his ten 
predecessors.144 In 1971, Benning was an important choice not only because Vietnam 
was an infantryman's war but also because all infantry officers received advanced skills 
training there and rotated through the post several times throughout their careers. At that 
time, it was also home of infantry doctrinal development, which served to influence the 
Army's generic perception of "leadership." Indeed, this latter point was underscored by 
SAMVA choosing Benning as the experimental post to explore the "development" of NCOs 
and officers.145    
 In terms of financial resources, each VOLAR post received $5 million. For 
assessment and evaluation, SAMVA leaned heavily on external consultants, primarily the 
Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), to conduct the evaluations. 
Throughout the three phases of the eighteen-month experiment (each phase lasting six 
months), HumRRO conducted extensive periodic surveys. In total, HumRRO ultimately 
surveyed more than 26,000 enlisted men and 2100 officers. 146  
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 When the VOLAR field experiments ended on June 30, 1972, the findings revealed 
many promising results and a few surprising trends and conclusions. The behavioral 
scientists at HumRRO, deeply aware of current behavioral science research, designed 
their questionnaires in accordance with current quantitative methods to directly address the 
core components of VOLAR's two primary goals. The first goal (to make "the Army a more 
satisfactory place to work in by fostering professionalism, identification with the Army, and 
greater job satisfaction among officers and enlisted men alike") led the researchers to focus 
on "professionalism" and "greater job satisfaction." This focus directly related to their 
assessment of "leadership." The second goal (to take "actions directed toward making the 
Army a better place to live in by improving the quality of life and removing unnecessary 
sources of irritation and dissatisfaction") had the researchers assess "irritants" and to 
identify "lifestyle" activities that the Army could easily implement. These distinctions were 
critical in not only shaping the structure of the HumRRO questionnaires but, more 
importantly, in framing the future views and debates over the nature of modernization and 
reform for the post-Vietnam/AVF Army. In short, during VOLAR and after, the Progressives 
would see great promise and opportunity in the first goal that addressed "professionalism" 
(leadership), and "job satisfaction." The Healers would largely ignore, minimize, or self-
define the first goal and devote their time and attention to the second goal of "irritants" 
removal and "lifestyle" improvements. 
 In formulating the questionnaires, HumRRO structured their questions—with the two 
stated goals as guidelines—to assess overall attitudes toward the Army. Important subsets 
included "career behaviors and intentions," morale indicators, and impact of lifestyle 




situations and conditions according to three criteria: their personal importance, "the extent 
that they see the Army taking action about them," and "their influence on a decision to 
remain in or leave the Army." The extensive attitudinal surveys appeared to represent 
Maslow's model of hierarchical needs well. The researchers used a set of four factors for 
the classification of items. In climbing Maslow's pyramid, these classifications were 
security, inequity, involvement, and leadership.147 
 Each of the VOLAR posts approached the experiments seriously and expeditiously. 
The installation commanders devoted many resources and an enormous amount of time to 
implement as many improvements as possible given the time constraints and financial 
limitations. While each post was assigned different emphases as targeted objectives based 
on the installation’s mission and associated force structure, they all adopted similar ideas 
and methods throughout the length of the experiments. What differed, however, was the 
emphasis that each post commander placed on the two overarching goals. As reflected in 
survey results and installation reports, Carson sought a balance between the two goals. 
The commander of Fort Benning, though, heavily focused on removing irritants and 
adopting lifestyle improvements. In doing so, he relegated the leader/professional 
development initiatives to a lower priority. Benning's diminished preference on the latter 
was puzzling (and a bit ironic), given that it was the only post that was asked to direct its 
experiments specifically toward officer and NCO development, and because Fort Benning 
representatives were present at the SAMVA planning sessions in November 1970 when 
Forsythe brought in behavioral science educators and researchers.148 It appeared that 
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Benning was not only the home of the infantry, it was also the home of the Traditionalists 
and cautious Healers.  
 Surprisingly, given its mission as an initial entry training center, Fort Ord led the way 
in exploring leadership and professionalism. HumRRO's 1972 report on the entire VOLAR 
program clearly revealed this "Great Divide" between goal one (leadership/professionalism) 
and goal two (irritants and lifestyle). In consolidating all of the surveys from the VOLAR 
posts, the control groups, and a survey conducted Army-wide, HumRRO ordered in rank 
those items "on which the most Army action was seen" for officers and enlisted men. Both 
groups listed a large number of lifestyle and irritant items as observed VOLAR actions or 
improvements. Neither officers nor enlisted men, however, listed lifestyle and irritant items 
as improvements that were personally important. On the contrary, leadership factors 
dominated their top personal concerns but were not observed as actions taken in the 
VOLAR initiatives.149 Consequently, the authors of the report highlighted their belief that 
the greatest opportunities for improving the areas categorized as "leadership" and 
"involvement," and that would "have the largest impact for enlisted men," would be "the 
soldier's need for self-esteem, . . .  the soldier's need to feel that he is wanted and valued as 
an individual, . . . and the consideration for them by their superiors, expressed in the form 
of reasons. . . ."150 Similarly, the report's conclusions about discipline (i.e., AWOLs, non-
judicial punishment, etc.), and re-enlistment intentions—all traditional measures of a 
commander's leadership effectiveness—revealed little or only slight improvements. 
 In addition to the HumRRO reports, Fort Benning and Fort Ord later published 
comprehensive accounts of their particular VOLAR programs. The differences in their 
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narratives were striking in several ways, but what really stood out was the power and 
influence of the commanding generals who clearly shaped and steered the direction of the 
experiments. At Fort Benning, Talbot was in command during all three phases of VOLAR 
but preferred to leave the oversight of the program to Colonel Willard Latham.151 Latham 
commanded the 197th Infantry Brigade (the largest primary unit at Benning) during Phase I 
and II of VOLAR, and then served as Talbot's deputy commander and chief of staff for 
Phase III. Latham would prove to be a strong Traditionalist and reluctant Healer.  
 At Fort Ord, Davidson relinquished command to Major General Harold "Hal" Moore 
near the end of VOLAR Phase I in early June 1971. Moore, a Progressive, was a perfect 
choice to succeed Davidson. A graduate of West point and a career infantry officer, Moore 
as company commander during the Korean War, taught at West Point, and held staff 
positions, including a NATO assignment in Oslo, Norway. Several assignments, with the 
82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg and at the Pentagon, included work with experimental 
projects and programs. In addition, Moore earned a master's degree in international affairs 
from George Washington University.  
 Moore is best known, however, for his command of a battalion in the new, 
experimental 11th Air Assault Division that was testing innovative concepts in the use of 
helicopters for air mobility. In July 1965, the 11th Air Assault Division was re-designated 
the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) and deployed to Vietnam. In November 1965, Moore's 
under-strength battalion, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, fought in the Army's first major 
engagement of the Vietnam War in the la Drang Valley.152 
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 With an extensive career in experimentation, Moore took over command of the Army 
Training Center at Fort Ord in June 1971, during the initial phase of the VOLAR field 
experiments.153 He quickly picked up where Davidson left off. Like Davidson, Moore 
personally invested much time and effort into the program. In fact, shortly before 
relinquishing command in 1973, Moore would coauthor his installation's experience with 
VOLAR in the publication Building a Volunteer Army: The Fort Ord Contribution. In a clear 
recognition of the leadership goal, Moore noted that "greater attention was to be given to 
professionalism and to the legitimate physical and psychological needs of the men and 
women who filled the Army's ranks."154 For example, in marching in step with his fellow 
Progressives, Moore noted that 
a great shift in American cultural patterns in the last twenty or so years 
seems fully apparent. Particularly among the young, there have been 
sweeping changes in values, aspirations, and goals. The problem was to 
identify the direction and end results of these shifting cultural patterns as they 
related to the young people entering the Army and, where appropriate, take 
these new factors into consideration when devising life-style improvements. 
Otherwise, all efforts would be liable to misdirection, and could, in the long 
run, be counterproductive. In other words, it was necessary to establish a 
dialogue [with young soldiers] to find out "where they were at. . . .” [We] fully 
recognized that improvements in life-style would have to be accompanied by 
across-the-board improvements in the quality of leadership and the 
standards of professionalism within the Army in order to be truly effective.155 
 
 Importantly, the Fort Ord report spoke to Ord's approach of reaching out to current 
pedagogical research and methods in structuring their Experimental Volunteer Army 
Training Program (Fort Ord's VOLAR). "A major reason for change was normally the result 
of a desire to test an instructional technique or new methodology which offered a chance of 
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improvement."156 As he had done for Davidson, Datel continued his work under Moore in 
conducting this type of research alongside HumRRO. His ideas were especially effective in 
the aptitude strategy experiments. The tests were so successful that these new 
"pedagogical changes which were the core of the experimental training program" were 
subsequently applied on a "large scale" to all areas of combat arms and combat support 
training at Fort Ord. 
 In contrast, the report from Fort Benning, which Latham authored in late 1973 under 
the title The Modern Volunteer Army Program: The Benning Experiment, 1970–1972, spent 
much time recounting the startup of VOLAR. Because Davidson, Letgers, Datel, and 
HumRRO had accomplished so much work prior to the official start of VOLAR, Benning was 
at least a year or more behind Fort Ord. However, Talbott and Latham moved aggressively 
ahead to catch up. They turned to Colonel William B. Steele, director of the Leadership 
Department of the US Army Infantry School (USAIS), to directly manage Benning's VOLAR 
program. In doing so, Talbott could then incorporate VOLAR activities for the entire 
installation, while Latham could offer up his 197th Infantry Brigade as a test bed with his full 
involvement.157 
 Latham's account of the VOLAR program at Benning gave good, insightful detail of 
the planning and implementation of the Benning VOLAR initiatives. It recounted the first-
rate team of infantrymen that Steele recruited and the criticality of getting the proper 
framework established and articulated prior to beginning the experiments. Here, though, is 
where the Benning and Ord programs significantly diverged. Whereas Davidson and 
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Moore saw both Westmoreland's and the SAMVA guidance as their framework (obviously, 
since Forsythe formulated his guidance on Davidson's previous work), Steele only cited 
one small portion of Westmoreland's pre-commanders conference backchannel message 
as the basis and guiding principle of this framework and future reforms: 
In considering possible actions to be taken, the study group followed 
General Westmoreland's guidance on the volunteer Army. "Nothing is 
considered sacrosanct except when military order and discipline—the soul of 
the Army that ensures success on the battlefield—are jeopardized."158 
 
In contrast, Moore included Westmoreland's entire message in his account and showed 
how the CSA and SAMVA guidance were complimentary and comprehensive in forming the 
Ord framework for VOLAR.159 
 In Latham’s view, the Benning Plan did not ignore or disregard leadership. In fact, 
the plan included a day-long “block of instruction” entitled “Enlightened Leadership.” All 
officers and NCOs stationed at Fort Benning received this course, as well as the students 
who attended the infantry school during the VOLAR period. However, there was nothing 
new or experimental about this course. In dramatic contrast to Fort Ord’s embrace of new 
pedagogical ideas and methods from the behavioral sciences, the Fort Benning 
enlightened leadership course “did not present new material but reviewed proven tenets of 
leadership and re-emphasized their importance in the movement toward a Modern 
Volunteer Army.”160 In other words, existing leadership doctrine was viewed as sound and 
just needed a bit of modification to explain how new freedoms and amenities for soldiers 
did not foster “permissiveness” or threaten authorities.  
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 Particularly for the students in the infantry school (predominantly lieutenants and 
captains attending the officer basic and advanced courses), the instructors expanded their 
current “program on the contemporary problems facing today’s leaders. Instruction on race 
relations, drug abuse, and prevention of AWOL was given to all leadership students.”161 
Latham noted in his report, without detail or explanation, that this course contributed to 
“increasing professionalism.” That Latham, Steele, and the other implementers of the 
Benning plan viewed leadership in this manner only fostered and promoted the 
misperception that organizational effectiveness measures were designed to eliminate 
racism, drug abuse, and desertion. Indeed, such beliefs would haunt the Army OE program 
well into the 1980s. 
 Finally, the largest action Benning took to address the leadership goals of VOLAR 
was the expansion of its management curriculum for captains attending the infantry officer 
advance course. Under VOLAR, Latham and Steele increased the “management” block of 
instruction from twenty hours to forty-four. As Latham explained, 
the expanded program emphasized general management procedures and 
used the case study method to stress the functions of management and 
the techniques of solving management problems. “Management Practices 
in TOE Units” was added to the program to teach students to relate 
industrial management techniques, work flow, distribution, and other 
similar practices of Army units.162   
 
Remarkably, to make room for expansions of management instruction, the school cut its 
only two viable leadership programs in May before the end of VOLAR Phase I. One was 
the Peer Evaluation Program, “designed to provide each student with a leadership 
profile and enable him to capitalize on strengths and correct weaknesses.” The other 
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eliminated program was four hours of instruction on “relevant problems encountered by 
the newly commissioned officer.”163  
 Both Latham’s and Moore’s reports illustrated the difficulty their programs 
experienced in dealing with resistance, especially from their senior NCOs. Moore 
lightheartedly recalled that at Fort Ord, “it was always easy to spot the drill sergeant—
he was the man who was gritting his teeth.”164 The perception that VOLAR was 
designed to cater to young recruits and that the All-Volunteer Army would become very 
permissive spread throughout the entire Army, well beyond the VOLAR posts. Indeed, 
such notions became pervasive throughout VOLAR, and the press reported on the 
initiatives quite frequently, so much so that over time VOLAR became synonymous with 
“beer in the barracks” and “go-go girls in the clubs.”165   
 SAMVA and the CSA were both to blame for the propagation of such attitudes. 
Their programs, underscored by the guiding but nebulous terms “professionalism” and 
“leadership,” left far too much room for interpretation. Consequently, everyone found 
something in the guidance that they liked. For the Traditionalists, the terms required no 
explanation. The Army simply had to get back to basic soldiering. The Healers, certainly 
pragmatists, favored many lifestyle changes because they knew that the future AVF had to 
attract large numbers of recruits. In their view, allowing beer in the barracks and hiring 
civilian KPs, for example, did not really threaten traditions or the authority of officers and 
NCOs. In the Healers' minds, happier soldiers would be easier to train and manage. The 
Army would develop effective leaders through hard training; a modernized, reequipped and 
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re-manned force; and a return to conventional warfighting doctrine. Well-trained soldiers, 
proficient in their tasks and enjoying the lifestyle of the 1970s with more free time and 
money, would commit to the Army over time and, in turn, become leaders by training those 
who came after them. For the Healers, removing irritants and emphasizing hard realistic 
training largely defined both professionalism and leadership. 
 For the Progressives, VOLAR offered an opportunity for the Army to strongly 
embrace the behavioral sciences and to experiment with recent research and theories, 
especially in the fields of social and organizational psychology as well as with new 
pedagogical methodologies. Fort Ord was their initial beachhead and VOLAR their air 
support and cover. SAMVA had officially placed a seal of approval on their efforts to date. 
More importantly, the Progressives could now point to the HumRRO reports that clearly 
supported the Progressives’ view that leadership improvements (as defined in the 
behavioral sciences) offered the greatest means for real change and positive impact.166   
 In sum, the greatest obstacles to breaking down the "Great Divide" were the ill-
defined terms "professionalism" and "leadership." The Peers Report and the USAWC 
Study on Military Professionalism showed that the two terms shared many of the same 
traits and were thus interrelated. Within the Army's culture, both terms were also 
intertwined with "officership," especially in the eyes of the Traditionalists. The problem was 
that all three terms were complex and evoked strong emotions from most NCOs and officers 
and, consequently, accurate and meaningful definitions were left to individual interpretation 
or, more consequential, to the espoused interpretations of senior commanders who held 
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significant power and influence over their subordinates. Certainly, Westmoreland 
exacerbated this problem. In retrospect, the greatest unintended consequence of VOLAR 
and HumRRO's findings was that the experiments solidified the Great Divide and 
permanently defined and articulated the boundaries between the Healers and the 
Progressives. 
VOLAR and the Conversational Framework 
 From the Hersch revelations about My Lai in November 1969 until the start of VOLAR 
in January 1971, the national news media increasingly published stories of an Army in crisis. 
Most of these articles detailed the deteriorating state of discipline in Vietnam as the Army 
slowly disengaged from the war. Common themes were drug and alcohol abuse, fraggings, 
combat refusals, and racial conflict. These stories carried a central theme of 
"permissiveness" among the nation's youth and perpetuated the common notion that anti-
authoritarian beliefs and immoral behaviors carried over into the Army's junior ranks.167 
Although the USAWC's Study on Military Professionalism dispelled and rejected this 
connection, the idea continued to grow, fueling the Traditionalists' views in the short term 
and offering some rationale to those in the years ahead who sought to explain the defeat in 
Vietnam. By fusing the "Army in crisis" theme with the "permissiveness" theme, the 
national press quickly and primarily viewed VOLAR as a lifestyle improvement program—
thus ignoring the other important elements of change and reform. 
 Throughout the eighteen-month experiment, the popular press generated much 
discussion and speculation about the changes the Army would eventually adopt for the 
AVF. Almost every major publication in the nation ran numerous articles on the various 
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VOLAR initiatives. Unfortunately, these articles and commentaries created confusing 
misperceptions of VOLAR that resulted in skeptical and critical attitudes toward the Modern 
Volunteer Army Program (MVAP). VOLAR was quickly forgotten as an eighteen-month 
experimental effort and soon became synonymous with the MVAP; consequently, the 
negative connotations of VOLAR carried into the initial years of the All-Volunteer Army. In 
short, "the national press boiled down VOLAR, MVA, and the All-Volunteer Army into 'beer 
in the barracks.’"168 Despite Forsythe's quick recognition of this problem and his attempt to 
frame the conversation into one of professionalism rather than permissiveness, SAMVA 
was unsuccessful at dispelling the growing perception that change and true reform in a 
post-Vietnam Army was much more than a kinder, gentler Army willing to offer good pay 
and a lot of lifestyle amenities to attract recruits. The Healers, of course, welcomed this 
perception. Lifestyle changes were palatable and, if managed correctly, compatible with their 
plans to reorganize, reequip, and re-man the force. 
 As if SAMVA's attempts to sell all of the new concepts and ideas to the public at 
large were not challenging enough, Forsythe's efforts within the Army became more difficult 
during the VOLAR months as well. The rank and file of the entire Army weighed in on the 
conversation, predominantly through the widely-read Army Times—a weekly independent 
newspaper that chronicles current events in the Army. The popular "Letters to the Editor" 
section became a sounding board for both enlisted soldiers and officers on the ills and 
merits of VOLAR. The majority of these opinions clearly exposed the colors of the 
Traditionalists and the Healers. Mirroring the civilian press, the vast majority of the 
discussions centered on lifestyle changes. By 1972, the dialog between these two camps 
became significantly divisive. Where once they had stood shoulder to shoulder on their 
                                                          




concepts of leadership, professionalism, and officership, the two groups were now clearly 
separated. The Traditionalists viewed lifestyle changes as a direct assault on discipline 
and authority, and therefore a threat to these important concepts. The Healers saw the 
VOLAR initiatives as benign adjustments required to appeal to young soldiers as the Army 
rebuilt itself. If controlled and implemented properly, the new changes would enhance the 
concepts of leadership, professionalism, and officership without seriously modifying their 
current nature or presumed definitions.  
 While emotional views about VOLAR and the coming AVF found expression in 
numerous media outlets—both internal and external to the Army—a more serious, 
reflective dialog began to take shape at the USAWC and in Army professional 
publications. In the respected Military Review, published by the Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, numerous articles began to appear in 1970 that 
offered higher-caliber discussions on the evolving changes and reforms. In fact, a 
significant number of the articles published between late 1970 and the end of 1972 were 
about the AVF and leadership. Yet, most were merely more sophisticated discussions 
than those appearing in the press at large. Almost all of these authors were 
predominantly Army field-grade officers who generally sided with either the 
Traditionalists or the Healers.169 In Parameters, the professional journal of the USAWC, 
six articles related to leadership and the ongoing changes within the Army appeared 
during the same time frame but were much more scholarly, as one would expect. All 
tended to be conservative, and the authors primarily aligned with traditional views of 
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officership and professionalism.170 What is striking about all of these articles is that the 
terms leadership and professionalism were never defined or clarified in the narratives. 
They were presumed to hold the same meanings for everyone. The tone was that these 
were concepts or terms that needed no explanation for any commissioned officer.   
 As conservative and supportive of traditional views as the Army’s publications 
were during the VOLAR period, a more influential force was at play throughout 1971 
inside the USAWC. On January 21, 1971, only three weeks into the VOLAR 
experiments, Westmoreland approached the USAWC to conduct yet another study. This 
time, the CSA asked the college to study “leadership for the professional soldier.” 
Specifically, he requested a “critical examination of the appropriateness of the Army’s 
concept of leadership.”171   
 Westmoreland gave the study team three guiding parameters: first, survey as 
"wide a base of Army leadership" as possible; second, employ the same research 
methods as the previous Study on Military Professionalism, which had included "an 
introspective study of Army officer values and standards"; finally, produce "utilitarian 
results which could be applied readily to Army leadership without the requirement for 
additional studies or extensive interpretation of theoretical findings.”172 In other words, 
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they were to come up with realistic, practical definitions and solutions that avoided 
theory.173  
 To answer the overarching research question as to what type of leadership was 
required, the team also posited two supporting questions: “To what extent will existing 
principles meet requirements?” and “What group of leadership principles and behaviors 
will meet requirements?”  At that time, with VOLAR just beginning and with Nixon’s 
order to initiate the AVF by July 1973, these were prudent questions that acknowledged 
the tumultuous social changes occurring in American society. The authors of the study 
appeared to recognize this:  
Inasmuch as Army leadership policy and practice have developed for 
almost 20 years in an environment where personnel sustainment was 
insured by conscription, there was good reason to believe that a "zero-
draft" condition would present leadership challenges sufficiently different 
to warrant some modifications of existing leadership practices. 
Accordingly, a derivative objective of the AWC study was to assess the 
validity of the Army's institutional concept of leadership, reflected in the 
commonly accepted 11 Principles of Leadership, and, should this concept 
and these principles appear inappropriate or to some degree deficient to 
the leadership requirements of a zero-draft condition, to determine the 
concept and principles that would be appropriate. The ultimate purpose of 
the Army—success in combat—remained the single overriding 
consideration in both study design and execution.174 
      
 This study was a natural extension of the Study on Military Professionalism. In 
fact, Westmoreland referred to the previous study as such and directed that the new 
study team follow the same research methodologies. Like his predecessor before him, 
the new commandant of the USAWC, Major General Franklin M. Davis, Jr. (Eckhart had 
since returned to Vietnam), included both faculty and students on the study team. Sixty 
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officers volunteered, primarily lieutenant colonels and colonels. Eighteen were chosen, 
including Ulmer and Malone. 
 More importantly, the study team reached into the civilian world to consult with 
several prominent social scientists, all of whom held PhDs in their fields of study: David G. 
Bowers, Thomas O. Jacobs, Rensis M. Likert, Charles R. Moskos, Donald R. Penner, and 
Ralph M. Stogdill. Except for Moskos, a prominent academic in the growing field of military 
sociology, the others generally worked in the areas of social or organizational psychology. 
As discussed in the Preface, these scientists were engaged in research work in the post-
World War II era that strived to move beyond the Trait Theory of leadership, so dominant 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.175 The USAWC study team 
members were especially drawn to the work of these scientists on the styles approach to 
leadership.176 
 By far the most influential participant in the USAWC Study on Leadership was 
Stogdill. Indeed, the study pointed directly to his work at the Ohio State University (OSU) 
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that he conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s.177 In the 1950s, researchers at OSU were 
interested in "how individuals acted when they were leading a group or organization."178 
Their approach was to identify certain types of behaviors that leaders demonstrated from 
the perspective of followers. Of the 1800 or more behaviors they compiled, 150 became the 
basis of a survey that they called the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ). 
After giving the LBDQ "to hundreds of people in educational, military, and industrial 
settings," the researchers found certain "clusters of behavior" that were common to all 
leaders. These clusters fell within two general categories: "initiating structures" behaviors 
and "consideration" behaviors. In short, they were very similar to the two categories found 
in the UM studies and were each viewed as independent. In 1963 Stogdill greatly 
expanded on the LBDQ and produced an abbreviated version called the LBDQ-XII that was 
the most widely used survey in research for many, many years. In fact, Stogdill was still 
advancing his work at OSU when the USAWC solicited his participation in its study.179  
 The USAWC research team then used a questionnaire similar to the LBDQ-XII to 
survey 1800 soldiers from seventeen different Army posts "on specific kinds of leadership 
behavior" from the perspectives of both subordinate and superior.180 Approximately forty 
percent of the participants came from the enlisted ranks, while the remainder came from 
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the officer corps, including forty-six general officers.181 Like the approach that Ulmer and 
Malone had taken with their previous study, the team also conducted group interviews with 
450 of the survey takers. The group participants were asked two questions: first, "What are 
the leadership problems at your grade level" and second, "What do you expect of the 
leadership of your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your 
contemporaries and yourself?"182 The team leaned heavily on Stogdill's 1950s work with 
the Navy because they believed that those findings "described relatively pure leadership 
behavior." 
These findings are generally regarded as a milestone in leadership 
research because they gave definition in an area which previously had 
been highly subjective. Extensive follow-on research established the 
validity of these items of leadership behavior. Selected items of leadership 
behavior from the Ohio State research were adapted to the military 
environment and used in the USAWC study as an operational definition of 
leadership which, for the purposes of the study, represents the application 
of leadership principles.183  
 
In other words, current doctrinal definitions of Army leadership and the eleven leadership 
principles were re-validated. In essence, the team married the forty-three items with the 
existing eleven doctrinal leadership principles to assess and rank order the behaviors. They 
concluded that "[t]he findings show dramatically that the Army's time-honored principles of 
leadership are accepted overwhelmingly by leaders at all levels as appropriate for the 
coming decade."184 The study's primary (and only) criticism was that Army leaders were 
not applying the eleven leadership principles consistently.185 
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 Interestingly, the team's analysis of the inconsistent application of principles revealed 
several important trends that actually supported the findings of careerism and the 
assessment of poor leadership throughout the officer corps that came out of the previous 
USAWC Study on Military Professionalism. For example, they cited lack of communication 
and inattention to human needs as "significant defects."186 Similarly, they also found that 
field-grade officers demonstrated "overly ambitious behavior far more than their superiors 
and subordinates think they should [which] could be a graphic illustration of "ticket-punching" 
syndrome."187 Yet, in contrast to the previous Ulmer-Malone study, the final report 
downplayed or minimized these and other similar problems. 
 One explanation for the report's ultra-conservative outcomes was that the initial 
framework of the study design itself was too restrictive. The team narrowly interpreted 
Westmoreland's guidance (1) to avoid theory and (2) to not assume that current leadership 
doctrine was flawed. Consequently, in regard to the latter, their initial surveys revealed that 
almost everyone viewed the eleven leadership principles as a valid concept of Army 
leadership.188 Unfortunately, that conclusion shut the door to any examination or 
assessment "of the Army's institutional concept of leadership," contrary to Westmoreland’s 
specific directive.189 Indeed, the study team leaned heavily on existing Army publications 
for the majority of their research, namely FM 22-100, Military Leadership (1965), DA 
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Pamphlet 600-15, Leadership at Senior Levels of Command (1968), and T. O. 
Jacobs's Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organization.190 The final report 
included an extensive annotated bibliography of the other sources that the team 
utilized. Of the 175 sources, 124 were military publications. 
 To avoid theory, the team turned to established social science research that had 
been underway since the early 1950s. In doing so, they found merit in concepts of 
leadership that were leader-centric. The Style approach, with its advocacy that 
leadership behaviors could be learned, tended to confirm for the War College that the 
Army's leadership training programs throughout the institution were adequately 
developing leaders.191 More damaging in the long term, however, was their fundamental 
belief that "the findings produced by rigorous analytical techniques were "consistent" 
and "comparable’’ with the “intuitive judgments of experienced military professionals."192 
This core belief held by both the Traditionalists and the Healers, that leadership was 
essentially "plain old common sense" that came with experience and more senior rank, 
ultimately proved to be the primary obstacle to change for the proponents of the Army 
OE Program. 
 Finally, to meet Westmoreland's guidance "to produce utilitarian results which 
could be applied readily to Army leadership," the study provided the Army at large with a 
workable or operational concept of leadership that leveraged the existing Army 
leadership principles to produce "The informal contract." In acknowledging that a 
leader's human skills (as largely defined by Stogdill and Likert) required the creation of 
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a positive relationship between the leader and his followers, the informal contract would 
be fulfilled when the expectations of both parties were met. As the USAWC 
commandant explained, 
in accordance with our guidance from General Westmoreland, we have 
attempted to produce a utilitarian report which can help commanders 
identify and diagnose leadership problems, and discover ways whereby 
leadership climate can be improved. We offer no panacea, nor do we 
ignore the fact that there are other ingredients than leadership in the 
formula for long-term effectiveness of the Army. The central theme of our 
study is that both the Army and the soldier must see themselves as parties 
to an informal contract. In this informal contract, the Army expects 
proficiency and disciplined response from the soldier. The soldier, on the 
other hand, expects fairness, worthwhile work, and sufficient pay from the 
Army.193 
 
 The USAWC's acceptance of the informal contract as a working definition for 
both Army professionalism and leadership served to formally establish the official views 
of the Healers. On one hand, the 1971 USAWC Study on Leadership was very important 
to the evolution of Army leadership conceptualization in the 1970s because it showed 
willingness on the part of senior conservatives in the Army officer corps to explore 
some social science research. On the other hand, instead of leveraging current 
research to drive the discussion about the nature of leadership for the 1970s, they 
utilized established research (not to mention existing pre-war, outdated Army leadership 
doctrine) to support their foremost argument that the Army (i.e., primarily the officer 
corps) already understood leadership quite well. From this point on, the Healers could 
state and believe that they were embracing change and transforming the Army for the 
AVF with an appreciation for social science research. For example, with verbiage that 
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sounded contradictory to the findings and overall tone of the study, the team noted 
that 
nowhere, except at the US Military Academy, did they find professional 
soldiers with formal leadership training in the scientific study of leadership. 
The relative newness of leadership as an area of scientific endeavor, no 
doubt, accounts for this phenomenon, but it is essential that the Army 
establish its requirements for officers formally trained in the scientific study 
of leadership and enlarge the advanced degree program in this area without 
delay.194 
 
 The study also served to establish a permanent demarcation line, with little room for 
compromise, between the Healers and the Progressives. From the Progressives’ point of 
view, operating on the cutting edge of humanistic leadership theories, the informal contract 
was welcomed, but more freedom in the barracks and higher wages had little to do with 
leadership. The study targeted the lower levels of Maslow's model and only simplified the 
complexity of interactive behaviors between leaders and followers to mean that effective 
leadership would result when the contractual agreements between the leader and the 
follower were met. As such, there was nothing utilitarian about the study because the 
findings were descriptive and not prescriptive. In essence, the study told everyone to 
abide by the existing eleven principles of Army leadership, accomplish the mission, and 
look out for the welfare of the men. In so doing, officers fulfilled their part of the informal 
contract.195 
 On July 8, 1971, Davis submitted the final report of the USAWC Study on Leadership 
to Westmoreland. Less than two weeks earlier, Davis had received and subsequently 
                                                          
194. Ibid., 60. Perhaps even the military academy needed modification. At this time, a major study of 
leadership and professionalism—as related to the academy’s fourth class system—was nearing 
completion at West Point. The study was initiated by commandant of cadets Rogers (the “godfather” of 
Army OE), and conducted by a team that included Tony Nadal (the “father” of Army OE, and Bill Golden 
(a future commandant of the Army OE school). Both were members of the Department of Military 
Psychology and Leadership. Discussed in Chapter II. 
195. Indeed, “accomplish the mission” and “look out for the welfare of your men” were the basic 




approved a request from his Chairman of the Department of Research and Studies, Colonel 
John B. B. Trussell, Jr., to conduct a similar study on "Professional Generalship." Most 
certainly aware of his colleagues' ongoing work on Leadership for the 1970s, Trussell 
similarly wanted to "define in comparatively precise terms what 'professional generalship' 
can be considered to encompass."196 Because all general officers are graduates of the 
USAWC, with twenty percent of all attendees becoming generals, Trussell's primary goal 
was to update and improve the War College's curriculum. More importantly, as part of 
determining what generals actually do, he also proposed an assessment of their 
leadership. 
Using literature in the field of academic research on leadership, identify 
the system of values we should adopt in distinguishing good or successful 
leaders from others, and define the behavioral patterns which characterize 
those who are "good leaders."197 
 
 Trussell conducted his study throughout the summer and early fall of 1971. In the 
process, he surveyed every three- and four-star general in the Army. He began with the 
May 1, 1971, general officer assignment list as his baseline, and from there organized 
everything that generals do into nine categories. In his final assessment, Trussell 
concluded that the USAWC curriculum was adequate for five of the subject areas but 
needed modification in four others. These four were all relationship issues: with Congress, 
with the media, “legal relationships and responsibilities of senior commanders,” and oral 
communications.198  
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 The final report revealed Trussell’s second research goal had been omitted, most 
likely by Davis. 
The memorandum at Appendix A [Trussell’s 25 June proposal] proposed a 
further question: “What system of values should we adopt in distinguishing 
good or bad leaders from others, and what behavioral patterns 
characterize those who are ‘good leaders’?” Subsequent reflection has led 
to the conclusion that this question, involving as it does issues of 
character, personality, and style, was not completely relevant to this study, 
and therefore was omitted.199  
 
Remarkably, in recognizing that significant changes were afoot throughout the Army and 
that the USAWC needed to define leadership for the 1970s and adjust its curriculum 
accordingly, the College deliberately saw no need to include leadership in their thorough 
exploration of what generals do (despite Colonel Trussell’s belief that it was important to do 
so). Yet the study stressed management/administration and communication with civilian 
bodies.  
Within the frame of reference of his relationships with other military 
personnel, a general officer’s influence is such that his judgments of 
subordinates are crucial to insure both fairness to individuals and the 
future best interests of the Army. Hence, he needs thorough 
understanding of the Army’s present and developing requirements, and an 
ability to judge the attributes of individuals accurately and objectively in 
terms of those requirements.200 
  
At best, the Study on Professional Generalship endorsed the “informal contract.” At 
worst, the study’s great emphasis on generals managing large, complex 
organizations perpetuated the cultural status quo that the Ulmer-Malone study had 
condemned. Viewing the Study on Leadership and the Study on Generalship 
through the lens of the University of Michigan and Ohio State leadership studies, 
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“professional generalship” meant emphasizing “individuals as resources” to meet 
requirements over “individuals as humans beings.” 
 Given that only the highest-rated field grade officers in the Army were 
selected to attend the USAWC, it is no surprise that the 1971 studies on leadership 
and generalship were conservative and appealing to traditional views. After all, 
these officers had been told since they were lieutenants that they were exceptional 
leaders. For the generals, the topic was not even up for discussion. Yet, these 
findings contrasted sharply with the 1970 Study on Professionalism. Was the Ulmer-
Malone report an aberration, an outlier? Were the two subsequent studies an 
attempt to tone down or counter-balance the 1970 Study on Professionalism in 
some way?   
 The three USAWC studies are crucial to the history of the Army OE program 
because the college exercised tremendous influence in setting the cultural climate of the 
Army officer corps. Whereas the Ulmer-Malone study had initially forced an important, 
albeit uncomfortable, dialog on the health of Army leadership, the two follow-on studies 
just as quickly dampened those conversations. This, combined with Westmoreland's "close 
hold" order on the first study, served to make the Progressives’ work much more difficult. 
Still, a large window of opportunity remained open for the Army to embrace a much more 
humanistic form of leadership grounded in the primary tenets of what Burns would describe 
as “transformational.” 
 In these early days, the progressive generals' power and authority were key in 
igniting positive change toward new ideas about the nature of the officer-soldier 




whereby he could shepherd the Army OE Program, the most influential grass-roots 
organizer was just getting started on the east coast. Major Tony Nadal, fresh from school 
and teaching sociology and psychology at West Point, felt strongly enough about recent 
advances in the behavioral sciences that he drafted his thoughts and boldly approached 
Westmoreland with his ideas. While many senior officers would likely look upon such 
audacity with great scorn, young Nadal was confident that recent research in academia held 
much potential in making his Army a healthier institution. Unbeknown to Nadal, the timing of 
his encounter with Westmoreland could not be more fortuitous. The "father" of the Army OE 
program had just stepped across the starting line of a long, exciting and sometimes painful 
journey. This journey would not only dictate and largely define the remainder of his career 
but, more importantly, would place him out front in taking the Army into a new direction of 





Presenting and Testing New Concepts:  
The Early Initiatives of Army OE 
Of all the kinds of leadership that require exceptional political skill, the 
leadership of reform movements must be among the most exacting.  
Revolutionary leadership demands commitment, persistence, courage, 
perhaps selflessness and even self-abnegation (the ultimate sacrifice for 
solipsistic leadership). Pragmatic, transactional leadership requires a 
shrewd eye for opportunity, a good hand at bargaining, persuading, 
reciprocating. Reform may need these qualities, but it demands much 
more. Since reform efforts usually require the participation of a large 
number of allies with various reform and non-reform goals of their own, 
reform leaders must deal with endless divisions within their own ranks. 
While revolutionaries usually recognize the need for leadership, anti-
leadership doctrine often characterizes and taunts reform programs.1 
James MacGregor Burns 
 
 Shortly before noon on November 14, 1965, company commander Captain Tony 
Nadal and his headquarters section were aboard the second lift of Huey helicopters flying 
into landing zone (LZ) X-Ray for a combat assault into the la Drang valley of South 
Vietnam. Nadal was the first man of Alpha Company to step onto the LZ, just as his 
battalion commander—Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore—had been the first soldier of his 
entire battalion to do so an hour earlier. Over the next three days, Moore, Nadal, and the 
rest of the understrength 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division) would fight the first 
major combat engagement of the war against a force of North Vietnamese regulars four 
times in size. The battle would endure for three days and, in the end, result in seventy-nine 
Americans dead, 121 wounded, and almost 2000 enemy killed and wounded. While the 
                                                          




battle resulted in "a sea change in the Vietnam War,” it also taught young Nadal a thing or 
two about leadership.2 
Tony Nadal Steps Forward 
 Several months later, as his tour of duty in Vietnam was coming to an end, Nadal 
was thinking about his future. At that point in time, Nadal was a senior captain and, despite 
the early stage of the war, already completing his second tour in Vietnam, having served 
earlier with the US Army Special Forces. Soon becoming eligible for promotion to the rank of 
major likely meant an assignment to a staff job somewhere in the United States. 
However, West Point wanted him. 
I was sitting in a rice paddy in Vietnam [when] I received a letter from the 
Department of [Military] Psychology and Leadership asking me if I wanted 
to go back there and teach. So I said, “under the circumstances, hell yes! 
Tomorrow!” Anyway, I went to graduate school. I [then came] back with all 
this professed knowledge but [my leadership training did not align with all 
of] my observations of the soldiers' behaviors in really tough combat 
situations. . . . A lot of the courses I took were social psychology. . . . I said 
to myself, “Everything I thought I'd learned, everything I thought I'd 
discovered, is in these textbooks. But the Army never taught me all that.” 
And that's the thing that really struck me. I was not properly prepared, 
even though I'd been through four years at West Point, ranger school, and 
all that. . . . Graduate school was a revelation to me in that there was so 
much written about human behavior and leadership that was congruent 
with my experiences—especially my experiences in combat. No one in the 
Army had pointed out to me all of the things that were in these books of 
management and leadership and organizational behavior, and I had to 
learn them in the “school of hard knocks.”3 
 
 After earning his master degree in psychology from Oklahoma State University in 
1967, Nadal taught in the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership at West 
                                                          
2. Memo, Official After Action Report, “IA DRANG Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 
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Soldiers Once–and Young: Ia Drang, the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: Random 
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Point. During his three years there, from 1967 to 1970, he also became director of research 
for the department, which allowed him to "explore in depth the areas of organizational 
behavior.”4 At West Point, Nadal worked with two other officers who would later play key 
roles in the Army OE program. The first was Lieutenant Colonel William “Bill” L. Golden, who 
would later become an aide to the president of the United States and, thereafter, the most 
effective commandant of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) at 
Fort Ord. The other officer was Brigadier General Bernie Rogers, the Commandant of 
Cadets and the emerging “godfather” of Army OE. In 1969, these three, along with four 
other officers from the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership, produced a 
fascinating study that, in retrospect, mirrored and foreshadowed many of the initiatives that 
were yet to come Army-wide.5 
 While the most senior officer at the Academy was and is the superintendent (by 
position a lieutenant general), the commandant (a brigadier general) is arguably the most 
influential because he or she directly oversees the corps of cadets. Historically, the Army 
has assigned its top officers into this position, fully aware that the commandant personifies 
the values and ethics of the Army officer corps and is the first senior role model cadets 
observe as they begin their careers in the Army.6 As commandant, Rogers grew concerned 
with the negative leadership behaviors he observed in the academy’s fourth class system 
(i.e., the subservient and often belittling regimen of a cadet’s freshman year at the 
                                                          
4. Ibid. Note that the Department of Military Leadership and Psychology was not an academic 
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Macedonia, D. J. Erickson, and J. W. Baker. 
6. The vast majority progressed into the three- and four-star ranks. The most notable probably was 
military strategist Emory Upton. Upton was a brilliant Civil War general and, more importantly, later 
became the Army’s greatest reformer. He advocated for the creation of a large, standing professional 
Army for the first time in US history. The list is virtually a “who’s who” of well-known generals of all the 
nation’s wars. For a quick overview see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandant_of_Cadets. Last 




Academy). In his mind, the academy’s mission was to produce officers who “set the 
standards of professionalism for the Army.”7 Yet, from his observations, a new cadet’s first-
year experience was largely negative and punitive. Rogers was also concerned about the 
growing attrition rates of cadets that at that time had reached an unprecedented level. In late 
1968, he tasked the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership to conduct a study 
of the fourth class system, paying particular attention to “the mission, functions, history, and 
the positive and negative effects of the system.”8 Based on the commandant’s guidance, the 
study team was clear about their goal: “This study is concerned solely with the contribution 
which the fourth class system is making to the basic mission [of producing professional 
officers] and whether or not modifications can be made which will enhance the quality of our 
product.”9 
 The six officers on the team, all possessing recent formal education (master degrees 
or PhDs) and teaching experience in various areas of psychology, and armed with current 
research methods and theory, collectively produced an impressively thorough study. From 
the start, beginning with an initial analysis of the central problem, the team made clear that 
“unlike earlier studies, the present one will make extensive use of the growing body of 
knowledge concerning human motivation, personality development, socialization processes, 
the effects of reward and punishment, reactions to various leadership styles and related 
matter.”10 To do so, they utilized surveys and questionnaires that they randomly distributed 
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to twenty percent of the classes of 1970, 1971, and 1972 (i.e., seniors, juniors, and 
sophomores).   
 Strongly aware of the pressures of tradition and culture (and despite them), the study 
team discarded all assumptions and addressed the fundamental question: Why do we have 
a fourth class system and what is its purpose?11 The team quickly discovered that although 
the academy codified the system in 1919, there had never been any “effort to establish any 
causal relationships between what the system does and what its objectives are.” In short, 
they determined that the system existed for four primary reasons: “the military socialization 
of new cadets, equalization of new cadets, identification of those cadets who cannot 
function under stress and the furtherance of leadership opportunities for the upper 
classes.”12  
 The 122-page report found that the fourth class system was in a “monstrous state” 
and that the primary operative factor of the existing system was “stress.”13 They reported 
that the generation of stress was “not tied to any particular mode of behavior or set of 
regulations,” and that hazing frequently occurred as senior cadets “led” their plebes. Indeed, 
the study team determined that the system had evolved over time to resemble the 
widespread practice of hazing that was common on US college campuses throughout the 
twentieth century. Of serious concern was that the data revealed that the high attrition rates 
                                                          
11. Ibid., 1. The report acknowledged these pressures: “Comments have been elicited which reflect 
beliefs that study groups were motivated by a desire to make the System more "permissive" or to create a 
civilian college environment at the Academy.” Ibid., 1. Also, this is a perfect example of an adaptive 
challenge, as Heifetz would describe it. 
12. Ibid., 4. In the final report, the team provided a current definition of the fourth class system 
objectives based on what they discovered and a proposed definition of objectives based on their 
recommendations. The primary objective of the fourth class system was defined as “an artificially 
generated stressful situation which facilitates the socialization and equalization of cadets, assists in the 
identification of the maladjusted cadet and provides an opportunity for leadership development of the 
upper classes. The essence of the Fourth Class System as it currently exists is stress.” The team, 
however, proposed: “To develop each new cadet in a manner which provides him the opportunity to 
achieve his full potential within an environment which supports his efforts to do so.” Ibid., 6 and 30. 




were due to motivational losses, with two-thirds leaving voluntarily. “A sizeable number” of 
these losses were cadets who had demonstrated average or above average “officer 
potential.”14 This was a tragic revelation, given that 74 percent of all cadets stated that their 
number one reason for attending West Point was for “leadership training.”15 Indeed, the 
supporting data indicated that the system had “the opposite effect from what we would 
desire” because its methods actually “detracts from the effort to motivate new cadets toward 
the military.”16   
 In retrospect, this detailed report, with its extensive findings released in the spring of 
1969, was a harbinger of the same conclusions that Phil Davidson would discover with his 
TMEC initiatives at Fort Ord later that year and that the VOLAR experiments would unearth 
by 1972. Bernie Rogers would soon hear similar concerns from his enlisted men councils in 
the months ahead as he assumed command of Fort Carson in his next assignment. What 
these studies and experiments all shared were two things: (1) that the Army had to remove 
countless “irritants” from all corners of its institutional culture, and (2) that the institution had 
to relate more relevantly to society if it was to attract good officer candidates (for West Point) 
and voluntary recruits (for the future AVF).17 To the latter point, it is clear that Golden, Nadal, 
and their colleagues all believed that the academy was out of step with America’s youth and 
that the behavioral sciences held the keys to successfully adapting the culture to a new 
                                                          
14. Ibid., 7.  
15. Ibid., 9. 
16. Ibid., 8—10. In essence, the study team concluded that the plebe (freshman) year mirrored the 
perceived antiquated system of basic training for recruits at Fort Ord: “There seems to be an inherent 
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generation.18 They were supported in this belief by the 1969 reaccreditation process of West 
Point. The Middle States of Higher Education Evaluation Team, which visited the academy 
in February, noted that 
[t]he Academy's present concern about the increasing ratio of 'low 
motivation' separations from the Cadet Corps, and a decided decline in 
admissions applications provide evidence of rapidly developing changes in 
American society, and draw attention to the need for a sense of urgency in 
adapting Academy practices and programs to a new kind of student.19 
 
 The Fourth Class System report made clear that leadership and leader 
development were central to redressing all issues. In their analysis and rationale, the 
team heavily embraced the writings of Chris Argyris, Kurt Lewin, Abraham Maslow, and 
Douglas McGregor.20 They were clear that the current system was “an extreme example 
of a program based on Theory X assumptions [and that it] should be completely 
rewritten under Theory Y assumptions.”21  
 More importantly, the study team’s adherence to the tenets of transformational 
and some servant leadership principles threaded the entire study. Based on their formal 
education and a clear understanding of current research, the team viewed leadership as 
“an interpersonal process.”22 Likewise, they saw leader development and “the teaching 
of leadership [as having] evolved over the past ten years from a system in which certain 
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times.” 
19. Ibid., 11. Emphasis is mine. 
20. Ibid., Annex C, 12. 
21. Ibid., Annex G, 1. This references McGregor’s work. See Annex D for Maslow’s influence as a 
framework for analysis. Also see Ibid., Annex B: “It is tenuous to assume that the methods we used to 
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22. It is important to remember that the members of the Department of Military Psychology and 
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College to “avoid theory” in their leadership study (see Chapter 1), this study team noted that “the efficacy 
of any of our systems or methods must be assessed in light of current trends and requirements. . . .As the 
behavioral sciences have developed, much has been learned about human development and motivation. 




leadership principles were taught to a system based on the realization that leadership is 
a complex inter-relationship of a leader and his followers.”23 In essence, Golden, Nadal, 
et al. were the first to clearly define the views of the emerging Progressives: 
The end result of a leadership development program should be a cadet 
who has internalized certain attitudes as to how to best lead and control 
people. These attitudes should reflect an understanding of what makes 
people perform to their fullest and a realization of their responsibility as 
officers to aid and assist in the development of their subordinates.24 
 
 Finally, the team recognized significant resistance to change. They discovered in the 
survey results that the senior cadets saw less of a need to change the system than their 
juniors. Foreshadowing the feelings of the Traditionalists and the Healers, the 
upperclassmen were 
very reluctant to change the Fourth Class System or delete anything, 
because they know the System helped them develop, and are afraid of 
deleting something essential. It is this fear of some of the upper class that 
we of the study group are perceived as being destroyers of their System, 
rather than builders that causes defensiveness on the part of some cadets 
and some officers.25  
 
The team noted that correcting the system would require a lot of explanation and education. 
They stated that such change in attitudes must be generated internally and that the scope of 
the challenge went beyond technical changes and required a broad social change.26 “Any 
modification to the Fourth Class System will be perceived as a threat and resisted by 
some cadets unless the Corps of Cadets is educated to the fact that the modification will 
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better accomplish the objectives of the System.”27 Indeed, a decade later, one could 
accurately rephrase this latter statement, in regard to the Army OE program, to read: 
Any modification to the Army’s leadership culture will be perceived as a threat and 
resisted by some officers unless the Army is educated to the fact that the modification 
will better accomplish the objectives of the System. 
* 
 Proud of his contributions to the study and left with one more year of teaching at 
West Point (August 1969 to May 1970), Nadal reflected on his learning and began to 
formulate more specific ideas as to how the Army could benefit from the exciting work that 
was emerging from behavioral science research. As the department's director of research, 
Nadal had the time and resources to firm up his thoughts and began looking for 
opportunities to present his ideas. Largely unaware that generals Davidson and Rogers 
were experimenting with similar beliefs at Forts Ord and Carson during his last year at the 
academy, Nadal finally got his chance in May 1970, when General George Forsythe visited 
the Military Psychology and Leadership department at West Point. Assigned as Forsythe's 
escort officer, Nadal bluntly told his future SAMVA boss that, in his opinion, the Army was 
"not making full use of the available knowledge about organizational behavior—particularly 
in the areas of job satisfaction and motivation in developing the volunteer Army." Forsythe 
listened carefully and asked Nadal to send him his ideas in a letter. Nadal did so but did not 
hear back from Forsythe in the months ahead.28 
 Two months later, in July 1970, Nadal moved to Quantico, Virginia, to attend the 
year-long Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Throughout that fall and winter, 
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against the backdrop of Westmoreland’s pledge to fully support the AVF, the formal 
beginning of VOLAR, and Forsythe’s assumption of the SAMVA lead, Nadal continued to 
refine his ideas. In January 1971, Nadal learned that Westmoreland would soon visit 
Quantico and anticipated that the CSA would most likely meet with all Army officers who 
were assigned there. With the CSA’s visit scheduled for late February, Nadal drafted a 
paper of “suggestions.” 
 On February 25, as Westmoreland concluded a luncheon with the Army officers at 
Quantico, Major Nadal—in a bold and gutsy move for such a junior officer—handed the 
CSA his paper entitled “Suggestions for General Westmoreland.”29 “When the opportunity 
presented itself, I gave the letter to General Westmoreland telling him that a full explanation 
was not possible in the short time available.”30 In essence, Nadal’s premise for his 
suggestions was that the Army could “remain an effective, relevant instrument of our 
changing society only through the application of the principles of behavioral science.”31 
Apparently, the CSA read the document right away, for several days later Westmoreland’s 
staff called Nadal to schedule lunch with the CSA (March 4) to discuss the ideas. Nadal, 
fully aware that others at the Pentagon would review his paper for comment, arrived early in 
Washington in order to speak with those who had already examined the paper. Armed with 
their opinions and attitudes, Nadal drafted two pages of notes and arrived at the luncheon 
to present and, if necessary, defend his thoughts. To his surprise, some of the Army’s top 
officers were present: Lieutenant General George Forsythe (SAMVA), Lieutenant General 
Walter T. “Dutch” Kerwin (the DCSPERS), Lieutenant General William C. Gribble, Jr. (Chief 
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of Research and Development or CRD), and Colonel Volney F. Warner (Westmoreland’s 
executive officer). They all listened closely. After some discussion, Westmoreland asked 
Nadal what they could immediately implement. Without hesitation, Nadal replied “that we 
set up a group of people to present workshops throughout the Army—much as the 
civilian industry did on the latest findings on leadership and behavioral sciences.”32 
Westmoreland immediately agreed and also directed that Nadal soon be assigned to his 
office to work for Forsythe. In the meantime, Nadal returned to Quantico, correctly 
assuming that the Army staffing process handling his suggestions would take time to 
play out. 
 Unbeknown to Nadal, Westmoreland had already thought long and hard about the 
concept of travelling teams. The CSA was still in the process of formulating the best 
method for disseminating the findings of the Ulmer-Malone study that he had received eight 
months earlier and that remained restricted ("close hold"). Now Westmoreland saw 
Nadal's recommendations as a potential means to both convey the study's findings and to 
offer potential improvements in leadership training. In mid-April, eager to begin 
implementation, Forsythe pulled Nadal out of the USMC Command and Staff College 
several weeks prior to Nadal's scheduled graduation. Forsythe was comfortable with turning 
Nadal lose but realized that this junior field grade officer did not carry enough rank to 
effectively engage with the senior officers he would encounter: "I got called by Forsythe who 
said to me, Tony, I know this is your program but you don't have the horsepower as a 
major to make this happen, to influence the Army. They [Westmoreland and Forsythe] 
wanted to have a guy with a great reputation as a combat leader."33 As a result, Forsythe 
                                                          





assigned Nadal to the Continental Army Command (CONARC) Leadership Board that 
Westmoreland was then establishing to disseminate the findings of the Ulmer-Malone study 
Army-wide. Created on April 26, 1971, the CONARC Leadership Board was headquartered 
at Fort Bragg under the direction of Brigadier General Henry Everett (Hank) Emerson, the 
commanding general of the US Army Special Warfare Center. 
 Hank "the Gunfighter" Emerson was known throughout the Army as one tough 
soldier. He had earned his nickname by the non-authorized cowboy-styled six-shooter he 
wore in lieu of the standard issue .45 caliber pistol. The gruff and irascible Emerson was a 
strong Traditionalist, cut from the same cloth as Bill DePuy. Among the general officer 
corps, Emerson was highly respected for his innovations in infantry and airmobile tactics 
in Vietnam and his successes as a field commander. Like DePuy, Emerson believed in 
hard, stringent training. In Vietnam, he insisted that his troops only train at night in order 
to “out-guerrilla the guerrilla.”34 This man was now Nadal’s immediate supervisor, and the 
young major knew the new concepts would be a tough sell. 
 While Emerson was known to excel with any mission he had ever undertaken, he 
struggled with the proposed concepts. In retrospect, it appears likely that he wrestled with 
how Nadal’s progressive ideas and recommendations should actually be integrated into the 
leadership training curricula that the CONARC Leadership Board was tasked to improve. 
Still, Nadal became frustrated with Emerson's perceived reluctance to fully embrace and 
integrate the new concepts. While Nadal was in Washington one weekend to handle a 
family emergency, Forsythe asked him about progress. Nadal told his boss frankly that 
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Emerson was reluctant to follow his advice. This led to an immediate phone call to 
CONARC headquarters, where Emerson was coincidentally briefing the CONARC chief of 
staff (Major General George Putnam) and other senior CONARC officers on the program. 
Informed that he SAMVA Chief was on the phone, Putnam left Emerson's briefing and took 
Forsythe's phone call. As Nadal recalled, 
Forsythe says "I want you to understand what the chief [Westmoreland] 
wants done. Make sure these guys are doing it because he's going to hold 
you all accountable for making sure this goes along the way that was 
recommended by Major Nadal and that he approved." And then Forsythe 
described the proposed program that had been briefed to the Chief. And 
Putnam, lying, says, "Yes, sir, we're in this briefing right now and that's 
exactly what they're doing. . . .” Putnam comes storming back into the 
room and says, "Wait, wait, this isn't what he wants. I just had a call from 
Forsythe and he wants this and this. He wants us to do what that major 
[Nadal] told the chief of staff. [The following Monday, I was ordered to 
report] to Emerson and he starts tearing into me. And I said, "Sir, I was 
sent here by the chief of staff of the Army to carry out a program which he 
approved. If you don’t want to do that, I will go back. You can fire me, and I 
will go back to Washington this afternoon." So then he said, "Okay, you'll write 
the damn seminar, and we'll see."35 
 
 For three days, Nadal locked himself in his quarters to do just that. The result was 
impressive. The entire seminar consisted of two sections. The first section conveyed the 
findings of the Ulmer-Malone study—the AWC Study on Military Professionalism. The 
design, Nadal recalled, allowed the briefing team to present the professionalism study first, 
“because this set up the talk, you know, this is how bad it is out there and this is how we fix 
it." Nadal's section would then follow. Emerson, however, remained skeptical. Before giving 
his approval, he wanted to test the waters. 
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He [Emerson] brought in the oldest, crustiest airborne colonels, all veterans 
of Bastogne and whatever, that were hanging around Fort Bragg to be my 
audience. It was a tough crowd. At the end of it, he had them fill out a form, do 
you like this, not like this. And all the feedback he got from these guys was 
really good stuff!36 
 
 Nadal’s half of the travelling seminar was a seventy-page instructor manual entitled 
“Leadership for Professionals” that, as stated, was designed to “present some insights into 
behavioral sciences that will enable us to tie together the results of the professionalism 
study with recent findings in behavioral sciences.”37 In essence, this was not a lecture 
on recent research in behavioral science but an interactive “informal dialog” in which all 
participants could discuss the topic of leadership as they received some exposure to 
recent research from academia and industry. Nadal’s overall intent was for the 
participants to reflect and think about “better leadership techniques” they could develop in 
relating to subordinates. Like the other Progressives, Nadal’s material largely espoused the 
soldier-leader relationship as moral (transformational) rather than contractual 
(transactional). Nadal was clear about this from the beginning of his presentation where 
he, or the appointed instructor, told the audience that leadership was a behavioral 
interaction process that emphasized the needs of the individual soldier and included 
current social attitudes and values. Nadal’s seminar emphasized Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs. By soliciting much input and group interaction, the seminar instructor would ask 
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for “a list of behaviors that result when we find ourselves unsatisfied with our work—
when we are put in an environment which does not fulfill our needs. How would you 
behave in those circumstances?”  
 The seminar also included a short film on Herzberg’s Motivational Hygiene 
Theory (also known as Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction), which in the 
early 1970s was one of the best known and widely accepted job enrichment approaches 
to increase worker productivity.38 More importantly, Nadal challenged the audience to 
think beyond Army-specified values and to consider today’s “youth values.” In 
generating discussion, the seminar leader asked “What factors have changed in our 
culture [in which] values are derived? What are the factors that have caused changes in 
the young men?” The seminar sought to assuage the concerns of those who believed 
that the new approaches were catering to the liberties of young soldiers, brought up in 
the hippie era, at the loss of good order and discipline. In this regard, Nadal challenged 
the participants to define “discipline.” After much discussion, he offered a definition: 
“discipline is an internal attitude or an internal value. Discipline represents a 
commitment to carrying out orders by the individual. Discipline is doing a [good] job 
when the boss is not around.”39 This, of course, led to active discussions about 
punishment. Nadal argued that soldiers willingly follow orders that are rational and 
based on competence. He posited that rational orders require open communications, 
and that the soldier’s “ability to communicate upward and to make his views felt that the 
order was not rational are also important. To insure rationality, orders must have an 
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explainable and logical foundation. We've got to be able to explain what we do and why 
we do it.”40 The latter statement was a view that, at that time and in the existing culture, 
the Traditionalists rejected and the Healers only accepted with strong caveats.41   
 Between July 11 and October 17, 1971, Emerson’s eight teams travelled to more 
than seventy Army organizations worldwide to deliver the seminar. These visits coincided 
with the beginning months of the VOLAR Phase II experiments. Against that background, 
there is a strong likelihood that the audiences perceived the material within that context; 
that is, that these were experimental ideas and that receiving the seminars was in no way a 
directive to implement the concepts. Also important to note is that with the exception of two 
SAMVA officers serving on the teams (albeit with strong backing from Forsythe and 
Westmoreland), this was a CONARC program. For Emerson, the most substantial 
outcomes of the CONARC Leadership Board were the recommendations on how to 
improve leadership development instruction in all of the Army schools.42 
 The final, 159-page report of the CONARC Leadership Board stressed Emerson’s 
emphasis while remaining inclusive and fair to the work of Nadal, Ulmer, and Malone. It 
carefully articulated the Board’s overall approach to the study, the Board’s mission, a 
review of current studies and literature, the research design, and the Board’s findings and 
recommendations. The majority of the primary narrative listed recommendations that, 
based on eighteen findings, attempted to describe remedies or modernization updates to 
the curricula of the Army’s schools, called Programs of Instruction (POI).  
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 Several of the eighteen findings stressed the need for more behavioral science 
knowledge, both in the curricula of the Army school system and for the instructors at those 
schools. However, while it acknowledged that the numerous POIs were all outdated, 
“inadequate” and in need of more “instructors trained in human behavior,” the board’s 
primary concern was that the existing POI did not address contemporary problems such as 
drug abuse and that the leadership training did not prepare officers or NCOs for the duties 
of their next assignment. In these recommendations, the verbiage equated leadership 
instruction with rank levels as though “leadership” was a matter of the administrative and 
managerial functions of those ever increasing positions of responsibility. In this regard, they 
specified schools that prepared NCOs, company grade officers, and majors. Other 
recommendations stressed the need for an updated pedagogy that was more interactive, 
an improvement of ROTC courses, and the development of an Army training management 
system to ensure quality and consistency. To help institutionalize these improvements, the 
board favored more civilian education for selected officers, better utilization and placement 
of officers possessing advanced degrees in the social sciences, a self-development 
program, a “practical counseling manual,” and a revision of Army leadership doctrine that 
would address current social problems. In addition to these prescriptions, the study argued 
that the findings of the Ulmer-Malone study be released to the Army at large. 
     The most peculiar finding warned that  
to preclude an anti-leadership syndrome, [the Army needed to] ensure 
quality control of leadership study activities through centralized 
coordination of field survey operations.43 . . . . The potentially good effects 
of leadership research and studies could be negated if such efforts are not 
coordinated and controlled. Too many seminars and surveys could do 
more harm than good if they are not aimed at a common objective. 
Lacking central direction, such efforts could create the feeling that the 
                                                          




Army is thrashing about desperately for solutions. Central direction of 
leadership research and its application will ensure that the Army receives 
maximum benefit and that soldiers in the field will be receptive to these 
activities.44 
 
No rationale was provided nor did the board explain this caution. Indeed, their only 
recommendation was that CONARC should monitor and coordinate field leadership 
survey operations. Given that SAMVA had been underway for over nine months at this 
point (and served as the Army’s oversight body for the initiation of all leadership 
activities), and that VOLAR was 50 percent complete at the time of the report, it is 
difficult to understand the rationale or motives behind this finding. By this time, many 
installation and unit commanders outside the VOLAR program were initiating their own 
improvements, almost always on a very small scale and usually in the form of 
increasing amenities and removing “irritants.” Perhaps this finding reflected a disfavor of 
those independent activities. It is more likely, however, that either Emerson or the 
majority of the team members (or both) wanted to send a message of caution in light of 
the speed in which so many new and perceived liberal ideas were proliferating 
throughout the Army.    
 The latter viewpoint has merit. Because of the board’s short time frame to 
accomplish its mission, the board leaned heavily on the current work of the Army War 
College and the United States Military Academy (USMA), the only two Army schools 
excluded from the report’s findings as needing correction and improvement. Indeed, the 
report noted that both schools “provided considerable assistance and saved extensive 
research time.”45 Yet both schools had already expressed skepticism about the new 
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concepts, apparent at USMA from the reaction to the Fourth Class System study and at 
the War College where the Study on Leadership sought to distance itself from the 
Ulmer-Malone Study on Military Professionalism. Consequently, the report had plenty of 
material that both the Healers and the Progressives could find appealing. For example, 
for the Progressives, the report noted that 
fresh from that society—and still tied to it—young soldiers tend to reflect 
its social values. They cry for more participation, understanding and 
individuality. They criticize the concepts and procedures that historically 
have enabled the Army to get the job done. Indeed, they warn that our 
leadership situation is not what it should be, that it is out of step with the 
march of time.46 
 
At the same time, they reassured the Healers by reaffirming existing leadership doctrine 
and principles: 
The Army historically has supported the concept of getting the job done 
while taking care of its soldiers and preserving their dignity. Our research 
validated this concept as well as the Army's leadership principles. Neither 
recent changes in the Army nor fundamental changes in society at large 
have made them obsolete.47 
 
 By October 1971, with the CONARC Leadership Board adjourned and the AWC 
Study on Leadership completed, the Healers could say, with some degree of legitimacy, 
that they had consulted the behavioral sciences and had found some merit. However, 
the debate was just getting started. In truth, neither the Progressives nor the Healers 
had yet to adequately articulate their leadership philosophies or recommend how those 
philosophies would work in practice.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on July 30. In any case, they both conveyed the same cautious and conservative tones and both 
reaffirmed existing leadership doctrine and principles.  
46 Ibid., 2. 




Nadal Gains Traction 
 In mid-October 1971, Nadal returned to Washington to continue working for 
Forsythe. A few days later, on October 20, General Palmer, the Army Vice Chief of Staff 
(VCSA), finally received the Department of the Army (DA) staff study on Nadal’s 
“Suggestions for General Westmoreland.” He was not pleased. Not only had the study taken 
nine long months to complete, it basically “offered innocuous comments and reflected a 
status quo position.”48 Forsythe also was disappointed in the findings, so much so that 
he drafted a content-rich memorandum for Palmer on November 17. Forsythe was 
blunt: “As indicated by the generally negative tone of the staff's comments on Nadal's 
suggestions, we have not really faced up to his basic argument—i. e., that recent 
advances within the behavioral science disciplines have very significant implications for 
the Army but that these implications are either largely ignored by the Army or else, for 
one reason or another, simply not applied.”49 The eight-page memo cited several 
relevant findings from the CONARC and AWC studies as well as data that supported 
the gross underutilization of officers possessing advanced degrees in the social 
sciences.  
 The following week, on November 24, 1971, Palmer held a key meeting to 
discuss the Nadal suggestions. In attendance were fourteen general officers, most of 
whom were principals of the Army staff, and ten field-grade officers. The meeting was 
this large because Palmer had encouraged the generals “to bring action officers who 
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might have "some bright ideas to contribute.''50 The behavioral science agnostic Palmer 
opened the meeting by stating frankly that “the fact that the action on Nadal’s 
suggestions took so long . . . is indicative of the controversial nature of the subject.” The 
thrust of Palmer’s introductory remarks was that from his perspective, there really was 
no divide (between the views of the Healers and the Progressives) because the Army 
could be “mission-oriented and people-oriented at the same time.” The VCSA 
concluded his remarks by reminding everyone that the recent “Emerson Board had 
validated Nadal’s comments.” While this was not exactly true, Palmer’s tone served to 
set a neutral and safe climate in which an honest and open dialog could ensue.51 
 The Traditionalists were the first to offer comment. Several stated that “what 
VCSA was describing as problems could best be solved by good leadership and we 
may be diverted from the right track if we go for new terms of the behavioral scientists.” 
Their solution was that “the Army should return to the leadership principles of earlier 
years.” Indeed, the general consensus in the room was that the Army’s existing 
leadership principles were sound.52 
 Forsythe closely listened to the debate. When he finally spoke, he warned 
everyone “against polarizing ‘leadership’ vs. ‘behavioral science.’” To his credit, he did 
not attempt to explain that the two were dynamically intertwined, that behavioral science 
helps to explain the complexities of leadership. Instead, he prudently argued that even 
some of the Army’s best leaders could benefit from behavioral science knowledge. “If 
we send good leaders for training in this knowledge, we will have better leaders.” He 
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concluded by reminding everyone about social change and that the Army “didn’t 
accurately predict what was coming” with racial integration.53 
 The remainder of the meeting was devoted to discussions on what actions the 
Army could begin implementing. Palmer cited Forsythe’s recent eight-page memo and 
essentially stated that the Army needed to clearly identify positions for educated 
behavioral scientists and to understand the degree to which current officers with 
behavioral science backgrounds were underutilized and positions unfilled. Some had 
already done their homework. Major General Seitz, from the Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPERS) stated that his large office only had one designated 
position and that the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army (OCSA) had none. Seitz 
also reported that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODSCOPS) 
had none except in its psychological operations branch (PSYOPS). Palmer replied that 
this needed correction because “the lack of such people was causing us to overlook 
important knowledge” and suggested that Army chaplains were perhaps the only people 
who had initiated behavioral science–related studies (such as soldier motivation and the 
high AWOL rates). Brigadier General Robert Gard from ODSCPERS, an emerging 
Progressive who would soon play an important role in promoting OD, agreed and stated 
that what really bothered him was that “we hadn’t even thought to ask for such a 
study.”54 
 By this time, Palmer, perhaps guided by his awareness that Westmoreland 
wanted stronger action, had set the tone that the Army (meaning everyone in the room) 
would embrace behavioral science more closely. Lieutenant General Gribble (CRD) 






stated that moving ahead required both a research effort to get the data and the actual 
use of behavioral science throughout the Army. To ensure such progress, Palmer 
voiced that they needed a single staff agency directly within the OCSA. His deputy, 
Lieutenant General Bill DePuy (AVCSA) agreed, suggesting that a high-ranking officer 
should head this office to “push” it forward and to “give it proper emphasis.” Forsythe 
concurred by stating that the CSA needed “advice on a day-to-day basis.” The Healers 
in the room largely remained silent, although one argued that “we must translate 
behavioral science research into understandable language if it is to be worthwhile. 
Others agreed that this could be a real problem, especially given the number of service 
schools, if behavioral science “language” was not adequately translated. The meeting 
concluded with Palmer directing Forsythe to form a temporary study group within 
SAMVA that would: (1) develop a proposal for a permanent group in OCSA to advise 
the CSA on behavioral science matters and direct the Army's use of behavioral science; 
(2) develop specific study proposals for behavioral science research; and (3) develop a 
plan to identify positions in the Army that need to be filled with personnel with behavioral 
science education.55 
 Immediately following Palmer’s meeting, Forsythe appointed Nadal to head up the 
Behavioral Science Working Group (BSWG). Over the next two weeks, Forsythe, 
Montague, and Nadal formulated the tasks of the BSWG and, on December 9th, 
communicated their intent to Palmer, seeking his approval to begin. The BSWG mission 
was to: (1) propose a permanent group in the OCSA to advise the CSA on behavioral 
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science matters, (2) survey recent research, both military and civilian and “identify useful 
material” and gaps in the Army that could utilize new research, and (3) determine how best 
to utilize officers with advanced education in the behavioral sciences throughout the Army. 
Forsythe also indicated that “because many of the Army staff agencies are involved in this 
broad field, the working group should include [their] representatives.”56  
 Upon Palmer’s immediately approval of the BSWG agenda, Nadal’s team began 
their effort on December 13, 1972, just as SAMVA’s VOLAR Phase II was coming to a 
conclusion. Over the next two months, the BSWG spent many hours working on the various 
dimensions of the project, including visits of many large corporations in the civilian sector, 
such as AT&T, GM, DuPont, and Sears, to understand their efforts. By February, 10, 1972, 
Nadal was prepared to present an interim report to the CSA and produced a “talking paper” 
that summarized progress thus far. The paper confirmed that the initial BSWG objectives, as 
Palmer had approved, were correct and progressing well. In addition to validating the 
progress on those pre-identified tasks, the BSWG also reported a need to obtain 
motivational and attitudinal data to fill in existing research gaps. More importantly, Nadal 
reported that the top companies in industry had established what they called “an office or 
department of organizational development” to improve organizational effectiveness. The 
talking paper heavily stressed the adoption of OD. The BSWG recommended that the Army 
establish an OD office in the OCSA and that select Army officers attend graduate schools to 
receive formal education in OD. With such expertise in hand, the Army then should update 
the POIs at the service schools to include OD. Going further, Nadal recommended that the 
Army should soon employ “OD techniques and capabilities throughout the Army hierarchy.” 
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He even suggested that the CSA utilize OD “diagnostic tools and strategies to improve the 
efficiency of the Army staff.” The BSWG interim report was incredibly important to the 
evolution of the Army OE program because it was the first time that the Progressives 
specifically cited OD as the primary driver of their initiatives. Indeed, OD offered the 
Progressives a mechanism for translating their leadership philosophy into substantive 
actions and activities.      
 In mid-February 1972, Nadal presented the BSWG interim report in a formal briefing 
to Westmoreland. The briefing did not go well because, as Nadal recalled, “General 
Westmoreland was confused by the technical nature and jargon of the 
recommendations that we made. He directed that we go back and try again.” Although 
this was only a minor setback, Westmoreland’s reaction was a sharp reminder of the 
point that the Healers had made during the Palmer meeting three months earlier. 
Indeed, the Progressives’ challenge with translating behavioral science language into 
“Army speak” would haunt the Army OE program for years to come. Nadal took 
Westmoreland’s reaction to heart. Counter to the bureaucratic culture of the Pentagon, 
Forsythe had not “pre-briefed” Nadal and fully trusted Nadal to articulately present the 
findings. As Nadal recalled, 
if a lieutenant colonel is to give a briefing to the Army Staff Council or the 
Chief of Staff, he . . . would be rehearsed by the colonel, then you’d be 
rehearsed by the brigadier general, then you’d be rehearsed by the 3-star 
before they exposed you to the chief. [However], Forsythe said, you have 
this briefing to do. . . . I’ll see you there. . . . Forsythe was just the most 
unusual general . . . personality wise. He is really a guy who exercised 
positive leadership. . . . [Westmoreland’s reactions would have,] in many 
ways, ended my career. Forsythe put his arm around me, and we walked 
down the hall together, and he said, “Don’t worry about it. Next time we’ll 
set it up so that another day you can do it again. And when you do it, just 




way he handled it made me beholden to that guy for the rest of my life. I 
worked like hell to make it better.57   
 
 In fact, Nadal and his team doubled their efforts. Extending the anticipated 
completion date of the BSWG from March to June, the team members once again hit the 
road in search of information and examples. Nadal, though, went in search of allies. With his 
re-brief to the CSA scheduled for April 11, he spent March visiting his former commander 
Hal Moore at Fort Ord and Major General Sidney B. (Sid) Berry in Washington.58 Berry had 
been present at Palmer’s November meeting and seemed supportive. At that time, Berry 
was chief of the Army’s Military Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) that was soon 
renamed the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), the organization that controlled all 
personnel assignments throughout the Army. A highly decorated combat veteran of the wars 
in Korea and Vietnam, Berry held a master’s degree in international relations from Columbia 
University and had taught social sciences at West Point.59 After their initial meeting in 
March, Berry seemed amiable to the idea. To educate Berry on the practical concepts and 
potential benefits, Nadal flew with Berry to Columbia, South Carolina, to visit the Center for 
Creative Leadership just as he and Emerson had done earlier. Following that visit, Berry 
committed his organization to the project. 
 Nadal then flew to Fort Ord to visit his former commander, Hal Moore, who had 
assumed command of the installation from Phil Davidson the previous June. For five days, 
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Nadal stayed at Moore’s home where they had an opportunity to discuss many of the 
ongoing initiatives on post. Nadal was impressed with Moore’s progressive activities and 
was surprised to learn about the scope of work that Letgers and Datel had already 
completed. He discovered that three months earlier, Moore had initiated week-long 
programs of awareness training—an OD technique—for middle- and senior-level officers 
and civilian supervisors. “The training was directed primarily toward the development of self-
awareness, group problem-solving, recognition of hidden goals and motivations, and 
improved interpersonal communications.”60 In March, based on the success of the self-
awareness training, Moore had formally approved the Army’s first OD program that included 
authorized funding and the involvement of HumRRO. Letgers spent time showing Nadal the 
program and essentially proved to Nadal that Moore not only already had a strong OD test 
bed underway but also one that was on the same trajectory as Nadal’s.  
 Nadal rendered his report to Forsythe upon returning to Washington. The SAMVA 
chief was so pleased with Nadal’s visits, especially the Fort Ord trip, that he immediately 
wrote to Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr., the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training at 
CONARC, seeking permission to use Moore’s pilot program as a test bed for the entire 
Army. Hunt expressed his support and approved Forsythe’s request.61  
 Nadal then turned his attention to preparing for his re-brief to Westmoreland and to 
working with the team to complete the final BSWG report. With the briefing rescheduled yet 
again, for June 8, the BSWG had time to complete the final report and to improve the 
briefing at the same time. The final report was rich in detail. The main body of the report, 
twenty-nine pages long, consisted of twelve general findings and twenty-nine specific 
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recommendations.62 The introductory pages contained a thorough narrative that 
diplomatically acknowledged that the “common sense” approach had historically served the 
Army well. It went on to say that in light of the fact that the BSWG advocated research and, 
in some cases, unproven practices, the Army still needed to rely on common sense to some 
extent. The report cautioned that “as will be seen in the study, the findings of behavioral 
science sometimes run counter to our common sense practices.63      
 Overall, though, the report heavily underscored the point that the Army possessed 
little if any behavioral science knowledge.64 To redress this state, the BSWG recommended 
four areas of action: (1) significantly increase the number of personnel educated in the 
behavioral sciences, (2) augment the DA staff with an organization to facilitate and 
exploit the use of the behavioral sciences, (3) improve user-researcher relationships, 
and (4) consider the successes that have proven effective in industry and that “might 
have a place in the Army.”65 Of the twenty-nine recommendations, many were meant to 
remedy the shortfall  of qualified personnel both short- and long term through various 
personnel management strategies. Above all else, the report emphasized that OD was 
the mechanism to implement planned change throughout the Army.  
OD provides a framework for initiating deliberately planned change and 
emphasizes learning and problem solving by people in any organizational 
unit. By using the knowledge and techniques of the behavioral sciences, 
OD assists managers in integrating individual needs for growth with 
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organizational goals and objectives in order to make a more effective 
corporation. Some of the specific objectives are: to increase 
professionalism by creating an open, problem solving climate throughout 
the corporation; to locate decision-making and problem-solving 
responsibilities as close to the information as possible; to build trust 
among individuals and groups and thereby increase their self-direction; 
and to develop reward systems which recognize the individual’s 
contribution to the corporation’s mission.66 
 
The report called for the immediate implementation of an OD office on the DA staff, the 
creation of “an in-house capacity to conduct OD activities” on a “consulting basis” Army-
wide, and the Army “OD teams at the G-level [i.e., division level] to advise and assist 
commanders in applying behavioral science knowledge and OD techniques.” The latter two 
recommendations were the most important of the entire report because these specified 
activities essentially became the basis of the Army OE program. 
 Three other interesting points stood out in the report. First, historically the Army had 
done a poor job of properly conducting research into “people problems” and the research 
that did occur seldom made it to users who could utilize the results in any practical way.67 
The BSWG strongly argued that behavioral scientists in the Army were ideal for solving this 
problem. Second, an introductory course on OD should be developed and provided to all 
officers currently in command positions. Of note, counter to conventional wisdom, the 
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BSWG singled out colonels and generals for attendance.68 Third, these efforts would take 
time to put in place and would require initial programs to “create a climate” that would lead to 
“a structure which can maintain the requisite level of interest and understanding over 
the next few years and allow for the detailed work required to convert recommendations 
to functioning programs.69  
 On June 8, 1972, Nadal got his second chance to brief Westmoreland. Most likely, 
Forsythe had kept the CSA informed of SAMVA’s progress because this briefing was 
scheduled as a “decision brief.” A decision briefing is a formal presentation at the end of a 
planning process that then requires the commander’s approval and guidance for program 
implementation. Nadal was ready; the extra time had allowed the BSWG to put the final 
touches on all recommendations, including budget numbers. More importantly, Nadal had 
invited Letgers from Fort Ord to co-brief the presentation. 
 Nadal faced a tough crowd. In addition to the CSA, the audience included most of the 
principals of the Army staff—one general (VCSA Palmer), four lieutenant generals, and five 
other general officers. Nadal had learned from his earlier mistakes, though. With much 
confidence, he clearly stated in his introductory remarks that everyone needed to know only 
two terms: “behavioral science” and “organizational development.” After offering succinct 
definitions for both, Nadal presented the findings of the BSWG report. Undergirding his 
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entire briefing was the clear message that “the Army is not fully using behavioral science 
knowledge to improve professionalism and leadership.”70 After outlining some of the report’s 
specific recommendations, Letgers followed Nadal with a summary of the work that had 
been completed at Fort Ord and Hal Moore’s current plans for OD. Letgers stressed that OD 
had already provided “valuable command tools” for commanders to identify “favorable and 
unfavorable trends in leadership.” He went on to explain successes to date with their 
leadership awareness training for senior leaders, and he reported the results from the 
positive feedback that eighty-nine field-grade officers had already provided Moore. In fact, 
the demand at Fort Ord for more OD training currently exceeded available resources.71 
 Nadal, in his concluding remarks, asked Westmoreland to approve five initiatives: (1) 
establish a small behavioral science element in OCSA, (2) establish an advisory board of 
prominent behavioral scientists, (3) identify and validate positions for advanced degrees in 
behavioral science Army-wide, (4) establish an instructor training course for personnel to 
teach leadership in the service schools, and (5) conduct a pilot OD test at the Department of 
the Army level and at a field installation (Fort Ord). The CSA wasted no time in approving all 
of the recommendations. He congratulated the BSWG for their “excellent job,” adding that 
they had “come to grips with the problem and that the proposed program was a modest 
one.”72  
 Westmoreland then solicited comments. At first, the general consensus was 
supportive. Then, importantly, Palmer’s deputy and strong Traditionalist, Bill DePuy, 
carefully offered his support but predicted that it would “take a new generation of officers 
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before the program is fully accepted.” He recommended that “we put more emphasis on pilot 
projects and careful demonstration of the value of behavioral science techniques before we 
talk too much about abstract theory to the Army.” DePuy advocated that the OD element be 
subordinated within ODCSPERS rather than in OCSA. DePuy’s frankness undoubtedly 
encouraged others to speak their opinions. Lieutenant General Gribble and Major General 
Bolton readily agreed with DePuy that OD should fall under the DSCPERS. Lieutenant 
General Dutch Kerwin, the DCSPERS, who would receive all of this, disagreed and sided 
with SAMVA that OD should be directly under the sponsorship of the CSA, and if the 
program was successful, consideration should be given for OD to move into the personnel 
channel. Westmoreland broke into the debate with a compromise suggestion. He advocated 
placing the program in the OVCSA (Palmer) because as a new program, OD needed full 
support from the top of the Army. If at some future date OD proved successful, then—as 
Kerwin had suggested— it could move to the DCSPERS. Palmer agreed but reminded his 
boss that with VOLAR coming to an official end in less than three weeks (which appeared to 
some as ending SAMVA’s mission and reason for being), that they defer any further plans 
until they determined the future of SAMVA. That meeting was scheduled to take place 
immediately following Nadal’s decision brief.   
 This debate was extremely important to the evolution of Army OE for several 
reasons. First, it acknowledged that social science terminology and new behavioral science 
research constituted a very real obstacle to progress and the acceptance of new ideas, 
especially if new programs were perceived as basically theoretical in nature. In this regard, 




the usefulness of behavioral science before too much ‘pure theory’ is disseminated.”73 
Palmer readily agreed but bluntly stated that he disliked the terms “behavioral science,” 
organizational development,” and “human resources management.” Although SAMVA had 
suggested the latter term, Palmer asked Forsythe “to work on that.” Second, the dialogs 
reflected the emotional underpinnings of the individuals’ views on leadership and whether 
the Army truly had a problem with its leadership health or current condition throughout the 
institution in light of the improvements that VOLAR had already emplaced. In essence, the 
group represented all three camps: the Traditionalists (DePuy, Gribble, and Bolton), the 
Progressives (Berry, Forsythe, and his team), and everyone else in the room falling within 
the Healers’ camp. Finally, most important was the debate over where OD should reside 
within DA. Forsythe, Nadal, and Letgers, knowledgeable of OD, fully understood that 
successful OD programs required a strong, powerful champion at the very top. They 
recognized that placing it any lower than the OCSA would most likely doom the program 
from the start as it would inevitably become mired deep inside a cumbersome Pentagon 
bureaucracy.74     
 Unfortunately, their fears would be realized at once. In the meeting immediately 
following Nadal’s decision briefing, the Army’s senior leaders debated the next steps for 
SAMVA. With VOLAR coming to an end at the end of the month and the results looking very 
positive in terms of removing “irritants” and emplacing more soldier services and amenities, 
SAMVA, by all accounts, had done a good job. The Healers were pleased. In fact, Palmer 
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and Kerwin were encouraging Forsythe to end all experimentation (that is, declare that 
VOLAR had succeeded and that the Army should now stabilize “the all-volunteer effort on 
terms favorable to the Army”).75 Forsythe and Montague, on the other hand, did not consider 
the job complete. Irritants and amenities were merely technical problems that managerial 
change efforts could easily implement with adequate funding. The two had worked tirelessly 
to address the more adaptive challenge—introducing the entire officer corps to new 
behavioral science research and leadership philosophies, employing new research methods 
to improve human relations and communications and, more recently, implementing OD as a 
leadership tool to manage planned change and to improve unit effectiveness. They could 
not understand why the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) Program’s Master Plan—produced 
in January 1971—had met so much resistance, especially since VOLAR (the experimental 
arm of the plan) appeared successful and acceptable to the Healers. The two Progressives 
were disappointed with everyone’s decision to terminate SAMVA, but they were too 
exhausted to oppose it.76  
 Throughout the VOLAR experiments, Forsythe and Montague had grown weary of 
Westmoreland’s and Palmer’s “fearful leadership” practices, that is, the tendency of the CSA 
and VCSA to veto VOLAR initiatives simply because they personally did not like them or 
believed that subordinate commanders would not approve. Forsythe was frustrated with 
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their cautious hesitancy and criticized their proclivity to “let’s think about this, let’s study it 
some more, let’s have somebody do a research project on it.”77 When Forsythe 
disseminated initiatives to the Army’s field commanders, they complained to Palmer that 
SAMVA had created a dual, confusing process that supplanted DA’s normal communication 
channels. Palmer agreed and ordered Forsythe to “use established notification 
procedures.”78 Montague voiced even stronger opinions and viewed Palmer as a staunch 
Healer who was a major roadblock and “reluctant dragon.” Montague believed that “farming 
[ideas and initiatives] out to the Staff will not likely result in any positive action.” Instead, he 
preferred using external consultants and researchers.79     
 By the time of the Nadal briefing and SAMVA decision meeting, Palmer’s attention 
had turned to budget matters and preparation for fiscal year 1973 budget approvals—the 
year that ended conscription and took the Army to the inauguration of the AVF. Palmer 
believed that the many life-style amenities programs were vulnerable to budget cuts if they 
were viewed as experimental, especially since they were funded as supplemental requests. 
Having viewed SAMVA primarily as a semiautonomous organization that served to facilitate 
the transition from a conscripted army to an all-volunteer institution, Palmer saw no need for 
SAMVA if those program monies came under control of the DA staff as part of the Army’s 
base budget.80 Forsythe did not disagree with the necessity to protect the program’s monies 
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and helped to bring the “soldier-oriented” programs under the Army’s base budget. In doing 
so, however, those activities proved to be the last significant act of SAMVA. Realistically, 
Forsythe and Montague had anticipated the June 8, 1972 meeting for several months. 
Westmoreland had notified Forsythe in January that SAMVA should henceforth phase out of 
their purview those activities that were considered successful and enduring. Also since 
January, Palmer had been forthright with Forsythe in stating his desire to transfer the 
SAMVA programs to the DA staff. Subsequently, he asked Forsythe to revise the SAMVA 
charter to prepare for that eventuality.81 With those notifications, Montague had had enough 
and left in April. On June 30, 1972, three weeks after the Nadal and SAMVA meetings, 
Westmoreland and Forsythe both retired from the Army.   
 In retrospect, Forsythe and his “SAMVA warriors,” as they called themselves, had 
accomplished much in their twenty months of existence. Years later, Forsythe would look 
back on those experiences with some pride. However, at the time of his departure, he was 
disheartened by overall resistance to change, and Palmer and Westmoreland’s arbitrary and 
unilateral vetoes of even minor ideas and suggestions. Everyone’s concern about preparing 
for the end of conscription and rushing to get the new All-Volunteer Army “right” created high 
expectations throughout the institution that could not be met in such a short time frame. As 
Butler noted only a year later, 
SAMVA did not experience a natural birth. Because of the urgency of time, 
it came into being by caesarean and grew to maturity before its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quality of life programs. For the FY72 SAMVA-controlled budget, Forsythe had planned for $1.3 billion 
(later reduced to $613 million). However, Forsythe realized at the time that SAMVA would not receive the 
projected $3 billion that had been anticipated for the program in 1973. Indeed, the annual projections for 
the SAMVA programs were estimated at $3.3 billion through FY 77. 
81. Ibid., 155. Griffith writes that the final decision to end the SAMVA program was not reached until 
“late spring” but emphasized that Palmer anticipated it because he thoroughly reviewed the various 
elements of the program to personally decide which components would stay or be eliminated. That way, 
the new CSA (Abrams) would not need to review the MVAP and decide its future. Transferring it before 




musculature was developed enough to support it. It was not expected to 
solve all problems immediately, yet many thought it should and would.82 
 
 Forsythe and Montague’s gloomy disposition did not infect any of the Progressives. 
On the contrary, they were ecstatic with the outcomes of the Nadal decision brief. 
Westmoreland, originally a staunch Traditionalist whom Nixon had forced to become a 
reluctant Healer had suddenly empowered the Progressives to a level they likely had not 
expected. Not only had Westmoreland formally sanctioned their views and work thus far, he 
had officially approved OD as the mechanism to govern behavioral science change efforts 
and to improve leadership in the Army well beyond the confines of Fort Ord. At a moment in 
time when the vast majority of the Army staff wanted to permanently end all 
experimentation, the CSA authorized several high level OD pilot programs to begin. In all 
probability, on that day in June 1972, Westmoreland did not fully realize or appreciate that 
he had just unleashed arguably the most intellectual program the Army had ever seen. 
East Meets West 
 Following the Nadal decision brief, Letgers must have felt nothing but excitement and 
validation on his journey back to California. Westmoreland’s decision had just transplanted 
the seedlings of OD from the small installation-level garden at Fort Ord into the institutional-
level fields of the Army. Still, much work lay ahead; Letgers was smart enough to know that, 
at this point, a lot of cultural resistance existed. 
 In many ways, Letgers was just beginning to see traction with OD at Fort Ord. Six 
months earlier, he and his team had begun conducting week-long programs of 
“awareness training” for mid- and senior-level officers. This awareness training was 
                                                          





really a T-Group that utilized the laboratory method (sensitivity training). The course 
was the first iteration of the Leadership and Management Development Course 
(L&MDC) that would soon become the cornerstone of the OESO course. At this stage it 
emphasized the development of self-awareness, group problem-solving, recognition of 
hidden goals and motivations, improved interpersonal communication, conflict 
resolution, leadership awareness, and leadership counseling. Letgers and his team 
received positive feedback from the participants throughout the spring of 1972.83  
 Now that Westmoreland had directed Fort Ord to formally develop OD for wider 
use in the Army, Moore could devote more resources to establishing a directorate 
dedicated to this effort. Authorization to proceed arrived on July 13, when the Office of 
the Special Assistant for Training (OSAT) formally directed Moore to develop a two-year 
pilot program. The directive tasked Moore to complete a comprehensive plan no later 
than October 1, 1972.84   
 The initial challenge was finding a qualified director and more personnel with 
expertise in OD or recent behavioral science research. While the search went on for a 
director, on August 25, 1972, the existing OD staff moved into building 2864. This small, 
thirty-year-old, two-story wooden structure was just one of the scores of such buildings 
that the Army had constructed at the beginning of the Second World War to train the 7th 
Infantry Division. Three weeks later, on September 20, Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. 
Robinson became the acting director of what was now called the Organizational 
Development Directorate (ODD). He and his people worked hard on developing a plan 
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that would fully meet Westmoreland’s guidance. They based their plan on the CSA’s 
five specified tasks: 
1. determine minimum staffing required for OD activities at other army 
installations, 
2. refine OD techniques/procedures applicable in the Army's organizational 
setting, 
3. measure the effects of OD on typical army organizations, 
4. determine how behavioral science instruction in OD techniques and 
procedures could best be incorporated into the officer and NCO educational-
system, and 
5. develop educational materials for this latter purpose. 
 Work on the comprehensive plan was well underway when, on November 1, 
Colonel John R. Elliott took over as the ODD’s first director. Within two months, the 
team completed the plan for a January 1, 1973, implementation. Fully understanding the 
complexity of an OD program, Elliott and his team envisioned four six-month phases for 
the two-year pilot: Development, Testing, Execution, and Evaluation.  
 Phase I, the Development phase (January through June 1973), allowed the ODD 
to identify which components of OD were most appropriate for an Army organizational 
environment, focusing explicitly on the elements of surveys, team-building workshops, 
data feedback, and consultations and contracts (the formal process of initially meeting 
with commanders to understand their goals and to agree on an OD plan for the 
organization).85 The ODD designed Phase II, the Testing phase (July through 
December 1973), to refine the components identified in the Development phase. These 
                                                          




included tighter controls over the survey process, process consultation, action planning, 
and data feedback. More importantly, the Testing phase placed great emphasis on 
experiential learning. Using experiential learning methods, ODD personnel presented 
topics such as conflict management, role definition and clarification, formulation of unit 
issues, goal setting, and inter-group confrontation.  
 In essence, Phase III, the Execution phase (January through June 1974), served 
as a “dress rehearsal.” It incorporated the best “lessons learned” from the previous two 
phases. This phase validated the use of the GOS as a starting point and included the 
use of a control group to validate results. In addition to utilizing workshops, interviews, 
and experiential-based instruction, the team employed the L&MD course as a major 
component of an OD program. Finally, the ODD envisioned Phase IV, the Evaluation 
phase (July through December 1974), to assess the entire pilot program. During this 
phase, they hoped to evaluate all of the OD processes and techniques employed to 
date at another installation.86    
 Detailed plans were also formulated in Washington, albeit in a nebulous 
environment. Whereas Moore was in a position to support and control the rapid 
progress at Fort Ord, the DA staff struggled to wrap its collective arms around the 
myriad of expanding initiatives in Washington and throughout the Army. With Montague 
gone since April and the retirement of Westmoreland and Forsythe on June 30, Nadal 
found himself once again “walking point” to keep the fledgling program on course and 
moving in the right direction. Nadal was determined to execute a smooth transition from 
SAMVA to OSAT. Scheduled to depart for a three year assignment to Germany on July 





23, Nadal drafted a formal OD work plan for OSAT that articulated the tasks that 
needed completion. Issued on June 15, 1972, the extensive plan identified the following:  
 finalize OSAT’s organizational plan and staffing requirements, 
 assist Fort Ord in their effort to implement an OD pilot program, 
 develop guidance for ODCSPER for the expansion of graduate programs in 
the behavioral sciences, 
 initiate action for the development of a civilian advisory board to the CSA in 
OD and behavioral science matters, 
 implement OD seminars for the Army staff, 
 monitor and assist OPO (MILPERCEN) in development of a pilot OD 
program, 
 develop contractual procedures, 
 monitor R&D activities in carrying out the behavioral science research 
program, and 
 develop, plan, and implement an OD educational program.87 
 Nadal had some unexpected assistance from Palmer. When Westmoreland 
retired on June 30, Abrams faced some strong resistance to his appointment as CSA 
and did not receive confirmation until October 11.88 Palmer, the acting CSA during this 
interval, continued to strongly push Westmoreland’s directives for OSAT and the Army’s 
                                                          
87. Memo, “Organizational Development Work Plan, 14 June–1 September 1972,” Office of the 
Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, June 15, 1972, Nadal 
Papers. 
88. The Senate armed services committees was slow to approve Abram’s confirmation because of an 
ongoing investigation related to the violation of the rules of engagement (ROE) in the bombing campaign 
of North Vietnam. General John D. Lavelle, commander of the 7th Air Force in 1971 and 1972, was under 
investigation for authorizing air strikes into restricted areas. Because Abrams had been Lavelle’s boss at 
the time of the violations of the ROE, some members of Congress believed Abrams was complicit. 




implementation of OD.89 Despite his personal views that SAMVA/OSAT should end 
experimentations, solidify the VOLAR successes (irritants and amenities), and get on 
with the business of restructuring and rebuilding the Army, Palmer empowered OSAT to 
move the programs forward. He wholeheartedly supported Lieutenant General Glenn D. 
Walker (Forsythe’s successor) as head of the new OSAT. Also, like Nadal, Palmer 
wanted to see a seamless transition from SAMVA. While it is unclear whether the 
unassuming Walker was a Healer or a Progressive, he had a strong, favorable 
reputation among his peers. Walker had served four straight years of combat duty in 
Vietnam and had significant experience with the Army’s personnel system as a staff 
officer of DCSPER and a G-1.90 Now, in the summer of 1972, he replaced Forsythe—
certainly a hard act to follow—not only to oversee several complex pilot programs Army-
wide but also to guide OSAT through turbulent waters as many on the Army staff 
lobbied for the subordination of his organization out of the OCSA and into the 
DCSPERS. 
 Fortunately, Walker had powerful assistance in the form of Colonel John Johns, 
the head of the OD element in OSAT. Johns had earned a master’s degree in 
psychology from Vanderbilt University and had taught leadership and ethics at West 
Point. He would exercise significant influence with Bernie Rogers and the evolving 
direction of the Army OE program at the DA level over the next several years. With no 
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break in stride, Johns, Nadal, and several other SAMVA/OSAT personnel executed 
several key initiatives during the transition period. Among those, the most notable 
included the formal authorization to Fort Ord on July 13 to proceed with Letger and 
Moore’s OD initiatives, two minor ongoing studies with the Center for Creative 
Leadership (CCL) and, certainly the most important, the planning for the OD pilot with 
OPO/MILPERCEN.    
 Several months earlier, SAMVA had asked the CCL to assess eleven battalion 
commanders, all lieutenant colonels, to discern similar or different leadership behaviors. 
CCL ran the commanders through a week of intense assessments, utilizing current 
research techniques and comparing the results against an extensive data set from 
many similar studies, including previous work with hundreds of other Army officers.91 
This rich, detailed study, though only a footnote in the evolution of the Army OE 
program, contained hidden gems that articulated and differentiated, in clear, concise 
terms, those behaviors that are “transformational” from those that are managerial or 
transactional. In short, the author—Dr. Douglas Holmes—presented some of the 
psychologists’ findings within the context of officers having a strong preference for a 
“structure/role” orientation over a “consideration/self” orientation. The former reflected 
“the extent to which an individual is likely to define and structure his own role and those 
of his subordinates toward goal attainment.” The individual—“the commander”—was 
viewed as the person directing group activities such as planning, communicating, 
scheduling, and criticizing. The “consideration/self” orientation reflected “the extent to 
which an individual is likely to have job relationships with his subordinates characterized 
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by mutual trust, respect for their ideas, consideration of their feelings, and certain 
warmth between himself and them.”92 
 The overall findings indicated that 70 percent favored structure over 
consideration. “This result suggests some preference for satisfying organizational needs 
before satisfying the needs of individuals within the organization.”93 Seventy percent 
was also the percentage of officers who possessed the same Meyers-Briggs personality 
profile, although they were split between introversion and extroversion.94 In the final 
report, the researchers found that the battalion commanders were “highly motivated to 
achieve, very bright intellectually, more energetic than most people, and that they 
possess a strength of personality that enables them to cope well with stressful 
situations.”95 However, in doing so, they were seen as “self-contained, distant, and 
removed from their fellow man.” They scored low on “having to do with ease of 
maintaining good human relationships in a variety of circumstances [and] low on a 
variable measuring the raising of morale. Observers had the impression that most of the 
battalion commanders . . . were not freely experiencing their human relationships to the 
extent necessary to adapt effectively to the subtleties and nuances of human 
interactions.”96 Their scores reflected low interest in, “and [being] responsive to, the 
inner needs, motives, and experiences of others.”97 The strength of this entire study and 
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its findings, as articulated in the second half of the report, was the clarity between 
leadership behaviors defined as role oriented and those as self-oriented. In hindsight, it 
is clear that the CCL was conveying a message that for the AVF to work, the Army 
officer corps had to change its methodology for leadership development. That is, for the 
All-Volunteer Army to succeed, officers had to become more “self” oriented than “role” 
oriented, and commanders had to embrace “consideration” over “structure.”98  
In our judgment, it is impossible to turn back the clock on the recently 
visible, wide-spread demands of many individuals for greater self-
expressiveness and lesser role-prescribed behavior, especially among the 
young. Although such demands may be held in check with varying 
degrees of success for a prolonged period of time, the time is almost over 
when an organization can manage itself effectively without greater in-
depth social-psychological understanding of the forces at work and of the 
various internal management strategies and tactics that it might adopt in 
its efforts to remain or to become a viable, optimally effective 
organization.99 
 
 Following the termination of SAMVA, OSAT continued to work with Holmes at the 
CCL to produce a follow-up study entitled “A Report on an Evaluation of Twelve 
Brigadier General Designees.” Released in November 1972, this study discovered that 
the twelve colonels closely mirrored the findings of the battalion commanders. “We used 
the same assessment procedures with the BG designees as with the battalion 
commanders. The more general organizational implications that we described in the 
earlier report remain unchanged by our evaluation of the BG designees.”100 All scored 
extremely high for intelligence, and possessed strong personality strengths and a drive 
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to do well.101 In terms of the latter, they scored considerably higher than the battalion 
commanders on “capacity” or drive for status.102 Interestingly, unlike the battalion 
commanders, the group scored similarly to high level corporate executives in 
managerial traits: a strong need for achievement, order, dominance, endurance, and 
deference. Still, the group aligned with the battalion commanders on the majority 
possessing the same Myers-Briggs personality, which the report generalized as the type 
of individual who was “dependable, cautious, and managerial.”103 Like the previous 
group, this group strongly favored “role/structure” over “self/consideration.”104     
 The report’s final conclusions, similar to the one from the battalion commander 
report, underscored the role that personality types play in leadership and change. 
We believe a major determinant in an organization's adaptability and 
future direction of movement is the proportions of different types of 
individuals who occupy the more influential positions in an organization. 
[Our data] supports this view, especially if it is recognized that the stated 
beliefs about change in the Army are determined by personality type.105 
 
Holmes followed this statement with the hypothetical question: “How do I become a 
general?” He concluded that 
it is better to favorably impress the right people, to perform well on all 
assignments, to gain the range of experiences thought by decision-makers 
to be necessary or highly desirable for promotion [and] that you should 
appear to be, psychologically-speaking, a certain type of person in order 
to be tapped for higher levels of responsibility.106 
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In other words, the more junior officers should follow or mimic the behaviors of their 
seniors. 
 As important and insightful as the two CCL studies were to the work being done 
at OSAT, by far the most important projects on the horizon in the summer and fall of 
1972 were the official notification to begin (i.e., continue) the OD initiatives at Fort Ord 
(issued on July 13) and the planning for a major OD pilot program for OPO. OPO was 
headed by Major General Sid Berry, one of Nadal’s few allies who had been present at 
both the Palmer meeting the previous November and the June decision briefing for 
Westmoreland. Fortunately, Nadal had already received Berry’s commitment prior to the 
CSA decision brief and could now hand that initiative off to OSAT as he departed for 
Germany on July 23. Palmer, as the acting CSA, continued to push the OPO project 
forward by formally announcing to the heads of all Army staff agencies that OPO would 
initiate a large OD engagement. In his memo dated September 8, Palmer reminded the 
Army’s senior leaders of the June 8 decisions and that current thinking supported the 
assumption that “OD techniques and principles can improve the organizational 
effectiveness of the Army.” He informed them that the goals of the pilot were (1) to 
“provide for developing concepts for similar projects in other Army staff agencies,” and 
(2) to “develop an in-house (OPO) capability for sustaining project efforts following the 
termination of the contract.” He ended by stating that OPO would begin the program as 
soon as they could award the contract.107  
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 Palmer followed up that memo with another dated September 25, 1972, in which 
he announced to the entire Army that OSAT would govern all of these pilot projects 
within a program entitled the Motivational Development Program (MDP). The memo 
reinforced DA’s current definition of “behavioral science” and defined motivational 
development as “the applied use of behavioral science knowledge to improve the 
effectiveness of organizations by improving the motivation of individuals within these 
organizations.”108 Palmer again reminded the Army’s most senior leaders of 
Westmoreland’s June 8 directives while at the same time stressing that DA supported 
the findings of the Behavioral Science Working Group (BSWG) report that had 
undergirded the June 8 decision briefing. More importantly, this memo formally tasked 
both OSAT and the DCSPERS to implement the CSA’s directives by specifying each 
component and assigning responsibility. Although OSAT was already on top of its action 
items, it is noteworthy that Palmer assigned the execution of the pilot OD program at 
OPO to the DCSPERS instead of OSAT. This tasking signaled the impending 
subordination of OSAT (i.e., OD) to personnel channels (DCSPERS).109 In retrospect, 
Palmer’s September memos favored the Progressives’ agenda because they served to 
firmly entrench OD before the arrival of Abrams. Although Abrams would prove to be 
the most important Healer of his generation and beyond, the strong-willed general could 
have easily scrapped the OD pilots given the scope of his strong desire to reorganize 
the Army and his other enormous challenges with force modernization.110  
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 It certainly is important to not overemphasize the assignment of the OPO pilot 
project to DCSPERS. During these months, the Army staff was beginning to undergo 
huge changes and reductions that resulted in major reorganizations and consolidation 
of offices. Indeed, between January 1969 and June 1973, the DA staff was reduced 
from 9600 personnel to 4816—a 50 percent reduction.111 Just weeks before the Palmer 
memos in September, ODCSPERS took significant steps at internal reorganization. It 
converted the Discipline and Drug Policies Division (DDP) into the Human Resources 
Development Division (HRD) “in order to place required emphasis on the need for a 
positive approach to leadership and motivation.”112 At the helm of HRD was the liberal-
minded, energetic Progressive Brigadier General Robert G. “Bobby” Gard, whom Nadal 
held in great respect.113 Gard was frustrated with the confused restructuring, noting that 
the reorganization and HRD’s responsibilities for the pilots did not come with a needed 
increase in personnel. In fact, he was appalled that the old division was responsible for 
the “leadership function” but that this function only consumed a portion of one officer’s 
time and responsibilities. The new HRD division now faced the conversion of two 
existing positions “to begin preliminary work on upgrading leadership training throughout 
the Army and to coordinate with and respond to DCSPERS for tasking by the 
Motivational Development Section of OSAT.”114 This was the crux. Ever since the death 
of SAMVA and the birth of OSAT on July 1, 1972, everyone understood that once the 
pilots had produced tangible results, OSAT and the Motivational Development Program 
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would dissolve (just as SAMVA and the VOLAR program had). That dissolution would 
mean that DCSPER could at some point assume all responsibility for OD and all of the 
other behavioral science initiatives. Unfortunately, bureaucratic turmoil ensued during 
the DA downsizing, leaving OSAT (responsible to the CSA) and HRD (subordinate to 
DCSPERS) in a state of flux. Gard believed that OSAT should pass those personnel 
spaces to HRD sooner rather than later, given the scope of new responsibilities and the 
task of overseeing the pilot programs. “The combination of space reductions and the 
need to continue performing the various assigned functions precluded adding personnel 
to the area I consider the highest priority and greatest need within the Army: leadership 
and motivation.”115 Unfortunately, these inadequacies would endure until DCSPERS 
completed its reorganization in spring 1973. 
 On October 12, 1972, General Creighton Abrams began his first day as CSA. 
Palmer had performed well during the interim, but there was much to hand-off to his 
new boss.116 The last of the Army’s combat troops were returning from Vietnam, the DA 
staff and the Army at large were downsizing, the Army faced enormous budget 
challenges, poor race relations and drug abuse were pervasive and at chronic levels 
throughout the Army, the presidential elections were only four weeks out, and everyone 
was nervous about the start of the AVF—now less than eight months away. For the time 
being, Abrams would focus on these major issues. Not until the following March would 
he have the time to wade in on the Motivational Development Program in any significant 
way. Fortunately, he would not need to do so. Less than three weeks in the job, Abrams 
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chose Bernie Rogers as his new DCSPERS. As Chief of Legislative Liaison working in 
the Pentagon, Rogers had stayed closely informed of the ongoing initiatives. Now, upon 
becoming the DCSPERS on November 1, the Godfather of Army OE was well 
positioned to shepherd the Progressives’ agenda, beginning with the OPO project. 
One Giant Step Forward 
 From September to December 1972, OSAT sought a contractor for the OD pilot 
project with Sid Berry’s OPO. In January 1973, OSAT awarded this contract to System 
Development Corporation (SDC) and received their OD program proposal on February 
16. The 119-page SDC proposal was thorough and written with minimal behavioral 
science jargon so that Berry and his direct leadership team could easily understand the 
OD goals and objectives. SDC expressed a clear understanding of the intent of the pilot: 
“SDC views the current effort as a prototype OD effort operating within a setting which 
has all of the complexities of large, high technology industrial organizations, plus the 
unique characteristics of a military organization.”117 The proposal included several 
details: the program would (1) be tailored to the needs of OPO (as all OD projects 
should be); (2) the results would inform the Army’s senior leaders on how best to adapt 
OD to the Army at large, and (3) the pilot should devise a methodology to teach Army 
officers to be internal OD “consultants.” The latter point was extremely important. For an 
insular culture like the Army, drawing OD expertise from the ranks would carry 
credibility. To the credit of Westmoreland, Palmer, Forsythe and most other senior 
leaders of that period, all understood this imperative from the beginning. However, as 
will be seen, only those at Fort Ord fully realized that building that internal expertise was 
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a long, intensive process. Contracting such an effort in just one pilot engagement would 
likely be ineffective or unsustainable. 
 In addition to clearly understanding the intent, SDC also recognized the 
uniqueness of Army culture, that is, the “series of constraint conditions that are unique 
to the Army and OPO setting.” These “constraint conditions” included the following:  
 OD must be developed as Army in-house capability, 
 OPO must develop as OD leader for the Army as part of its mission, 
 techniques developed must be flexible and responsive to Army needs, not 
just OPO problems, 
 the application of techniques must not interfere with mission, and 
 the results and their evaluation are unambiguous to the DCSPER relevant to 
the extension of OD techniques to other organizations within the Army.118 
It is important to note that both the Progressives and key Healers who were involved in 
bringing about the pilot programs recognized these cultural constraints from the very 
beginning of the Army OE program by. Yet, charges that OD/OE was incompatible with 
the Army—culturally and for mission (especially combat)—would persist to the very end. 
    SDC envisioned four phases: (1) Start-up Planning (an organizational diagnosis); (2) 
Prototype Program Development (employing specified OD techniques while training 
“OD interns”); (3) In-Place Assistance (to sustain initial efforts and planning for 
expansion to other DA organizations); and (4) Documentation of Plans and Reports.119 
In laying out each phase of the program, the authors warned Berry about assumptions 
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and expectations. They succinctly stated that OD was not a “magic potion” or a quick fix 
for specific problems and that the evaluation process was complex and included both 
hard and soft data. Full implementation of an OD program would most likely require four 
to five years because “the transition from a closed system to an open system requires 
iteration of many OD interventions and processes.” Therefore success “is a function of 
command involvement and requires an environment that stresses openness, 
participation, and commitment to the program.” SDC also warned Berry that disruption 
would most certainly occur as the “undiscussables” were discussed. However, they 
stated that benefits would come because “conflict is healthy when it helps identify 
critical issues, and concurrently establishes procedures to resolve conflict constructively 
rather than suppressing it with the resultant behavioral dysfunctions.”120  
 Berry and his team reviewed the proposal for several months and finally gave 
SDC the green light in mid-May. On July 17, 1973, SDC returned to Berry, who now 
commanded the new Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), with a preliminary 
diagnosis.121 Although they had compiled an extensive set of data from interviews and 
surveys for their proposal, SDC was clear that the preliminary diagnosis presented a set 
of issues and problems that Berry should not immediately confront. 
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We are attempting to identify issues that lend themselves to OD 
intervention. We will leave for another day discussions about what· 
specific response is most appropriate for each issue.122         
      
 During the diagnosis phase, SDC held several meetings with Berry and his top 
leadership team, interviewed more than forty division- and branch-level managers, and 
conducted more than twenty “sensing sessions” with a large number of employees, both 
military and civilian. Based on that information, SDC held feedback sessions with 
higher-level managers to present all data gathered in order to construct a raw picture of 
the health and the dynamics of the organization. They then conducted “real time 
feedback sessions” to the employees with their leaders present in order to demonstrate 
that the bosses were willing to listen to everything—good and bad. SDC then created a 
customized attitude survey to address the issues that the consultants “believed to be 
indigenous to MILPERCEN.” They also reviewed a large quantity of organizational 
documents that would educate the SDC team on the nature of MILPERCEN’s 
organization and missions.123 
 The most interesting aspect of the July diagnosis report, besides the 110 pages 
of rich, extensive data, was SDC’s recommendation for a course change in the scope 
and direction of the program. The original proposal had envisioned a “test bed” 
approach that would focus on a few small units within MILPERCEN. This “crawl-walk-
run” approach targeting smaller organizational sizes would greatly facilitate the training 
of Army “OD interns.” However, whether it would serve to accurately identify those 
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elements of OD that the Army could potentially export to other organizations was 
questionable.124 The test bed proposal closely paralleled the Fort Ord plan, with the only 
difference being the scale of effort and the fact that Fort Ord’s ODD had already 
recruited a core team, both civilian and military, that now possessed an extensive set of 
skills. However, SDC now advocated a “systemic-organic” approach; in other words, 
they wanted to engage the entire command. They reassured Berry that this strategy 
would not result in a program that was “a mile wide and an inch deep.” SDC’s 
compelling rationale was that the initial data overwhelmingly reflected a pervasive 
perception, throughout all of MILPERCEN, that the command was “fractionated;” that is, 
MILPERCEN consisted of “a series of branches, units, and people going about their 
business without understanding the larger picture within which they fit.” SDC argued 
that the OD engagement could actually exacerbate this “fracture” by choosing some 
units and excluding others: “by saying, for instance, that we are going to work only with 
OPD [a division within MILPERCEN] would reinforce the already present sense of 
elitism within OPD and the sense of ‘second class citizenship’ present in the other 
directorates.”125 Berry concurred and approved the change in scope. 
 Here we begin to see the roots of a serious divergence in the early evolution of 
the Army OE program. The Fort Ord team had years to ramp-up, and consequently, 
were building a knowledgeable cadre of OD experts who were capable of training 
internal consultants to conduct effective interventions. Therefore, the Fort Ord core 
team turned to consultants to augment their efforts, not to drive and conduct OD 
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engagements as the primary agents of change management and new leadership 
techniques. MILPERCEN took the opposite approach, thinking that they could conduct a 
large-scale OD program and, at the same time, develop an internal cadre of “OD 
interns.” However, because they broadened the scope of the project, the interns 
essentially became administrative assistants for the two full-time on-site SDC 
contractors. The sixteen interns, a mixture of civilians, NCOs and officers, received only 
three days of training from August 14 to 16, 1973. While SDC recognized that this effort 
would only provide them a “rudimentary grasp of the principles of OD,” the company 
was overly optimistic that the interns would continue an OD program beyond the length 
of SDC’s involvement. For the long term, this was wishful thinking because the sixteen 
volunteers thought of their “internships” as an additional responsibility to their normal 
jobs. In sum, on the East Coast, MILPERCEN sought to achieve everything that Fort 
Ord had done to date with a single shotgun blast of OD from SDC.126   
 From May 1973 to August 1974, when MILPERCEN received the fourth and final 
technical report, SDC performed exceptionally well in delivering the contracted 
objectives. Everyone at MILPERCEN had participated in the program in one form or 
another via one or more OD techniques. MILPERCEN personnel had spent an 
enormous amount of time in their interactions with the consultants and yielded an 
enormous volume of data that painted a picture of numerous ineffective sub-
organizations comprised of employees who felt that the majority of their “leaders” (i.e., 
managers) were not engaged, were poor communicators, and were perceived as being 
largely uncaring.  
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 Overall, the SDC engagement unearthed significant but typical behaviors that 
defined the negative elements of a dysfunctional leadership culture, something future 
Army OE Staff Officers (OESOs) would see as well. Primary examples included poor 
communication; frequent internal reorganizations; officers compelled to always appear 
decisive and the needing “to make their mark;” officers being task- and role-oriented 
and unwilling to share their feelings; ceremony and etiquette resulting in too much 
emphasis on rank and status; a culture of blind obedience and “telling the boss what he 
wants to hear;” and risk aversion due to one’s perceived place in the organization, that 
is, lower rank or status.127 As expected, by late summer 1974, some of these negative 
perceptions began to change as positive, participatory activities started to pay off. SDC 
had taken on a massive OD effort in a large, diversified and complex organization (that 
had just formed), and had performed reasonably well. As such, it was really a 
microcosm of what the Army at large would soon face as it reorganized for the AVF and 
post-Vietnam commitments in Europe. All of the perceptions and challenges that were 
yet to come were present here—and largely dealt with in a respectful, professional 
manner. However, in retrospect, the MILPERCEN OD pilot was a missed opportunity for 
the Progressives to educate the rest of the Army early on about OD interventions, their 
extensive time frames and difficulties, and the fact that the onus of success was a 
function of internal investment, not externally-managed “quick-fix” programs. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the MILPERCEN successes or even the 
“lessons learned” were ever effectively shared throughout the Army. Perhaps, as a pilot 
(and with other pilots underway), interested parties saw little need to do so. In any case, 
the SDC project illuminated the two most significant “lessons learned” of any OD 
                                                          




engagement: (1) the criticality of “top down” support (which was there), and (2) the 
difficulty in measuring success (which was absent). 
 In terms of a champion at the top, MILPERCEN proved to be an exemplar of a 
showcase OD program. Berry’s consistently strong support enabled and, more 
importantly, empowered SDC to proceed at full throttle. Even though Berry left 
MILPERCEN before the first technical report arrived in August 1973—a full year before 
the end of the pilot—he had done all that he could to effect a smooth handoff to his 
successor.128 Fortunately for SDC and the people of MILPERCEN, as fate would have 
it, the new commanding general was none other than the Progressive Hal Moore, fresh 
from two years at Fort Ord. At this point, no other serving general in the Army knew 
more about the application of OD than Moore. It is clear from all of the SDC reports that 
Moore’s strong involvement ensured a continued, successful engagement. In years to 
come, this single factor—the strong commitment from the commander at the top—would 
mean the difference between successful or failed OD interventions.129 
 The second critical factor—effective measures of success—was the most difficult 
obstacle to surmount, both in the MILPERCEN program and in all future OD efforts. All 
OD consultants recognized that OD interventions were long-term investments that took 
years to show positive improvements. Changing the leadership culture of any 
organization took much time. Indeed, SDC clearly stressed this point in the initial 
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proposal and continued to emphasize it in every technical report. For example, in 
Technical Report No. 1, the authors wrote in a rarely used italicized font that “it is 
extremely important to recognize that OD should be judged by what happens in the 
hearts and minds of people, not by the weight or quantity of documentation.” In 
Technical Report No. 2, they estimated a minimum of five years for changes to take 
hold.130 In retrospect, these two OD obstacles exposed the greatest institutional 
dysfunctional behavior in the Army officer corps; namely, a commander’s overwhelming 
drive to show positive change and improvement within a short period of time. By and 
large, Army commanders since the Second World War have been exceptionally strong 
managers. As such, they spend many years learning to identify problems in technical 
terms rather than in adaptive terms. Unfortunately, short command tenures exacerbate 
the ills of this methodology. Officers take command with little time to make their mark 
(perceived as necessarily for advancement) or, in the case of Army chiefs of staff, to 
establish their legacies. Building upon your predecessor’s success has not offered a 
typical route to these personal objectives.131 As the OE program participants would 
learn, these two issues went hand-in-hand: strong championship at the top demanded 
continuity of support from commander to commander, and new commanders had to 
realize that easily quantifiable returns on investment in OD might not occur during their 
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tenure. The selfless, seamless Berry to Moore (and later to Gard) handoffs offered the 
greatest positive example, then and now.132  
Growing Pains on the West Coast 
 While SDC was busy working with MILPERCEN, the ODD at Fort Ord 
implemented its four-phase plan with three different organizations. The ODD Director, 
Colonel John Elliott, and his team had drafted a sound plan and enjoyed the full support 
of Hal Moore. However, several obstacles arose that directly affected the execution of 
all four phases of the plan. Phase I, the development phase, was largely a failure. The 
staff wanted to start with a small organization but Hal Moore requested that the 
directorate begin with the installation’s Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO). The PMO was a 
complex organization with over 550 personnel—both military and civilian—and various, 
distinct sub-organizations to include the installation’s confinement facility. Because of 
the scope involved, ODD personnel did not complete an OD plan for the PMO until late 
April 1973.  
 Although team members would learn from the experience, the team committed 
several critical mistakes that led to a poor implementation of OD within the PMO. For 
example, the instructors allowed participants to take home the surveys to complete and 
return later but few did. In addition, although the Provost Marshal (the head of the PMO 
himself) had volunteered his organization to Moore, his immediate subordinate leaders 
failed to “convey a sense of purpose or upper-level organizational commitment to 
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individuals receiving the surveys.”133 In retrospect, the ODD did not devote enough time 
to educating senior leaders on OD. Although the initial phase had planned for two 
installation-wide “Get Acquainted with OD” seminars, time constraints and mission 
requirements resulted in only a handful of senior officers receiving an orientation.134    
 While the three-day team building workshop and the weekly consultation 
meetings proved fruitful, most of the other activities for the PMO were hampered by 
significant obstacles. Four months into the engagement, Fort Ord received a new PMO 
(in September 1973) who was not impressed with the program. He greatly curtailed the 
ongoing efforts and only agreed to review the data feedback from the surveys and a 
four-step OD operation in the confinement facility. The OD team working on that project 
enjoyed some success until a new confinement facility officer arrived in February 1974, 
at which time the program stopped.     
 Although Phase I had begun with a slow, awkward start, the ODD initiated Phase 
II (testing) on time in July 1973. This time their client was a training battalion, a much 
more homogeneous and manageable organization. The battalion commander deserved 
much credit for the successful start and acceptance of the program. He took the time to 
understand OD, achieved buy-in from his staff, and personally explained the scope and 
importance to all members of his battalion. In August, after receiving an assessment 
briefing from the ODD team, the commander agreed to all components of the proposed 
program. These included a five-day team building workshop for the battalion staff 
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officers and company commanders, data feedback, process consultation, and an “action 
plan” for the commander to allow him to address the issues derived from the survey 
feedback. More importantly, the plan included linkage of key components down to 
platoon level, which allowed soldiers to feel that they each had a role—and a voice–in 
the program. In December 1973, the battalion received a new commander but this time, 
unlike the PMO case, the new commander accepted all ongoing efforts and continued 
the engagement. 
 In early 1974, external factors disrupted progress. First, the training battalion was 
inundated with an entirely new training environment filled with changes and challenges 
the Army had instituted the previous July with the start of the All-Volunteer Army. 
Second, the impact of the post-Vietnam reduction in force (RIF) began to take its toll, 
resulting in extensive personnel turnover. These factors also interfered with a second 
project that had begun in November 1973 with the Comptroller Office.  
 In November 1973, the Fort Ord comptroller volunteered his office as part of the 
pilot program. Although the comptroller initially agreed to the proposed plan, he soon 
demonstrated a lack of commitment that quickly permeated the organization. The ODD 
team struggled to salvage the engagement by convincing the comptroller to hold two 
one-day team building workshops that were designed to teach top managers how to 
“link down” to lower-level work groups and to teach participants of the managerial team 
a systematic method of problem solving through goals-planning.135 The ODD team 
conducted these workshops in February, while in March they were able to conduct 
some survey work and several office process observation/consultation sessions. Soon 
thereafter, the comptroller chose not to evaluate the assessments and terminated the 
                                                          




engagement in April 1974, just as the training battalion engagement came to an end. No 
“link-down” to the subordinate organizations ever occurred.    
 Just two weeks earlier, in early February 1974, the ODD implemented Phase III 
Three of its pilot with two larger-scale OD interventions. The first involved three 
companies within one battalion anonymously identified as “Hotel” Battalion (H Bn.). At 
this point in the evolution of the Army OE program, OSAT interjected itself into the 
initiatives at Fort Ord. OSAT directed ODD to structure the intervention to test and 
compare each company of H Bn., with “Alpha” Company (A Co.) receiving a full OD 
program, “Bravo” Company (B Co.) receiving only the popular L&MDC, and 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) serving as a control company (i.e., 
assessed without any OD intervention). By now, ODD had settled on two standards for 
OD programs: the first was their use of the GOS at the start and conclusion of each 
intervention, and the second was the inclusion of the L&MDC.136 
 ODD personnel conducted the bulk of their work in March. The full-up effort in A 
Co. proved fruitful, largely due to the participative engagement of the battalion 
commander and his staff in the process.137 However, in B Co., the L&MDC unearthed a 
host of issues that quickly derailed the instructors’ course schedule. “The energies and 
focus of the group were constantly straying to specific company issues and problems. 
As a consequence, the workshop moved in that direction, and many planned L&MD 
exercises were abandoned in the course of the week. There was also continued 
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evidence of some lack of commitment to the [OD effort].” However, all was not lost. A 
follow-up three months later showed that some learning had occurred, especially in the 
area of performance counseling.138      
 The largest effort of ODD’s Phase III began in mid-April, with four battalions 
participating in OD operations in which two would receive interventions and two would 
serve as control groups. Although the ODD had largely discerned effective OD 
techniques in the first two phases of the two-year pilot, the goal here was to evaluate 
testing methodologies on a large scale. “L” Battalion received pre-measures, team-
building and post measures activities. “J” Battalion received pre-measures, survey 
feedback and post measures. “K” Battalion utilized the same pre- and post-measure 
instruments but received no OD techniques, while “M” Battalion only participated in the 
post-measures activities. The strongest emphasis, however, was on “J” Battalion, with 
its use of survey feedback not as an instrument of measuring results but as an initial 
tool to disclose “the good, the bad, and the ugly.” The idea was to document the 
“undiscussables, as Chris Argyris had advocated long ago, and then use that survey as 
an OD technique. That data, shared first with the leadership team at the top, would then 
“waterfall down” through controlled, facilitated venues to the lowest levels where the 
data originated. OSAT directed this structure, largely due to early results from another 
pilot in USAREUR (discussed below) but also because of Dr. David G. Bowers’s current 
successes with the US Navy and American businesses. What is puzzling is that SDC 
                                                          




used this approach eight months earlier with strong success. Was OSAT not sharing 
information across pilots?139      
 Time proved to be a significant detriment to the full success of the four-battalion 
engagement—not due to the scope of the project but because of the personnel turmoil 
that occurred during the first year of the All-Volunteer Army. With the war over in 
Vietnam, the Army ended Fort Ord’s training mission and converted the post into the 
home installation of the newly reactivated 7th Infantry Division. This transition required 
an extensive shift in staffing requirements, and different military occupations and ranks. 
Consequently, many of the participants rotated out of the test battalions during the 
pilots, including a significant number of company commanders. Those soldiers who 
came in, many in the upper ranks, had no understanding of OD. Still, the ODD salvaged 
the engagement with some degree of success. While one of the control groups ("K" 
Battalion) showed no appreciable change, the two OD battalions revealed significant 
differences in several measurable indices. “On that basis, and on the largely favorable 
anecdotal and enthusiastic subjective comments gathered by the OD staff from the 
participants in both OD battalions, the operation was considered a success.”140 
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OSAT oversaw all pilots, issued directives, and was under pressure to field an Army-wide program. It was 
the first of many data points that DA (OSAT/DCSPERS) would poorly implement an Army-wide program. 
David G. Bowers was the Principal Investigator for the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan and had recently conducted studies as well for the Navy. See especially his “Development 
Techniques and Organizational Climate: An Evaluation of the Comparative Importance of Two Potential 
Forces for Organizational Change,” Technical report (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University 





Change, Change, and More Change 
 By November 1974, the several two-year OD pilot programs were coming to an 
end. Any understanding of the impact of these pilots on the transformation of Army 
leadership culture must be viewed within the context of Abrams’s challenges as the 
Army exited Vietnam and pivoted from a conscripted to an all-volunteer force. Abrams, 
perhaps the most significant reformer in the last fifty years, became Chief in October 
1972 but would die in the position on September 4, 1974. During those twenty-three 
months, Abrams directed and oversaw two huge organizational changes: (1) the 
dissolution of CONARC and the creation of Forces Command (FORSCOM) and 
Training Command (TRADOC); and (2) the expansion of the Army from thirteen 
divisions to sixteen divisions, despite a significant reduction in force. Both initiatives 
would profoundly affect the Army for decades to come.   
 Prior to the formation of FORSCOM and TRADOC, CONARC functioned as the 
headquarters for all Army training and combat readiness. Alongside CONARC, the 
Combat Developments Command (CDC) focused on current contingencies and future 
needs. A third command—the Army Materiel Command (AMC)—handled logistics. 
Abrams dissolved CONARC and CDC in order to cleanly differentiate the training 
mission of the Army (i.e., the Army’s extensive school system and doctrinal 
development) from the “field” Army (i.e., the combat, combat service, and combat 
service support operational units).141 AMC would continue to support the Army at large.  
 In addition to overseeing all operational divisions and strategic units located in 
the continental United States (CONUS), FORSCOM also oversaw the Army Reserve 
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Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program, all Army reserve units, and the readiness of 
the Army National Guard. Headquartered at Fort McPherson, Georgia, FORSCOM 
represented about 60 percent of total Army strength. TRADOC merged CDC’s 
responsibilities with all of the service schools. Three new centers assisted the TRADOC 
commander in coordinating the combat developments effort. These were the Combined 
Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (to include the Army Command and 
General Staff College); the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Virginia; and the Administration 
and Personnel Center (ADMINCEN) at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, with the latter 
playing a role in the Army OE Program. Headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, 
TRADOC represented approximately 22 percent of the active force.142  
 As noted earlier, the extensive reorganizations in 1973 also affected the Army 
staff, reducing personnel strength by more than fifty percent. Importantly, DA’s 
involvement within the domain of the major commands largely diminished as a result of 
the organizational changes. Now, the Army’s top headquarters had a more sharply 
defined mission “to plan and integrate broad programs, develop policy, arrange 
priorities, and allocate resources. It will pull together the activities of the three major 
commands, control the tasking of new missions, and provide for the disciplined use of 
resources.” For the DCSPERS, this reduction resulted in the elimination of three of its 
seven divisions and led to the creation of Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) 
on January 15, 1973, in Alexandria, Virginia. “By combining personnel assignment, 
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TRADOC existed in 1969, Phil Davidson would not have been required to brief both the Sixth Army 
commander and the CONARC commander on his experiments (only the TRADOC commander). See 




career planning, counseling, and personnel-related factions, the Army set up a one-step 
center for military personnel and reduced the operational functions of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel.”143 This restructuring, more than anything else, was responsible 
for OSAT moving “down” into the DCSPER. Fortunately, Bernie Rogers was the 
DCSPER at the time (since the previous October) and was personally interested in 
consolidating all of the behavioral science initiatives under his (DCSPERS) purview.144  
 As if undertaking the most extensive peacetime reorganization of the Army in 
history was not enough of a challenge, convincing Congress to expand the Army during 
a reduction in force seemed, at first, a quixotic quest.145 Yet, Abrams pulled it off.  
At the time, the Army planned to stabilize on thirteen divisions with an estimated end-
strength of 825,000 soldiers (with some in Congress calling for as few as 8 divisions 
and 500,000 personnel). Bill DePuy, still serving as the AVCSA, notified Abrams that in 
terms of personnel and materiel, the Army could only outfit ten divisions. Abrams 
acknowledged the math but was determined to stop the personnel hemorrhage and to 
build up from the existing thirteen divisions. His solution was to build “into the sixteen-
division structure a reliance on reserves [so] that the force could not function without 
them, and hence could not be deployed without calling them up.”146 Just three weeks 
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generated with the creation of MILPERCEN in early 1973 makes success of the SDC OD pilot even more 
impressive.   
144. The Rogers Papers contain Rogers’s handwritten notes from his meetings with Abrams during 
his entire tenure as the DCSPERS. Written in extraordinarily small script on 3X5 cards, they shed an 
interesting light on the substance of Abrams’s areas of interest. Abrams’ various directives and comments 
substantiate Sorley’s wonderful descriptions of Abrams’s view toward minorities, women, and soldiers as 
real, caring people.    
145. Sorley, Thunderbolt, 362.   
146. Ibid., 363–365. The Army referred to this integration as “round-out” units. Abrams said “They’re 
not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.” Many historians have written about the Army’s 




before his death, Abrams formally announced to the Army that Congress had approved 
his proposal and that the authorized end-strength of 785,000 for fiscal year 1975 would 
remain fixed through 1978, at which time the additional three divisions would come on 
line.147  
 Abrams did not necessarily desire a bigger Army, just a better, more professional 
Army that could fulfill its NATO commitments. He readily accepted the challenges 
brought forth by the AVF that required the Army to acknowledge social changes and a 
new type of volunteer soldier. Although he was not a Progressive (especially in terms of 
leadership philosophy), he valued the soldier as an individual. While a large end-
strength number was critical to fielding a sixteen-division Army, Abrams was adamant 
that his soldiers were not a “commodity:” 
By people, I do not mean end strength. . . . I mean people as individual 
human beings who make up the squads and the companies and the 
divisions. . . . They have confidence and anxieties. They have abilities and 
shortcomings. They have ideals, ideas, and hopes—and some 
uncertainties and fears, too. And they have names and faces.148 
     
 Abrams’s view toward people is important to the story of the Army OE program 
because the Army as an institution, then and now, view him as the most effective leader 
of his generation and the man who deserves the most credit for reforming and healing 
the Army after Vietnam. While his organizational reforms certainly deserve such 
accolades, evidence of his leadership behaviors and styles indicate that he was a 
traditional military leader willing to explore certain elements of transactional leadership 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In the Army’s view, failure to do so divested the American public from the war effort. In 1991, the First 
Gulf War would test the concept (with mixed results). Still, the integration of active and reserve forces 
remain Abrams’s greatest legacy—as we have witnessed in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.    
147. Sorley, Thunderbolt, 362–364.  
148. Ibid., 351. Abrams is also remembered for quadrupling the number of women in the Army during 




theory—especially with the All-Volunteer Army beginning on his watch.149 Such 
“exploration” was instinctual and derived from personal philosophy and love of the hard-
working soldier that he witnessed over three decades and three wars. Yet, unlike his 
predecessor, he saw little integrity crisis within the officer corps. He simply expected 
commanders to weed out the bad soldiers, whether officers or enlisted. Nor did Abrams 
spend much time on the Army’s extensive exploration of the behavioral sciences. By all 
indication, he trusted Bernie Rogers to shepherd those programs.150 In this regard, he 
was the consummate Healer. Since he was CSA, this made him the strongest, most 
powerful Healer of that time. Unfortunately, Abrams’s personal views and the example 
they set cosmetically blurred the lines between the views of the Healers and the 
Progressives. “Respect and love for the soldier,” and “take care of your men” (a 
statement that appeared in every leadership manual dating back to 1946) fueled the 
notion that “leadership was just plain old common sense” and allowed the Healers to 
point to some behavioral science research for support.   
 The best leadership lesson we can discern from Abrams’s behaviors was his 
very healthy and modest ego. He clearly detested all of the outward vestiges and 
symbols of his rank, authority, and position. For example, when he took over command 
of MACV from Westmoreland in Saigon, he refused the traditional change of command 
ceremony and ordered all of the plush office furnishings removed. Gone were 
Westmoreland’s elaborate office adornments, expensive carpet, and executive-style 
furniture, replaced with a small, old, gray Army-issued steel desk with only a side table 
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and chairs. Four years later, when he became CSA, Abrams exchanged 
Westmoreland’s luxurious black Cadillac limousine for a “small Chevelle from the 
Pentagon motor pool that was painted robin’s egg blue. No amenities, not even a star 
plate.” Similarly, he kept only a small personal staff and avoided the media at every 
opportunity.151 
Rogers as DCSPERS 
 Bernie Rogers worked for Abrams at a pivotal time in the Army’s institutional 
history. As the DCSPERS, he was perfectly positioned to advance the Progressives’ 
agenda. Rogers’s first serious embrace of the behavioral sciences had occurred at 
West Point, when he commissioned the Fourth Class Study.152 From then on, he was 
hooked. Perhaps the findings of that study and the recent research upon which it was 
based provided an intellectual framework for his personal leadership philosophy that he 
practiced while in command at Fort Carson. In any case, as previously noted, he stayed 
close to the early OE initiatives as they developed. By the time he became the 
DCSPERS, Rogers found himself in a position in which “he could do more for more 
soldiers.”153 
 Working as Abrams’s DCSPERS from November 1972 to August 1974 was no 
easy task. As the Army’s top personnel chief, Rogers had primary oversight of the 
institution’s large reduction in force, personnel redeployments from Vietnam, manpower 
planning for the extensive reorganizations throughout the Army, the creation of 
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MILPERCEN and his own reorganization on the DA staff, as well as the inauguration of 
the All-Volunteer Army (with grave concerns that it would not attract enough volunteers). 
Despite this heavy workload and pressure, Rogers devoted significant energy to moving 
Army OE forward. Fortunately he had exceptional assistance with the talented John 
Johns, Bobby Gard, and George Blanchard.154 
 Johns, the intellectual Progressive, was the driving force within OSAT throughout 
the summer and fall of 1973. As the pilot programs progressed against the backdrop of 
the creation of TRADOC and FORSCOM, it was Johns who noticed a fundamental flaw 
in the Army’s organizational overhaul. In October 1972, Johns attended the final briefing 
of Operation Steadfast—the program name for the creation of TRADOC and 
FORSCOM.  With his boss, General Walker, out of town, Johns represented OSAT. 
Although Bill DePuy exercised a strong guiding hand in Steadfast, it was Lieutenant 
General James G. Kalergis who functioned as the project manager and architect of the 
reorganization. Central to the reorganization was the aforementioned creation of 
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specialized “centers,” which the briefing explained in detail. Johns, as most others, was 
pleased that these centers could now devote enormous talent and resources to the 
professionalization of personnel (S1/G1), intelligence (S2/G2), operations (S3/G3), and 
logistics (S4/G4)—in other words, preparing primary staff officers for duties from 
battalion level on up. Kalergis showed adequate resources and staffing at Fort 
Huachuca for intelligence, at Fort Leavenworth with 375 personnel to handle operational 
doctrine and G3 activities, and at Fort Lee for logistics with over 400 spaces. When 
Kalergis briefed the staffing numbers of only seventy-five for the Army Personnel 
Administration Center (ADMINCEN) at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Johns fully expected 
Dutch Kerwin, the DCSPERS at the time, to strongly object. Seventy-five was barely 
adequate for training and doctrinal oversight for personnel administration. With future 
leadership and management activities and doctrine to soon fully reside within personnel 
channels (largely between the DCSPERS and Fort Harrison), Johns foresaw a disaster 
for the future of OD and the Army OE program.155      
 Johns, more than most others, believed that the personnel arm of the Army 
needed more reforms than any other occupational component. Heretofore, officers filling 
S1/G1 positions were combat arms officers in “holding patterns” awaiting command 
opportunities. Soldiers working in personnel career fields were administrative “paper 
pushers,” and their officers at personnel sections were adjutant or finance officers. With 
huge initiatives underway now to deeply embed and infuse behavioral science in the 
Army, Johns feared for the future survival of OD and everything that SAMVA, the MVA 
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(Modern Volunteer Army) Program, VOLAR and now OSAT had accomplished to date. 
More importantly, Johns clearly advocated the Progressives’ view on leadership. In his 
mind, commanders should have staff officers who could advise them on leadership and 
OD just as S2s advised their bosses on intelligence, or chemical officers offered advice 
on chemical warfare.             
 When Walker returned to the Pentagon, Johns expressed his strong objections. 
Walker concurred and promised his assistance. He suggested another meeting with 
Palmer, but Johns reminded Walker that Palmer already understood the situation. 
Instead, Johns was able to arrange a meeting with Kalergis for November 2. “What the 
hell are you so upset about,” asked Kalergis. Johns explained; Kalergis listened and 
finally said, “Well, what you are saying makes since. But I won’t [interject]. General 
Rogers just took over as the DCSPERS yesterday. I want you to go down and talk to 
him.”156 Johns smiled as he left the office. He already had a special relationship with 
Rogers.157 As Johns recalled, 
I went down and laid this out to [Lieutenant] General Rogers and his 
[brigadier] generals. He’d just taken over from “Dutch” Kerwin. And he 
said, “I have two questions for my generals. First of all, how in the hell did 
this reorganization go through this process without this glaring deficiency 
showing? Secondly, why do we have to have Colonel John Johns come 
up from the office of chief of staff [OSAT] to point it out to us? Bobby? 
Bobby Gard, you work with John. And you tell me what spaces we need at 
Fort Ben Harrison to make it into a broad concept of personnel 
management, a critical component of which is human resources 
development, to include and establishing a leadership division in Bobby 
Gard’s shop [DCSPERS/HRD].158 
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 This meeting marked an important juncture on the road toward the 
institutionalization of Army OE. Rogers brought OSAT and DCSPERS much closer 
together that day and paved the way for DCSPERS to adequately consolidate all OD 
activities the following year (1973). More importantly, Johns and Gard worked well 
together and produced new definitions of “personnel management” that included strong 
resources for human resource development, with specific emphasis on leadership. They 
sought to dispel the notion that only the commander is responsible for leadership and 
that personnel educated in the behavioral sciences could serve in advisory roles to 
commanders.159  
 In retrospect it is clear that Rogers gained his initial foothold as the godfather of 
Army OE while serving as the DCSPERS. During the first several months of their 
working relationship, November 1972 to February 1973, Rogers kept Abrams well 
informed of the OD initiatives underway and the progress that his DCSPERS, working 
with OSAT, was making with the pilot programs.160 On March 6, Rogers provided an 
extensive briefing to Abrams that painted an accurate picture of the shortfalls within the 
Army on the utilization of recent behavioral science knowledge. In attendance were his 
strong supporters, namely Bobby Gard and Sid Berry. Gard, in proffering perhaps the 
most insightful observation of anyone during those early years of the Army OE program, 
strongly asserted that 
there is a considerable void in leadership doctrine designed to solve the 
"people problems" which pervade our Army today. As a result, only scant 
improvement has been made in the quantity and quality of leadership 
instruction in our service schools; field commanders are trying to make up 
the difference by experimenting with new ways to improve leadership 
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through development of their own leadership and professionalism 
courses.161 
 
Abrams listened carefully and agreed. “Our lyrics for taking care of people are fine, but 
when it comes to doing our business, the human element is in last place.”162 On the 
surface, his comments mirrored the strong beliefs of the Progressives. However, 
Abrams was firmly entrenched in the Healers’ camp. At that briefing he directed that  
we develop a cohesive program to use organizational and motivational 
development techniques both to upgrade leadership instruction in our 
service schools and to provide useful information to the field in practical 
language that will permit building on the solid base of traditional leadership 
traits and principles . . . our proven principles [and] not throw those 
away.163 
   
To provide oversight to ensure that his directives moved forward within the framework of 
the MDP, Abrams established the Motivational Development Program Advisory Group 
on May 1, 1973. In that directive, he specified that the membership should include 
representatives from OSAT, DCSPERS, OPO, and CRD.164 More importantly, the 
memorandum charged the advisory group to monitor the progress of the pilots 
underway at Fort Bliss (performance coaching), Fort Benning (assessment center), Fort 
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Ord (OD), and in USAREUR (attitudinal surveys).165 For Rogers, the creation of the 
MDP Advisory Group (with its membership dominated by Progressives) was another 
important step forward in the institutionalization of OD.  
 Despite the enormous workload levied on his organization during his tenure as 
the DCSPERS, Rogers found time to promote his strong advocacy for the new 
behavioral science movement. He remained in close contact with Berry and Moore as 
MILPERCEN progressed through the SDC OD project, and was fully aware and 
supportive of Hal Moore’s efforts in July 1974 to continue OD beyond the SDC 
engagement. Also in 1974, Rogers took a strong interest in attending the innovative 
Army Science Conference at West Point from June 18 to 21, 1974. In fact, he agreed to 
chair a panel entitled “Human Resources Research: The Volunteer Army’s Investment 
for the Future,” and took an active role in selecting the panel members. The five-
member panel of presenters included Dr. Jerald Bachman from the prestigious Institute 
for Social Research at the University of Michigan, Dr. Meredith Crawford, president of 
HumRRO, and Dr. P. Phillip Sidwell, Georgia State University. Bachman’s presentation 
spoke to societal changes and the impact on the Army, and Crawford, fully aware of his 
organization’s work at Fort Ord, addressed training systems and quality performance. 
Sidwell had captured the interests of Rogers and the Secretary of the Army, Howard H. 
“Bo” Callaway, for his work on measuring motivational aptitude for recruits (Sidwell 
frequently corresponded with Callaway).166 Rogers clearly set the tone of the panel with 
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his opening remarks: “We will be talking about my favorite subject—people. Not the 
mechanistic approach—the management and use of people, but the humanistic aspects 
of people—the what, the how, and the why.”167 All of the presenters spoke to current 
behavioral science research, albeit within their areas of expertise. The conference 
served to reinforce Rogers’s support for current research and its applicability to the 
reforms underway in personnel channels. His participation also sent a strong message 
that the work of the Progressives would continue.   
 By late summer of 1974, Rogers could look back on his time as the DCSPERS 
with a strong sense of accomplishment. The All-Volunteer Army was a year old and off 
to a cautious but promising start. The DCSPERS office was reorganized, streamlined 
and, after OSAT dissolved, capable of providing adequate oversight of all of the 
behavioral science initiatives. Indeed, the hard work and expertise of Walker, Johns, 
and the other personnel in OSAT had made Rogers’s efforts much easier. When OSAT 
transitioned into the DCSPERS on June 28, 1973, Johns and his team brought with 
them their just completed “Final Report on Motivational Development.”168 In reality, this 
lengthy two-part document was more than a “report.” In fact, it served as the 
comprehensive plan for a viable framework within which the DCSPERS could manage 
and coordinate the numerous initiatives that VOLAR and the pilots had generated. In 
essence, it built upon the 1972 SAMVA BSWG report, making clear that 
Westmoreland’s directives were now permanent and that OD was the system of change 
management that the Army would use going forward. The authors of the report clearly 
stated the three strategic objectives of OD: changing attitudes or values, modifying 
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behavior, and inducing change in structure and policies. Importantly, the document 
served as the best reference to date to clearly articulate the Progressives’ views and 
ideas on transformational-type leadership behaviors and how OD would translate their 
views into practice:169       
OD is basically concerned with persons and their interactions as the basic 
resources of any organization and its basic goals include the following: 
1. To increase openness of communication in all directions without fear of 
retaliation, to increase trust and support between groups, and to diminish 
goal-unrelated competition and conflict in favor of goal-related 
collaboration. 
2. To develop a climate reinforcing self-direction, increased competence 
and responsibility in sharing planning and implementation, and increased 
identification of personal with organizational aims. 
3. To aid executives in generating objectives relevant and meaningful to 
organizational purpose and to the work force. 
4. To create a climate in which creative and open problem-solving can 
exist with minimal personal conflict. 
5. To increase open and honest confrontation and solution of 
organizational problems at the level at which they exist, in contrast to 
covering or ignoring them, or referring them to higher levels for decision. 
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6. To create a climate in which rank authority is augmented by knowledge 
or technical authority. 
7. To locate decision-making and problem-solving responsibilities as near 
to relevant information sources as possible.  
8. To develop a climate that reinforces and integrates organizational goal 
attainment and development with personal goals and development. 
 By August 1974, Rogers also saw that key Progressives were occupying critical 
positions to keep the momentum going. Gard had left the summer before to take 
command at Fort Ord as he relieved Moore who, in turn, replaced Berry at 
MILPERCEN. Gard would keep OD moving forward at Fort Ord. Nadal was just finishing 
up a year at USAREUR HQ to run the survey feedback system pilot there, with 
significant success. As Rogers left the Pentagon in August to pin on his fourth star and 
to take command of FORSCOM, the godfather of Army OE was fully prepared to make 
many of the behavioral science initiates permanent throughout the institution. In 
Rogers’s mind, “permanence” meant “institutionalization.” As his personal papers 
reveal, he was under no illusion that this would be an easy task. Going into 1975, the 
real barriers to change were no longer at the Pentagon. General Frederick Weyand, 
who succeeded Abrams as CSA in September 1974, would serve only two years in that 
position and prove to be an extension of Abrams—dutifully implementing his 
predecessor’s re-organization initiatives. Rogers would also have strong allies in 
Washington with Moore as his successor and with Johns in HRD. Gard would take 
command of MILPERCEN from Moore, perfectly positioned to make the SDC project 




the first commander of the newly formed TRADOC. Although DA sat above TRADOC 
and FORSCOM in the bureaucratic pecking order, the institutionalization of OD was 
largely embedded within training and doctrinal development—DePuy’s domain. To date, 
DePuy had shown little inclination to embrace OD and was on the record early on about 
ending all of the experiments. In essence, he was the chief spokesman for the Healers 
who believed that VOLAR had succeeded in identifying irritants and implementing 
amenities. For Rogers and DePuy, institutionalization of OD would reveal the true 
strength of their friendship and illuminate two totally distinct views on how best to 





Growing Pains and Turf Wars: The Weyand Years 
The genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act 
on their own and their followers’ values and motivations. 
James MacGregor Burns 
 
 On September 4, 1974, only a few weeks after Bernie Rogers assumed 
command of FORSCOM, Creighton Abrams died. The entire Army mourned the great 
armor officer’s passing. During his short tenure as CSA, Abrams had set in motion, in 
terms of scope and effectiveness, unprecedented reorganizational reforms that would 
stand the test of time. His sixteen-division Army would soon become a reality that later 
not only would fulfill US obligations to NATO but also , without firing a shot due to their 
excellent state of readiness, would help bring down the Soviet empire. Abrams’s 
envisioned force structure included the most advanced technological weapons and 
battlefield operating systems in the world—including a new superb battle tank bearing 
his name. His renewed Army would train to a new operational doctrine, AirLand Battle, 
which would prove overwhelmingly successful in the First Gulf War. More importantly, a 
rejuvenated and fully integrated Army Reserves component would deploy in all 
subsequent wars alongside the active components. 
 General Frederick Weyand formally became Abrams’s successor on October 3, 
1974. Like most of his peers, he was a veteran of three wars. In the Second World War, 
he served as a staff officer in the China-Burma-India theater of operations. In the 
Korean War, Weyand commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment in the 3rd 
Infantry Division, and later served as the division G3. He fought during the toughest 




eleven Medal of Honor recipients. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Weyand served in 
several assignments in Germany and Washington, including deputy chief and chief of 
legislative liaison from 1961 to 1964. In 1964, Weyand commanded the 25th Infantry 
Division in Hawaii, and deployed it to Vietnam. Relinquishing command in 1967, he 
became deputy, then commander of II Field Force, responsible for the III Corps Tactical 
Zone that comprised the eleven provinces around Saigon. With experience in 
intelligence, Weyand convinced Westmoreland to pull more troops into the Saigon area 
just prior to the Tet Offensive—a move that proved extremely fortuitous. He also gained 
notoriety for dissenting with Westmoreland’s conventional war strategy.1 In 1970, he 
became deputy commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and 
succeeded Abrams as commander of MACV on June 30, 1972. It was Weyand who 
brought the Army home from Vietnam.2 
 Upon becoming CSA, Weyand was determined to complete what Abrams had 
started. He knew the vision and goals well, having served as Abrams’s Vice Chief for 
more than a year.3 During his two-year tenure as CSA, Weyand succeeded in forming 
the sixteen-division force. He did so by improving the combat-to-support troop ratio and 
logistical readiness across the Army. More importantly, he focused his efforts on 
integrating the reserves into the regular Army and making Abrams’s “roundout” concept 
feasible. However, his actions and decisions as CSA had virtually no impact on the 
Army OE program. He simply showed no interest. In October 1974, and for the next two 
                                                          
1. He did so anonymously with the press. Weyand believed that counterinsurgency was more about 
winning the hearts and minds than a war of attrition with insurgents and regular forces. 
2. Weyand was also decorated for valor. He received two bronze stars and a silver star, and was 
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 
3. In May 1973, Weyand replaced Alexander Haig (who only served as VCSA for five months). Haig 




years, the evolution and fate of the Army OE program fully and firmly rested in the 
hands of the FORSCOM and TRADOC commanders. 
Spreading the Seeds of Institutionalization 
 When Rogers assumed command of FORSCOM in August 1974, FORSCOM 
was entangled in the throes of radical change. As Weyand carried out the Abrams 
reforms, the heavy lifting of expanding the Army and integrating the reserves fell 
squarely on Rogers’s shoulders. Interwoven through both of those challenges were the 
Army’s chronic racial problems and pervasive drug and alcohol abuse. With the All-
Volunteer Army barely a year old and the verdict still out on its sustainability, Rogers’s 
primary task was to make all combat forces in the Army combat ready—a formidable 
challenge.  
 In Rogers’s mind, solutions could be found in the human dimension. 
Pragmatically, Rogers fully understood that strong management was required to 
restructure, re-man, and reequip the force. Those activities, while difficult tasks and 
time-consuming on his and his subordinate commanders’ part, were underway. Despite 
spending an enormous amount of time away from his headquarters visiting active and 
reserve units, Rogers also expended much energy on propagating OD throughout the 
Army. As FORSCOM commander overseeing all of the Army’s operational forces, he 
had the authority and power to highly encourage the use of OD within those units. Full 
institutionalization, however, required a significant revision of the programs of instruction 
(POI) for the dozens of Army schools. Bill DePuy, as TRADOC commander, “owned” 





 Rogers’s shepherding of OETC while serving as Abrams’s DCSPERS from 1972 
to August 1974 certainly granted him a power base as well as a framework in which to 
prepare the Army’s personnel channels to become more amiable to receiving OE 
initiatives in the future. However, in August 1974, upon receiving a fourth star and 
becoming the commander of FORSCOM, Rogers’s scope of influence dramatically 
expanded. He now found himself in a position where he could empower the 
Progressives to actually implement the Army OE program throughout the Army’s 
combat corps and divisions. He clearly recognized that he needed OESOs in his 
combat divisions sooner rather than later.  
 His eagerness appeared early on. Only days after he assumed command of 
FORSCOM, Rogers deeply involved himself in Phase IV of the Fort Ord pilot that called 
for a full-fledged OD engagement in two combat divisions, excluding the 7th Infantry 
Division at Fort Ord that was already heavily tested and committed to OD. ODD was 
forced to delay the start of Phase IV, however, when the commanding generals of the 
9th Infantry Division (Fort Lewis, WA), 4th Infantry Division (Fort Carson, CO), and 1st 
Infantry Division (Fort Riley, KS) all declined to participate. After Rogers offered some 
“persuasion,” the latter two agreed to conduct the engagements. The 1st Infantry 
Division, Rogers’s combat alma mater, bore the bulk of the Phase IV pilot. In addition to 
conducting the Installation Wide Survey (IWS), members of the division participated in 
six L&MD courses and three Senior Officer Awareness Training courses.4 This was only 
the beginning of his keen interest in OETC. Throughout his entire period of command at 
                                                          
4. Ibid., 20. None of these commanders were aware of Rogers’s personal interest in the pilots—until 
he phoned them. Obviously, pressure was brought to bear. All the courses included an introduction to OD 
concepts and discussion of possible future applications in the Army. The courses were enthusiastically 
received, and the instructors reported indications of considerable support for OD among the students 




FORSCOM, Rogers showed no hesitation to involve himself in the affairs of OETC, 
purely a TRADOC entity.    
 When Rogers replaced Dutch Kerwin as FORSCOM commander in August 1974, 
he inherited a myriad of problems that Kerwin had just begun to address. Kerwin, like 
Weyand, had been committed to putting the extensive Abrams reforms in place, and in 
the thirteen months that Kerwin served as FORSCOM commander, his primary job was 
to staff the new headquarters and establish associated administrative processes. When 
Rogers took command of FORSCOM, his major focus was on making the field forces 
combat ready; a task that appeared daunting. Yet Rogers was convinced that the Army 
OE program could help facilitate the improvement initiatives by focusing on people—
especially quality junior officers and enlisted personnel—rather than the technical 
challenges associated with Army reorganization and modernization. As he travelled the 
country visiting active and reserve units, Rogers always stressed his humanistic views 
of leadership. His personal papers contain many examples. At a “leaders luncheon” at 
Fort Campbell on November 12, 1974, Rogers first presented a truthful picture, 
undergirded by numerous statistics, of the poor state of the Army. He quickly addressed 
the many efforts underway to redress these problems. What he stressed, however, was 
what “leaders” at all levels could do to make the most difference. He challenged the 
audience to “question all practices, procedures, policies and to ask why.” He stated that 
leaders must genuinely “give a damn for them [soldiers]” and that their priority should be 
“dignity and respect [and developing their] potential.”5 He was even more frank with the 
colonels attending the Army War College when he addressed that class on October 16, 
1974. Armed with much data, he depicted the poor state of readiness throughout the 
                                                          




Army but offered that the All-Volunteer Army could only be successful if the officer corps 
“provided a professionally satisfying environment for our soldier and his family.” He 
stressed that this was about “improving leadership—not authoritarian compliance but 
positive motivation.” He placed these senior officers on notice and told them that junior 
officers questioned the “integrity, honesty, loyalty, motivation for self-interest” of their 
senior officers. Soberly, he noted: “We have all contributed our share to a lessening of 
credibility.”6    
 The moment he became FORSCOM commander, Rogers formulated a clear 
vision to institutionalize OE forever. The first overt evidence appeared in mid-1975 with 
the FORSCOM publication of a widely disseminated pamphlet. This artful, black-and-
gray pamphlet, distributed throughout FORSCOM, was unusual in that it resembled a 
modern, commercially produced marketing tool. Cleverly folded in a multi-layered, 
cascading tri-fold, the pamphlet “sold” OD with a long bullet list of OD “services” that 
could improve not only management practices but also “self-awareness of leadership 
styles and the understanding of organizational behavior.” It stressed the OD four-step 
process as a way for people to acquire a number of organizational, human resource, 
and technical skills such as leader development, effective listening, motivation and job 
enrichment, and counseling. More importantly, one entire panel quoted Rogers’s recent 
remarks at the 1975 TRADOC Leadership Conference: 
I hope I have made the point that I am convinced there are scientific tools 
and techniques which a leader can use to enhance the capability of the 
organization itself, to provide a greater payoff to that leader and to the 
organizational climate of the unit. In other words, there are means 
available, if we want to use them, to improve the behavior of the 
organization as well as the behavior of individual leaders. We have to 
provide these tools to the young leaders. . . .  
                                                          




     Our objective is to improve the climate, enhance discipline, raise 
motivation, increase commitment and improve organizational 
effectiveness. All of this in turn will impact favorably upon training and 
upon the state of readiness, which is the Army's primary mission during 
peacetime. It requires that we develop some personnel with the 
appropriate skills, seed our organization—our Army—with those 
individuals, and get the system institutionalized, so that 10 or 15 years 
from now, those young bucks who come behind us will be saying, "You 
mean we have not always done it this way?" It is going to take that long, in 
my opinion, to get what I am talking about institutionalized."7        
 
While Rogers was correct that marketing OE was vital to institutionalization and that a 
successful marketing campaign was a long-term endeavor, what he really needed in 
1975 for effective advertising were immediate, clear successes of OE in his combat 
divisions. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Rogers found his strongest supporter in Major 
General Thomas H. Tackaberry, the commanding general of the 82nd Airborne 
Division.8   
 Tom Tackaberry held much credibility with Rogers as well as within the Army 
officer corps. A career infantry officer and paratrooper (he attended jump school in 
1944), Tackaberry held command and staff assignments during the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars, including one where he was one of Rogers’s subordinate commanders. 
Staff assignments continued with postings to the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, the 
Pentagon, and command of the 82nd Airborne Division.9  
                                                          
7. FORSCOM OE Pamphlet, Powell Papers.  
8. Tackaberry served in this position from October 8, 1974, to October 11, 1976, precisely coinciding 
with Rogers tenure at FORSCOM.  
9. http://veterantributes.org/TributeDetail.php?recordID=1562. Last accessed 31 January 2014. Later 
Tackaberry earned his third star and served as the Deputy Commander of VII Corps in West Germany 
from October 1976 to July 1977, and finally commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort 
Bragg from July 1979 until his retirement from the Army on October 1, 1981. Remarkably, Tackaberry 
earned three Distinguished Service Crosses during his career. He is the fifth most decorated American in 
US history (see VFW Magazine, April 2014, 43). The others were GEN Douglas MacArthur, COL David 




 As a close acquaintance and former brother officer of the Manchus, Tackaberry 
was well aware of Rogers’s passion for OE when his tour of duty in legislative liaison 
coincided with that of Rogers as the DCSPERS. Tackaberry possessed a masters 
degree in psychology from Tulane University and had quickly grasped the potential of 
OD. The driving force behind Tackaberry’s extensive employment of OD during his 
tenure was the exceptional Lieutenant Colonel Roy Ray, the 82nd Airborne Division’s 
first OESO. Together, they formed a close working relationship and demonstrated very 
clearly that for OE to succeed, it had to have the strong support and committed 
involvement of the commander. 
 Tackaberry and Ray’s extensive use of OE in the 82nd Airborne Division is well-
documented. In fact, Nadal later credited Ray with enabling FORSCOM to strongly 
propagate OE during Rogers’s tenure as commander. During his previous tour of duty 
at MILPERCEN, then Major Ray had been a strong participant in the SDC engagement 
there as one of the internal “OD interns” and had played an instrumental role in 
sustaining OD at MILPERCEN after SDC departed. Although Ray had not attended the 
OESO course at Fort Ord, his vast knowledge and experience at MILPERCEN allowed 
him to obtain an assignment to Fort Bragg as the 82nd Airborne Division’s first OESO.10 
In a letter to the commandant of OETC, Tackaberry stated that he and Ray had initiated 
a number of “extended problem identification and problem solving sessions.”  
Those sessions resulted in the identification and resolution of numerous 
problems, some of which we had not known existed. Although there are 
no records available to provide details of specific savings, the workshops 
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always caused greater cohesiveness and effectiveness among my staff 
and subordinate commanders.11 
 
Tackaberry cited specific examples, including a number of initiatives and improvements 
in tactical training, operations, and command management. These were critical 
testimonials from a credible commander coming at a time when the Healers were 
beginning to question the real value of OE, especially its use for improving combat 
readiness. The Army was much larger than just the 7th Infantry Division and the 82nd 
Airborne Division, though. The FORSCOM commander needed more FORSCOM units 
to accelerate OE’s acceptance and institutionalization.   
A Big Push In Germany 
 Rogers received that additional boost from United States Army, Europe 
(USAEUR). In July 1972, when Tony Nadal first transferred to Germany after assisting 
in the handoff between SAMVA and OSAT, he was assigned to USAREUR 
headquarters. One of the last actions Nadal completed before his departure from 
Germany was to arrange a contract with Cambridge Communications Group (CCG) to 
carry out a survey feedback system for use at the company and battalion level in units 
assigned throughout USAREUR. The Army Research Institute (ARI), the Army’s long 
standing organization for social science research joined the project, with Dr. Doug 
Holmes in the lead for ARI and Dr. Scott M. Cunningham as the project leader for 
Cambridge. Holmes had recently left the Center for Creative Leadership to join ARI and 
held much credibility with DA (OSAT), especially as a result of his authorship of the two 
recent reports on the studies of battalion commanders and brigadier general selectees. 
He was a known personality to Nadal, who now worked as the Chief of the Policy and 
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Conduct Branch in the Human Resources Division (HRD) of the USAREUR DCSPERS 
(G1).  
 The contract with CCG specifically stated that the project should “provide 
information on actual and potential value of a survey feedback system in USAREUR, by 
assessing its effectiveness, feasibility, and acceptability; and to develop suitable 
materials and procedures for an operational survey feedback system.”12 The selection 
of USAREUR was a natural extension of the earlier VOLAR experiments there when 
HumRRO had first issued attitudinal surveys throughout the USAREUR units to unearth 
“irritants” in Army life.13 OSAT viewed this project as a pilot because it fundamentally 
differed from the previous generalized surveys and, if proven feasible (i.e., accepted by 
field commanders as an effective assessment tool), it would become an important 
mechanism of the Army OE four-step process. Indeed, as the early OD proponents 
knew, surveys were fundamental OD techniques and were vital to most OD 
engagements.   
 Nadal worked on the project for more than eighteen months. The plan called for 
CCG and ARI to administer the surveys to the soldiers of sixty companies (fifteen 
battalions). They would then provide the results to the company commanders and 
summarized feedback to the battalion commanders who, in turn, were encouraged to 
                                                          
12. Douglas S. Holmes, Harold C. Strasel, and Charles Consentino, Survey Feedback in Combat 
Units in the U.S. Army In Europe: A Pilot Project, Research Problem Review 77-2 (Alexandria, VA: US 
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, March 1980), DTIC accession number: 
AD-A076693, 2. 
13. See James S. Goffard, James S. DeGracie, and Robert Vineberg, Attitudinal Studies of the 
VOLAR Experiment: A Longitudinal Study, 1971–72, HumRRO Technical Report 73-6, (Presidio of 
Monterey, CA: Human Resources Research Organization, Division No. 3, March 1973), DTIC accession 
number: AD-A758873; and Robert Vineberg and Elaine N. Taylor, Summary and Review of Studies of the 
VOLAR Experiment, 1971: Installation Reports for Forts Benning, Bragg, Carson, and Ord, and HumRRO 
Permanent Party Studies, Technical Report 72-18 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research 




meet with their subordinates to plan action responses. The team trained the company 
commanders to use the survey data in a cycle of diagnosis, action planning, action, and 
evaluation. Survey questionnaire items were related to leadership, organizational 
climate, job satisfaction, administrative functions, and training activities. The project 
would run for a year, from June 1974 to April 1975, with the research team 
administering the surveys each quarter.14  
 Despite exposure to the OE process, it is important to note that these efforts did 
not constitute a full OE engagement. The survey was only one OD technique of an OE 
project, albeit a critical component.15 Still, the project constituted the largest effort to 
date to apply new behavioral science theory and research methods in the field Army.  
Although Nadal left in early spring 1974, several months before the first survey was 
administered, Rogers could take comfort in knowing that John Johns and Fred Schaum 
were overseeing the project from DA/DCSPERS and that Nadal had formed a first-class 
team. Nadal left USAREUR HQ to take command of the 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry of 
the 8th Infantry Division in Mannheim, where he found himself on the receiving end of 
Army OE.16 Fortunately, momentum continued to build as a bright, energetic lieutenant 
colonel arrived from Washington to take his place. 
 Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. “Dick” Powell was an avid proponent of OD and 
proved to be one of the strongest “true believers” among the Progressives. A New York 
state native, Powell received his bachelor of science degree in psychology and an 
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command was uneventful in terms of the history of the program. Incidentally, he was credited with 
averting a serious accident when he rushed into a burning armored personnel carrier to remove live 




ROTC commission from Middlebury College in the early 1960s. As a junior officer, he 
was “troubled by some lousy leadership” he experienced, and during his time with the 
1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam and with the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, “it had 
become increasingly clear that the culture of fear within organizations [was] precluding 
open communication, fair treatment of people, and accurate information for decision-
making.”17 
 In 1970, by the time he was attending Command and General Staff College, 
Powell went in search of more knowledge. While his classmates enjoyed time off 
playing golf or spending time with families, Powell enrolled in a graduate course at the 
University of Kansas entitled “The Psychology of Communication in Human Relations.” 
As he later recalled, “the experience formed a foundation of knowledge and a set of 
beliefs that I knew I would act on in my personal and professional life.” Indeed, months 
later, while assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) 
in the Pentagon, Powell began pursuing a masters degree in human relations with the 
University of Oklahoma. During this time, like Nadal, Powell learned about new theories 
of leadership and management that were blossoming at the time. In his studies, he was 
attracted to the method of T-Groups as well as other progressive research and 
assessment methods coming out of the behavioral sciences. 
 In early 1972, Powell learned that Westmoreland had commissioned a study 
group to explore the use of behavioral science in the Army. Bored with his job in 
intelligence, Powell sought out the BSWG team that included Tony Nadal, Fred 
Schaum, and Don Sawtelle.18 From these initial conversations, Powell returned to his 
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studies determined to learn as much as possible about OD. Six months later, Sawtelle 
invited Powell to participate in the process to select a contractor for the OD pilot project 
with MILPERCEN. Once the team selected SDC to conduct the engagement, Powell 
worked hard to convince all of the stakeholders to include him in the project. After much 
convincing, his boss permitted him to work one half day a week as one of the project 
interns. Powell was ecstatic. He used his work with SDC as part of his masters thesis, 
received his degree, and then sought out Fred Schaum to join the OD effort. Fred 
connected Powell with Nadal, who wanted to leave the USAREUR project in good 
hands as he took command in Mannheim. Powell arrived in Heidelberg in April 1974, 
just in time to begin the execution phase of the project. As he recalled, his 
explicit role was to oversee and support the pilot tests. . . . Also, I was 
expected to manage the branch and our assigned programs which 
focused on troop morale and behavior, and implement the eventual results 
of the OD pilot tests. I knew my implicit mission was to pave the way for 
introduction of OD in USAREUR.19 
      
 Powell soon found that the senior officers on the staff at USAREUR headquarters 
were a mixed bag. Some, like General Michael Davison, the USAREUR commander, 
and Powell’s outgoing boss, Major General Doc Hayward, the USAREUR DCSPERS, 
appeared supportive. Others, however, remained skeptical, such as Hayward’s 
successor Major General Robert McKinnon. “McKinnon was a healthy skeptic at first but 
patiently listened and learned.” In retrospect, the new USAREUR DCSPERS may have 
chosen to conform. Rogers was just completing his time as the DA/DCSPERS and had 
“encouraged” all of the subordinate commands’ DCSPERSs to support the OD 
initiatives. Powell, with finesse and astuteness, remained sensitive to the controversial 
nature of the program.  
                                                          




During the first year, I had a lot of educating and informing to do, often to 
very suspicious and reluctant ears, some in my own branch and division. 
COL Duke [Powell’s immediate supervisor] gave tacit support. So I walked 
carefully on a dangerous line between survivor and advocate in softening 
the staff to the inevitable arrival of a program which would make use of 
OD technology.20 
   
 During his first year at USAREUR, Powell pioneered several other OD projects, 
to include the Noncommissioned Officer Professionalism Program (NCOPP). The goal 
of the NCOPP was to discover what NCOs believed they needed to improve their 
professionalism (as opposed to previous practices whereby officers directed 
improvements). The program received high-level support. It began with a steering 
committee headed by the deputy commander of USAREUR and the USAREUR 
command sergeant major. Powell leveraged opinion surveys to unearth the real issues 
and found great reward in observing the NCOs actively plan and implement a program 
that would directly affect their lives. The end result was a program that “enhanced 
responsibility, developed careers, and increased education, respect and effectiveness 
of the NCOs.”21 
 As the CCG/ARI survey pilot progressed throughout the summer and fall of 1974, 
Powell had an opportunity to conduct a small workshop and to share some of the initial 
results with the senior USAREUR commanders at a race relations/equal opportunity 
conference held in late fall. Because some of the data revealed quantitative indications 
of serious racial problems in many of the units, Powell experienced “quite a bit of 
reticence to discuss data that suggested shortcomings in unit leadership.” In concluding 
his presentation, Powell appealed to the general officers to utilize OE to improve 
interpersonal communications in their units. In doing so, he remained nervous. “I felt 
                                                          





that I had taken a big risk in introducing the feedback/dialogue process to the top of the 
organization without getting killed. . . . This was all risky business for me—pushing 
senior commanders in particular to look at social and psychological conditions that they 
had had a hand in perpetuating which were not especially helpful to unit effectiveness”22 
 During the conference, Powell noted that USAREUR’s two corps commanders, 
Lieutenant General George Blanchard of VII Corps and Lieutenant General William 
Robertson Desobry of V Corps, reacted quite differently to his presentation. Blanchard 
showed a lot of interest, whereas Desobry and others seemed disinterested. Powell 
took heart in watching Blanchard actively dialog with the other commanders in the small 
group discussions in the workshop. Unbeknown to Powell at the time, Blanchard would 
soon take command of USAREUR and, in that position, propagate the Army OE 
program throughout Europe.23 
 Still, Powell was encouraged. In the spring of 1975, Rogers visited USAREUR 
headquarters and received a briefing on the various OD initiatives, especially on the 
success of the NCOPP and on progress made thus far with the CCG/ARI survey project 
(CCG/ARI did not release the final report until July 1977). At one point during Rogers’s 
visit, Powell passed a note to the Chief’s aide-de-camp that suggested that the Army 
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23. To non-military readers: USAREUR is the highest-level command for the Army in Europe, 
commanded by a four-star general. USAREUR has two subordinate commands, called corps, that are 
commanded by three-star generals. The V Corps commander was LTG Robertson Desobry, a staunch 
Traditionalist who had achieved fame within the officer corps for commanding an armored battalion as a 
young major during the Battle of the Bulge, where he was wounded and taken prisoner. Desobry retired 




should staff OD consultants down to battalion level. A year later he discovered that his 
note appeared in a DA decision paper that addressed this suggestion.24   
 On June 30, 1975, George Blanchard assumed command of USAREUR. For 
Rogers, Blanchard’s promotion could not have come at a better time. Rogers was well 
aware of Blanchard’s exceptional record in the Army which, in many ways, resembled 
his own. Blanchard had entered the Army via the National Guard, where he served as a 
sergeant. He earned an appointment to West Point and later served with the 70th and 
78th Infantry Divisions in Europe in 1944 and 1945 as an infantry officer.  Like Rogers 
and Cushman, Blanchard held several assignments in Washington as an assistant to 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Omar Bradley), and as the executive 
officer for two secretaries of the Army. For his command assignments, Blanchard 
served as the commander of the 2nd Battle Group, 503rd Infantry in the 82nd Airborne 
Division, and later returned to Fort Bragg to command that division. In Vietnam, 
Blanchard was the assistant division commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, and later 
served as chief of staff for I Field Force. 
 Within a few days of assuming command, Blanchard welcomed the visit of 
Colonel John Johns and Major Fred Schaum from the DA/DCSPERS Human 
Resources Division (HRD). Johns, as HRD’s director, led the briefing to explain the plan 
to propagate OD throughout the Army. “Blanchard liked what he heard and said, ‘let’s 
go.’” The HRD plan envisioned three phases that would run from December 1975 to 
December 1977: (1) prepare the various HRD offices of the higher, command-level 
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staffs throughout the Army, (2) initiate OD engagements, and (3) expand OE through 
the commands. 
 Powell viewed the first phase as the most difficult because it required an 
enormous amount of effort to prepare the commanders within USAREUR for OE. 
Fortunately, he received strong assistance from Blanchard and Johns. Blanchard 
agreed to personally conduct two seminars to jumpstart the two-year program. These 
would be action planning conferences like the ones SDC had held for MILPERCEN. In 
fact, SDC’s John Hallen, still under contract, accompanied Schaum to Heidelberg to 
lead the conferences. The first of these conferences would include Blanchard and many 
of his subordinate commanders and their command sergeants major. The second one 
would involve the USAREUR staff as well as the staff sergeants major from USAREUR 
and the many subordinate commands. Powell realized a lot was at stake. “The future of 
OE in Europe hinged on a successful initial learning experience for these key 
participants.”25 
 USAREUR headquarters sponsored the conferences (really seminars) on March 
16–17 and 19–20, 1976. The primary goal of the program was to acquaint the attendees 
with OD and the new Army OE Program. Hallen and Schaum provided a review of all 
activities that had occurred since the 1970 Fort Ord experiments. Especially important 
were the discussions of the current FORSCOM initiatives that were well underway as 
Rogers was nearing the end of his tenure as the FORSCOM commander. The briefers 
carefully explained the definition and concept of Organizational Effectiveness as well as 
its process and methods. They reviewed the areas and guidelines for the application of 
OE with examples from current Army OE operations, such as Tackaberry’s successes 
                                                          




at Fort Bragg. Above all, the presenters were careful to define the roles of the chain of 
command and the OESOs by clearly underscoring the point that OE was a 
commander’s program and in no way undermined the commander’s authority.26   
 The seminar included material that articulated the differences between 
leadership and management. This was an important lead-in to the group activities and 
other practical exercises that followed. In fact, for the commanders’ seminar, the 
participants returned in the evening after dinner to conduct a feedback exercise on 
management styles and an exercise on intergroup problem-solving.27 The material 
covered additional topics, such as organization assessment methods, survey-guided 
development, small group sensing sessions, team assessments, action planning and 
implementation methods, small-group problem solving, and designs for effective 
communications.  Hallen and Schaum also provided a document that outlined the 
fourteen steps of the OE process, noting again the criticality of the commander’s strong 
involvement, and reiterating that OE was voluntary and not a threat to the commander’s 
authority.28 
 In practical terms, the briefers provided the commanders with information on the 
importance of surveys and their use in the OE process. Since some of the commanders 
in the seminar had subordinate units that had recently participated in the CCG/ARI 
survey project, the message was well understood. In addition to a thorough discussion 
on surveys, the commanders received a handout that showed how survey data could 
help them assess the health of their organizations. The handout consisted of a matrix 
showing the survey data that fell under the categories of leadership, motivation, 
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communication, decisions, goals, and control. These subject areas reflected 
uncomfortable questions: “How free do they [soldiers] feel to talk to superiors? Are 
subordinates' ideas sought and used? How accurate is upward communication? At what 
level are decisions formally made? Are subordinates involved in decisions related to 
their work? What does your decision-making process contribute to motivation?” The 
presenters then displayed examples of what the survey data revealed about the 
command. The results provided an assessment on the supervisor’s behavior, the work 
team process, job satisfaction, influence, communications, management practices, work 
conditions, work relationships, concern for the individual, organizational satisfaction, 
and organizational effectiveness.29 
 Blanchard and all of the event organizers were pleased with the conferences. As 
Powell recalled, 
the seminars came off rather successfully in late March, although, as we 
expected, there was still plenty of skepticism among participants about the 
abundance of participative practices uncommon in the Army's culture. On 
the face of it many saw these approaches to leadership as giving up control 
and command responsibility. In spite of that, the process unveiled critical 
issues in the command and consensus about priorities and actions. GEN 
Blanchard expressed his strong support for the methods, indicated his 
intent to use them in his work, and encouraged his commanders and staff 
to be open minded and support HRD as well. He was so impressed with 
Fred's smooth delivery and command of the material he closed saying, 
"Major Schaum is wise beyond his years.” We had hit the home run we 
wanted.30 
  
 Blanchard was true to his word about his intent to use OE in his work. Only one 
week after the conference, he called on Powell’s group to organize and facilitate his 
upcoming USAREUR-wide commander’s conference scheduled for April 27 and 28.  
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Although a commander’s operations staff (DCSOPS or G3/S3) typically organizes such 
conferences, Blanchard wanted to utilize the new “HRD” format (i.e., OE) to design this 
important event. On April 8, 1976, Powell learned that he would be Blanchard’s chief 
facilitator and met with ODCSOPS (Operations) to discuss the format that would 
address Blanchard’s theme of “where we are and where we are going in readiness and 
training."31 In short, the USAREUR commander wanted to use OE’s problem solving 
techniques to address his primary questions. Two weeks later, on April 22, Powell met 
with Blanchard for thirty minutes to review the conference plan and agenda.32  
 Blanchard kicked off the conference on April 27 with some introductory remarks 
on combat readiness and informed his commanders that they would use small groups to 
identify problems. He introduced the fourteen facilitators and data collectors and 
stressed that HRD would guide the agenda. Many were surprised. Commander 
conferences were almost always a series of briefings in which the most senior ranking 
personnel dominated the conversations. Blanchard told his commanders that he 
expected everyone to be open and to say what they really thought. He promised to 
listen because he genuinely wanted to help them do their jobs better, adding that he 
expected everyone to “be imaginative and bold, and to take risks.” 
 In addition to the USAREUR staff principals, the attendees totaled two lieutenant 
generals, eleven major generals, eight brigadier generals, and twelve colonels (of whom 
several had recently been selected for promotion to brigadier general). The two 
lieutenant generals were Donn Starry and Frederick Kroesen, who recently had taken 
command of V and VII corps, respectively. After a brief introduction to OD problem 
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solving techniques, the commanders divided into four working groups.  These groups 
met in separate rooms to identify issues and to brainstorm approaches to problem 
solving. Blanchard floated among the groups and often counseled that brainstorming 
meant “anything goes.” He stressed that “consensus meant everyone had to buy into 
the proposed solution to some degree.” Buy-in, he stated, “required persuasion, not 
coercion.” His heavy involvement was key because each group comprised officers 
ranging from colonels to lieutenant generals. At one point, the USAREUR commander 
became so enthused in the collective discussions that he  
gestured for me [Powell] to stay put as he would do the recording. As each 
group reported he paraphrased and rapidly wrote the points they were 
offering. When he got to bottom of the first chart, without hesitation, he 
removed his 4-star blouse, got on his knees and completed the chart. I 
and 40 others were astonished. This was indeed a different process and 
image of CINCUSAREUR. He understood the symbolism of support, and 
was challenging all present to follow his lead in supporting the OE way. . . 
. I was thrilled to see that he had a natural bent to the participative process 
and the trust and support he was extending to me personally. This was a 
heady experience for me to be guiding CINCUSAREUR in a novel 
approach to leadership of his 50 or so top commanders and staff 
officers.33 
 
 Still, not all of the commanders bought into the new process and methods.       
Powell’s work group included Starry, the new V Corps commander. Starry, DePuy’s 
protégé, had taken command of V Corps two months earlier when Blanchard relieved 
his predecessor, Lieutenant General Robert L. Fair, for poor leadership behaviors.  
Fair’s relief caught the media’s attention because Fair was the only corps commander to 
be relieved of command since the Second World War. As Time Magazine reported, Fair 
relished his nicknames “old hardnose” and the “iron general.” Fair had publicly stated 
that “you have to reward and punish to get what you want done.” Blanchard was aware 
                                                          




that Fair’s officers, “whose palms sweat when Fair raked them over with abrasive 
questions, disliked him intensely.” 
Blanchard fretted that Fair's tough-guy approach might reverse the 
gradual improvement of morale from its post-Viet Nam nadir of racial 
conflict, drug abuse, alcoholism and boredom. A former commander of the 
82nd Airborne Division, Blanchard, 55, is no cream puff either. But by 
contrast with Fair, he adopted a more relaxed attitude toward his forces, 
encouraging his troops to take time off, learn German and meet local 
people. He approached enlisted men as citizens in uniform.34 
 
Still, Starry showed little interest in the work group sessions. Powell, who was Starry’s 
work group facilitator, remembered that the new V Corps commander had “not shown 
much enthusiasm at the HRD Seminars” in March either. “So I sucked it up [his attitude] 
and went at the process, and got reasonable cooperation knowing much of that was due 
to the CINC's insistence to follow the facilitators' lead.”35  
 Clearly, this group of commanders consisted of a mixture of Traditionalists, 
Healers, and Progressives. As some offered final comments during the wrap-up, Starry 
was not alone in his ambivalence. Major General Cleland, commander of the 8th 
Infantry Division, offered positive comments but believed that HRD (i.e., OE) should not 
be used for most conferences. Colonel Withers stated that he “needed time to reflect” 
on the process. Colonel Harper voiced that he believed that the USAREUR commander 
should have picked the issues to discuss. Brigadier General Faith stated that in his 
opinion, the topics were “too large, too broad, and too vague.” Starry, very much 
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connected to DePuy’s ongoing work at TRADOC, openly stated that USAREUR wasn’t 
asking the right kinds of question about training.” 
 Other commanders differed and shared Blanchard’s enthusiasm.  Major General 
Dillard believed that the senior people talked too much and that the “junior people must 
input more.” Brigadier General Lynch surprised some of his colleagues by saying that 
“we need to involve battalion commanders in these conferences. They can better 
identify issues.” Finally, Blanchard offered his final remarks. “I'm convinced these HRD 
techniques are helpful and I expect you to consider using them.” He noted that OETC 
would soon deliver the first wave of new OESOs to most of the commanders present—
eighty consultants over the next two years—so that they would have the “resources to 
help you apply these techniques.”36  
 The significance of Blanchard’s support for Army OE cannot be overstated.37 His 
heavy use of OE came during a time when Rogers, as FORSCOM commander, needed 
strong supporters in order to institutionalize the program. Powell fully recognized this 
fact. “Knowing too that Rogers was solidly behind these developments was hugely 
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encouraging to me. These were indeed exciting times for me, as we worked toward our 
vision of seeing OD practices and practitioners working as part of the maturing Army 
culture.”38  With Blanchard remaining in command for several more years and Rogers 
only weeks away from becoming the Army Chief of Staff, Powell capitalized on the 
momentum and pushed the program forward. Indeed, immediately following the 
conference, Powell dove into the extensive planning for a consultant-based OE project 
at USAREUR Headquarters, earmarked for January 1977. In June, he formally issued a 
request for proposal to solicit experienced OD contractors such as CCG and SDC to 
conduct the engagement.39 As Rogers entered his last few months as FORSCOM 
commander, it was clear to him that OE in Europe was alive and well, and headed in the 
right direction. The seeds of institutionalization were fully sown at Fort Ord, Fort Bragg, 
DA/DCSPERS, and now throughout Europe. 
The Return of Nadal 
 Just as Rogers looked out across his FORSCOM units to showcase successes 
for the institutionalization of Army OE, he likewise required the same emphasis within 
his own headquarters. However, despite his numerous personal efforts during his first 
year at FORSCOM (August 1974 to July 1975), he lacked a hard-hitting power figure 
within his own building to help him fight that fight. In the summer of 1975, Tony Nadal 
completed his time as a battalion commander and prepared to return to the United 
States. In looking for a new assignment, he initially wanted to go back to West Point 
since he had recently learned that the Department of Leadership and Psychology was 
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looking for a permanent professor. To prepare his application packet, Nadal asked 
Rogers for a letter of recommendation. Rogers wrote Nadal a stellar letter. Then, should 
Nadal not receive the assignment, worked to place the father of Army OE on his staff.40  
 When Nadal returned from his three-year tour of duty in Germany, he did end up 
at FORSCOM. Rogers assigned him to his DCSPERS shop to work in the Human 
Resource Division (HRD). Once there, Nadal familiarized himself with the progress thus 
made throughout the FORSCOM units. He concluded that there had not been much 
traction with OE during his time in Europe. Rogers somewhat agreed. He told Nadal that 
“it is your job to embed OE so deep that it will be easier to leave it in place than to get 
rid of it.”41 To empower Nadal, Rogers soon removed the existing HRD director (a 
colonel) and emplaced Nadal as the head despite his junior rank (lieutenant colonel).42 
 Nadal approached his new job with vigor. His first order of business was to 
surround himself with fellow Progressives. As the new chief of Human Resource 
Division in FORSCOM , Nadal recruited majors Chick Berrera, Bob Jackson, Bob 
Edwards, and John Emington. He also received a highly qualified civilian, Dr. Jack 
Collier. Together, they planned the utilization structure for the first wave of OESOs that 
called for two OESOs in every FORSCOM division and one OESO per separate 
brigade. These were some of the OESOs that Blanchard had referenced at his 
commanders conference.43 
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 Nadal and his team then created a consulting cell within his department that 
could serve the FORSCOM units. As he recalled, “we wanted to model behavior that 
said that at FORSCOM there would be a group of more expert consultants than were 
available in the field.” Nadal already envisioned a need for more experienced 
consultants at higher levels of command. He and the FORSCOM OE consulting cell 
anticipated a time in the future when OESOs would serve a second tour of duty at 
higher echelons after gaining significant experience in the brigades.44 In the interim, the 
FORSCOM HRD OE consulting cell could serve in that role.  
 The OE team at FORSCOM also initiated a monthly publication entitled The OE 
Forum. This publication highlighted the activities of the Army OE program both within 
FORSCOM headquarters as well as in the field. It was during this time that Nadal 
reconnected with Roy Ray. Ray and Nadal leveraged the OE Forum to publicize 
General Tackaberry’s OE projects at Fort Bragg, thus broadcasting published 
testimonials that other FORSCOM division commanders read. Rogers, in his travels and 
remarks, would often site examples from the Forum articles.45   
 The FORSCOM team placed considerable emphasis on education. In the two 
years that Nadal ran HRD at FORSCOM, he organized three OE workshops in Atlanta 
“in which we brought people in to share experiences, to be exposed to new knowledge 
and techniques, and to hear from the commanding generals and the general officers at 
FORSCOM, of their interest in the program.” Nadal’s major goal for the workshops was 
to expose OESOs to recent research and to create a supportive climate and network for 
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the OESOs. He believed that this support network was “important, especially in those 
early days, because we were asking the OESOs to venture forth into uncharted waters 
and to carry on a job at high personal risk and high anxiety.”46 
 By far the most important program that Nadal and his team created was a two-
day action research workshop directly targeting division commanders. Although Rogers 
had no intention to order or direct the use of OE in the divisions, he certainly wanted all 
of the division commanders to thoroughly understand OE. In essence, Rogers saw the 
action research workshops as a way to force his commanders not only to learn about 
OE but to also to experience one important OE technique. Rogers directly informed his 
subordinate commanders that his HRD OE team would conduct the workshops and that 
he expected full participation by them as well as their brigade commanders.  
 In many ways, the workshops resembled the road shows that Nadal and Hank 
Emerson had conducted years before with the CONARC Leadership Board. The 
workshops were designed to familiarize the commanding general and his staff with OE, 
to give them an actual OE experience through participation in an action-planning 
workshop, and to introduce the newly assigned OESO to the division staff and the other 
commanders of the division.47 Just as he had demonstrated for Westmoreland, Nadal 
was not shy about leveraging the authority and empowerment he obtained from Rogers 
as he travelled to the FORSCOM units to deliver the two-day workshops. In most cases, 
the commanders knew he represented Rogers and appeared supportive.48  
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 The action-planning scenarios were essentially group problem solving exercises, 
with participants divided into groups comprised of different ranks. Initially, participants 
tended to express some degree of skepticism and doubt about the utility of OE. 
However, as Nadal recalled, many of them quickly overcame their initial reservations: 
One simulation we had was this . . . little tank [built] out of Lego toys. And 
this little tank was inside a box. You could look at it but you couldn’t touch 
it. The task was to replicate that tank. We broke up the attendees into 
three groups. It became very competitive—and I knew that these guys 
were so intrinsically competitive that they busted balls to be the winner, 
particularly since the division commander was one of the participants. 
Only one person at a time could go up and observe the tank from each 
group. Their initial response was, “You’re wasting my fucking morning 
here playing with Legos?” But they’d get so into it. I was the process 
observer, myself and one of my other guys, and we were taking notes. 
After each event, I would process their relationship, the interactions, and 
their effectiveness and point out that the more dictatorial ones were 
predictively unsuccessful.49 
 
 Several officers proved extremely supportive, such as Lieutenant General Robert 
M. Shoemaker, the commander of III Corps at Fort Hood. “I showed up at Ft. Hood, and 
he treated me like his son. [This] was the first seminar for a corps and corps staff. And 
present were the division commanders. And Shoemaker gives me this glowing 
introduction. Well, when that happens, everyone else in the room says, ‘I’d better be 
nice’ and, you know, no problems.”50 Another strong supporter was Major General 
Julius Becton, commander of Shoemaker’s 1st Cavalry Division. Becton “was very cool 
on the whole thing, very soft-spoken, didn’t get excited, took some time to get himself 
and his guys [involved]. His group was [tight]. . . . He had the staff officers working right 
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with him.”  Becton approached Nadal and requested that Nadal return to deliver the 
workshop for his command. One of the brigade commanders who stood out was John 
“Jack” Woodmansee, Jr. Woodmansee made a point to tell Nadal that he thought the 
workshop was “extremely useful.”51   
 Indeed, Nadal experienced only one engagement where the commanding 
general showed an open disdain for the workshop. A month before Nadal ran the 
workshop for Shoemaker’s III Corps, Nadal and his team conducted a session with 
Major General George Patton IV, commander of the 2nd Armored Division. As Nadal 
recalled, “that was the most miserable experience.” 
I was there for two days, and the whole time, he and one of his brigade 
commanders played off each other, laughing and making snide remarks to 
each other, and whatever. So, at the end of this first day, I’d had it, and I 
got up in front of the group and said, “General Patton, I came here 
because the [FORSCOM commander] asked me to help spread the 
knowledge of OE. It doesn’t seem that anyone here is interested. So, if 
nothing changes I think I’ll go home.” He said, “Oh, no, we understand, 
whatever, we’re fine, we will cooperate.” Then, a month later or so, I go 
back out there and I do the corps. Well, Shoemaker invited the division 
commanders. And Patton shows up, shakes my hand. I’m talking to 
Shoemaker, and Shoemaker says, “So, General Patton, I’d like you to 
meet Tony Nadal.” Patton says, “Oh, I know Tony, sir, I had him out to 2nd 
Division. Yeah, he did a great job for us!” Typical of the way the Army 
functions. Nobody tells the truth. I saw that with [the incident between] 
General Putnam and General Forsythe; with General Emerson, and then 
with Patton and Shoemaker.  How do you create an organization where 
folks don’t feel compelled to lie?52 
 
 While such confrontations and open resistance were rare, Nadal and his team 
always faced a mixed crowd of Traditionalists, Healers, and Progressives. Once, at Fort 
Lewis, Washington, they delivered a workshop for Major General Volney Warner, 
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commander of the 9th Infantry Division, who was very enthusiastic about the sessions. 
Warner had earned a masters degree in psychology from Vanderbilt University and had 
previously taught in the Department of Psychology and Leadership at West Point. “So 
he, of most people in the Army, understood what I was trying to do.” Despite the strong 
support from the Progressive Warner, one of Warner’s subordinate commanders 
became so frustrated with the workshop that he openly exclaimed “This worthless 
fucking exercise. Doesn’t show anything about anyone.” As Nadal recalled, “I just let it 
roll off my back.”53   
 In retrospect, Nadal and his team of OD experts deserve great credit for doing 
the hard work to propel Rogers’s vision forward. Yet, one thing was missing—a strong 
bond between DA, FORSCOM, and OETC. While it was true that these organizations 
communicated and worked together to plan out the utilization of the first 200 OESOs, 
they did little else to move OD into one concerted direction. For example, Nadal’s 
workshop served the same purpose as OETC’s Organizational Effectiveness Executive 
Course (OEEC), yet there was no coordination of content or effort to ensure that they 
delivered the same message to the participating colonels and general officers.54 In 
many ways, the grassroots movement that had its conception at Fort Ord in 1969 
basically remained a grassroots movement. In reality, however, there was only so much 
that DA and FORSCOM could do. As the pioneers, their largest contribution was the 
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fertilization of the institution to prepare the ground for the arrival of the internal 
consultants. Their efforts, albeit important, would only take the movement so far. 
Turf Wars 
 While the Progressives were influential in two of the three centers of power in the 
Army (DA/DCSPERS and FORSCOM), at TRADOC the Healers ruled supreme. Led by 
DePuy, they were aggressively pursuing their own radical reforms. The story of Bill 
DePuy’s obsession with re-writing Army tactical/operational doctrine is well known. As 
several authors have noted, the horrendous casualties he personally witnessed in the 
days following the Normandy invasion of 1944, as the Allies fought desperately to clear 
the Cherbourg Peninsula, left an indelible mark upon his psyche. He attributed many 
needless deaths to inadequate training and poor leadership. In the post-Vietnam world, 
he was genuinely concerned about the threat Soviet forces posed in Eastern Europe. 
With the US Army in Europe greatly outnumbered, he looked for qualitative ways to 
even the odds. He found his answers in lessons from the Second World War and in the 
recent Yom Kippur War, as well as in American advanced technology.55  
 DePuy was TRADOC’s first commander when it was activated on July 1, 1973. 
During his first year in command, “he was concerned first and foremost with getting his 
new organization off to a good start with efficient administration and financial 
management.” In terms of healing the Army, DePuy wanted to end gross inefficiencies 
in the way that “the Army Materiel Command dominated the equipment development 
process.” He wanted to close the “gap between the development of doctrine on the one 
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hand and equipment specifications on the other [which] was ‘big enough to drive a truck 
through.’”56 Threading all of DePuy’s thinking was the fundamental question: How does 
the Army fight? In his view, the answers to that question differed at each level of rank 
and organization. Company-grade officers led soldiers within the tactical realm of 
warfare, that is, with their platoons and companies, while field-grade officers and 
general officers led larger organizations in the operational level of war. Therefore, for 
soldiers to be ready to fight without lengthy mobilization times, their equipment, 
doctrine, and training had to be closely synchronized. Officers and their soldiers had to 
master the technical tasks for their occupational specialty at that particular level. To do 
all of this, DePuy went after standardization. “By combining combat developments with 
the schools under the same command, the Army hoped to shift the emphasis in materiel 
development from the scientists, engineers, and contractors to the fighters and, in the 
process, make a more persuasive case for its modernization needs.”57 Within this 
context, it was DePuy’s intent to modernize the institution by reorienting the Army away 
from counterinsurgency back into a conventional, mid-intensity war mindset. He fully 
backed Abrams’s vision of a sixteen-division force; in his mind, the spear-point of a 
reformed, highly equipped and well-trained Army would reside in Germany.         
 The Israeli counterattacks in the October 1973 war greatly impressed DePuy and 
other American military observers. Egyptian and Syrian forces had surprised the Israelis 
on October 6, 1973, with coordinated attacks across the Suez Canal into Sinai and 
against the Golan Heights. After three days of deep encroachments into their territory, 
Israeli counter attacks halted the invaders amidst heavy fighting. With the Arabs 
                                                          





equipped with Soviet armaments and indoctrinated in Soviet tactics, the Israeli 
response, using primarily American or NATO equipment, was a litmus test of an 
American-Soviet engagement. DePuy was impressed with the Israelis’ use of antitank 
weapons and tactics. Indeed, he quickly dispatched his protégé (and future successor) 
Donn Starry to Israel to meet with Israeli officers and to learn as much as possible. 
Depuy also proved to be a strong Germanophile and was enamored with the 
Wehrmacht’s large counterattacks on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. 
As the German Army retreated westward in 1943 and 1944, their superb execution of 
innovative, mobile defensive/counter-attack tactics resulted in several large defeats of 
Soviet armored and mechanized forces.58 In DePuy’s mind, the Israelis and Germans 
had demonstrated a mastery of “active defense”—precisely the situation NATO would 
face should the Soviets invade Germany and western Europe. 
 Throughout 1974 and 1975, DePuy devoted much time and energy to rewriting 
the Army’s most important doctrinal manual: FM 100-5, Operations. At the same time, 
he sought to reinvent training and training management.59 The many new advanced 
weapons systems planned for production, manned by highly trained soldiers, would 
make his new tactical doctrine feasible. Although the Army largely would reject his life’s 
most important work, DePuy recognized that doctrine should be the articulation of ideas 
that are approved and shared in order to support the Army’s “planning, organization, 
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training, leadership style, tactics, weapons, and equipment.” In short, he “demystified” 
doctrine, making it readable, usable, and the basis for all training.60 DePuy’s greatest 
legacy is that he forced the Army to pay close attention to doctrine.61 With the exception 
of leadership doctrine, the Army has continued to do so to this very day. Indeed, in 
terms of his own concepts of leadership, DePuy was a traditional autocratic officer. He 
personally led by authority and power: "Decide what has to be done, tell someone to do 
it, and check to be sure that they do."62 
 In drafting the new operational doctrine, DePuy centralized all efforts within his 
headquarters, surrounded himself with an obedient group of writers, and wrote some of 
the chapters himself. People who disagreed with him were beaten down. The best 
example was his confrontation with Major General John H. Cushman, who in 1974 was 
the commandant of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth (one of 
three subordinate centers under TRADOC). In the fall of 1974, when DePuy decided to 
rewrite all of the Army’s doctrinal manuals, he first turned to Cushman to rewrite 
operational doctrine. This request conformed precisely to DePuy’s strong belief that 
TRADOC—by charter—have sole responsibility for writing doctrine. CAC would write 
operational/tactical doctrine, the logistics center at Fort Lee Virginia would write logistics 
doctrine, and ADMINCEN would write leadership/personnel administration doctrine. 
These centers would also exercise authority over all schools within their jurisdictions. 
However, DePuy rejected Cushman’s initial product, and their disagreements revealed 
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62. Ibid. DePuy had a strong record of firing people—many people. See especially Henry G. Gole, 
“General William DePuy: His Relief of Subordinates in Combat,” 
http://www.vmi.edu/uploadedFiles/Archives/Adams_Center/EssayContest/20062007/GoleH_0607.pdf 




“significant philosophical differences between [them]—and therefore within the Army—
about the purpose of doctrine and the conduct of warfare.”63 Consequently, DePuy took 
the task away from Cushman and devoted himself to the effort.64      
 DePuy’s behavior with Cushman is telling and informs the story of the Army OE 
program and TRADOC’s view of Army OE in the early stages of institutionalization.  
The conflict between Cushman and DePuy was precisely the conflict that the 
Progressives were experiencing with the Healers throughout the Army. Cushman 
enjoyed a strong reputation throughout the officer corps “as one of the Army’s real 
intellectuals.”65 Unlike DePuy, he did not experience the horrors of close combat in the 
Second World War, although he served three tours of duty in Vietnam.66 In many ways, 
he closely resembled Rogers; that is, he built a strong career record with his intellect 
through assignments within the upper levels of DOD, such as serving as the military 
assistant to the Secretary of the Army. And, like Rogers, he could effectively soldier with 
the troops, having recently served as the commander of the 101st Airborne Division.67  
 As the CAC commander, Cushman viewed his primary responsibility to be the 
stewardship of the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He set out to 
overhaul the entire curriculum because he wanted it “to be real” and to “make them [the 
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students] think.” As Cushman recalled, “General DePuy was determined to teach the 
Army in the field, and Leavenworth students, ‘how to fight.’ I wanted to teach the 
students ‘how to think about how to fight.’ We never quite connected.”68  
 Cushman pushed his progressive views to an extreme. He constantly challenged 
his students outside of the CGSC curriculum by asking them to write essays of 500 
words or less on provocative questions he posed. For example, he asked them “how to 
attract young Americans to join a Volunteer Army, as infantrymen.” Consequently, and 
to Cushman’s delight, the students began to speak up and “to bring up issues such as 
ethics and integrity.” 
By now something unexpected was happening. . . . The Commandant’s 
requirements were clearly troublesome materiel for them. . . . For 
example, when does an officer speak his mind, stand his ground, or even 
resign? It was clear that the students were interested in tackling basic 
questions such as honesty, candor, and the freedom to fail without 
committing career suicide. . . . These [thematic] cases touched the 
students’ nerve ends. Heated discussion ensued, not simply about the 
particular cases, but about a range of issues as to lying, honesty, and 
integrity, and especially about integrity in the face of command pressures.    
 
 These discussions and debates excited Cushman. In response, he organized two 
symposia planned for 1974 and 1975 on “officer responsibility.” He drew on the Ulmer-
Malone study as a basis of discussion and promoted reflection on the Army officer corps 
“professional ethic.” The symposia posed tough questions, such as “how do we help 
create an environment of integrity as the routine order of things?” More importantly, 
Cushman recognized that “the event belonged to the students. It was for them to ask, 
and if possible to answer, the questions. Hard questions [such as] Is the individual first a 
                                                          




military officer, responsible to the dictates of the system, or first a human being 
answerable to personal conscience?69 
 In sum, as Herbert recounted, the differences between Cushman and 
DePuy could not be more different:    
General DePuy believed that real initiative was rare in human beings and 
that an organization functioned best when its members were frequently 
told in simple terms what to do. Major General Cushman believed that an 
organization worked best when liberated, to the degree possible, from the 
artificial constraints placed on the tremendous creative potential of the 
group. . . . Cushman would more likely involve many in the problem-
solving process and would encourage alternative solutions. DePuy wanted 
USACGSC to train its students to be experts in handling a division in 
combat and to take with them to their field assignments a learned system 
for training their division's subordinate elements. Cushman wanted to 
educate students as well as train them, to make them think, to enrich them 
personally and professionally, and to prepare them intellectually for all of 
their years as field grade officers. DePuy was confident, analytical, and 
decisive and never hesitated in delivering a "that's wrong" when the "cold 
hard facts" told him it was needed. Cushman was thoughtful and 
reflective, acknowledging at least philosophically the potential merit in all 
ideas.70   
  
 In retrospect, the Progressive Cushman appears to have been a strong, adaptive 
thinker, with a self-transforming mind who, like Bernie Rogers, displayed the behaviors 
of a transformational leader. For example, he believed that "the search for valid doctrine 
is, at its root, a search for truth."71 For Cushman, education, in addition to training, was 
the key to this search. “Therefore, the Army as an institution must constantly study war 
thoroughly and make available to all within it the latest and best thought about 
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warfare.”72 DePuy, on the other hand, believed that there was already too much 
emphasis on education:  
Down at Fort Benning most of the training of the lieutenants was 
accomplished in a classroom instead of out with troops. The orientation 
was very academic, very intellectual. I don't know whose fault it was. 
Some people didn't think it was a fault. There's been a big argument for 
years about education and training. I'm not sure what all the differences 
are.73  
 
 Cushman’s views did not prevail; instead, DePuy’s doctrinal field manuals would 
tell soldiers what to do and how to do it. DePuy developed a methodology for training in 
which every task, regardless of occupational specialty, was spelled out within a 
framework of a task, a condition, and a standard—a rote approach where success was 
determined by proficient demonstration.74 “FM 100-5 was DePuy’s one-liner on 
leadership applied to the Army at large.” In the end, DePuy fielded the FM too rapidly 
and tried to shove the new doctrine down the throats of the entire Army. “Ironically, the 
Army perceived the doctrine as an oversimplification that paid too little attention to the 
human dimension of warfare.”75  
DePuy believed that the Army's increasing dependency on highly 
sophisticated weapons and equipment and the support services 
necessary to sustain them signaled the Army's evolution from an 
organization of people with weapons to an organization of weapons with 
crews.76     
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In some ways, the Army can trace its overwhelming reliance on technology, and the 
dominant, superior role that technology has played in “reforming,” “transforming,” or 
“modernizing” the institution back to DePuy’s doctrinal and training reforms. 
 Within this context, it is clear that OD was far removed from DePuy’s field of 
vision.  During Rogers’s tenure as FORSCOM commander, DePuy, by his actions (and 
inactions) signaled that he found the new leadership concepts distasteful. During his 
tenure as TRADOC commander, DePuy did little to allow progressive, humanistic views 
on leadership to impact the training curriculum in the Army school system. While the 
clearly charted missions of TRADOC and FORSCOM delineated well-defined 
jurisdictional boundaries, the one single exception was OETC. From the moment of its 
inception, OETC was an anomaly of sorts because its unorthodox activities straddled 
DA/DCSPERS and TRADOC and then, in October 1974, FORSCOM. 
The ADMINCEN-OETC “Tug of War” 
 In October 1974, several weeks after Rogers assumed command of FORSCOM, 
Fort Ord lost its mission as a training center and began its conversion as the home 
installation of the reactivated 7th Infantry Division. The 7th would be one of the three 
new divisions that would take the Army to its new size, from thirteen to sixteen divisions. 
This meant that Fort Ord would be a FORSCOM rather than a TRADOC installation. 
Bobby Gard, nearing the end of his two-year tenure there, was the initial commander. In 
January 1975, he relinquished command of the division to fellow Progressive Major 
General M. C. Ross.77 With the pilots coming to an end soon, Ross immediately made 
the decision to make ODD’s OD plan a permanent fixture at Fort Ord. “The plan 
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borrowed heavily from experience gained during the pilot test, and in final form 
described in detail how the 7th Division, or any large organization, might embark on a 
comprehensive OD program.”78 In the view of Ross and Rogers, OD was now ready for 
the rest of the Army. More importantly, the right people were in the right places to make 
it happen. In addition to the influential positions held by Ross and Rogers, Gard 
returned to Washington to replace Moore at MILPERCEN. Moore, in turn, became the 
DCSPERS and inherited the invaluable Colonel Johns as the head of his new 
Leadership Division.   
 In working with Gard at Fort Ord, Moore (as the DCSPERS) expedited the 
formalization of the ODD as a permanent organization. In November 1974, Moore 
pushed for ODD to continue beyond the last pilot. With several years of extensive 
development of OD and its testing of OD’s application to the Army’s culture, ODD had 
already gained tremendous momentum to carry the Army OE program forward. Indeed, 
in late 1974 and early 1975, the transition of ODD from a prototype directorate to an 
official training center was practically seamless in terms of growing the Army OE 
program. Yet, jurisdictional friction continued to surface as Moore and Rogers kept a 
close eye on the events at Fort Ord, and as DePuy pushed hard for the fledgling 
ADMINCEN to assert more control. In fact, by December 1974, DePuy became 
frustrated with his headquarters being the “middleman” in the formal communication 
flow between DCSPERS and ADMINCEN, so much so that DePuy met with Johns on 
                                                          




December 16, 1974, to tell Johns that TRADOC approved of DCSPERS going directly 
to ADMINCEN—a practice Moore took care not to violate.79       
 On the surface, DePuy’s comments seemed to reflect accommodation for the 
growth of the program. However, DePuy’s real agenda for his meeting with Johns was 
to get Moore and Johns to quickly and deeply embed OD into the personnel 
management channel so that he could focus attention on ADMINCEN to modernize 
training and to write OE and leadership doctrine. DePuy “stressed that the motivational 
development program must offer some practical techniques that can be applied in field 
units and that the projects must be moved out of the experimental stage.”80 In short, 
DePuy wanted tangibles, not theory. Indeed, he had always been outspoken about his 
dislike of behavioral science jargon, so much so that during this time period, it was 
DePuy who suggested to Rogers that the Army call OD “organizational effectiveness.”81  
 DePuy then pressed Johns for details on how DCSPERS would embed OD. 
Even more pointedly, DePuy insisted that all parties must work together to strengthen 
ADMINCEN. DePuy “referred to his comments in 1972 whereby he stressed that the DA 
DCSPER [Rogers at the time] must take a personal interest in the broadened concept. 
He observed that GEN Rogers had not visited Ben Harrison after the initial meeting in 
1972 to set up the HRD element and had not brought up the subject with him until 25 
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October 1974.”82 This was an important meeting because by December 1974, DePuy 
was serious about rewriting all of the Army’s doctrinal manuals. In DePuy’s mind, 
ADMINCEN had full responsibility for writing leadership doctrine. However, no one at 
ADMINCEN had any expertise to write on leadership, OD, or any other behavioral 
science subject; the center of that expertise was Fort Ord.83 Yet, at the same time, no 
form of relationship existed between MDP/ODD and the ADMINCEN. In essence, 
DePuy was trying to light a fire under Moore to make that happen. Johns, a bit 
overoptimistic at the time, left the meeting thinking that DePuy could be supportive “of 
making the personnel staff officer capable of doing the things we want him to do [if 
DePuy] is convinced we know what we want.”84 Although Johns noted at the time that 
DePuy wanted to meet with Johns at Fort Harrison on January 15 and 16 to “discuss 
how we can achieve our goals,” DePuy wasted no time in firming up his position.  On 
December 30, 1974, he approved and issued TRADOC Regulation 600-3 “Human 
Resources Development.” Its stated purpose was to “define the TRADOC 
responsibilities as the Army’s proponent for human resource developments and 
leadership activities.” Despite using half of the two-page regulation to explain the terms 
“military personnel management” and “human resources development,” no definition 
was provided for “leadership,” although that was the stated purpose of the regulation. 
The substance of the regulation fell under paragraph 3 “Concept of Operation.” Here, 
DePuy formalized Moore’s “black cable” by authorizing a “special relationship” between 
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DA/DCSPERS and ADMINCEN “for the purpose of establishing a direct channel of 
communication for liaison, guidance, monitorship, assistance, tasking, and priority of 
effort.” In defining “tasking,” DePuy made clear that ADMINCEN would write and 
produce leadership doctrine “to meet the needs of the Army,” and could directly “task 
TRADOC service schools to develop, revise, or modify human resources development 
training literature.” As subsequent events revealed, the TRADOC regulation was just as 
much about DePuy establishing firm control over OETC (via his ADMINCEN) as it was 
about improving relationships with DCSPERS or OETC.85 
 The most apparent demonstrations of TRADOC’s efforts to promote 
ADMINCEN’s control over OETC were the frequent attempts in 1974 and 1975 to move 
the OE school to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. On February 6, 1975, just weeks 
after the issuance of TRADOC regulation 600-3 and DePuy’s first meeting with Johns, 
TRADOC and ADMINCEN again raised the subject of the OE school moving to 
Indianapolis. Johns argued a strong case that it was imperative for the OE school be 
located on a FORSCOM installation in order to conduct the end-of-course practicum 
with an operational unit. The practicum, he explained, was the culmination of sixteen 
weeks of work during which students would actually implement an OE engagement for a 
FORSCOM field unit. Fort Ord was the home of the 7th Infantry Division, while Fort 
Benjamin Harrison was only a TRADOC training center. Johns also argued that the OE 
faculty consisted of highly educated civilians who were not likely to relocate to Indiana. 
These twenty-one civilians comprised half of the faculty and had developed strong 
relationships with California universities, HumRRO, the Naval Postgraduate School, and 
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other important civilian organizations. Ever frank, Johns also stated that if OE were 
located with ADMINCEN, the Army’s perception would be that OE was just another 
“people program,” and would even perceive the program as part of the AG and Finance 
school. These were sound arguments. After much discussion, DePuy reluctantly agreed 
to leave the OE school at Fort Ord for the next three years. During that time, he said, 
ADMINCEN should plan to bring the center to Indiana and develop an “expanded 
training capability.” However, six months later, DePuy backtracked on his position and 
informed Major General Stan L. McClellan, the TRADOC DCSPERS, that the OE school 
should begin movement in August 1976 and be prepared to resume courses at Fort 
Benjamin Harrison by that November. As subsequent events played out, that plan never 
produced any traction.86  
 As the powers-that-be fought these turf wars, their subordinates worked hard to 
formulate effective working relationships with each other. On March 10, 1975, Moore 
and Johns organized a conference at Fort Ord to work out program details and to clarify 
the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders. In attendance were 
representatives from DCSPERS, TRADOC, FORSCOM, ADMINCEN, 7th Infantry 
Division, and ODD. The meeting proved fruitful: “Basic decisions on the nature of the 
training, content of the POI, support relationships, and utilization of available personnel 
were made and formed the basis for a consolidated plan of support.” By the end of the 
month, the participants had finalized required staffing levels, a budget, and a plan for 
the facilities.87 In regard to the latter, they all agreed to recognize the results of the 
DePuy-Johns meeting and TRADOC regulation 600-3—that ODD would remain at Fort 
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Ord as a tenant organization and fall under the control of the new ADMINCEN at Fort 
Harrison rather than being a direct subordinate to TRADOC.  
 At the same time, with virtually no in-house expertise on recent behavioral 
science research, ADMINCEN attempted to assert its new jurisdiction over all things 
deemed “leadership.” In addition to the aforementioned efforts to move OETC to Indiana 
and to make clear that ADMINCEN would produce leadership doctrine, the center early 
on (September 1974) began to produce a series of publications entitled “The 
Leadership Monograph Series.” The stated purpose of the entire, multi-year series was 
to “keep Army leaders abreast of pertinent and recent findings and research in the fields 
of management and leadership.” 88   
 From the first issue on, there was no recent research of leadership drawn from 
the behavioral sciences. ADMINCEN released the first publication of the series at the 
time of the DePuy-Johns meetings in January 1975. This publication combined 
monographs one through five. All twelve monographs in the series were actually the 
products of the Army War College (AWC). These writings were an extension of the 1971 
AWC Study on Leadership (see Chapter I) and heavily drew upon the vast amount of 
data that the authors had gathered for the initial study. For the first five monographs, 
AWC members Don Penner, Mike Malone, Tom Coughlin, and Joe Herz drew upon that 
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data to “lay a foundation” of demographic analyses for subsequent writings. From the 
very beginning, the authors were clear that the monographs were directly tied to the 
original study and that “this monograph series retains the same focus.” That focus 
centered on the concept of an informal contract which exists between the individual and 
the organization.  
The basic idea is that the individual leader at any level in the organization 
expects certain behavior from his superior, from his subordinates, and 
from himself. Also, both his superior and his subordinate expect certain 
behavior from him. It appears that only when these expectations—the 
“terms” of the informal contract—are known and met that true leadership 
can take place.89 
 
 This perspective perfectly aligned with DePuy’s world view that subordinate 
soldiers should be told what to do, and that their superiors should check to ensure that 
they accomplished all tasks. More importantly, the monographs also reinforced DePuy’s 
and the AWC’s belief that leadership differed at each level of rank. In this way, 
ADMINCEN’s leadership doctrine would go hand-in-glove with DePuy’s FMs that 
defined the skills and proficiencies required at each rank level in accordance with the 
relevant doctrine and technology employed. In October 1976, those views were codified 
in ADMINCEN’s issuance of Monograph No. 8: A Matrix of Organizational Leadership 
Dimensions and, six months later, in Monograph No. 9: Organizational Leadership 
Tasks for Army Leadership Training (discussed in Chapter IV). Those two publications 
were arguably the most important of the series because they provided a behavioral 
science foundation to TRADOC and ADMINCEN’s views on leadership and the 
development of leaders.  
                                                          




 Although the publication’s disclaimer stated that “the views expressed are those 
of the authors and not necessarily those of [ADMINCEN],” Monograph No. 8 served as 
ADMINCEN’s established view of organizational aspects of leadership. The authors 
were Major Stephen D. Clement, a West Point graduate and artillery officer who had 
recently earned an MS in industrial relations and a PhD in organizational 
communication from Purdue University, and Ms. Donna B. Ayres, a colleague of 
Clements from Purdue.90  Leaning heavily on management literature and “a survey of 
prominent industrial executive development programs,” the authors identified nine 
dimensions of organizational leadership, of which only one was “human relations.” In 
short, the authors focused on different levels of management and, in the process, made 
little distinction between leadership and management. In fact, they deliberately 
combined the two terms and left any definitions up to the reader.  
Precise definitions of leadership and management have been avoided. 
Leadership and management are such diverse concepts that the attempt 
to create a generally accepted definition becomes so profoundly involved 
that it hinders rather than helps further thought on the subject.91    
 
 In Monograph No. 8, Clements and Ayers sought to determine common tasks 
and behaviors related to different organizational levels of management. In short, they 
wanted to quantify what leaders/managers do at each level of responsibility. They 
aligned the Army's rank structure with five civilian management levels, equating junior 
NCOs with supervisors/managers and general officers with industry executives. Their 
intent was pedagogical, and their aim was to produce a matrix that would be useful in 
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the "leadership development effort within the Army." The 115-page monograph reflected 
the work of four sources: Stogdill's Ohio State studies (underway since 1948), Likert's 
University of Michigan studies (also underway since 1948), and the work of two leading 
management scholars—J. K. Hemphill (early 1960s) and R. Stewart (late 1960s).  
 The terminology the authors used throughout their monograph was strongly 
antithetical to the views of the Progressives. For Clements and Ayers, leadership was 
positional and leaders were appointed. "In reviewing the literature regarding leadership, 
one finds that there has been a shift from . . . the personality of the individual leader to 
the job requirements (i.e., behavioral demands) of the leadership role." By behavioral 
demands, the authors did not mean relationships between the leader and the led but 
rather the increasingly complex scope of tasks associated with higher levels of 
responsibility. They stated that 
[t]he aim of this monograph, then, is to classify skills and competencies 
representing essential requirements for effective organizational leadership 
functioning. The emphasis is upon preparing a prospective leader to 
display skill proficiency once he assumes a leadership role. 
   
In short, Clement and Ayers, while clearly rejecting the Great Man theory of leadership, 
also largely rejected the "styles" approach to leadership and the notion of situational 
leadership. They strongly embraced a leader-centric view of leadership in which the 
term "management" totally subsumed the term "leadership." They favored Hemphill's 
1957 definition that stated that "leadership is the behavior of an individual when he is 
directing the activities of a group toward a shared goal." Indeed, the authors seemed to 
dismiss even transactional leadership theories that many of the Healers found worthy of 
consideration. However, ADMINCEN's monographs conformed perfectly with DePuy's 




Leadership Monograph Series perfectly complimented the family of field manuals that 
would soon appear, especially the technologically reliant operational doctrine.  
 In retrospect, the ADMINCEN Leadership Monograph Series publications (really 
AWC productions) played an important role in the story of the Army OE program 
because they helped to institutionalize the Healers' views and definition of leadership. 
Despite the disclaimers that the views expressed in the monographs “were those of the 
authors and not ADMINCEN,” the series became the conceptual framework for 
developing leadership doctrine and the basis for all revised leadership training POI in 
the Army schools. Over time, TRADOC would cement the Healers’ definition of 
leadership—transactional/contractual—throughout the Army training system. 
Simultaneously, TRADOC would bring the term “management” back into vogue, and 
eventually blend that term with “leadership” to such a degree that the Army has 
confused the terms to present day. Looking back at these series of events, we can trace 
those origins to Monograph No. 8 and Monograph No. 9. 
OETC Blossoms 
 While DePuy, Moore, and Johns wrestled over important matters of program 
jurisdiction and future directions, the new commanding general of the 7th Infantry 
Division, General Ross, moved to make the ODD a standing consultative and training 
organization. On July 1, 1975, ODD officially became the US Army Human Resource 
Management Training Activity. Colonel Porcher L. Taylor, Jr., replaced Elliott as the 
commander and, as of that date, the new organization transitioned from TRADOC to 




to the US Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC).92 OETC’s 
mission was  
to train personnel in Organizational Effectiveness skills who can assist 
commanders in enhancing mission accomplishment; establish and 
maintain liaison with commanders utilizing these personnel, develop and 
evaluate organizational effectiveness techniques, develop and refine 
instrumented survey systems and data processing requirements to 
support Organizational Effectiveness programs.   
 
 To accomplish this mission, OETC was initially organized into five sub-
organizations: 
1. Operations and Management Division, responsible for administration, 
2. OE Training Division, responsible for conducting the 16-week OE Staff Officer 
Course,  
3. Survey and Measurement Division, responsible for survey development and 
data processing, 
4. L&MD Course and the Management Development Instructor's Training 
Course (essentially a division), and 
5. Organizational Development and Evaluation Division to develop and evaluate 
OE techniques, refine the contents of the OE course, assist in student practicum 
and maintain liaison with other organizations doing OE work.93 
By August 1975, OETC had an assigned strength of nineteen officers, six enlisted 
soldiers, and twenty-one civilians. It was now ready to educate the first wave of “internal 
consultants—Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs)—for the Army. With 
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this, Johns got his wish: staff officers, educated in OD, who would advise their 
commanders on leadership and change. 
 Although ADMINCEN had jurisdiction over the new OE center at Fort Ord, 
Rogers wasted no time in exerting his influence during the school’s early development. 
Only two weeks after the school “stood up,” Rogers met with Brigadier General William 
L. Mundie, the commanding general of ADMINCEN, to ensure that quality personnel 
were assigned to Fort Ord. They met on July 15 and 16, 1975, to formulate the criteria 
for the selection of officers who would become OESOs. They agreed that the screening 
criteria for prospective officers would be senior captains or majors with strong 
performance records, placing them in the upper half of their peer groups. Other basic 
criteria included an undergraduate degree, previous company command, and 
graduation from the advance course in their career branch. Upon graduation from the 
OE course, the officer was expected to volunteer to enter the personnel career field as a 
secondary specialty OPMS 41. Rogers, however, tightened up the actual selection 
criteria. Prerequisites for the course were education or experience in one or a 
combination of:  (1) formal education and a terminal degree (i.e. bachelor, masters, or 
PhD) in management/behavioral science; or an undergraduate degree with some 
graduate level courses in behavioral science; (2) former participation in civilian OD 
professional development programs or prior experience in managing or conducting OD 
operations; and (3) hold the rank of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel with a 
secondary specialty of personnel management, and prior experience in leadership 
command or management positions.94 
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 The first course began on September 8, 1975. The organizers, former ODD 
personnel with several years of experience and evaluation at this point, structured the 
prototype course to prepare the faculty and staff of the school for the hundreds of 
students who would soon attend. Of the original sixteen students selected, several were 
earmarked to join the school after graduation. The faculty wanted to limit initial course 
attendance to sixteen personnel because they wanted a small student to teacher ratio. 
The curriculum placed high demands on the students, was self-paced, and emphasized 
small-group activities. The course designers stressed that instructors would not conduct 
“platform-type lecture/conference techniques” that were the hallmark of Army training 
schools. However, Rogers again interceded, just weeks before the start of the course, 
and doubled the number of attendees. The FORSCOM commander wanted trained 
OESOs out in the field units as soon as possible.95    
 The initial curriculum carefully defined the role of the OESO. From the beginning, 
OETC insisted that OESOs were not leadership experts.96 Their job was to apply 
acquired skills and knowledge from the behavioral sciences that would assist 
commanders by collecting and analyzing organizational effectiveness indicators, “to 
interpret this data for the commander, and to assist him in developing and implementing 
action plans to resolve significant problems.”97 The curriculum embraced the current 
behavioral science research and theories that emphasized humanistic and 
transformational leadership principles. Thus, OD became the mechanism that enabled 
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the faculty to take these principles beyond philosophy and theory and to place them into 
practice within a pertinent, Army-adapted brand of OD called Army OE. From the 
beginning, OETC also was careful to articulate what the OESO was not: 
 The OESO does not operate or achieve success at the expense of 
command perogatives or through by-passing channels. He is not trained 
to prescribe ready-made solutions for organizational issues or problems 
without application of the 4-step process and the desires of the 
commander. The OESO does not engage in long-term theoretical studies 
of management problems. He is not a systems analyst or a time and 
efficiency expert. He is not a "spy" or undercover agent for the 
commander. He is not trained to train other OESOs.98 
 
By the time of the first course, the faculty had matured the core components of 
the OE curriculum. The three pillars of the OE program were the “Four-Step Process,” 
the popular L&MDC, and the end-of-course practicum. The four-step process was 
OETC’s way of simplifying the basic OD 
process; that is, “de-jargonizing” h ow 
an OD engagement works and assuring 
the Army that the commander was at 
the center and in control of the entire 
process. Although assessments could 
lead to a number of different 
engagement techniques, the process revolved around the commander’s commitment to 
accept the results of the assessments and then work closely with the OESO to plan and 
implement improvement activities. By the fall of 1975, the process was sound. It had 
matured from all of the Fort Ord experiments dating back to 1969 as well as recent 
                                                          




pilots. The four-step process diagram subsequently promoted institutionalization by 
appearing on the inside covers of many OETC publications.   
 More than any other component of the OE curriculum, the L&MDC best 
expressed the transformational, humanistic underpinning of the entire Progressive 
movement. The week-long course utilized an experiential learning model that was 
based on a cyclical learning process of five separate but interlocking 
procedures. As implied by the name of the model, the emphasis is on the 
direct experiences of the learner. It is based on the premise that 
experience precedes learning and that the learning, or meaning, to be 
derived from any experience comes from the learner himself. Any 
individual’s experience is unique to himself; no one can tell him what he is 
to learn, or gain, from any activity. Probable learnings can, of course, be 
devised, but it is up to the participant to validate these for himself.99  
 
Each new situation, as faced by the individual, served as an entry point into the cyclical 
model. The five steps involved the following: 
1. CONCRETE EXPERIENCE: The process starts with a concrete 
experience. The participant becomes involved in an activity; he acts or 
behaves in some way or he does, performs, observes, sees, says 
something. This initial experience is the basis for the entire process. 
2. PUBLISH AND PROCESS: Following the experience itself, it 
becomes important for the participant to share or “publish'' his reactions 
and observations with others who have either experienced or observed 
the same activity. The dynamics that emerged in the activity are explored, 
discussed, and evaluated (processed) with other participants. 
3. GENERALIZE: Flowing logically from the processing is the need to 
develop principles or extract generalizations from the experience. Stating 
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learnings in this way can help participants further define, clarify, and 
elaborate them. 
4. DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION: Generalized learnings usually 
suggest alternate courses of action and speculation of outcomes if an 
event were repeated differently–this speculation can be formed into a 
plan for application of the principles derived from the experience. 
5. APPLY COURSES OF ACTION: The final step in the cycle is not 
complete until a new learning or discovery is used and tested 
behaviorally. This is the “experimental” part of the experiential model. 
Applying, of course, becomes a new experience in a NEW SITUATION 
and, with new experience, the cycle begins again.100 
 The course comprised twelve subject areas with learning objectives that focused 
heavily on individuals learning to be open to sharing information and experiences, 
especially of a personal nature, in a group environment. Clear communication skills, 
with a focus on listening skills, were critical. Another focus were the application of FIRO 
theory, the development of performance objectives and, finally, the application of the 
learnings on the job.101 
 The faculty referred to the attendees as “learners” rather than students. Their 
philosophy was that the attendee “has the responsibility to actively learn in light of the 
requirement that he function and be treated as an adult learner rather than a person 
passively receiving teachings.” Although the course was entitled “leadership and 
management,”—and succinctly differentiated the two— the course was predominantly 
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focused on the former. It strongly reflected the work of Kurt Lewin with its T-Group-like 
framework and espoused Chris Argyris’s belief about unearthing and discussing “the 
undiscussables.” For most of the attendees, it was a unique, often unsettling experience 
at first.   
 The sixteen-week OESO course began with the L&MDC. Dr. Jerry Eppler, a 
strong humanist, facilitated the L&MDC as well as the second and third weeks. Over 
time, Eppler became the “soul” of the Army OE program, beloved by all those who 
attended the course and worked at OETC. To this day, he remains the "spiritual father" 
of Army OE. In the early 1970s, he was drawn to Fort Ord by an overwhelming desire to 
serve, to be a part of something important and much bigger than himself. In 1974, with a 
PhD in psychology from the University of Arizona, Eppler was a practicing child 
psychologist in La Jolla when a colleague in the OD community told him about the OD 
experimental program that the Army was conducting at Fort Ord. In time, he managed 
to get an interview with Colonel Robinson and the officers of ODD. As Eppler recalled, 
[o]f course they were all no hair on their heads. I had hair down to my 
shoulders. They were all just "STRAC" officers in the Army . . . a couple of 
SF guys and a couple of airborne guys. There were a couple of artillery 
guys. So there were about six or seven guys. I walked away from them 
and that first meeting—it was about a five hour interview—and I said, 
"Wow! They look different than I do, but we're talking the same thing. They 
have similar values that I have myself. I was amazed, surprised.102 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Jim Looram's experience was typical of many who attended 
the OESO course. Like most of the other Army officers who attended the course, 
Looram's initial exposure was novel and very alien to his previous experiences. A career 
infantry officer, Looram was a 1961 West Point graduate. After spending his lieutenant 
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years with the 101st Airborne Division, he attended the Defense Language Institute's 
Vietnamese course where he was the honor graduate. He spent his first tour of duty in 
Vietnam with the 1st Air Cavalry Division and then, after an assignment at Fort Benning, 
returned to Vietnam to serve as a briefer to General Creighton Abrams in the 
headquarters of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Selected to teach at 
West Point, Looram was promoted "below the zone" (i.e., ahead of his peers) and 
attended the University of Hawaii. As he recalled, 
[graduate school] totally radicalized me and changed me. For the first time, 
I saw the power of the behavioral sciences. When we were taught 
leadership at West Point, it was the Great Man Theory: it's all about you, 
you this, you that. I saw the power of what the behavioral sciences could 
do and that was in the early 1970s when leadership still wasn't that well 
codified. [When I] came back to West Point, I thought I was just different at 
that point. I didn't want to be part of the [old] system.103 
 
Following his time at West Point and after serving as a staff officer in the 7th Infantry 
Division at Fort Ord, and now a lieutenant colonel, Looram chose to become an OESO 
and joined the faculty at OETC. In recalling his experiences of the L&MDC and Jerry 
Eppler's first three weeks of the course, he noted that 
I had a hard time with it, from where I came from [but] it did me a lot of 
good. 
They twisted my head 27 different ways in the process. . . . [Jerry and his 
colleagues] grounded you in the first half of the program in all the 
communications skills that you needed, not as a colonel, but as a person 
dealing with somebody else. A lot of active listening, a lot of developing 
your own sense of presence, a lot of interaction, so it really took away a lot 
of what you were trained to do, and it was excellent, excellent. . . . You 
could put [Jerry] in a room with twelve people, and he'll get everybody to 
cry eventually. . . . It was grassroots. We were cutting out a new cloth out 
there with some really unusual men. But we kept it at a really sensitive 
level. Basically it was an encounter-group operation. [In the end], we were 
reborn. We saw another way to be. 
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 The third pillar of the OESO curriculum was the end-of-course practicum. The 
practicum was an impressive, real-world OE engagement in an active duty unit. The 
event involved a great amount of planning and preparation. Behind the scenes, the 
faculty had to find a unit somewhere in the Army that was willing to receive the fledgling 
OESOs to tackle legitimate problems. In the early days of the school, this was no easy 
task. In later years, after OE was somewhat established, the new OESOs were able to 
communicate with their earmarked units of assignment to identify OE opportunities. 
These were month-long engagements that involved many long hours. In the years 
ahead, the term "practicum" was discarded in the effort to "de-jargonize" OE. Instead, 
OETC used the term "field training exercise" (FTX) to legitimize the engagement in the 
eyes of the Army. 
 The course presented a radical departure from the Army’s traditional “platform” 
training methodology. Instructors at all of the other Army schools literally lectured from 
raised wooden platforms, with students sitting in rows dutifully taking notes and 
regurgitating the correct answers on exams for each “block of instruction.” Often, the 
instructor would stomp his foot, signaling that the particular point would appear on the 
exam. As DePuy’s training management system evolved in the years ahead, platform 
training would become even more regimented as each block of instruction tightly 
conformed to a “task, condition, and standard.”  
 Although the prototype course was planned out in detail, it did experience 
growing pains. It got off to a slow start primarily due to administrative issues caused by 
Rogers sending additional students and by the need to hold classes in Fort Ord’s Family 




framework of the course was sound, the instructors relied on some of the students who 
would soon be faculty to teach as well. This meant that the details of the course were 
still evolving. Still, the first ten weeks of experientially-based “laboratory training” worked 
well as the students divided into teams of eight students each. For the following month, 
the students conducted their practicum by implementing an OE engagement with one of 
the infantry battalions of the 7th ID. While the battalion commander was supportive, his 
unit was preparing for a major external evaluation which detracted from the project. Still, 
the practicum and the course overall proved to be a promising start.  
 In December 1975, faculty, staff, and students all came together to assess the 
prototype course. The students commended the excitement of the staff and the skills of 
the outside consultants. They expressed appreciation for the opportunity for personal 
growth and for allowing the “students to take some of the responsibility for themselves.” 
In terms of the curriculum, the students found the L&MDC and the practicum with the 
infantry battalion the most valuable. As expected, they disliked the administrative 
detractors, especially early on, and found that some of the instructors avoided conflict 
and were indecisive. Chroniclers of the critique attributed the latter comments to the fact 
that “the students and faculty were suffering something similar to an identity crisis.”104 
 For the faculty, the prototype course prompted an intense introspection. On one 
hand, the overall course proved very sound, based on years of development, testing 
and evaluation. The foundation was firm as a result of the faculty having practiced 
mainstream OD with some of the Fort Ord units. The intense, post-course assessment, 
which involved everyone, also validated the components of OD that were appropriate 
and effective for the Army’s institutional culture. On the other hand, the course 
                                                          




demonstrated that much fine-tuning was needed to ensure that OETC actually produced 
well-qualified OD consultants. OETC demanded a lot from the students. In sixteen short 
weeks, OETC attempted to produce what college graduate programs often took two 
years of study to accomplish. For captains and majors to serve with credibility as 
OESOs on higher-echelon staffs, advising their colonels and generals, they had to 
possess not only a high level of expertise in the behavioral sciences (primarily OD) but 
also the poise and communication skills that were imperative to win the trust and 
confidence of skeptical participants. This reality was precisely the reason why Rogers 
wanted to set the selection criteria so high and fought TRADOC on reducing the length 
of the course below sixteen weeks. TRADOC’s view was that the OESO course was 
just another specialty school. 105  
 The second serious introspection concerned the intense, experientially-based 
laboratory framework of the curriculum that heavily stressed T-Groups and sensitivity 
training. Halfway through the course, the faculty grew concerned when DA issued a 
directive that race relations training could no longer employ sensitivity training. 
Throughout 1974 and 1975, the Army had attempted to heal the chronic racial tension 
that pervaded the ranks with mandatory race relations training. These sessions were 
eight hours long and involved fifteen to twenty soldiers, unfamiliar with each other, 
sitting in a circle with a facilitator. The organizers were careful to enroll an equal 
proportion of races in an attempt to balance out the dialog and interactions. The intent 
of the course was sound, with the instructors attempting to unearth the 
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“undiscussables.” Unfortunately, the course tried to ramrod an experientially-based 
method that normally required a certain level of maturity and weeks of assimilation into 
several hours. Soldiers often left these sessions feeling angry and frustrated.106 When 
the DA message arrived on October 1, only three weeks into the course, OETC 
instructors feared that although the OETC curriculum was not a race relations course, 
it’s very structure that rested on the foundation of laboratory training could be perceived 
in the same vein. In the ensuing discussions, the faculty expressed divided opinions. 
One group advocated a more didactic-oriented approach, while the other group wanted 
to retain the existing experiential orientation. “Adding to the dilemma was the lack of a 
clear definition of sensitivity training.” As one chronicler noted, 
this issue required a lot of time and energy on the part of the organization 
to define what was actually happening in the course and how this differed 
from sensitivity training. The result was that what the school was doing 
had a stated goal and sensitivity training did not.107 
 
Most impressive about the results of this “soul-searching” was that the group essentially 
employed OD on their own organization. This event marked the beginning of an 
improvement process that never ended throughout the lifetime of the Army OE program. 
In short, OETC continuously sought to improve its effectiveness, that is, it “practiced 
what it preached.”108  
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107. Golden manuscript, 36. 
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OETC Is Open For Business 
 On January 8, 1976, OETC opened its doors to the first full course of thirty-five 
future OESOs. To mark the importance of this event, Rogers—again flexing his muscles 
in TRADOC’s back yard—sent Major General Calvert P. Benedict, his top personnel 
chief (i.e., the FORSCOM DCSPERS) to formally address the class at the start of the 
course. Benedict reassured the students that OETC had strong support at the highest 
levels and that as OESOs, they were bringing advances in science “into the areas of 
military life that can have a major impact on effectiveness.”109 
 While Course 1-76 was underway from January 8 through April 30, 1976, the 
OETC faculty and staff produced an enormous amount of work that would meet 
TRADOC and DA’s guidance on propagating OE throughout the Army. The staff 
devoted much of their time and effort in developing appropriate instructional materials 
and literature to support OE instruction in other TRADOC service schools. Especially 
noteworthy was the development of the competency planning system that determined 
“whether or not students in training were receiving appropriate material in a number of 
areas, such as self-awareness, interpersonal relations, group community relationships, 
organizational development and other professional areas of functions.”110  
 This system was important because it established a mechanism to ensure that 
high standards were clearly defined and followed. These standards not only were 
applied to the students in the resident course but also established the criteria that 
allowed exceptionally qualified officers to receive certification as OESOs without having 
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attended OETC. In the history of the program, only seven officers received the OESO 
additional skill identifier of 5Z by virtue of formal education and experience.111  
 By spring 1976, the competency planning system had identified 44 knowledge 
areas and 44 skill areas. The staff also accomplished a number of other projects to 
include pioneer work in the use of data processing to assist with survey work (novel at 
that time) that would greatly assist OESOs in the field; the design of a survey officer's 
course and a survey data processing course; an assessment model that combined 
systematic feedback from the field, action research, and an accurate appraisal of the 
effects of the OE effort; a civilian/NCO concept-course development that determined the 
appropriate rules for civilian/NCO participation in OE; and inputs to survey and 
management doctrine and policy at ADMINCEN, MILPERCEN, and DA. 
 Perhaps the most important work during these months was the creation of the 
Organizational Effectiveness Executive Course (OEEC). OETC personnel designed this 
course specifically for senior commanders (colonels and general officers) in order to 
demystify OE and to educate commanders that OE was a tool that would assist them in 
achieving organizational goals. OEEC was the key to breaking down resistance to the 
Army OE program. In May 1976, TRADOC school representatives attended the first 
OEEC at the Casa Munras hotel near Fort Ord. At this conference, OETC also 
presented much of the aforementioned work, “an initial literature package,” to TRADOC. 
This delivery served to fulfill one of the major tasks that Westmoreland, Forsythe, and 
others had foreseen; namely, the inclusion of behavioral science in the Army’s 
extensive school system. At this point in time, it was clear to everyone at Fort Ord that 
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OETC was much more than a TRADOC school. Indeed, with all of the projects 
underway, OETC was already a research and educational center.  
* 
 OETC entered 1976 with a running start. On January 8, 1976, Nadal’s boss, 
FORSCOM DCSPERS Major General Calvert P. Benedict, formally opened OETC class 
1-76 with a key note address. In his remarks, General Benedict “reinforced the high 
level of support for the OE program” (meaning from his boss, Rogers), and reminded 
each of the thirty-five students of their exceptional “technical expertise” and their 
potential to “bring the advances of science into the areas of military life that can have a 
major impact on effectiveness.” Having fine-tuned the curriculum from the prototype 
course, the faculty delivered a rich program that included a matured L&MDC and 
practicums at Fort Ord and Fort Lewis. The participants graduated on April 30, 1976, 
with Major General Stanley L. McClellan, the TRADOC DCSPERS, attending as the 
guest speaker.112  
 It is important to understand that by early 1976, OETC had become more of a 
center than a school.113 The OESO course, while certainly the cornerstone of 
institutionalization, only constituted a portion of the OETC workload. As the first course 
was underway, the center underwent a significant reorganization that would better align 
with the expansion of its other missions. This reorganization, largely transpiring in 
March, followed on the heels of Colonel Taylor’s departure as commandant on January 
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28. His successor, Colonel Phillip B. Merrick, oversaw the organizational changes, in 
which the divisions essentially became directorates. The directors were Lieutenant 
Colonel R. A. Robinson (resource management), Lieutenant Colonel Frank Lawler 
(training), Mr. Savard (evaluation), and Dr. Mel Spehn (development).          
 Spehn’s Development Directorate arguably undertook the most important and 
difficult work at the center: the planning and development of OE curricula. His team’s 
most pressing task in the early spring of 1976 was the development of POI for 
TRADOC. This was a major project that resulted in the development of materials and 
literature to support OE instruction in the other TRADOC service schools should 
ADMINCEN accept them. His team completed an initial package that they distributed to 
TRADOC school representatives during the OEEC course held in Monterey in May.114 
At the same time, Spehn’s team began to work on expanding OE into the Army 
Reserves and the National Guard. This expansion aligned with the Army’s 
organizational “round-out” plans to fully integrate the active and reserve components. 
Finally, the Development Directorate planned for the introduction of NCOs into the 
OESO course. Their vision was to produce OE NCOs who would aid OESOs in the field 
as assistant internal consultants. This initiative also proved to be an important step in 
the institutionalization of the OE program as Army OE expanded beyond the officer 
corps and into the NCO corps. 
 On top of this heavy workload, Spehn dealt with the curriculum development for 
the OESO course. With lessons learned from the recent prototype course and as class 
1-76 was underway, the directorate worked hard to improve the curriculum. Their work 
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was made more difficult as Spehn fought with ADMINCEN to keep the course length at 
sixteen weeks. ADMINCEN wanted to reduce the course to fourteen weeks by 
eliminating the material that prepared OESOs to instruct the L&MDC. As described 
above, Rogers’s recognized the criticality of the L&MDC and personally intervened to 
prevent the curtailment. Rogers’s intervention ensured that the more humanistic 
elements of leadership development would propagate throughout the Army, as the 
OESOs could now teach the L&MDC beyond the confines of Fort Ord. For the 
Progressives, this was an important component of institutionalization.115  
 Whereas the Development Directorate had a clear path to follow, albeit with a 
heavy workload, the Evaluation Directorate was just beginning an arduous, difficult 
journey that would ultimately struggle to show the value of Army OE. Those were battles 
yet to come. In March 1976, the directorate’s primary mission was the development of a 
plan to evaluate all facets of the OE activities both in the field and at OETC. The plan 
was difficult to formulate because only a handful of OESOs from the prototype course 
were in the field.116      
 Fortunately, that number would soon increase. Class 2-76 began on April 30, 
1976, with forty students. This class experienced an improved curriculum and an 
expanded practicum. Students from class 2-76 travelled to Fort Riley, Fort Lewis, Fort 
Hood, and the Presidio of San Francisco to conduct their OE FTXs. At their graduation 
on August 13, Rogers sent Brigadier General Phillip Kaplan, the FORSCOM Assistant 
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DCSPERS, to be the guest speaker. One week later, on August 20, 1976, class 3-76 
began with forty students. This class included three NCOs who would test out the 
concept of the OENCO, First Sergeant Larry G. Hibbs, Sergeant First Class Richard L. 
Hines, and Staff Sergeant Callie M. Edwards. Class 3-76 conducted FTXs at Fort Hood, 
Fort Carson, and Fort Riley. They graduated on December 10, 1976, with Major 
General Robert L. Kirwan, Commander of Fort Ord’s 7th Infantry Division, as guest 
speaker. 
 During the course for class 3-76, the Army DCSPERS, Lieutenant General Hal 
Moore, visited OETC and spoke with the students. In the conversations that ensued, the 
students “expressed concern about their acceptance as OESOs” in the field.  
Specifically, they told Moore that they feared that their future commanders would 
suspect them of trying to “usurp the chain of command prerogatives.” Moore reassured 
the class that the OESOs were welcomed. Upon his return to Washington, Moore sent 
the class a memorandum on December 1, 1976, that stated that “the OESOs were 
being well received and supported in the field.”117     
 This was an important conversation because it revealed that the students had 
already sensed resistance to the Army OE program, enough to cause them some 
degree of anxiety. It was too early for such feedback to come from the OESOs out in the 
units. After all, the students from the previous classes (1-76 and 2-76) had only recently 
arrived in their organizations. Whatever source of their concerns, the conversation 
reflected a real fear that their involvement with OE could jeopardize their careers. As 
senior captains and majors, these students, at this point in their lives, were fully 
committed to a twenty-plus year career path in the Army. More importantly, their anxiety 
                                                          




revealed a pervasive level of skepticism that OE posed a threat to a commander’s 
position and authority, despite extensive efforts to dispel that perception. In retrospect, it 
is clear that this fear reflected widespread resistance to change, both then and in the 
years ahead.     
 Unfortunately, TRADOC did little to understand the extensive work underway at 
Fort Ord. In part, this inattention was deliberate—DePuy was comfortable with Fort 
Benjamin Harrison’s charter to pull OETC into the ADMINCEN family. However, friction 
between ADMINCEN and OETC began to mount in the spring and summer of 1976, as 
OETC made tremendous progress in both the OESO course and the numerous 
administrative projects. This friction created a “real upheaval between the organization 
and the ADMINCEN . . . . There appeared to be a lot of dissent between the two 
headquarters. [T]he results were unrest, concern, and a general feeling that there was 
an eruption about to occur.”118 Both sides contributed to the escalation of tension. 
Perhaps bolstered by the strong support from FORSCOM (i.e., Rogers) and by the 
success of the prototype course, the new OETC commandant—Colonel Phillip B. 
Merrick—wrote Major General Mundie requesting that ADMINCEN change OETC’s 
name to the Organizational Effectiveness Institute (OEI). Merrick wanted the Army to 
know that OETC was much more than a TRADOC school. The name would “clearly 
denote OETC's position as a small, highly-specialized element of a larger educational 
organization, at the same time implying that OETC performed a variety of tasks other 
than training.” Mundie never acknowledged the request. This was followed by 
ADMINCEN’s suggestion that OETC shorten the course by two weeks that Rogers 
successfully thwarted. On July 30, ADMINCEN requested Merrick’s input on what 
                                                          




support would be needed to move OETC to Fort Benjamin Harrison. Merrick’s staff was 
prepared. On the same day, they provided ADMINCEN with a thorough staff study that 
indicated that Fort Harrison would not have the space and equipment to house the staff 
and school. More importantly, the move would seriously interrupt the OE program by as 
much as a year. This estimate, however, assumed that Indianapolis could provide the 
civilian expertise that the Monterey area now contributed. Above all, the study 
underscored the high level of expertise that had taken years to achieve.  
 ADMINCEN did not respond to Merrick’s input, which meant to the people at 
OETC that a move appeared imminent. Indeed, on August 3, the ADMINCEN 
comptroller contacted TRADOC to understand budget impacts of moving OETC to 
Indiana.119 Throughout August and September, ADMINCEN remained silent on the 
proposed move, which caused considerable apprehension among the staff and faculty, 
most of whom just had recently relocated to Fort Ord. Fortunately, the matter was 
settled on October 15, 1976, when Mundie finally replied to Merrick and advised him 
that OETC would remain at Fort Ord “for the foreseeable future.” Rogers’s hand in the 
matter was apparent—he had become Chief of Staff of the Army only two weeks earlier. 
 In late September 1976, as Rogers departed FORSCOM, he had done all that he 
possibly could to make Army OE acceptable and perhaps “permanent” in the Army’s 
combat divisions. In looking back on his twenty-five months as the commander of 
FORSCOM, Rogers took heart that OE was on the right path. He frequently spoke 
about the evolution of this enormous effort and frankly told his audiences that it would 
take a decade or more for OE to really become entrenched in the culture. He also 
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closely embraced, rewarded, and empowered his junior Progressives as they performed 
the hard work on the front lines. In September 1976, these troops consisted of his 
longtime dependable “right hand” men, Nadal, Schaum, and Johns, as well as the first 
wave of true believers that included Powell, Ray, the faculty and staff at OETC, and the 
100 new OESOs that were just initiating numerous OE engagements throughout the 
Army. Typical of his transformational leadership behaviors, Rogers consistently trusted 
them and openly received their counsel. Indeed, on the eve of becoming CSA, he once 
again accepted Nadal’s unsolicited critique and recommendations. As Nadal recalled, 
[o]ne of the things that I did prior to General Rogers's departure from 
Forces Command was to write him a letter. This letter was sent to his 
home so it would not be intercepted by the bureaucracy or by his 
gatekeepers. The letter said that, basically, I had enjoyed working for him 
and helping get OE started, but that it was my conviction that at DA and 
throughout the rest of the Army there was no master plan to implement the 
OE program.120  
 
Rogers concurred with Nadal’s assessment. In fact, in the weeks ahead, Rogers would 
turn to Nadal to develop a 3- to 10-year master plan for the program. Rogers’s selection 
as CSA delighted the Progressives. They realized that Rogers had been and would 
continue to be “the locus of power for the evolution of the program,” and that “when he 
became Chief of Staff of the Army, much of the power shifted with him to the Chief's 
office and to DCSPERS.”121 
 By the fall of 1976, the Healers and the Progressives strongly clung to their 
respective views and did so simply because nothing drove or required them to reach 
across their largely philosophically borders to shake hands. As FORSCOM commander, 
Rogers had recognized this and leveraged Nadal and his team to spend a large amount 
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of time with brigade, division and corps commanders. Fortunately, as Rogers neared 
the end of his tenure at FORSCOM, OETC was poised to take a quantum leap in the 
propagation of Army OE. By the end of September 1976, as Rogers left FORSCOM to 
serve as the Army Chief of Staff, OETC had graduated a hundred OESOs. Indeed, the 
momentum at Fort Ord was accelerating. From this point on, Rogers could provide 
powerful “top cover,” especially in terms of pressuring TRADOC to promote OE, but the 





The Institutionalization of OE: The Rogers Years 
Cross-cultural research and analysis in popular motives and values at last 
permits us to avoid parochial notions of authority and power and to identify 
broad patterns of leadership-followership interaction as part of a broader 
concept of social causation. At last we can hope to close the intellectual 
gap between the fecund canons of authority in a new and general theory 
of leadership. 
James MacGregor Burns 
 
 On October 1, 1976, General Bernie Rogers became chief of staff of the US 
Army. Five weeks later, on November 2, Jimmy Carter defeated incumbent Gerald Ford 
for the presidency of the United States. Rogers would serve as the CSA for thirty-two 
months, through the majority of the Carter Administration. In November 1976, as control 
of the executive branch shifted from the Republican to the Democratic Party, the service 
chiefs braced themselves for possible radical changes in the defense establishment. 
Carter had campaigned on a pledge to reduce defense spending by seven billion dollars 
and to balance the budget by 1981. The president-elect and his new secretary of 
defense, Harold Brown, favored the use of systems analysis, former Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara's system of quantifiable management, now abhorred by the military 
due to its use of demanding statistics and quantifiable measures for managing the war 
in Vietnam. It was clear in late 1976 that Carter would dive deep into the armed 
services' budgeting processes precisely at a time when key reforms in the Army heavily 
depended upon budget increases.1 
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 Rogers inherited from outgoing Chief of Staff Weyand an Army that was adrift in 
a sea change of force modernization and reform. Weyand had pushed Abrams's 
expanded force structure too quickly by activating too many units for the sixteen division 
force too soon. Consequently, the Ford Administration and Congress had approved the 
expanded structure but not commensurate increases in personnel or funding. As 
Rogers became CSA, Army units throughout USAREUR suffered extensive shortages 
of supplies, spare parts, ammunition, and fuel. These were serious concerns for Rogers 
given that the Soviet threat in Europe was the US and NATO's primary concern.  
Exacerbating this state of readiness, as Rogers assumed his new responsibilities on the 
first day of fiscal year 1977, was a serious problem with recruitment. Congress had 
reduced the Army's recruiting budget from $72 million to $29 million for FY77 and had 
ended the Vietnam-era Gl Bill—a major incentive for attracting volunteers.2 
The Godfather Takes Action 
 Against this contextual backdrop, Rogers hit the ground running in setting 
priorities. Timing proved fortuitous as the annual Army-wide commanders' conference 
was scheduled for the end of November. Of all the issues facing the Army at that time—
recruitment challenges, widespread concern over the Soviet threat, readiness, women 
entering the force, race relations and drug abuse, underfunded procurements for long-
overdue modernization—he chose the topic of Army OE for his keynote address. 
                                                          
2. Frank L. Jones, "A Hollow Army Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics 
of Military Readiness," Letort papers (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War 
College, October 2012), DTIC accession number AD-A566298, 20–22. See also US Department of 
Defense, "Report of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 
1979 Authorization Request, and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs," 17 January 1977 (Washington DC: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense). DTIC accession number: ADA-082839. The tone of this report was 
severe in regard to the Soviet threat. Albeit anecdotal, I experienced these severe shortages first hand. 
As I left the Army in Germany during Rogers's first month as CSA, we were cannibalizing our vehicles to 
keep others operational and buying toilette paper on the German economy because we could not get it 




Rogers delivered this address to all of his senior commanders on November 30, 1976. 
One week earlier, he had tasked Fred Schaum to put together his talking points. His full 
trust in Schaum was evident as he retained almost all Schaum had drafted.3 
 The new CSA made clear from the very beginning of his remarks that he 
intended to institutionalize OE and that he viewed OE as a way to address most, if not 
all, of the Army's organizational challenges: 
As all of you know, I have for sometime been interested in Organizational 
Effectiveness (OE) as a technology and capability for strengthening and 
improving the Army in the broadest sense. The results obtained from 
pioneering efforts with OE during the past four years have been 
illuminating, but are only the tip of the iceberg. Collectively, these early 
initiatives in line and staff units signal a significant long term contribution to 
the Army. For this reason it is important for us to discuss OE at this 
conference and to use this discussion as a starting point for developing a 
shared viewpoint of how to institutionalize and employ this capability in the 
coming years.4 
 
Rogers first cited examples of successful OE engagements underway, giving particular 
credit to Blanchard and Powell's work in USAREUR and the work at FORSCOM with 
Nadal. He was also careful to note that he intended to expand its use within his own 
extensive staff at DA. 
 The remainder of Rogers's speech dealt with the nature of institutionalization. He 
heavily emphasized that OE was a tool for the commander and that its use was 
voluntary. However, he informed his commanders that certain aspects of the OE 
program were obligatory. Rogers was clear and direct: “We are proceeding to develop 
an Army OE capability which will be self-sustaining. This part is mandatory." By this he 
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meant the creation of spaces for OESOs, adequate funding, policy and doctrine, 
education and training, and strong support for follow-on research and evaluation. He 
acknowledged the existence of widespread skepticism but informed his audience that 
those who had tried it found it successful, so successful, in fact, that in those commands 
requests for OE were greater than the OESOs could accommodate. While Rogers 
sought to paint a very positive picture, he also issued a stern warning that 
those commanders who chose not to selectively use this technology 
should not preclude their subordinates from using it. . . . Some people in 
the Army are trying to second guess my sincerity. Others may be "buying 
in" because it appears to be a good horse to ride. This can get in the way 
of attaining any genuine success, so we must change these attitudes.5 
 
 The most powerful message of his remarks was his distinction between 
leadership and management. He delineated the differences especially in emphasizing 
that the former was all about people, and that OE was a "practical and systematic way 
of looking at how the Army and its organizational elements function by reflecting on the 
distinctly human nature of any organization." Succinctly, he stated that 
we need to proceed toward institutionalizing OE with the same degree of 
interest that we devote to a new weapon system. But we also need to 
recognize that the attainment of this goal is even more complex than 
bringing a new weapon system on line because we are dealing with the 
human dimensions of the Army. . . . There is a danger of pushing too far 
and too fast because the successful use of OE involves people. It is not 
something done to them.6 
 
 During his speech, Rogers informed his commanders that he had created a study 
group to assess "the Army involvement in OE to find out where we are, where we are 
trying to go, and how we should proceed to get there." Rogers established this group— 






the Organizational Effectiveness Study Group (OESG)—on November 17, as a direct 
follow-up to Nadal's personal letter from September criticizing the lack of a strategic 
plan for OE. Although Nadal was still assigned to FORSCOM, Rogers chose Nadal to 
head up this small group that also included OE all-star veterans Lieutenant Colonel Roy 
Ray from the 82nd Airborne Division and DA/DCSPERS/HRD's own Major Fred 
Schaum.7 
 Nadal's team had the mission of assessing where the Army currently stood with 
OE activities and to then recommend an appropriate strategy and courses of action that 
would facilitate institutionalization. Rogers's initial guidance to Nadal and his team was 
to "operate in a consultative manner and provide assistance for ensuring that an Army-
wide OE capability is institutionalized with an emphasis on quality." With the study group 
directly focused on institutionalization, their task was not to study the state-of-the-art of 
OD but rather to determine the "long-term development and sustainment of an Army-
wide OE capability from the standpoint of organization, staffing, resources, and 
management requirements." Rogers emphasized to the team that  
the orientation of the study reflects a commitment to bring OE on line as a 
technology in a substantive and deliberate manner and to fully integrate its 
use by the chain of command across all levels and functional areas. The 
establishment of this capability is a top priority Army goal.8 
 
 Nadal and his team spent five weeks, from November 17 to December 21, 1976, 
assessing current Army-wide OE efforts. The study group then briefed Rogers on their 
interim assessment on December 22. After hearing their report, Rogers directed the 
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study team to draft a memo for his signature that would direct specific Army staff 
agencies "to initiate certain time-sensitive actions which were supportive of the study 
objective." He also asked them to draft a concept paper that described the capabilities 
and structures for an Army-wide OE program, and to create a time-phased plan for 
institutionalizing Army OE.9 
 Eager to move OE along, Rogers wasted little time in issuing his directives to the 
heads of several Army staff agencies. On February 9, 1977, the CSA directed the staff 
to create an OE consulting cell within the Office of the CSA that would advise the CSA 
on OE and provide OE consulting services to the entire DA staff. Rogers also directed 
Hal Moore, his DCSPERS, to compile a list of key positions at various headquarters that 
required knowledge of OE and to identify and begin to assign "the most qualified officers 
available" to staff those positions "by reason of civilian education, training, or 
experience." Moore's office was also asked to prepare an Army regulation on OE, to 
publish a DA pamphlet on Army OE, and to work with the Chief of Public Affairs, Office 
of the Secretary of the Army, to draft a plan to inform the Army of the OE program. 
Finally, the DCSPERS was to work with the Army chief of legislative liaison to "prepare 
material to inform Congress of Army OE efforts." Rogers expected his tasked generals 
to complete these directives no later than April 1, 1977. 
The OESG Delivers 
 From December 22, 1976, through March 1977, the OESG completed the Chief's 
assigned directives. Nadal, Schaum, and Ray were careful to ensure that they received 
as much data and feedback from the field as possible. For example, from March 22 to 
25, the OESG conducted a four-day conference with twenty-five OE staff personnel 





from a number of major commands and Army staff agencies. During the conference, 
they reviewed the draft findings and developed recommendations for a time-phased 
institutionalization plan. More importantly, the OE personnel who attended the 
conference were asked to staff these recommendations within their commands for 
comment and suggestions. Overall, the OESG emphasized discussions with 
commanders and staff officers who were using OE-trained personnel. In total, they 
visited seventeen Army installations and eleven service schools. They interviewed thirty 
general officers and "tapped the views and experiences” of thirteen major commands 
and thirteen Army staff and field operating agencies.10 
 Serendipitously, the OESG was able to incorporate data from phase I of the 
three-year OETC Evaluation Program. OETC's effort was a data-base analysis of 132 
OESOs conducting OE engagements in the field. OETC was interested in the extent to 
which OE was being accepted in the Army. By that time, the OESOs who responded 
represented fifty-eight Army locations around the world. The OESG found the data 
especially useful because "the majority of the OESG observations were substantiated 
by [OETC’s] evaluation effort."11 
 The most important input that the OESG received during this time was SDC's 
twenty-one page report entitled "Summary of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) on the 
Army Staff" the OESG had requested earlier. The report was released on March 21, 
1977, in time for the findings to be shared with the four-day conference that began the 
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next day. This rich, comprehensive report outlining SDC's previous four years of OD 
work with DA and especially with MILPERCEN not only reported the successes and 
challenges of their work thus far but also accurately described the cultural resistance to 
change in general and Army OE in particular. In essence, the report summarized the 
"basic issues which have surfaced again and again" since their initial engagement in 
May 1973 with OPO/MILPERCEN and subsequently with DA DCSPER, DA DCSLOG 
(logistics), DA DCSOPS, Office of the Director of the Army Staff, DA Chief of Public 
Affairs, FORSCOM, USAREUR, and the Military District of Washington.12 
 In sum, the most habitual and extensive problem was communications and 
interpersonal relations. SDC noted that the problem with communications was twofold. 
Communications, on one hand, "can refer to the procedures, regulations, and forms 
through which information is processed on paper, or it can refer to interpersonal 
relationships and how they affect what goes on a paper and how it is processed." John 
Hallen, the author of the report, explained that because the Army "places great value on 
hierarchy and rank, the information flow . . . is more filtered and controlled than it need 
be." Within the Army bureaucracy, officers at each level in the chain of command place 
their own interpretation on the information. The result of the "filtering phenomenon” is 
that the final product may often distort or deviate from what was actually requested. 
"Thus, information that reaches the top is often less valid than information available at 
lower organizational levels." Hallen reported that immense authorities associated with 
rank and positions and the extreme competitiveness within the Army officer corps 
resulted in decisions being made "on the basis of rank rather than on the basis of data." 
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In echoing an underlying philosophy of Army OE, Hallen expressed his view that "it 
does not follow that a person of higher rank necessarily is better informed about specific 
issues." As a consequence of these organizational dysfunctions, the system "creates a 
climate in which subordinates tell their superiors only what they think superiors want to 
hear," and in which officers become "risk takers [in name only] who carefully avoid any 
potential conflict with superiors."13 
 The OESG completed their report in early April 1977. The framework of the         
140-page report articulated eleven "guidelines" that were required as a foundation for 
the creation of a comprehensive strategy to guide the Army OE program toward full 
institutionalization. These guidelines reflected three general concerns derived from the 
thirty-four specific findings and sixty-nine recommendations: TRADOC's slow progress, 
a lack of senior officer involvement, and the necessity of quality OESOs.14 
 In regard to TRADOC, the team reported that TRADOC lacked trained OE 
personnel and lagged behind all other actors in pushing Army OE forward. While the 
OESG also noted that some major commands had yet to embrace OE, they attributed 
that issue to the limited number of trained OESOs in the field. The report stated that 
TRADOC's shortcomings were serious because a lack of policy and doctrine resulted in 
a state of "ad hoc management" of OE throughout the Army. Exacerbating ad hoc 
management was the widespread belief that the Army was not serious about OE 
(despite the CSA's remarks at the previous commanders’ conference) because there 
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was no comprehensive DA plan or DA regulation that spelled out the OESO's duties 
and responsibilities. For successful institutionalization, the authors emphasized that OE 
doctrine must appear in Army doctrinal literature.15 
 The OESG report made clear that quality OESOs and willing commanders were 
vital to the institutionalization of the program. Indeed, the vast majority of the report 
identified many recommendations that would address these two imperatives. Willing 
commanders required subordinate commanders who were educated in OD/OE theory 
and practice:  
We know from experience, within and outside the Army, that the only way 
OE can be institutionalized is for the chain of command to be actively 
involved, supportive, and responsible for its application. A staff function 
and a group of specialists cannot assume this role. One of the major 
findings of this report is the lack of a shared understanding on the part of 
senior officers about what OE is and how it should be used. If this is not 
addressed rather expeditiously in the next 1-2 years, OE will be relegated 
to the status of another "gimmick" that had a short existence.16 
 
Again, in drawing attention to TRADOC, the report criticized the lack of OE educational 
material in the school system, especially noting its absence at the Army War College. 
"Eventually the TRADOC school system, in conjunction with the Army War College, will 
ensure that senior officers are knowledgeable about OE. In the immediate future, 
however, some exceptional measures are required." By "exceptional measures" the 
authors meant that the CSA would have to remain heavily involved. 
The introduction of OE into the Army is a complex, long-range effort. It is, 
in many ways, an attempt to constructively change and revitalize part of 
the Army culture. Recognition of these facts means that the 
institutionalization of OE will have to be managed by exception from the 
highest levels of the Army until some time in the future when its 
acceptance is more clearly assured.17 
                                                          






 With substantive recommendations in hand, the team did well to help reviewers 
of the report by charting a path between forcing OE down the throats of the entire 
Army—as DePuy was currently attempting to do with his new operational doctrine—and 
educating and demonstrating that, in the long term, OE could offer commanders 
tremendous benefits and payoffs. To accomplish the latter would take time—a great 
deal of time. The authors warned that to "cultivate a receptive environment for OE, [the 
program] required at least a decade of concerted effort," especially since the Army was 
"working on the forefront of this technology."18 
 The most important message from the OESG report was its realistic recognition 
that key personnel (i.e., specific Progressives and especially the CSA) would only 
remain in their current influential positions for a relatively short period of time. A 
successful decade-long maturation period for OE rested firmly in the hands of a world-
class center for OE education and its production of quality OESOs. As ongoing and 
subsequent activities at Fort Ord revealed, OETC heard this message loud and clear 
(discussed below). While Nadal, Ray, and Schaum all recognized that Fort Ord would 
hold the fate of Army OD in its hands, long-term centralized oversight was required at 
the DA/DCSPERS level to ensure not only the production of quality OESOs but the 
ability of OETC to retain its humanistic, people-centric focus over time. Indeed, the 
report’s most important (and prescient) recommendation was that “additional 
monitorship of the OE Training Center is required to ensure that its focus does not shift 
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from the current emphasis on organizational and interpersonal processes to a more 
generalized and mechanical resource manager point of view.”19 
 On April 7, 1977, Rogers received the OESG final briefing. The team 
emphasized two main points: (1) "Institutionalization of OE will ultimately be 
accomplished by high quality, well-trained OE staff officers working with commanders 
who understand the OE process," and (2) "specific actions need to be taken to create 
the conditions for institutionalizing OE." In regard to the latter, the briefers emphasized 
that quality OESOs required a high-priority emphasis in the selection process for officer 
assignments. Developing the correct staff structures throughout the Army was critical for 
the assignment of OETC graduates and for the appropriate support of OE activities. 
Finally, they stressed that these efforts would fail to promote institutionalization unless 
"commanders and staff officers at all levels understand the purpose and functions of OE 
and the OESO.” 
 Because this presentation was essentially a decision briefing, Rogers 
immediately approved the report and issued specific taskings: 
1. the DCSPER will implement the OESG plan as approved,  
2. manpower spaces for institutionalizing OE on the Army Staff and the 
OESO School will be made available, 
3. MACOMs [major commands] will be required to convert and identify a 
total of approximately 363 spaces to OESOs with no additional duties 
(based upon rule of thumb of two per division/installation, one per 
separate brigade or equivalent, 
                                                          




4. an OE branch will be established within OCSA to provide OE 
consulting services to the Army Staff, 
5. Director of Management will identify and assist in providing the 
necessary spaces to support an OE division within ODCSPER, 
6. a memo to CG MILPERCEN will be prepared expressing CSA desires 
concerning the priority for selection and assignments of OESOs and key 
OE staff managers,  
7. DCSPER will ensure that appropriate OE positions are validated for 
graduate education, 
8. a memo will be prepared for DCSRDA [Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Research and Development] emphasizing CSA desires that OE research 
be adequately supported at all levels and receive appropriate priority,  
9. a study will be conducted to determine the feasibility of fencing 
personnel research money from other research monies and including 
these funds in the DCSPER budget, and 
10. that the OESG brief the Army Staff Council on 20 April.20 
 Rogers paid particular attention to the report's findings that TRADOC lagged the 
furthest behind in promoting the Army OE program. While most of his directives fell to 
DCSPERS to implement, the Chief directed TRADOC to "investigate the most 
appropriate manner to educate senior officers on OE," and to brief him "on plans for 
introducing OE and OE-related instruction into the service schools." The former was 
primarily directed at CGSC and the AWC, while the latter sent a strong message that 
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the Chief of Staff of the Army was personally invested in seeing OE appropriately 
established throughout the Army's entire school system.21 
 Two weeks later, at Rogers's request, the OESG briefed the Army Staff Council 
on the findings and recommendations. Rogers made clear to his senior generals that 
"the commitment to institutionalize OE Army-wide was a high-priority goal." When the 
OESG finished their presentation, the Chief  
indicated that this is a long-term, complex task requiring substantive 
allocation of both personnel and resources, continued emphasis on 
quality, creative use of this OE capability by knowledgeable senior officers 
and noncommissioned officers, and retention of the OE Training Center 
(OETC) as an integral part of the service school system with the highest 
quality staff and faculty, curriculum, and facilities.22 
 
Rogers then followed with a long list of specific action items that further expanded or 
clarified his previous directives as well as some new items for DCSOPS. For example, 
he informed Moore that the DCSPERS conversion of the aforementioned 363 dedicated 
OESO positions was a "minimum Army-wide OE capability" and that he expected that 
number to grow as the Army implemented the "Total Army" plan (i.e. the "round-out" 
force structure) that would soon include civilians, NCOs, and Army reserve personnel. 
Future OESOs should be the best officers in the Army and given the opportunity to 
attend graduate schools that offered best education in OD.23 
 Significantly, Rogers announced to the council that he was reorganizing the DA 
staff to enable better oversight of the program. Within DCSPERS, he created an OE 
division "to provide an adequate level of focus and emphasis for Army-wide OE matters. 
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In not wanting any OE function or requirement to be overlooked, he tasked DCSPERS 
to "establish an OE technical support system and provide appropriate guidance for 
managing and sustaining this system, especially with those agencies and organizations 
which are not under the normal purview of OE staff elements." The CSA tasked 
DCSOPS to ensure that OETC had adequate staffing. Finally, he directed the 
Management Directorate to create a consulting cell of OESOs, much like Nadal had 
done at FORSCOM, to provide consulting services to the Army Staff. Rogers specified 
the position of a full colonel to head the cell. These and Rogers's other actions 
throughout the first nine months of his tenure as CSA not only reflected his careful 
stewardship over the program but also signaled his desire to lead the way by employing 
OE throughout the entire DA staff. During the same meeting, Rogers tasked Lieutenant 
General John R. McGiffert, Director of the Army Staff, to "conduct OE activities within 
the Army staff during FY 78," only ten weeks away. As the meeting concluded, Rogers 
stated his strong desire to stay engaged in the progress of the initiatives and informed 
his principal staff officers to schedule "in-process reviews" (IPRs) "on an as required 
basis but no less frequently than quarterly."24 
 Rogers's reorganization of the DA staff was important not only because it 
significantly created more spaces and functions for OE personnel but also because 
these positions were filled by recent graduates of OETC. In this way, Rogers helped 
close the gap between DA and OETC and thus provided a more concerted direction 
than had previously existed. From DA, Rogers employed the "intellectual father" of 
Army OE, Major Fred Schaum, as his Special Advisor for Organizational 





Effectiveness.25 From OETC, Rogers obtained Lieutenant Colonel Mike Plummer as 
Chief of the OE Division in DCSPERS that was formed on April 19. Arriving on July 11 
to assume his duties as division chief, Plummer and his seven colleagues identified five 
division priorities: (1) begin developing the 3-10 year OE plan, (2) educate and expand 
the OESO base, (3) educate potential OE users, (4) develop feedback mechanisms, 
and (5) "fine tune as we go." However, with so many CSA directives and activities 
underway, the division would take almost a year to firm up even a sound concept for a 
proposed 3- to 10-year plan. In the meantime, the Progressives throughout the Army 
OE program would utilize the OESG report as their short-term plan. Over time, the 
participants referred to the OESG report as the 1-3 year (phase I) OE plan.26 
 Throughout the remainder of 1977, as Rogers entered his second year as CSA, 
DA established and implemented several more milestones on the road to 
institutionalization. In late May, DA/DCSOPS issued a message to all major commands 
(MACOMs) to convert 247 personnel positions to OESO positions no later than 
December 1977, and to convert the remaining 117 earmarked positions by December of 
the following year. Positions for the distribution plan called for eighty-one for 
FORSCOM, ninety-five for TRADOC, eighty for USAREUR, thirty for DARCOM 
(Development and Readiness Command), and the other MACOMs receiving the 
remainder.27 Then, on November 1, 1977, the Army issued regulation AR 600-76, 
"Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Activities and Training." This AR defined the 
objectives of Army OE activities, provided operating instructions, and established 
responsibilities. AR 600-76 essentially formalized the mandatory components of the 
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Army OE program. The regulation codified the space requirements in the MACOMs for 
OESOs and required the MACOMs to obtain trained personnel to fill those positions, to 
allocate funds to support OE functions, to develop policy for the use of OE, and to 
provide opportunities for the continuing professional education of assigned OE 
personnel. 
 Clearly, by mid-point of his tenure as CSA, Rogers had done his part to propel 
Army OE forward. By late summer of 1977, he had received Johns back as his new 
director of the Human Resources Division in DCSPERS. Largely thanks to Rogers, 
Johns had received his promotion two years prior and had then served as the assistant 
division commander of Rogers’s alma mater, the 1st Infantry Division. With Johns back 
at the helm and Schaum as his personal advisor, the Chief had a strong team at DA. 
This was important because DA retained policy and officer assignment authority for 
OETC and the OESOs who attended the course and served throughout the Army. Now, 
the detailed, hard work rested in the hands of OETC. Full institutionalization required 
much more than just producing quality OESOs. Indeed, for OE to become fully 
assimilated into Army culture, the center had to produce numerous support programs 
and OE doctrinal material. They also had to plan for OE expansion to meet the Total 
Army goals that included women, NCOs, and the inclusion of the Army Reserves and 







 Rogers's ascension into the CSA position served to elevate OETC to a level few 
at Fort Ord could have imagined only a year earlier. From the moment the Godfather of 
OE took charge of the Army in October 1976 and through the end of 1977, the faculty 
and staff at OETC took on a mountain of work, fully aware that the momentum of full 
institutionalization had shifted into their hands. Empowered by the OESG report and 
Rogers’s directives, the school received a significant increase in personnel. On April 1, 
1977, OETC was authorized a total of 77 personnel, which included 39 officers, 8 
enlisted soldiers, and 30 civilians. These 77 people were organized into five 
directorates: Operations and Support, Training, Evaluation, Concepts Development, and 
Training Developments.28 
 Throughout 1977, OETC continued to expand its “products” and services. The 
staff spent much time identifying the concept, roles, and responsibilities for expanding 
OE into the NCO ranks. They envisioned trained “OESNCOs” who would assist OESOs 
in all aspects of their work. This vision was critical to achieving full institutionalization 
because the program would introduce modern leadership philosophies into that part of 
the Army that harbored the most Traditionalists; that is, the NCO corps. The planners 
recognized the power of doing so—sergeants were much closer to soldiers than were 
the officers. 
 While Rogers had clearly articulated that TRADOC was responsible for training 
all soldiers on Army OE, OETC acted independently of TRADOC to educate officers. As 
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evident from experiences to date and reports from the field, OETC was fully aware that 
resistance to change largely came from the upper field-grade officer ranks (lieutenant 
colonels and colonels). As a result, they developed an OE educational block for the 
Army’s pre-command course that prepared new colonels for command at the battalion 
and brigade levels.29 In addition, OETC continued to refine the Key Managers Course 
that they conducted each quarter. Also in 1977, the OETC staff developed a four-hour 
block of instruction on OE for ROTC programs.     
 Throughout the year, the school made significant changes to the 16-week OESO 
course POl. By far, the most important development and expansion effort was the 
increased emphasis placed on the L&MDC. By December, OETC had trained more than 
1500 soldiers and certified 115 as L&MDC instructors at various locations throughout 
the United States. The staff had also designed a pilot test program for drill sergeants 
that would introduce a modified L&MDC for an entire week of their six-week drill 
instructor POl. In addition, they drafted a version of the course specifically designed for 
field grade officers. Finally, the staff had completed a modification in the OESO course 
POI that would certify all students as L&MDC instructors beginning with Class 1-78. 
 By the latter half of 1977, the extensive workload at OETC appeared to 
foreshadow a successful future for the Army OE program. The increase in enrollments 
for the OESO course and the vast expansion and production of educational and OE/OD 
doctrinal material led the OETC commander, Colonel Palmer, to remark that "the beads 
of perspiration have arrived." Yet, a serious concern surfaced that would continue to 
grow in the months and years ahead. The Army at large was beginning to ask about the 
                                                          




program's "return on investment." What were the payoffs? How did OE directly 
contribute to combat readiness? 
The Challenge of Evaluation 
 The Progressives, of course, were well aware that the benefits and real 
improvements in the effectiveness of organizations would take time to surface. After all, 
that was the nature of organizational development. At OETC, the staff and faculty 
believed that the key to demonstrating success was the quality OESO in the field who 
built a strong, trustful relationship with the commander and, together, fully implemented 
the four-step process. Thus, in late summer 1977, OETC designed a long-term 
evaluation program to assess and document the value of using the OE process. The 
planners drafted a five-phase Evaluation Program "directed at determining if OE is 
doing what it is supposed to do." 
 The plan called for the phases to run from spring 1977 through the end of 1979. 
In phase one, the center surveyed the 250-plus OESOs who had already graduated 
from the course and were conducting OE in their assigned units. Questionnaires and 
structured interviews were designed to address the training and assignment of OESOs, 
and to assess how those factors impacted on OE levels. In general, the survey focused 
on the organizational climate, the OE process and the OESO. OETC personnel 
travelled to more than fifty installations, obtained responses from 919 questionnaires, 
and conducted 290 interviews. Commanders in the field had ample opportunity to 
provide input to the evaluation. 
 From the perspective of organizational climate, it appeared that as familiarity with 




disadvantages to senior commanders in evaluating the impact of the OE effort within 
their organizations was "a lack of systematic feedback on OE operations in subordinate 
units [because] feedback [was] often blocked by the privileged information policy." This 
practice presented a real dilemma for OESOs. Successful OE required absolute 
anonymity and confidentiality in order for participants to honestly contribute and to trust 
the process. There was always an underlying fear that OESOs could act as a "political 
commissar" for senior commanders. Though rare, some OESOs experienced attempts 
to use them as such. What exacerbated this revelation in 1977 was the fact that OE 
engagements to date had largely taken place at the company or battalion level. 
Consequently, battalion and brigade commanders—the lieutenant colonels and 
colonels—(i.e., those ranks offering the most resistance to change), were eager to learn 
what the OESOs unearthed. 
 The phase one data also revealed that some OESOs were spending a great deal 
of time on non-OE related functions. Indeed, some initially found themselves in non-OE 
positions, despite the CSA's directive to fully staff them as OESOs. In addition, the 
location of the OESO within the chain of command varied widely. The most common 
location was in the G-1 (personnel) channel. This location seemed logical as it tended 
"to be seen as proving a minimal threat and being a people program." The latter view 
proved cancerous to the program over time because by late 1977, the mainstream Army 
had grown weary of all of the programs that were born of VOLAR to remove "irritants" 
and increase amenities. Indeed, most "old timers" or "lifers" throughout the Army 
believed that the Army had already gone too far in catering to the young All Volunteer 




OE was thereafter viewed in the same vein as equal opportunity and chaplain programs 
rather than a tool for commanders to manage change and improve leadership. 
 Another data set that concerned the OETC staff was the finding that OESOs 
were worried about their future promotability. The supervisors of OESOs made the 
same comments, and other staff officers viewed OE as a fringe program they did "not 
consider . . . to be in the main stream." OESO Mike Perrault's experience was common:  
Following the phone call from the branch assignment officer, I immediately 
informed my boss, a lieutenant colonel, that I would be attending the 
Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer course at Fort Ord. His 
somewhat less than enthusiastic response was, "Mike, you're a good 
officer, don't let that touchy-feely stuff screw you up."30 
 
 In taking action on the findings, OETC concluded that the center had to (1) 
provide additional training in how to present and sell OE, and (2) solicit success stories 
from the OESOs in the field, especially testimonials from their commanders. In terms of 
the latter, OETC had FORSCOM and Tony Nadal to thank because they had pioneered 
the marketing and testimonial solicitations during the previous eighteen months (early 
1976 through summer 1977). As Nadal had done with FORSCOM's periodic bulletin, 
OETC utilized its new professional journal, the OE Communique, to advertise OESO 
case studies and commander testimonial letters. The first issue appeared in October 
1977, and within a year, the OE Communique became an exceptional scholarly journal 
on par with any similar academic journal in the social and behavioral sciences. In fact, 
subscription rates significantly increased as other armed services, academic institutions, 
and OD organizations in industry requested copies.31 
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 The survey data, along with limited feedback, to date also produced unflattering 
evidence that some OESOs had set poor first impressions in their units and 
consequently had sparked negative attitudes toward OE. Some OESOs had adopted 
traits of the recent counter-culture generation in regard to dress and grooming 
standards. More troublesome were the attitudes and language that many OESOs 
displayed in presenting their engagements. Many of their customers, predominantly 
Traditionalists and Healers, were turned off by the behavioral science terminology and 
their perception that OESOs projected intellectually superior attitudes. Indeed, from this 
time forward, the issue of "de-jargonizing" the program would persist. From the 
beginning, the Progressives had a public relations problem that would not go away. 
Such behaviors painted a picture of non-conformity with Army culture. As Mike Perrault 
recalled, 
It was evident that I had previously missed the value of OE because of the 
jargon used by those in the program. It reminded me of those "touchy-
feely hippie types" I had read about in Time and Newsweek articles during 
the late 60's and early 70's. The central thought that I kept recurring during 
the initial phases of the [OESO] course was that this was a healthy 
concept which may not gain acceptance by the majority of the Army 
because it is not being communicated properly to the soldier in the field.32 
 
 Even one of the movement's staunchest Progressives, Brigadier General John 
Johns, was appalled at this behavior that he had personally witnessed in his recent 
assignment as an assistant division commander. In fact, his entire remarks to the 2-77 
graduation class constituted a collective reprimand:  
[I was] constantly confronting OESOs at Ft. Riley to be aware of how they 
presented themselves—of how they were coming across to the 
commanders. . . . If you let either verbal or nonverbal cues [dress, 
language, and lack of customs and courtesies] creep into your behavior, 
that you look down on this commander in a condescending attitude—as 





an old brown shoe Neanderthal—to the degree that it comes out, you are 
going to lose rapport. . . . Do you know what you do when you use first 
names in referring to seniors? You confirm their worst fears that you 
represent an effort to break down the cast[e] system, social distance and 
discipline in the Army. The average line commander and NCO is terribly 
afraid that the Army is going very permissive, that we have no respect for 
the Chain of Command and rank, and that it is becoming a big social 
club.33  
 
 OETC took Johns' comments to heart. The school began to solicit input from the 
OESOs by asking: What is it that will give the OESO credibility? How can the OESO 
establish credibility and when will it happen? What would be the criteria or indicators 
that OE is institutionalized in the Army? OETC also appealed to the OESOs in the field 
to write about their successes and to solicit testimonials from their commanders. In 
subsequent months, OETC utilized the OE Communique to publish responses.  
 As time would tell, the OESOs in the field racked up some impressive successes, 
such as Nadal's work at FORSCOM, Powell's work at USAREUR (and soon DARCOM), 
Ray's efforts at Fort Bragg, and many others. Furthermore, great commanders, such as 
Tackaberry in the 82nd Airborne Division and Blanchard in Germany, publicly endorsed 
the program through their OESOs and enthusiastic support. Yet, the program remained 
in a precarious position, with its future very much in doubt. The Progressives were 
slowly growing fearful that quantifiable results were needed in order to convince the 
skeptics. This, they saw, was the real challenge the OE program confronted.  
TRADOC Plows Along 
 In July 1977, General Bill DePuy departed TRADOC to retire from the Army. As 
some historians have noted, DePuy left the Army with a slightly bitter taste in his mouth. 
His efforts to radically redirect and modernize Army operational doctrine were deemed 
                                                          




unsuccessful as many in the Army viewed his operational concepts as too defensive. 
The Army's rejection of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 proved temporary. Donn Starry, 
his protege and successor, built upon DePuy's work by examining and incorporating 
some of the valid criticisms that ultimately produced what some consider the most 
effective operational doctrine ever produced—the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, AirLand 
Battle. As Starry assumed command of TRADOC in the summer of 1977, he focused 
his priorities and efforts on building upon DePuy’s work. In comparison, Army OE was 
just a minor fringe program neatly chaperoned by ADMINCEN. 
 In late summer 1977, Starry was on the hook to brief Rogers on the state of OE 
in TRADOC, as the CSA had directed following the final OESG report in April. 
Fortunately for Starry, he had the services of Colonel Mike Malone. By this point in his 
career, Malone had compiled a stellar reputation throughout the officer corps as an 
insightful, reflective thinker. His various writings, often carrying a tone of Will Rogers-
type humor, were widely read, especially at the Command and General Staff College 
and the Army War College. Although Malone had never attended the OESO course or 
had any close dealings with OETC, he served as the special assistant to the TRADOC 
chief of staff for organizational effectiveness.  
 For many in the officer corps, Malone was an insightful writer on the subject of 
leadership. His extensive combat record and his outspoken views on the importance of 
caring for soldiers had won him many fans, especially among the Healers. What made 
Malone's voice so powerful was his strong belief that leadership was all about ethics, 
and his extraordinary ability to convey strong messages about ethical behaviors through 




leadership theory and behavior, OD/OE encompassed so much more. At the end of the 
day, ethical behaviors reflect individual character. They do not in and of themselves 
define the dynamic relationship between the leader and the led. Rather, ethics help 
provide the necessary moral framework in which effective transactional or 
transformational leadership takes place.34  
 The reality was that throughout 1977, TRADOC had not accomplished much in 
pushing OE toward institutionalization. Although TRADOC had received several superb 
OESOs, those officers worked as internal consultants within TRADOC's subordinate 
organizations as they were trained to do. They were not there to represent Army OE as 
overall program representatives except by performing their duties in an exceptional 
manner. The only person positioned to champion the program, by having Starry’s ear, 
was Mike Malone. However, Malone was considered an outsider to Army OE, especially 
by the faculty and staff of OETC, and by some at DA. Still, Malone spoke for the 
program and held Starry's confidence.35 
 In late summer of 1977, Starry and Malone briefed Rogers on the status of OE in 
TRADOC but the briefing did not go well. As Malone explained TRADOC's plans to 
propagate OE throughout the Army school system, Rogers became clearly aggravated 
with Malone's presentation. Brigadier General Johns was present and recalled that  
when he [Malone] finished, Rogers said "Mike, I didn't understand the 
beginning of your presentation, and the end, or anything in between. John, 
did you? Donn? Can you two tell me what the hell he is trying to say?" And 
                                                          
34. My view is that ethics are a vital prerequisite for transformational leadership. However, consistent 
ethical behaviors are also expected of officers regardless of which type of leadership style they choose. 
The same holds true for managers or for anyone who exercises power and authority over others. 
35. Johns Interview. Johns stated that "Mike Malone did not like OE." Similar views came out in the 




Starry [attempted to]. Rogers said, "You haven't done any better." And he 
turned to me and said, "John, tell me what they're trying to say to me."36 
 
Johns, ever the diplomat, explained their overall plan but secretly agreed with Rogers. 
"It was too abstract."37 
 Rogers, however, had no patience for abstracts. Fully cognizant that the OESG 
report had identified TRADOC as moving too slowly on OE, the CSA directed that 
priority of assignments for OESOs would go to TRADOC service schools. Rogers 
directed Starry to establish a quality assurance team, comprised of OESOs, to conduct 
quality assurance reviews of OE instruction at all of the Army's schools. He specified 
that these reviews were to be conducted prior to the implementation of OE POl. Rogers 
reminded Starry of "his strong personal interest and support and emphasized that the 
instructional challenge was not merely to teach this new methodology, but to teach it 
effectively." Furthermore, OESOs would be assigned to the schools to teach OE 
because "the OE instructional modules require detailed understanding of OE 
methodology and can only be taught effectively by an OESO with experience in OE 
operations."38 
 As TRADOC belatedly came into compliance with Rogers’s directives, significant 
differences still existed between how the Healers and the Progressives each viewed the 
implementation of the OE program. The Progressives believed through 1977 and early 
1978, that they had successfully adapted state-of-the-art organizational development 
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techniques to a version especially appropriate for the Army. At this stage in the 
evolution of the program, humanistic, transformational tenets still strongly underscored 
OE. Kurt Lewin’s beliefs, supported by other transformational-related theorists such as 
Chris Argyris, undergirded the curriculum and staff work of OETC. This was especially 
apparent in the pedagogical use of experiential learning and the popularity of the 
L&MDC. In contrast, the Healers, extremely dominant at TRADOC and the Army War 
College, believed that they had indeed consulted behavioral science research and that 
they were already incorporating that research into modified POI as evident by the 
ADMINCEN Leadership Monograph series, which really was an extension of the AWC’s 
July 1971 work (Leadership for the 1970s: USAWC Study of Leadership for the 
Professional Soldier). TRADOC appeared content to let ADMINCEN continue in that 
direction even though they had little interaction with OETC or the DA staff—the two 
pillars of the Army OE program. 
 When Starry took command of TRADOC in July 1977, he followed in the 
footsteps of his predecessor and mentor, determined to carry through on DePuy's 
doctrinal and training/training management reforms. There is little doubt that these were 
large challenges that required extensive efforts on the part of many people. In 
retrospect, by his words and deeds, Starry became the primary spokesman for the 
Healers as he advanced all that DePuy had started. He pursued his own agenda to do 
so even when he attracted the ire of his boss, Bernie Rogers. By July 1978, Rogers had 




institutionalization of the program. On July 26, he wrote a blistering letter to Starry that 
outlined his frustrations.39 
 First, he objected to the heavy focus on technology. While all of the Army was in 
favor of force modernization, especially since so many modernization programs had 
been delayed (first by Vietnam and later by fiscal constraints), Rogers believed that 
TRADOC's current trajectory had largely ignored the human dimension. He wrote that 
"for several years the lack of a systematic, integrated approach to the management of 
our human resources has concerned me. We have witnessed, in my opinion, the 
ascendance of technocratic management practices to the detriment of the human 
component of the Army." What Rogers meant was that TRADOC had done far too little 
to educate and build up the human resources development (HRD) arm of the Army.  
Our approach to HRD has been piecemeal, often in reaction to crises such 
a racial conflict and drug and alcohol abuse. As a result, HRD activities 
are perceived either as "social welfare" programs or as ad hoc 
arrangements dealing with "people problems." This negative view of HRD 
hinders command commitment. We have taken several steps to change 
the ad hoc approaches to these activities [i.e., OE] but we have only 
begun.40 
 
Rogers concerns were certainly valid as career personnel officers, those officers 
"branched" as members of the Adjutant General Corps, were not yet fielded throughout 
the Army's maneuver units as S1s/G1s. As everyone was aware, the military 
intelligence branch and the quartermaster branch were years ahead in placing their 
officers in units as S2s/G2s and as S4s/G4s. More importantly, the Progressives at DA 
had long argued and planned for OE to be an integral part of the S1/G1s’ portfolio. 
Indeed, these were more than plans; they were already a reality as the human resource 
                                                          





divisions within the Army's major commands were heavily engaged in implementing OE. 
Nadals position as head of HRD for FORSCOM three years earlier and Powell's work in 
HRD in USAREUR during the same time period were pointed examples.41 The "owner" 
of this problem was TRADOC's ADMINCEN. Heavily engaged in modernizing and 
automating fundamental personnel administration, they were moving far too slowly in 
the areas that Rogers considered the most important. 
 In his letter to Starry, Rogers cited Abrams's 1973 emphasis on the importance of 
HRD and his directive that all personnel management functions and training be 
integrated into normal staff channels. Rogers reminded Starry that when he (Rogers) 
was Abrams's DCSPERS, they had expanded the definition of personnel management 
beyond traditional duties and responsibilities and established a new role for the S1/G1 
that "would be more than "adjutant" or "administrator"; he would be the commander's 
resource for analyzing the people component of the organization, to provide the human 
estimate of the situation." He added that  
obviously, the broadened responsibilities of the personnel management 
staff officer require knowledge and skills that are not acquired solely by 
normal experience. They require a working knowledge of organizational 
behavior and the application of human resource management, in addition 
to administration. 42 
 
 The remainder of Rogers's letter was directed at his perceived deficiencies and 
criticisms of ADMINCEN. In short, Rogers strongly objected to the elimination of several 
courses that focused on human relations and “interpersonal leadership skills for junior 
officers in favor of the technical aspects of maintenance, training and tactics.” He told 
Starry that “soldiers perceive a lack of concern by their leaders—the absence of a ‛care’ 
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factor,” and that ADMINCEN had done little to promote doctrine in this area. Rogers 
concluded his correspondence by directing Starry to conduct  
a top-to-bottom look at personnel management in the context of the 
concept as currently defined and the concept of the personnel 
management staff officer as the commander's source of expertise. This is 
especially important when we consider the changing composition of the 
Army and the many changes we have made in the system over the past 
several years. We need to see if they are all compatible with the human 
system. . . . [N]eglect of personnel management cannot be permitted to 
continue.43 
 
 Less than two weeks later, on August 8, Starry replied to Rogers that he agreed 
with the CSA's "view of our inadequate management of human resources and the need 
to expand the role of personnel management" and added, "I accept your challenge to do 
something about it." He told his boss that he believed the root of the problem was a lack 
of a "doctrinal base." Starry stated that correct doctrinal bases for technical, operational, 
and logistical areas enabled progress and successes in those realms. He was adamant 
that ADMINCEN was the appropriate place to develop this doctrine:  
Admin Center, as the doctrinal proponent for human resources/personnel 
management, has been directed to do a "top to bottom" analysis of 
personnel management in its broadest context. We should not constrain 
them with a preconceived definition of personnel management and human 
resources development, so I'd like some flexibility there until we've 
completed our analysis.44 
 
Starry, consumed with improving DePuy's operational doctrine and fully supporting his 
mentor's guiding philosophy that TRADOC's focus must be on how the Army fights, 
added that the "more difficult job will require a comprehensive application of the concept 
[Army OE] across the entire Army training system—institutional and unit.” Also, he 
noted, "it will require complete integration with the operational and logistical aspects of 
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how we fight." As time would tell, this latter point was what really drove the division 
between the two generals' world views and personnel philosophies. Starry added that 
this "complete integration," went "hand-in-glove with efforts required to redesign officer 
training to support RETO recommendations." In retrospect, this point was the most 
significant signpost of TRADOC's future directions and Starry's intentions.45 
 In the meantime, on August 31, 1977, Rogers commissioned a study group—the 
Officer Education and Training Review Group (OTERG)—to review the entire Army 
education and training system to determine if it was capable of producing the soldiers 
needed in a restructured Army that was moving quickly into a highly technical 
modernized force. Consisting of forty-four members under the chairmanship of Brigadier 
General Benjamin Harrison, Cushman's former "right-hand man" and "indispensable 
partner" at Fort Leavenworth, OTERG interviewed more than 100 general officers and 
received nearly 14,000 comprehensive surveys. RETO, "Review of Education and 
Training for Officers," was perhaps the most extensive study of its kind that the Army 
has ever conducted. The final report, released on June 30, 1978, consisted of five 
volumes totalling almost 2500 pages in length.46 
                                                          
45. Ibid., Starry’s true feelings about OE were conveyed in a memo to his subordinate generals 
Lieutenant General John R. Thurman and Major General William F. Hixon Jr. on June 8, 1978. In 
discussing how TRADOC should frame the complexities of force integration for peacetime training and 
combat power in war, Starry stated that existing “relevant words, shopworn and misused so badly … 
probably won’t serve. It is truly organizational effectiveness; a relevant phrase, so widely interpreted and 
misunderstood in the current OE program that it is probably not useful. . . . At commander and soldier 
level alike, leadership is an appropriate word, not individual charismatic leadership, but leadership climate 
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 The Rogers-Starry correspondences took place only weeks after the release of 
the report. Starry must have been pleased with the report's findings as he corresponded 
with Rogers in mid- to late August 1978. Overall, the team concluded that the Army 
needed to adjust its training curriculum/POl to meet the needs of the numerous 
occupational specialties of both the officer and enlisted corps, especially in light of force 
modernization, reorganization, and the integration of advanced technologies. In the 
executive summary, Harrison noted that the study team "maintained a steady focus on 
Army requirements."47 
 In retrospect, the RETO study heavily reinforced the philosophical views of the 
Healers. It had everything to do with training and very little in regard to education. The 
study placed huge emphasis on management and diminished the criticality of "human 
skills." The recommendations perfectly aligned with the DePuy-Starry vision that 
education and learning (really training) and leadership (really management) must be 
carefully tailored to the rank and position of the individual soldier, from private through 
general.48  
 Within this context, Starry told Rogers that "this mission fits very well with the 
other mission that you gave me to articulate an integrated leadership and management 
doctrine for the Army. We are in a position to insure that these two efforts are closely 
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coordinated." In time, Starry did exactly that. The following month, Harrison was 
promoted to major general and moved to Indiana to take command of Fort Benjamin 
Harrison and ADMINCEN. There, Harrison would begin developing the most radical 
revision of Army leadership doctrine ever undertaken—the 1983 edition of FM 22-100, 
Be, Know, Do.49      
 Rogers wasted little time in responding back to Starry. On August 25, the CSA 
wrote: 
Your specific suggestions for getting on with the task are acceptable to 
me, except your suggestion to alter the definitions for personnel 
management and human resources development. I do not oppose your 
fine-tuning these, but I am satisfied with them as they reflect the role I 
want personnel managers to play. These definitions deliberately expand 
the responsibility of the personnel manager from "counting beans" to 
encompass all aspects of leadership and management of people, to 
include motivation, morale, and commitment. I look forward to reviewing 
your plan to make this expanded role for personnel managers a reality.50 
 
 Starry's response to Rogers may have done little to improve the Chief's lack of 
confidence in TRADOC. On the same day that he replied to Rogers, on August 8, Starry 
wrote a second letter to his boss explaining why TRADOC was late in publishing FM 22- 
600-20, Duties, Responsibilities and Authority of Noncommissioned Officers. Rogers 
had long been interested in expanding Army OE throughout the NCO corps and earlier 
had instructed OETC to develop an OESNCO course that would parallel the OESO 
course. However, because the draft manual "was deficient in its explanation of 
organizational development/organizational effectiveness," Rogers halted production and 
directed a revision. In his letter, Starry explained how TRADOC consulted with Rogers's 
staff, DA/DCSPERS, and OETC "to reshape the manual." However, in reviewing the 
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final revision, he found the reading level to be too high and ordered that the authors 
lower it to an eleventh grade reading level. Starry then asked Rogers to consider this 
newer draft because he had just "learned that you [Rogers] want to review the manual 
prior to its final publication."51 
ADMINCEN Sticks to Its Agenda 
 During late summer of 1978, as the correspondence between Rogers and Starry 
played out, ADMINCEN continued to publish its Leadership Monograph Series with the 
intent that the monographs were to form the basis of the POl in the Army's various 
training schools. In August 1978, ADMINCEN issued the most important monograph of 
the entire series entitled Human Relations in the Military Environment. This monograph 
was an intended expansion of one of the nine subjects presented in monograph #8—
human relations—and the topics discussed in monograph #9. In his introduction, 
General Harrison, only days into his new assignment as commander over ADMINCEN, 
stated that the publication "explores human relations in terms of interpersonal 
interaction and organizational development," and that it was intended for service school 
instructors. "It departs from the usual format and presents the subject first in terms of 
practical application, followed by the theoretical and historical basis for human relations 
development." The author was Major Raymond C. Hartjen, Jr., a member of the Army 
War College. 
 Hartjen certainly produced the most scholarly monograph of the entire 
Leadership Monograph Series. This 128-page document constituted a rich overview of 
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available writings that fell under the subject of human relations. Hartjen skillfully 
provided a synopsis of behavioral science research from the 1950s forward. There was 
much here that the Progressives could find appealing. Hartjen gave fair treatment to 
theorists such as Chris Argyris, Douglas McGregor, and Abraham Maslow, and he 
spoke at length to human relations as "inter- and intra-personal phenomena" that 
described "relations between one person and another, and the relationship of an 
individual with himself." Additionally, knowing that his writing would become the basis of 
POl in the Army's training centers, Hartjen attempted to provide practicality to his views 
by presenting notional, scenario-driven cases of poor soldier-leader confrontations. 
While Hartjen was certainly correct that the effectiveness of leadership is relationship 
driven, all seven test cases, ranging from the fictional characters of Specialist Jones to 
Lieutenant Colonel Gross, were examples of overt misbehaviors such as alcoholism, 
racial discrimination, abuse of power, spousal abuse, and suicide. Each case concluded 
with a type of "lesson learned" summary.52 
 While Hartjen included descriptions that fairly described the several leadership 
theories and schools of thought at that time (see my Preface), he clearly rejected any of 
the theories that contributed to transformational leadership. Indeed, he strongly favored 
current theories of management and argued that managers most certainly care for their 
subordinates and must pay attention to their personal needs. He heavily advocated for 
the task approach in management theory that argued for the "fusing" of previous 
management theories that would achieve “common objectives" by aligning 
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organizational demands and personal needs. Hartjen argued that organizations exist to 
manage technical, economic, and human resources to accomplish a task, and that such 
an approach "reflects a renewed interest in total systems and is, perhaps, connected 
with emphasis on totality and with high-level manufacture of complex units [because] 
laborers are relatively sophisticated."53  
 Hartjen provided the best intellectual foundation for the Healers to date. His well-
articulated views promoted managerial/transactional leadership behaviors. They 
reinforced the idea of the "informal contract" and promoted the concept that leadership 
(never defined) differs significantly by rank and position. This concept seamlessly 
aligned with TRADOC and Starry's view that leadership was different at each rank level 
and position. Hartjen not only believed that "different skills are required at different 
levels, in actuality, different skills are used with differing frequency at various levels."54     
 Monograph #12 struck a strong blow against the Army OE program by directly 
challenging the impression that the Progressives were the subject matter experts on 
behavioral science. More importantly, Hartjen argued, using the past tense, that the 
Progressives' movement had failed, and that the Army had already begun to move 
toward the task approach during the previous two years (since 1976). 
Following the Viet Nam War, the Army attempted the human relations 
approach with poor results. Discipline declined, over-supervision ran 
rampant, soldiers were in conflict with the organization, and the capability 
of the Army to accomplish its goals was greatly diminished. Instead of 
reverting to classical management principles, the Army moved in a 
direction which is very similar to the task approach management 
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model. . . . The human relations approach toward military management 
has proven to be 'inadequate in its most recent application [i.e., Army 
OE].55 
 
 Never specifically citing but obviously speaking about Army OE, Hartjen declared 
the movement dead. "The failing of the human relations phase [1973–1976] was that it 
never really penetrated the organization." Given that OETC did not hold its first OESO 
course until late 1975 and that organizational development programs take a decade or 
more to implement, Hartjen's declaration seemed a bit rash. His basic argument was 
that 
top level management subscribed to the theory; but first-line supervisors, 
trained in a classical management model, continued to conduct day-to-day 
business using those methods of personnel control which had been used 
for years. The dichotomy between recruiting slogans and the actual work 
environment may have led to soldier dissatisfaction, unrest, and 
disciplinary problems. Desertion rates were the same as they were during 
the Viet Nam War, even though the threat of war had been eliminated. It 
became quite clear to all echelons of the Army's leadership that the 
human relations management model was not going to solve its recruiting 
or readiness problems. It abandoned the human relations school and 
moved on to the task approach. 
 
The greatest damage inflicted by Hartjen’s monograph was that his arguments gave 
credence to the views of the Traditionalists and the Healers that the Army had gone 
“soft” in recruiting volunteers, and that all of these “people programs” not only weakened 
Army customs and traditions but directly slowed or impeded the Army’s efforts to 
achieve combat readiness, especially in the face of Soviet dominance.      
 Given the ongoing correspondences between Rogers and Starry during the same 
month as the publication of Hartjen's monograph, complete with Harrison's 
endorsement, it is small wonder that the Progressives were becoming frustrated with 
confronting the various sources of resistance. To date, the conventional wisdom was 
                                                          




hat slow successes with OE taking place in various pockets throughout the Army would 
eventually win more and more advocates, as skeptics heard the testimonials of 
respected senior officers such as Tackaberry and Blanchard. In retrospect, it is 
apparent that resistance to change was not due to a lack of proven success but was 
institutional in the slow roll-out of "leadership doctrine" within TRADOC.56 
 With the publications of monographs 8, 9, and 12, ADMINCEN was clearly 
marching in step with Starry's activities at TRADOC. Throughout September, October, 
and early November, Starry complied with Rogers’s directive to conduct a “top-to-
bottom look at personnel management.” On November 20, 1978, Starry presented his 
“status report of the concept and plan of attack for getting on with the top-to-bottom 
analysis of our personnel management system.” In contrast to the previous 
correspondences, this letter replaced the previous tone of “subordinate compliance” 
with a tone of determination to align his views of human relations with the ultimate goal 
of achieving combat readiness. Clearly Starry viewed effective organizations as those 
staffed with soldiers who were highly skilled in their tradecraft, took collective pride in 
those skills, and thus achieved high morale: 
The goal is the development of a system that will place and sustain trained 
soldiers in cohesive units that are capable of effectively employing our 
modern weapons systems on the battlefield of the 1980's. . . . [W]e are 
going to consider man-machine interface as it relates to individual 
weapons systems and the complications associated with employing these 
systems in units, on the lethal, continuous operations battlefield.57  
 
Starry also provided a list of specific activities geared toward “institutionalizing training 
developments and training concepts” to accomplish these goals. Of particular 
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importance were the development of training instruction for lieutenants and captains at 
their career courses, and a “package” for commanders “to assist them in analyzing the 
human component of organizations.”58 
 Starry’s status report clearly illuminated the tremendous gulf between his and 
Rogers’s philosophical views on human relations. Whereas Rogers believed that Army 
OE could improve the effectiveness of organizations by educating NCOs and officers on 
the psychological, humanistic elements of the dynamic interaction in the superior-
subordinate relationship, Starry, like DePuy before him, thought that high-quality training 
under tough, realistic conditions was the key to organizational effectiveness. Like most 
Healers, Starry believed that skill development and a well-defined occupational career 
path supported by good pay and benefits would meet both the individual and collective 
needs of soldiers. In sum, Starry wanted to institutionalize training developments and 
training concepts, whereas Rogers wanted to institutionalize human relations education 
and new leadership behaviors. Unfortunately for the future of the Army OE program, 
neither side recognized that the two views were not mutually exclusive.59 
The Army War College and OE 
 That Rogers and Starry were speaking past each other was apparent by mid-
1978 as other initiatives unfolded. Six months earlier, toward the end of 1977, Rogers 
had already lost patience with TRADOC placing adequate emphasis on OE in the Army 
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school system, especially at the Army War College. Like all Army chiefs of staff, Rogers 
stayed abreast of the events and activities taking place at the Army War College, 
periodically making visits to the college to either speak to graduating classes or as part 
of their extensive lecture series. Aware that he could exercise more direct influence over 
the AWC than he could over CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Rogers leaned heavily on the 
AWC Commandant, Major General Robert G. Yerks, to emphasize OE.60  
 Yerks more than carried through on Rogers’s request. For academic year 1978, 
the college offered an elective course in Army OE. More importantly, Yerks organized a 
large and robust weeklong seminar on OE that included twenty-seven guest speakers. 
These participants were some of the leading academics of organizational development 
from some of the top universities in the United States, industry executives who had 
implemented state-of-the-art OD programs in large corporations, and several general 
officers who had direct involvement in Army OE as either users or OE program officials. 
The latter group included LTG Tom Tackaberry, LTG R. M. Shoemaker, LTG Volney 
Warner, LTG J. R. McGiffert, Jr., (Rogers’s Director of the Army staff), and BG John 
Johns (Rogers’s Director of the Human Resources Directorate in DA DCSPERS). 
Running from February 6 through 10, 1978, the program was part of the year-long 
curriculum in the Department of Command and Management. 
 In recognizing the criticality of establishing the correct tone for the weeklong 
lectures and panel discussions, Yerks asked Johns to be the introductory key note 
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presenter. Of interest, however, was the wording he used in his formal invitation to 
Johns: “You may be aware that we are approaching HRD/OE from a slightly different 
perspective. Rather than hitting it head on, we are using as a focus certain behaviors 
and procedures uniquely required at high levels of command and management in the 
Army.”61 Well aware of Johns’s passion for Army OE, this was an important “heads-up.” 
AWC, by that time, doctrinally was the “headquarters” of the Healers and had been 
since the release of the late 1971 Leadership for the 1970s: USAWC Study of 
Leadership for the Professional Soldier, which provided the source and basis for the 
recent ADMINCEN Leadership Monograph Series.       
 What the Command and Management faculty wanted out of this week and the 
other topics covered in the curriculum were discussions and examples of practical 
application of the new behavioral science topics, with OE as only one component. 
Indeed, the other command and management courses were almost entirely focused on 
management. There was little that dealt with leadership. These courses showed that 
AWC was most interested in the evolving research into complex systems and how 
executives or senior managers ran such organizations effectively.62  
 While OE was only an elective course that covered the basic elements of the 
OESO course, the faculty viewed OE as a supplement to the primary management 
course. As the course description indicated, “the course is designed to supplement the 
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Command and Management course and is useful to officers in all [career fields] and 
particularly relevant to the management specialties.” By this, they meant the other 
electives such as organizational theory and general management, philosophy of 
management, managerial decision-making, and management information systems. 
Even more to the point was Colonel Gustav J. Gillert’s introduction in the text of the 
primary command and management course text: 
Considerable discussion and at times serious controversy has evolved 
around the interpretation and interrelationship of the terms leadership, 
command, and management. Some view command and management 
activities as conflicting functions and perhaps incompatible. We do not. 
We take the position that command is the authority a person in the military 
service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of his rank and 
assignment; and that management is the process of planning, organizing, 
coordinating, directing, and controlling resources such as people, material, 
time, and money to accomplish the organizational mission. It follows then 
that commanders must manage—but managers do not exercise 
command. Both use the process of leadership to control the most 
important of all resources—people. While there are many definitions for 
the complex effort of controlling this resource, we view leadership as the 
process of influencing people in such a manner as to accomplish an 
assigned mission.63 
 
 Clearly, at this point, AWC had moved beyond OE in comparison to how Rogers 
and the Progressives viewed human relations. Still, although 1978 was a precarious 
year for the process of institutionalization, there was plenty of momentum pushing the 
program forward. While the close ties between AWC, ADMINCEN, and TRADOC did 
not bode well for the future of OE from a doctrinal development standpoint, OETC was 
still in the driver’s seat as increased enrollments at OETC pushed more and more 
OESOs into the field units. In the eyes of most Progressives, increasing OE successes 
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in the Army’s combat units would facilitate institutionalization and determine the Army’s 
ultimate assimilation of OE into its culture. 
OETC Shifts Gears 
 Throughout 1978, OETC faced a year of tremendous activity, change, and 
transition as Rogers's full agenda for institutionalization placed extraordinary demands 
on the faculty and staff. The CSA had essentially given OETC a "blank check," trusting 
that they would "get OE right." The Progressives in positions of power and influence—
Rogers, Johns, Nadal, Schaum, and others—had worked tirelessly to pave the way for 
this moment. It was clear to all that Rogers would not remain in the CSA position forever 
and that 1978 and 1979 would be pivotal years for the Army OE program. 
 At Fort Ord, OETC came under increasing pressure, both self-imposed and 
external, to show a return on investment (ROI) for OE thus far. Initially, the OETC 
commander pleaded with OESOs to submit testimonials from their commanders and to 
write case study articles for OETC's publication, the OE Communique. In January 1978, 
OETC reported the results from Phase II of its three-year evaluation effort (how best to 
educate and prepare OESOs for their assignment), which had concluded the previous 
October. Among the many findings were several indications that institutionalization and 
cultural assimilation had a long way to go. For example, the data indicated that OE was 
"still seen in the field as a people program [with negative connotations], and that other 
staff officers viewed OE as a "fringe program" and did "not consider it mainstream at 
this time." The OETC staff believed these views were a result of where OESOs "sat." 




location is the G1 [channel]; however when placed in the G1 [channel], the effort tends 
to be seen as proving a minimal threat and being a people program."64 
 The Phase II report also noted that commanders who had utilized their OESOs 
were quite pleased with improvements in organizational communications and team work 
but were the least supportive of how OE increased mission accomplishment. In addition, 
the evaluation discovered that senior commanders were often frustrated in evaluating 
the impact of the OE within their organizations because of “a lack of systematic 
feedback on OE operations in subordinate units. Feedback is often blocked by the 
privileged information policy.” This data, also emphasized in the Phase I report, 
reflected a dilemma that the OESOs faced throughout the entire length of the program. 
For OE to work, all participants had to fully believe that surveys taken for assessments 
were strictly confidential. It was simply a matter of trust. Some OESOs found 
themselves in incredibly difficult situations in regard to this issue, as Dick Powell did in 
1978. 
I get a phone call. “Powell, this is General Patton. Are you the OE guy?” I 
said “yes, sir.” He said, “I got a couple of guys who cause a lot of trouble. I 
want you on a chopper with me at 0700 tomorrow morning. We’re going 
down to Fort Monroe to knock heads.”65 
 
Powell convinced Patton to meet with him first to put together a meeting design, and 
Patton agreed to go through the OE process. They flew to Fort Monroe where they were 
greeted at the airfield by TRADOC commander Donn Starry. Powell managed to 
facilitate an initial meeting with all parties where they decided to later hold an action 
planning conference at Patton’s headquarters. Soon thereafter, Powell facilitated the 
                                                          
64. OE Communique 1-78 (January 1978), www.armyoe.com.  




planning conference that included more than twenty participants. By midday, he thought 
it was going well and approached Patton for his opinion. 
“General, how do you think it’s going?” “It’s going OK but I’ve got to fire 
this sonofabitch.  I don’t like him. I don’t trust him.” He then looked me in 
the eye. . . . I said, “wait a minute, General. That’s not going to make [OE] 
look good because everybody is going to associate firing with the OE 
process. Is there another way [of handling this]?” I had to put it right out 
there. “Let me think about it,” he said. Two weeks later he fired him.   
 
 In fact, this incident came as no surprise to Powell. A year earlier in USAREUR, 
the long awaited report on the use of survey feedback in combat units (the pilot project 
that Nadal began and Powell implemented; see Chapter III) had revealed similar 
concerns. The senior commanders over the fifteen battalions that took part in the pilot 
expressed frustration in not gaining access to the assessment data. The report 
cautioned that "maintaining confidentiality could become a serious problem in the 
operational use of survey feedback.'' However, in response, the report made clear that 
commanders must maintain "a constructive, problem-solving attitude" and that such an 
attitude "was essential to the technique's success."66 
 As 1978 progressed, the OETC Evaluation Directorate faced increasing pressure 
to show ROI and how OE contributes to combat readiness. Recognizing the need to 
expand its evaluation efforts to show value, especially objective evaluation, OETC 
contracted with McBer and Company to conduct a series of external evaluations that 
would complement the internal evaluation program. The Army Research Institute (ARI) 
contractually sponsored the McBer studies, with McBer's Lyle M. Spencer authoring the 
final reports.67  
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 Spencer released the first report entitled "Taxonomies of Organizational Change: 
Literature Review and Analysis" in September 1978. In consulting recent literature on 
assessment taxonomies and methods, McBer hoped to identify important variables that 
accounted for effective OD engagements. They discovered four: change agent 
characteristics, competencies, and roles; client characteristics and problems; 
intervention methods and processes; and outcome objectives and results. They found, 
however, that intervention methods were too vague "to permit a reviewer to determine 
exactly what change agents actually do to produce outcome results." In essence, they 
concluded that OETC should, through detailed study, determine the competencies of its 
OESOs and understand the design elements of successful interventions. In retrospect, 
this 242-page study did little to inform OETC as to how the school could produce more 
effective OESOs. Its value, instead, was its real-time survey of the evolving state of OD 
in academia. Buried in its depths were important emerging developments in OD with 
topics such as socio-technical systems, complex systems, and executive management. 
The Progressives would soon face these rising concepts head-on. 
 The first Progressive who fully realized that OD had significantly evolved 
throughout the decade was Lieutenant Colonel (soon to be Colonel) Tony Nadal. From 
the summer of 1977 until the summer of 1978, Nadal attended the Army War College as 
a student after his assignment at FORSCOM. Throughout his year at AWC, he acted 
once again as the "front man" for Rogers. Although his influence was somewhat limited 
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due to his student status, he played a significant role in helping to organize the 
weeklong OE seminar. Nadal knew many of the civilian guest speakers from his work at 
FORSCOM and on the OESG Study Group. More importantly, Nadal produced a much 
more useful study than Spencer’s in June 1978 as a result of his AWC research project.  
 As part of the AWC curriculum, all students produce a research project by the 
end of their study year, either as an individual or group project. Nadal teamed with 
military intelligence officer Colonel Donald W. Blascak and fellow infantry officer 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Schwar to write a 137-page report entitled "An Analysis of 
Corporate Organizational Development Experience and Its Implications for the Future of 
the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Program." Nadal and his colleagues wanted to 
study American corporations known to use OD in order to understand how they had 
evolved OD technology since 1971, and to compare these experiences with those of the 
Army. For understanding the state of research, the team visited Case Western Reserve 
University and the renowned Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. 
For understanding practitioners, they went to American Telephone and Telegraph, 
Exxon, Connecticut General Insurance, Consolidated Edison, General Motors, Dow 
Chemical, Saga Corporation, Proctor and Gamble, Shell, and Texas Instruments. 
Importantly, they also visited ARI and OETC. In sum, the study group concluded that 
the recent Army effort, to the extent that it has developed, compares 
favorably with the corporate early experience and has the capacity built 
into its process to manage the change of the process itself. The Army is 
not yet doing two pertinent levels of OD which the corporations [we] visited 
are doing. The Strategic OD, accomplished to systematically address the 
organizational future in a participatory way, and the Socio-Technical areas 
of OD which are executed to enhance jobs, redesign work, and increase 
organizational productivity at the worker level are not done in the Army at 
this time. Recommendations follow that the Army should expand its 




educate manager/commanders at all levels and develop a survey 
feedback system in order to accomplish Strategic and Socio-Technical 
functions to vertically integrate the OE process in the Army.68 
 
 OETC paid particular attention to Nadal's AWC study. Nadal's work seemed to 
confirm what some OETC researchers had been observing since late 1977. In January 
1978, OETC alerted the OE community at large that the center was looking closely at 
the "systems view of the total organization." Influenced by the work of academicians 
Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig, the OETC staff illustrated the center’s 
evolving view by placing a diagram on the cover of OE Communique that depicted the 
interconnectivity of soldiers, structures, mission, and technology. Together, they 
comprised the organizational environment. The authors were careful to emphasize that 
the commander was at the center and in control of this total environment. 
 At this point in early 1978, OETC was clearly at a crossroads. All of their 
extensive efforts to date, including the recent objectives of the phase III evaluation, 
were grounded in the humanistic foundation that promoted transformational leadership 
behaviors. However, the Army was changing, and changing very rapidly. Although all of 
the service chiefs were fighting budget battles with the Carter administration, especially 
Rogers, almost 400 largely technologically advanced systems were staged to enter the 
Army inventory soon. The Army faced a level of force modernization not seen since the 
Second World War, hence the attractiveness of total systems theory. OESOs were the 
designated change agents of the Army. Should they not be facilitating such changes?69 
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 In April 1978, OETC published an update on its work with OE and total systems. 
Still very sensitive to the perception that OE was a threat to commanders, the center 
staff formally announced that they had modified their conceptual diagram of OE and 
total systems to emphasize the chain of command as a critical subsystem. They posited 
that “this subsystem serves as the interface between the commander and all other 
subsystems and helps the commander or leader of an organization to balance the other 
subsystems as changes occur.” Without much elaboration, they argued that “the 
addition of this subsystem will also assist us in our efforts to explain the 
interrelationships between organizational effectiveness, organizational leadership, and 
situational leadership.” Did this announcement signal a radical change in OETC’s 
behavioral science orientation? Where was the individual—the leader and the follower—
in the subsystems? 
 Throughout the spring and summer of 1978, OETC forged ahead with adapting 
OE to a total systems approach. With the Nadal AWC and McBer studies firmly in hand 
and confirming that OETC was heading in the right direction, several external factors 
influenced the azimuth they were taking. These external forces of influence all 
originated with one large issue—combat readiness. 
 At the national level, as budget battles were being fought, a nation-wide debate 
arose about the possibility of bringing back the draft. Driving this debate were the very 
public comments from both Congress and the armed services that the United States 
was ill-equipped and unprepared to confront the Soviet Union with conventional 
weapons should the Soviets invade Europe. Although Congress was becoming more 




the Vietnam-era GI Bill and significantly reduced recruiting dollars. Fearing that these 
incentives would result in fewer enlistments, many observers of these developments 
began to question the viability of the AVF. To some, the threat of Soviet aggression and 
poor recruiting prospects meant that the only solution would be to reinstate conscription. 
Was the AVF in danger of failing? Were the American military services really in such 
dire straits? 
 The answer to those questions arrived in December 1978 with the release of a 
DOD report entitled “America’s Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed 
Forces.” The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve 
Affairs and Logistics had initiated the study in 1977. In total, the report painted a positive 
picture of the AVF and argued that although some serious concerns existed, these 
problems were not insurmountable. For example, while the active forces had remained 
within 1.5 percent of congressionally authorized levels, the Army was experiencing 
declining aptitude test scores of its recruits, and nearly one-third of first term enlistees 
were being discharged before the end of their enlistment period. Of greater concern for 
Rogers was the state of the reserve forces. The end-strength of the reserve 
components was well below congressional mandates, and more than half of all 
enlistees were failing to complete the first half of their six-year obligations. Rogers faced 
this problem when he was the FORSCOM commander, spending an enormous amount 
of time with the reserves, and was disheartened about the lack of progress since that 
time. In fact, by early 1979, though supportive of the AVF, Rogers advocated drafting 
people into the reserves. Above all, the report contained a warning that caught 




would be needed to meet a major conventional attack in Central Europe. By far the 
greatest shortfall is in the combat arms.”70     
 This context was especially important to the evolution of the Army OE program 
because the entire Army by this time had grown concern about combat readiness. 
Within an OE context, Rogers addressed this concern early on by directing the 
DCSPERS to integrate OE throughout the Army Reserves and National Guard with the 
hope that changing the leadership culture in these components would improve 
retention. At Fort Ord, OETC’s reaction to the question about combat readiness was to 
show OE’s direct value not only in helping to prepare units for combat but to employ OE 
in combat. Thus arose the term combat OE. From early 1978 until the end of the 
program in 1985, OESOs would struggle with articulating their efforts in this area. Some 
argued that OE had its greatest payoffs pre-and post-combat, while others said OE had 
an important role in combat as facilitators of improving communications, especially in 
tactical operations centers. In general, however, very few commanders viewed OE in 
combat as a force multiplier. 
A New Azimuth Is Set 
 By late 1978, it was clear that OETC had changed course. Whereas the concern 
over combat readiness, ever the objective of any commander, had always been 
centered on the subject of human relations, it now appeared to be centered on force 
modernization and systems integration. While many of the staff and faculty at the center 
hoped to retain OE’s humanistic core, even that desire began to dissipate by late 
summer. From August 14 through 18, representatives from OETC, FORSCOM, and 
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TRADOC met at Fort Ord to discuss the future of the L&MDC. This important course, 
always adept at defining and illustrating the distinct differences between leadership and 
management, was now threatened with a significant revision. The participants 
appreciated its history but really met to determine “where we would like it to go.” The 
end result was a revision that “militarized” the jargon and the exercises and that 
changed the emphasis on several subject areas. These affected areas included 
guidance to students on where and when not to use “awareness skills in military 
situations,” an expanded use of systems theory, matching L&MDC skills with the goals 
of the Army, replacing the consensus exercise with a “militarized unit on teamwork,” and 
a “simplification of the behavioral science readings.”71 In short, these changes served to 
dilute the humanistic elements of the course that served to inform students about the 
process of social integration to create a genuine leadership climate.  
 While all of these changes were meant to show relevance and value to the Army 
at large, OETC still struggled with objective evaluation and quantifiable ROI. Even 
though the center proceeded with its own internal evaluation through the end of 1978 
and into 1979, the desire for external evaluations increased. In December 1978, Lyle 
Spencer of McBer and Company released another report on a study to determine the 
effectiveness of OETC. Overall, the findings indicated that “OETC has accomplished its 
missions: It has graduated a highly motivated group of OESOs who have been 
successful in implementing organizational development operations in the U.S. Army.” 
Spencer found six major issues concerning the future development of OETC. The most 
important was the need for OETC to create “additional training in methods which can 
increase the probability that OE operations produce measurable mission 
                                                          




accomplishment outcomes for client units.” The report emphasized that OETC needed 
better methods for evaluating OE operations, and that OESOs should complete the 
four-step process in order to achieve success with client commanders. This latter point 
had become a particular problem for OESOs because often the length of the operation 
would exceed the command tenures of the clients. Consequently, OESOs were getting 
through the contracting and assessment phases but faced difficulty in having the time to 
do action planning and solution implementation.72          
 A second important recommendation reflecting industry trends was that OETC 
should educate its students on socio-technical methods. “More time in the OETC 
curriculum should be devoted to task-oriented socio-technical intervention methods and 
evaluation techniques.” Mirroring the trend in industry, Spencer stated that “OETC 
students need additional training in management and organizational consultation 
methods which deal with more than just "people problems." He cited examples such as 
analysis of workflows, operations research, systems analysis, planning methods, 
management information and control systems, cost benefit analysis, and changes in 
organizational structure.73 
 The OETC staff quickly acted on the McBer recommendations. Immediately after 
receiving Spencer’s report, OETC hosted an Open Systems Workshop/Seminar 
designed for OESOs working in large and complex organizations. Turning to industry for 
advice, the center invited Dr. G. K. Jayaram of the Arthur D. Little corporation to speak 
about conceptual frameworks of open systems “which the participants then utilized in 
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small groups to develop models for addressing some of their complex back-home 
issues.” John Hallen, who had long ago facilitated the initial MILPERCEN engagement, 
also spoke. His topic was macro systems, with special emphasis given to issues “facing 
the Army today and in the foreseeable future.”74      
 Between January and March 1979, the staff at OETC explored the feasibility of 
incorporating socio-technical systems theory, diagnosis, and change technologies into 
the OESO/OESNCO course. In announcing this effort to the OE community, OETC 
summarized and described the socio technical approach as an attempt “to optimize the 
relationship between the "people” system and the technology used by the system to 
produce output.” In developing the new course material, the school reviewed current 
literature in academia, civilian industry, and the United States Air Force. They 
completed the instructional material in time to change the POI for class 2-79 that began 
on March 8, 1979. In short, the staff viewed open systems as a means of “viewing 
organizations which exist in an environment of rapid technological, social, and resource 
changes.” This definition certainly described the rapid changes taking place within the 
Army at that time, especially in regard to force modernization and systems integration. 
 By early 1979, apprehension grew throughout the OE community and especially 
at OETC about the fate of the Army OE program after Rogers’s imminent departure. 
This apprehension exacerbated an already anxious climate in which the center was 
hard pressed to show how OE directly contributed to combat readiness. In retrospect, 
the center’s quick embrace of open systems, socio-technical systems theory, and macro 
systems was not only a result of catching up with industry’s lead in the evolutionary use 
of organizational development (as Nadal had illuminated with his June 1978 AWC 
                                                          




study), but was also a survival mechanism to prove its relevancy to a healed and largely 
reformed institution. In sum, the winter of 1978–1979 proved to be an “adapt or die” 
moment. 
Metamorphosis 
 With all of these changes occurring within a short span of time, OETC rapidly 
reacted and adapted in several important ways. First, they saw a need to practice OE at 
higher levels of command. Heretofore, they had focused their efforts primarily at the 
battalion and company levels. For the values-laden nature of OD/OE during the early to 
mid-1970s, this was an appropriate focus because those were the levels where "people 
problems" were most apparent. Those also were the levels where the new AVF soldier 
asked "why" and where company-grade and lower-ranking field-grade officers had the 
most direct contact with their followers. However, the value of those engagements failed 
to reach the colonels and generals who were steeped in the managerial sciences, who 
sought access to the inaccessible assessment data (due to the OESO privilege policy), 
and who expected immediate ROI on quantifiable results such as reduced desertion 
and AWOL rates and improved reenlistments. 
 Secondly, accurate or not, the Healers had come to view OESOs as planners 
and change agents. However, the Healers and the Progressives held different 
interpretations of the role of a change agent. The latter saw OESOs, equipped with 
extensive education in OD, as highly skilled facilitators of change management. In 
contrast, the former viewed OESOs as process improvement staff officers. By 
embracing socio-technical systems, OETC essentially synthesized the two views. 




subordinate subsystem within a larger, complex system. Thus, it was no longer the focal 
point but rather just another "systems" entity. Further, as the Army began fielding more 
than 400 new, largely technological systems, the “socio” dimension was buried under 
the “techno” dimension. 
 A new commander arrived at OETC in December 1978 to drive home this 
pragmatic adaptation. On December 12, Colonel Joseph C. Lutz became OETC's new 
commandant. Unlike the previous commanders, Lutz was well-known and well 
respected throughout the Army officer corps.75 Originally an armor officer, Lutz became 
a member of the special forces community early on, serving two tours of duty in 
Vietnam. Other assignments included commands, in the 82nd Airborne Division and the 
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Just prior to arriving at Fort Ord, Lutz earned a masters 
degree in human relations from Webster College. His selection sent a strong signal that 
OE was an important program for the Army but one that would take a different form. For 
example, Lutz was clear that OE's most important mission was to enhance combat 
readiness. In his change-of-command remarks that day, Lutz told his soldiers and 
civilians that "we are in a process of gaining recognition for OE [by] giving it discipline. . 
. . [W]e must also, simultaneously, move beyond the interpersonal aspect of OE and 
begin to deal more systematically with systemic organizational concerns." Lutz 
reminded everyone that they were all soldiers and that they must paint OE "green" by 
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staying away from the esoterics, avoiding the vernacular and, above all, "staying in the 
mainstream of the Army."76 
 The following month, in his opening comments to the quarterly OE Communique, 
Lutz wrote that the most important task of all OE dealings was "the task of assuring 
commanders and leaders throughout the Army that the sole purpose of OE is to 
contribute to our Army's effort in maintaining a high degree of combat effectiveness." 
With his opening remarks to this issue of the OE Communique, Lutz notified the entire 
OE community as well as the Army at large that the center would "carefully and 
rigorously scrutinize the techniques and methods that we employ in the name of OE [to] 
insure that those which contribute to the goal of combat effectiveness are continually 
refined and that those which do not contribute are eliminated."77 
 It is important to note that not everyone readily accepted OETC's quick 
adaptation. Innovation and experimentation had always been the hallmark of the 
Progressives at Fort Ord, and thus Dr. Jerry Eppler and several others continued to find 
ways to keep attention focused on the human element. In fact, Eppler and several other 
OESOs became members of what became known as Task Force Delta. 
 Started by Mike Malone at TRADOC in 1978, Task Force Delta was a unique 
distributed “think tank” of sorts. Malone was attracted to living systems theory as 
espoused by psychologist James Grier Miller of Harvard University. Miller developed 
living systems to formalize the concept of life. He was especially interested in how a 
number of subsystems interacted with each other and the environment, space, time, 
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matter, energy, and information.78 Malone was also attracted to the role of information in 
complex systems. Like many other senior Army officers, Malone believed that the 
Soviets had achieved technological equality with the United States during the 1970s. He 
thought that information and communications, explored in unprecedented ways by some 
of the best minds available, could help the Army achieve a qualitative advantage over 
Soviet forces. He sold Starry, who was trying to integrate all of the Abrams-DePuy 
reforms with new training and operational doctrine, on the concept.79 In 1978 Malone 
enlisted more than sixty “futurists” from various professions to think of new concepts in 
unconventional and innovative ways. By 1979, Delta Force participants numbered more 
than 130. That year, Malone published his concept paper that encapsulated this 
“thinking renaissance,” as he called it. Over time, Delta Force members, including 
several influential OE personnel, published a number of concept papers.80 
 For example, DA OESO Lieutenant Colonel Frank Burns wrote a Delta Force 
concept paper entitled “High Performance Programming: An Operating Model for a new 
Age of Leadership.” In essence, Burns attached himself to some elements in living 
systems. He argued that “to become effective leaders, we have to improve the quality of 
thinking about the nature and practice of leadership. We need to get outside our current 
frame of reference.”81 Similarly, OETC’s Director of Training, Lieutenant Colonel William 
R. Fisher, embraced recent research into neuro-linguistic programming (NLP). NLP was 
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an attempt to codify and apply knowledge from linguistics (language), kinesics (body 
language) and cybernetics (the study of communications systems). In his view, NLP 
helped people improve communication skills to advance “the art of establishing rapport 
and influencing behavioral change.”82     
 The most extreme example of OETC’s exploration of humanistic ideas was its 
close association with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Channon, a Task Force Delta member, 
and his concept of the First Earth Battalion. In 1978, the Army allowed Channon the 
time and freedom to explore “alternative human potential.” In many ways, Channon 
shared some of Malone’s views about living systems. However, whereas Malone stayed 
within conventional cultural boundaries to explore information and communication flows, 
Channon strayed outside these boundaries, finding merit in many of the spiritual and 
philosophical beliefs that came out of the counter-culture movement of the 1960s. 
Channon was attracted to the human potential movement (HPV) that had deep roots in 
“humanistic psychology,” which was grounded in the work of Abraham Maslow and Carl 
Rogers. In 1979, Channon published the First Earth Battalion Manual, with Malone 
writing the foreword. Malone proffered that Channon’s “battalion” was a place where 
Task Force Delta could dream. Writing more in the form of a comic book than any 
manual, Channon and Malone shared the belief that “soldiers can be the principal moral 
ethical base on which things political can harmonize in the name of the Earth.”83       
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 As unorthodox as it may seem today, Malone’s influence on Starry and TRADOC 
cannot be understated. His heavy embrace of “systems,” combined with his extensive 
work on ethics (which largely defined TRADOC’s view of leadership), coincided with the 
maturation of so many training and doctrinal reforms underway since Abrams’s time. 
Simultaneously, with OD in the private sector and academia evolving into socio-
technical and complex systems, the Army kept in step with the whole new way of 
looking at the management sciences. Although Malone was never fully accepted by the 
OE community, he helped to bridge the gap between the new direction at OETC and the 
DePuy-Starry roadmap for TRADOC.        
 Despite the efforts of some of the early-committed Progressives to retain the 
program's initial focus on the individual and the core of leadership behaviors, by early 
1979, as Rogers neared the completion of his term as CSA, a noticeable change swept 
over the Army OE program beyond Fort Ord and throughout the institution. FORSCOM 
proclaimed its refocus by stating that it had "shifted somewhat from its initial humanistic 
direction to more of a systems approach." The OE personnel at FORSCOM 
headquarters indicated that this shift would directly impact the kinds of people selected 
for the OE program and the type of formal education they would receive. 
     At TRADOC, some students strongly rejected OE instruction. Rogers, leaning 
on Starry to incorporate his views of OE throughout TRADOC, had taken a strong 
personal interest in the quality of TRADOC's Pre-Command Course for newly 
designated commanders. Starry had revamped the old Command Refresher Course 
Program into a high-priority course that would more effectively prepare new 




to ensure that participants received instruction in OE. To underscore his strong 
humanistic views of the course material, Rogers lifted the restrictions on "sensitivity 
training" and authorized the laboratory method and the use of experiential instruction. 
However, the students heavily resisted experiential learning. As the after-action report 
noted, 
[t]he students were not receptive to discussing subjects such as stress or 
time and meeting management. A typical comment was “just tell me what 
you want me to know–to discuss it is a waste of time.” The students 
resisted any subject they perceived as related to Organizational 
Effectiveness. There was a great deal of “unknowns" and "mysticism" 
about OE which was projected into subjects we taught. This situation was 
exacerbated by two or three individuals in each workshop who attacked 
the content of what the OE instructor was trying to teach.84 
 
 Throughout late 1978 and through the end of his tenure as CSA in June 1979, 
Rogers continued to do whatever he could to push OE into institutionalization despite 
the increase in resistance. In the latter half of 1978, he ensured that OE programs 
would fall under inspector general guidelines (IG). Officially becoming part of the IG 
program was an important step in the cultural assimilation of OE because it would 
ensure that OE objectives were periodically evaluated by external inspectors and that 
OE operations were conforming to well-defined standards of performance. Rogers also 
frequented the meetings of the Washington-area OESOs—Capital Area Network for 
Organizational Effectiveness (CANOE)—who had organized themselves to share best 
practices. By early 1979, membership had grown to more than eighty. They met 
quarterly for almost an entire day, with DA staff members often in attendance. It was 
here that Rogers and other DA personnel could hear firsthand about OE operations on 
the front lines. 
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 Indeed, down in the trenches, many soldiers had become aware of Rogers’s 
"give a damn about them" focus. His papers contain examples of soldiers and NCOs 
writing personal letters of appreciation—some dating back to the Korean War when he 
served as their battalion commander. One special example stands out in a letter written 
to Rogers by Private First Class Prescott Melvin of Fort Jackson, South Carolina on 29 
December 1977. Melvin had heard that Rogers practiced transcendental meditation and 
stated in his letter that he was “gratified that such an important person as yourself was 
learning, through direct experience about the laws of nature at an accelerated rate for 
the benefit of not only myself, but also of his many soldiers.” Melvin went on to suggest 
that all officers learn transcendental meditation so that “enlightened leaders will be able 
to overcome in a most creative way the many threats to peace that we face as the 
world’s most important defender of liberty and justice."85 
 While letters such as Melvin’s may have been anecdotal, the reality was that 
where OE had been used and given time to mature, it was succeeding at becoming part 
of day-to-day business. With the focus on human relations, organizations were 
becoming more effective. Testimonials from dozens of general officers appeared in the 
OE Communique to support that assertion. Yet, the Healers continued to ask about 
ROI, especially in terms of combat readiness. Unfortunately, little quantitative data ever 
accompanied those testimonials. 
 By the time of Rogers's departure in the summer of 1979, Hartjen's previous, 
premature pronouncement of the OE movement's death had become a reality. More 
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poignantly, in the April 1977 OESG report by Nadal, Schaum, and Ray, they had 
warned that "additional monitorship of the OE Training Center is required to ensure that 
its focus does not shift from the current emphasis on organizational and interpersonal 
processes to a more generalized and mechanical resource manager point of view." 
Evidently, the words of Nadal, Ray, and Schaum had gone unheeded.  
 Not only had the Healers succeeded in disseminating their views of behavioral 
science methods more acceptable by existing Army culture, largely by way of AWC and 
ADMINCEN, they also offered methods (largely managerial and transactional) that 
appealed to commanders faced with extensive problems in force modernization and 
systems integration. External forces also contributed to management being in vogue 
again. This was the dawn of the Information Age. Complicating the concerns of combat 
readiness were the extensive efforts at automation and data processing that seemed to 
permeate every process of any organization. Largely healed of drug and alcohol abuse, 
racial tensions, and disciplinary problems in the ranks, commanders with aggressive 
training schedules to meet had little patience for "touchy-feely" or "people" programs like 
OE. 
OE Goes On Autopilot: The Meyer and Wickham Years  
 On June 21, 1979, Rogers turned over the reins of the Army to General Edward 
C. "Shy" Meyer. Rogers left at the peak of the budget battles and the widespread 
concern over the possibility of Soviet superiority. Such concerns would soon have 
Meyer claiming that the United States had a "hollow force."86 However, Rogers did not 
retire from the CSA position as most of his predecessors had done. Instead, he moved 
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on to serve as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) through most of the 
Reagan Administration—from July 1, 1979 to June 26, 1987—longer than any other 
commander before or since. While he was in that position, Rogers never again 
commented on the Army OE program until 1985, when CSA General John Wickham 
terminated the program. In a sharply worded message to Wickham objecting to the 
termination, Rogers told Wickham that the decision was "paramount to eating our seed 
corn."87 That Rogers clung to such strong emotional ties to Army OE is apparent in his 
personal papers. Among the many boxes in the Rogers collection, one small box 
contains a two-inch high stack of papers that Rogers always kept on his desk. That 
small stack included two documents: a copy of the 1970 Ulmer-Malone study (the Study 
on Military Professionalism), and a document entitled "Organizational Development 
(OD) for US Army Commands: Some Commonly Asked Questions and Tentative 
Answers.”88 
 When Meyer assumed the position of CSA, he had the clear intention of 
completing the force modernization efforts that originated with Abrams. Meyer 
emphasized quality over quantity and stressed the need for a long-term investment in 
procuring the necessary logistics and materiel for the Army’s corps and divisions. He 
would also be remembered for “fixing” the Army’s recruiting program.89 
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 Meyer had served as Rogers's DCSOPS and was well aware that the Army OE 
program was shifting into full swing as OETC increased the number of OESO courses 
from four to five per year. Although he was perceived by some OESOs as being 
supportive of the program, Meyer soon demonstrated his true views of OE through his 
words and deeds. For example, just weeks into the job, Meyer delivered a speech in 
Indianapolis where he commented that 
the Army is finally maturing when It comes to soldiering with a completely 
volunteer force. Initially, when faced with that task, we took a searching 
look at ourselves. Based on our perceptions of what was necessary if we 
were to subsist in a volunteer environment, we made a number of 
changes. Some, such as improved pay and greater trust in the maturity of 
our people, were excellent and long overdue. Others were, in retrospect, 
not desirable. They not only appealed to the wrong instinct, but they 
tended to detract from a necessary focus on the business of soldiering. 
The correct focus must permit us to create and maintain unit cohesion, a 
quality invariably essential to successful military units.90 
  
Meyer viewed Army OE as a fad program. In later years he revealed this belief in an 
article on leadership published in Military Review. In that article, the former CSA stated 
that “[s]ocietally accustomed as we are to discarding the old for the cleverness of the 
new, we weary of redundancy and look for the new buzz word [like] Organizational 
Effectiveness. . . .”91 
 Also during his first year, Meyer issued a moratorium on surveys in response to 
complaints about their overuse, which hindered OETC's evaluation efforts. He also 
moved the OE program out of the DCSPERS/HRD channels and into the empowered 
Office of the Director of Management at DA. The new director, Major General Thomas 
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O. Greer sent a strong message of OE oversight by speaking at the graduation 
ceremony for OESO class 2-80 on July 25, 1980: 
The objective of the change is to facilitate the shift of emphasis from a 
primarily human relations perspective to a broader systems approach, 
focusing on a wide range of management skills used to address major 
issues in support of Army goals. Work at HQDA level as shifted from team 
building and other interpersonal activities to an emphasis on problem 
solving and management improvement of the total organization.92 
 
Also during his first year, Meyer approved the long delayed OE 3-10 Year Plan, which 
clearly rejected the humanistic OD in favor of the systems approach. The plan purported 
to offer "good managerial tools for managing the transition of OE into a macro-system 
approach over the next seven years." The plan required OESOs to provide case study 
documentation of their engagements. To ensure standardization for this requirement, 
DA contracted with SDC, under the sponsorship of ARI, to produce a formal manual for 
this purpose. SOC completed this product, entitled "Organizational Effectiveness Case 
Development Manual," in October 1980. More ominously, the plan called for the transfer 
of basic OE skills to unit personnel managers.  
 During the last years of the program, while the OESOs in the field were busy with 
systems integration and force modernization, OETC fell under a constant barrage of 
external evaluations that attempted to understand the ROI of the Army OE program. In 
1981 alone, several significant external studies explored the effectiveness of the OE 
program. In May, McBer produced a study entitled “Competencies of Organizational 
Effectiveness Consultants in the US Army.” The researchers attempted to identify 
specific competencies “that distinguish the superior performer from the rest of the 
OESO population.” In the process of identifying successful OESO skills, the study also 
                                                          




revealed an extensive survey of OE engagements that were not as successful as they 
could have been. In October, Arthur Young and Company conducted a study entitled 
“Assessing the Impact of the Army’s Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Program: Model, 
Methodology, and Illustrative Cases.” This study assessed the current impact of the 
Army OE program. In their conclusion, the researchers reported that measuring change 
in units remained difficult and that the shift to socio-technical engagements did not 
result in easier evaluations. Three years later, in November 1984, Arthur Young and 
Company updated their earlier study with a new one entitled “Analysis of the Impact of 
the US Army Program of Organizational Effectiveness.” Like the other studies, this 
report concluded that “true macro-level operations were very difficult to implement 
successfully,” and that the degree of involvement and support of the senior commander 
marked the difference between success or failure. More ominously, the findings stated 
that “it was not possible . . . to obtain reliable data on costs and benefits of OE 
operations.”93 
 Under Meyer and Wickham, management became acceptable again.  Not unlike 
McNamara’s systems analysis of the 1960s, the Army’s stewards of the 1980s expected 
all of the Army’s activities and behaviors to be quantifiable. This became quite evident in 
1983 with the long-awaited revision of Army leadership doctrine. The new FM 22-100 
was a radical departure from the 1973 FM (see my analysis in Appendix B. The authors 
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posited a new leadership doctrinal framework entitled “Be, Know, Do.” This reflected 
Meyer’s view that leadership was a formula where character plus knowledge plus 
application equals leadership. In short order, however, the “be” was greatly 
subordinated to the “know” and the “do,” as it still is today. In keeping with Starry’s view 
that every task, including leadership, was quantifiable, FM 22-100 offered eleven 
generalized “leadership principles,” such as “know your soldiers and look out for their 
welfare,” and “keep your soldiers informed.” As these principles were throwbacks to the 
1940s and 1950s manuals, the new FM also took a large step backward with its 
undisguised re-embracing of Trait Theory. In addition, the authors devoted much of the 
narrative to managerial skills and the situational approach to leadership. 
 In retrospect, Meyer and Wickham’s views on leadership and professionalism 
were closely in step with those of DePuy, and Starry. While both men stressed the need 
for quality soldiers and viewed TRADOC's training and training management methods 
as the appropriate mechanism for producing solders needed to operate the new, 
advanced technological systems, their definitions of leadership remained traditional. In 
any case, the retro views of both chiefs were largely irrelevant. By the time Meyer 
settled into the CSA position, OE had completed its quick adaptation to process 
improvement. In reality, there was no longer any distinction between leadership and 
management—at DA, at TRADOC, and at OETC. 
 The real tragedy of the OE program’s long, slow demise was the extinguishment 
of the professional commitment that hundreds of OESOs had given to making the entire 
Army as effective as it could be. This is especially true of the second wave of OESOs—




OD. Colonel William “Bill” Golden, who took over command of OETC from Lutz on June 
8, 1979 (and arguably the most effective of the nine commandants), deserved much 
credit for guiding the center through the rapid metamorphosis. Golden, who coauthored 
the West Point Study with Nadal years earlier, fully understood modern leadership 
theories and OD. At the beginning of his tenure, he put himself through the entire OESO 
course (unlike all of his predecessors) and was well-aware of the strong, humanistic 
currents running through the program. Pragmatically, he recognized the “adapt or die” 
moment and heavily invested his command in the latest thinking on OD in academia 
and in industry. He promoted an extensive professional development program for his 
staff and faculty that exposed them to some of the best theorists and practitioners of 
current OD technologies. Consequently, OETC personnel acquired the skill levels 
required to educate OESOs in the latest consulting methods related to socio-
technology, complex systems, and open systems (i.e. strategic planning). That the 
program continued for another five years was largely due to Golden’s efforts.  
 Still, the systems approach, while it may have helped facilitate the most 
technically and operationally proficient Army in American history, hijacked a movement 
that was poised to educate the entire Army on the critical differences between 
leadership and management. In many ways, it was a Camelot moment. Leadership was 
not about the king sitting at the head of a long, rectangular table commanding his 
knights, but rather about a group of professional soldiers, forming an effective 
organization, sitting at a round table where it was safe to speak truth to power; where it 
was safe to speak your mind, to ask “why” questions, and to participate in the decision-




humanistic OD in the 1970s brought the institution closer to understanding the nature 





Conclusion: Lost Victories 
“Increasingly,” [sociologist] Karl Mannheim wrote shortly before his death, 
“it is recognized that real planning consists in coordination of institutions, 
education, valuations and psychology. Only one who can see the 
important ramifications of each single step can act with responsibility 
required by the complexity of the modern age.” It is the leaders who 
preeminently must see in this way.  But to see alone is insufficient; they 
must act too, and of all the tasks proposed by Mannheim . . . the changing 
of institutions is the most difficult. For institutions are encapsulated within 
social structures that are themselves responses to earlier needs, values, 
and goals. In seeking to change social structures in order to realize new 
values and purposes, leaders go far beyond the politicians who merely 
cater to surface attitudes. To elevate the goals of humankind, to achieve 
high moral purpose, to realize major intended change, leaders must thrust 
themselves into the most intractable processes and structures of history 
and ultimately master them. 
James MacGregor Burns 
 
 In assessing the rise and fall of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Program, 
one primary question remains: did the program succeed in transforming the leadership 
culture of the US Army? The short answer is "no." However, the 2000 plus direct 
participants in the program, in the course of engaging tens of thousands of soldiers, 
may have affected positive changes that have endured over time. 
 The entire movement started off on the right track. The defeat in Vietnam and the 
end of conscription compelled almost everyone in the Army to anticipate many changes. 
Given the state of the Army on the heels of My Lai and the revelations brought forth in 
the Ulmer-Malone Study on Military Professionalism, most senior officers understood 
very clearly that such changes would be radical and far reaching. In being honest with 
themselves (as 108 general officers were in the 1976 Kinnard study), senior officers had 
observed, through their own experiences especially in Vietnam, that the leadership 




with the ramifications and effects of the social movements on the domestic front, 
created a window of opportunity for a number of reforms. More importantly, this 
"window" generated an institution-wide climate, albeit temporarily, in which new ideas 
were welcomed, especially (and uncharacteristically) from the junior ranks. Central to 
this climate were foreboding questions: How can we create an all-volunteer army of 
young people who protested the war and generally hold the institution in low regard? 
How can we make the Army appealing? 
 Different perspectives emerged as the Army officer corps addressed these 
questions. In short, the Traditionalists wanted to return to the old Army, the Healers 
wanted to radically revamp the Army as an organization and to modernize it by infusing 
hundreds of new technological advancements, and the Progressives wanted to relate to 
young people in new and largely unproven ways that were perceived to be antithetical 
to Army customs and traditions. For the latter group, their initial grass roots movement 
took advantage of this window of opportunity to experiment with new ideas. 
 As the Healers experimented with new ideas that would remove "irritants" in a 
soldier's life in the Army, the Progressives reached out into the world of behavioral 
science to understand recent research on human relations. They did so because they 
believed that for the AVF to succeed, the Army's NCOs and officers had to relate in a 
different way with the post–social movement youth of America. In understanding the 
new advances in social and organizational psychology, the Progressives strongly 
embraced the emerging practice of "organizational development" (OD), and quickly 
adapted it for the Army under the term "organizational effectiveness." At that time, OD 




Progressives believed that leaders had a moral obligation to meet the highest-level 
needs of soldiers, as articulated by Maslow's hierarchy of needs pyramid. In anticipating 
what Burns would soon term "transformational leadership," the early Progressives at 
Fort Ord developed a "leadership" course that clearly distinguished the differences 
between leadership and management. With an emphasis on the former, the course 
created an "experiential learning" environment in which the course facilitators utilized 
the laboratory method or sensitivity training to allow the participants to become more 
self-aware. 
Because they believed that leadership was "all about feelings," and that it constituted a 
dynamic relationship between the leader and the led, self-awareness was key to 
developing effective leaders. In this way, the Progressives worked to change the 
leadership culture of the Army. 
 As the Fort Ord grass roots movement expanded, the experimenters gained the 
sponsorship of several lower-ranking general officers who possessed extensive power 
and authority (albeit within the confines of their installations) to test out new concepts. 
Most interesting, these one- and two-star generals were not expert behavioral scientists, 
nor did they possess recent formal education in those disciplines. Rather, these officers 
had come to believe that leadership was more about interpersonal relationships than 
rank or position. Unlike their seniors, the three- and four-star generals, whose 
weltanschauung was shaped by the Great Crusade of the Second World War, these 
senior Progressives viewed their world through the lens of their experiences in the 
Korean War (as company and battalion commanders) and in Vietnam (as brigade or 




younger generation than the three- and four-star stewards of the institution is an 
important speculation worth pondering. 
 After the Army ended conscription and inaugurated the AVF, the institution 
initiated a number of reforms, unprecedented in terms of scope and size, that would 
eventually alter its doctrine, training, organizational, and technological make-up. In the 
process of formulating and implementing these reforms, the Army became healthier 
and, as such, saw less and less need to focus on "people problems." Although OE was 
well on the way toward full institutionalization, by the dawn of the 1980s, the new 
stewards of the institution saw decreasing value in the Army OE program and 
subsequently terminated the program in 1985. What accounts for this "fall?" How can 
we best assess the failure of the Progressives to change Army culture? Fortunately, 
there are two general frameworks we can use. The first is to look at the warnings posed 
by OD experts in the early 1970s that alerted OD practitioners to the possible pitfalls of 
OD implementation. These warnings were the result of extensive studies conducted on 
OD engagements, largely in the private sector, to date. The assessment method is the 
framework offered in the 2002 Science Applications International Center (SAIC) study 
entitled “Changing Military Culture” for the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. The 
Pentagon contracted with SAIC to study and deliver a report on why the secretary of 
defense’s two-year attempt “to transform the American military . . . has met with 
considerable resistance.”1 The final report concluded that a number of “cultural sources” 
were responsible for resistance to change and the failure to transform.  Strikingly similar 
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to the conclusions drawn from Vietnam, risk aversion and careerism were factors that 
contributed to this resistance. The authors found that individual activists “or maverick 
officers may be deemed insubordinate and penalized,” and that working in any “non-
traditional areas important to future warfare [could] slow their career advancement.” The 
study proffered that three strategies can address the problem of cultural resistance to 
change: (1) bypassing insurmountable obstacles by employing experimental initiatives, 
(2) changing processes within the existing culture, or (3) directly confronting the 
culture.2 
Difficulties with OD Implementations: The View From 1972 
 In the early 1970s, several academics published a number of articles that offered 
the OD community research results on the difficulties that some organizations had 
experienced in implementing OD programs. For example, many of the early warnings 
came from some of the biggest theorists of that time. 
Warren Bennis observed that OD, by its nature, tended to ignore or avoid the problem 
of power in the politics of change. His observation precisely described the fundamental 
friction between the Healers and the Progressives. In essence, their philosophical 
differences were played out in a power struggle, with the Healers gaining the upper 
hand over time largely through the activities of TRADOC and Meyer's ascendancy into 
the CSA position.3 
 Several authors spoke to potential problems associated with organizational and 
suborganizational cultures. Marguiles and Raia noted that OD engagements had been 
successful in strong hierarchical systems where organizations had a common purpose 
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defined by goals and subgoals; centralized power and a hierarchy of coordinating 
authority; and a common system of values and norms. However, they found that OD 
was far less successful in large-scale "open systems." In retrospect, the Army OE 
program experienced the same results. In the 1970s, when OESOs operated at brigade 
level and below, they reported numerous successes. At those levels, OESOs engaged 
with commanders holding the ranks of captain and lieutenant colonel (i.e. companies 
and battalions with 200 to 700 soldiers), who tightly controlled homogenous units with 
very specific missions. Above brigade level, at the division and corps levels (with 10,000 
to 30,000 soldiers), the OESOs who were engaged with socio-technical and open 
systems activities faced two- and three-star generals who exercised much less control 
over their heterogeneous suborganizations and subcultures. The OESOs of the 1980s 
who operated at those levels ultimately found themselves involved in limited 
engagements such as process improvement or planning. Also, it is at those levels were 
the problem of power in the politics of change was most apparent.4  
 There is little doubt that the above mentioned factors posed a real dilemma for 
the OESOs, especially those assigned to combat units. They were there as internal 
consultants; that is, they were bona fide members of the profession. With anywhere 
from eight to fourteen years of service under their belts, they were committed to full 
careers in the Army. Yet they were sent out into the field Army to advocate for a process 
of change management that many, if not most, of their "clients" viewed with skepticism.5 
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This situation spoke to the issue of credibility. Often, the new OESO had to first prove 
himself as a competent infantry or armor officer, at least in the eyes of the client 
commander. Achieving credibility was paramount, for without it the OESO could not 
establish rapport with the commander and therefore his support. All OESOs recognized, 
as numerous studies revealed, that without the commander's involvement, OE 
engagements were likely doomed to fail. In the early days of the OE program, the 
1970s, the OESOs were predominantly men from the combat arms who were more 
senior in rank (majors and lieutenant colonels) and who had served multiple tours of 
duty in Vietnam. For them, the credibility issue was of little concern. However, after 
1980, most OESOs were captains, and the school began to receive NCOs, women, and 
soldiers from the Army Reserves and the National Guard. Many in the OE community 
ultimately believed that the quality of OETC attendees decreased over time and 
consequently contributed to the decision to terminate the program.6 
 The OESOs had other dilemmas to deal with as well. Chris Argyris wrote about 
the difficulties that consultants face when they try "to help an organization learn to solve 
its own interpersonal difficulties." In the process, the consultant "may have to ask the 
client to consider values that are fundamentally different from those upon which the 
organization, its controls, and his leadership pattern are based." For the OESOs of the 
1970s, they had to ask because they believed, based on their formal education and the 
OETC curriculum, that feelings and emotions were critical to the resolution of 
organizational problems and that they enhanced a climate of openness and trust as well 
as improved communications, and encouraged experimentation and risk taking. Argyris 
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noted that formal organizations tended to "penalize openness, leveling, and 
experimentation on the interpersonal and emotional levels," although organizations 
rewarded those activities on a rational level. Argyris believed that the focus on 
rationality created organizational cultures "in which feelings are considered to be 'bad,' 
and ‛immature.’"7 This description certainly fit the Army's overt macho and overly 
masculine culture (both then and now). In retrospect, this dilemma accounts for the 
resistant attitudes certainly expressed by the Traditionalists and most of the Healers, 
especially when OESOs utilized sensitivity training in their engagements. 
 The subject of the laboratory method or sensitivity training (i.e., T-Groups) was 
much debated in the early 1970s because of its extensive use in recent years. Warren 
Bennis, for example, believed that its overuse led people to believe that T-Groups and 
OD were synonymous, when in fact the laboratory method was only one technique in 
the OD toolkit. Robert J. House wrote that "the T-Group experience is a very soul-
searching process; it requires the individual to become introspective, to look at his own 
values and his own emotions, to ask himself whether and why he likes them, and 
whether he wishes to live the way he has." House, while strongly believing that T-
Groups certainly had a role in OD, admitted that it may not work for everyone. He 
acknowledged the critics' concerns that "mandatory" T-Group training may be unethical. 
Similarly, Sheldon A. Davis found that participants who were strangers to one another 
(i.e., from different organizations) generally experienced extreme euphoria but often 
experienced tremendous letdowns when they returned to their ongoing cultures. In 
Davis's view, most organizations do not value feelings and confrontation, and those that 
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typically employ "highly traditional methods of management" (like the US Army), carry 
unrealistic perceptions about people that tend to reflect Douglas McGregor's Theory X 
assumptions.8 Many OESOs, especially those from the first few OETC classes, reported 
that they inevitably confronted a handful of participants who strongly resisted or 
objected to sensitivity training. Rogers himself discovered this with the attendees of the 
Pre-Command Course who strongly objected to its use in their curricula.  
 Perhaps the most relevant analysis that may inform the demise of the OE 
program is found in Michael G. Blansfield's article "Depth Analysis of Organizational 
Life." Blansfield hypothesized that OD becomes attractive when an organization is 
confronted with an enormous challenge. Once the organization utilizes OD to address 
the challenge, then three conditions must exist for OD to succeed: 
1. The change must start at the top of the hierarchy; that is, it must initiate 
at the locus of power and be diffused downward in the traditional way in 
which authority and responsibility usually flow. 
2. The change must be pervasive; that is, it cannot be isolated in certain 
components of the organization, but must be general throughout the total 
organization. 
3. The change must generally be consonant with the ethical values of the 
organization. Otherwise [there is] a good deal of energy lost in the struggle 
to make the change compatible with the prior organizational values or to 
revise key values so that growth is permitted.9 
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 In tracing the evolution of the Army OE program, we can see that none of 
Blansfield's conditions were fully met. The OE initiatives did not start at the top of the 
institution but rather began as a grassroots movement. They gained traction early on, 
however, within the confines of the Fort Ord and Fort Carson installations. There, 
generals Davidson, Moore, and Rogers provided that push-down support, utilizing the 
traditional chain-of-command structure. It would take several years before a champion 
at the nexus of power could do that for the entire Army. Even then, though, Rogers 
made the use of Army OE optional.  
 OE never achieved pervasiveness throughout the institution, even though Rogers 
utilized Army bureaucracy to institutionalize the program. Throughout the entire length 
of the program, OE was always "isolated in certain components of the organization." 
This first occurred due to the nature of its grassroots origin. As OE grew and became 
part of the Army's overall experimentation efforts (i.e., VOLAR), it never fully took root in 
much of the Army's domain. Even in fertile areas, such as USAREUR and Fort Bragg, it 
did so only because the commanding generals in those organizations (Blanchard and 
Tackaberry) were true believers, and because their successors carried those programs 
forward. 
 Blansfield's last condition is an important consideration in the historical evaluation 
of the Army OE program. The entire progressive movement started because the Army 
exited Vietnam with ethical problems. The Peers Report on My Lai and the Ulmer-
Malone Study on Military Professionalism revealed that the ethical problems may be 
chronic. This fear constituted an enormous human relations challenge that was further 




was open—to an unprecedented degree—to an intense self-examination of its values 
and its concept of professionalism. That openness created a window of opportunity for 
some officers to inject or attempt to adapt their recent education in the behavioral 
sciences to Army culture. Once they decided to utilize OD to do so, the Progressives 
embarked on a voyage to transform the leadership culture of the Army, whether or not 
everyone fully realized it at the time. 
 Blansfield warned that much energy could be "lost in the struggle to make the 
change compatible with the prior organizational values." With the benefit of hindsight, 
we know that the Progressives strongly embrace the basic tenets of Burns's 
Transformational Leadership Theory. They viewed human relations as a moral 
imperative and, as such, leadership was a dynamic behavioral relationship between the 
leader and the led. However, once the VOLAR experiments were underway, the 
Traditionalists and the Healers perceived the new concepts as a threat to exiting 
organizational values that they believed were appropriate. In their eyes, the 
Progressives were attempting to change those values by making Army culture under the 
new AVF more permissible. Ultimately, the Healers won out largely by doing what 
Blansfield posited—"by revising key values so that growth is permitted."10 
Difficulties with Cultural Transformation: The View from 2002 
 The 2002 SAIC study entitled "Changing Military Culture" sought to understand 
why the secretary of defense's attempt to transform the American military met with 
"considerable resistance. The 285-page report concluded that three possible strategies 
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exist for addressing cultural resistance to change: (1) bypassing insurmountable 
obstacles, (2) changing processes within the existing culture, and (3) directly 
confronting the culture. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the 
Progressives utilized all three strategies at various stages of the program. 
 The authors of the 2002 SAIC study recognized that change agents attempt to 
preserve some aspects of the existing culture as they work around the sources of 
resistance to change. They do so by creating experimental units in which "clarity of 
purpose, flexibility, and autonomy make them more agile and innovative." Early on, the 
Progressives enjoyed a great deal of success with this strategy. Although initially it was 
not a deliberate strategy due to its grassroots birth at Fort Ord, it quickly became 
deliberate under the VOLAR program. While the decentralization of the VOLAR 
experiments did not eliminate resistance, as evident by the events at Fort Benning 
where the new concepts were largely ignored, the experiments elsewhere proved 
promising. This was especially true at Fort Ord, Fort Carson, and in USAREUR. 
 Blansfield's caveats in his third condition are also important factors to consider. 
He notes that those same characteristics that allow change agents to work around 
sources of resistance also, paradoxically, may isolate them too far from the existing 
organizational culture to the point where the activities are not taken seriously. Certainly, 
the Traditionalists never took the new concepts seriously. Many of the Healers did so 
but only when Rogers became CSA. However, at that point (fall of 1976) they were 
positioned via TRADOC, ADMINCEN, and the AWC to ensure that doctrinal 
development reflected the Healers' views on management and leadership. In short, the 




Rogers could push hard for institutionalization. Equally important was Rogers's decision 
to make the use of OE optional. In doing so, many probably took the program less 
seriously. 
 SAIC's second strategy, changing processes within the existing culture, is the 
one the SAIC authors viewed as most likely to be effective because it "concentrates on 
altering certain processes within the existing culture rather than attacking the culture 
directly." They noted that "small changes in key areas can have important long-term 
consequences." Rogers's agenda for institutionalization was certainly an attempt to 
employ this strategy. Once he was CSA, he heavily leveraged the bureaucratic system 
to advance the program. He emplaced many "small changes," such as changing the 
staffing structures throughout the Army to formalize the positions of the OESO, creating 
an Army regulation for OE, and making OE a part of the IG inspection system. Prior to 
October 1976, however, the mainstream Army viewed OE as an anomaly to the existing 
culture not only because it was an unusual, novel experiment but largely because most 
people did not understand the new concepts. The Progressives deserve all of the blame 
for this. Granted that OD was (and is) difficult to define, they failed to adequately market 
the program along the way and to therefore gain consensus in the process. This was a 
lesson that Starry had already learned. DePuy had made the same mistake with the 
1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Starry, in revising and modifying the new 
operational doctrine, took care to listen to a wide array of feedback and to build 





 SAIC viewed their third strategy, directly confronting the culture, as unlikely to be 
productive. As they noted in their report to the secretary of defense, "individual service 
members, especially the officer corps, are deeply and personally vested in their 
[existing] service's organizational culture. Attacking important aspects of that culture 
directly generates resistance that can slow and even halt transformation." Even from the 
earliest days of the VOLAR experiments, the Army at large viewed the new concepts as 
a direct assault on not only the Army's culture but its traditional customs and courtesies 
as well. From the very beginning, as talk of ending conscription became a reality, the 
majority of the Army's officers and NCOs believed that the Army would become too 
permissible under the new AVF. This belief, more than any other, undergirded the long-
enduring resistance to change. 
 Rogers's strongly articulated agenda, in which he made the institutionalization of 
OE mandatory but is use optional, was perceived by many as an affront to the existing 
culture. These perceptions of an assault were more implicit than explicit; that is, the 
entire officer corps—especial colonels, brigadier and major generals—were always 
keenly sensitive to the power and authority of the CSA. The CSA directed general 
officer assignments and had great influence over who advanced into the general officer 
ranks. The culture has always been "What the chief wants, the chief gets." There is a 
great possibility that many senior officers utilized OE because they knew it was the 
chief's "pet project." If so, this undoubtedly fueled a widespread state of passive 
resistance. As OETC director Dr. Mel Spehn stated, "the boss's pet programs often get 
external compliance and internal resistance."11 
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 It is fair to say that many officers viewed the Army OE program as too liberal, 
especially in the 1970s, as evident by their fear of a new culture of permissiveness 
emerging in the AVF. Was OD or Army OE too incompatible with the Army's 
fundamental institutional culture? No, because the Army is a professional institution 
grounded in a well-established set of moral values. Transformational leadership is 
grounded in moral values. Leadership, unlike management, is all about feelings, 
feelings expressed via the dynamic interrelationship between the leader and the led. 
Those who enjoyed success with OE understood that the program made poor units 
good, and good units great. More importantly, OE made those in positions of power 
more caring, more concerned with the aspirations of their followers. As Jim Looram 
stated, OE allowed some to see "a new way of being." 
Self-Assessments 
 When the program ended in 1985, many OESOs reflected on the termination in 
order to understand its sudden demise. Dr. Mel Spehn, a director at OETC from the 
beginning of the program, took the time to write about his "reflections."12 Spehn believed 
that the heavy emphasis of sensitivity training in the early years may have sent the 
wrong message to the first several hundred OESOs. He observed that the early OESOs 
believed that they should do similar training events in their assigned units. "More than a 
few of the early graduates left with a missionary zeal to 'humanize' the Army." His 
primary concern was that they were not adequately trained to utilize the laboratory 
method. This, combined with the frequent use of personal-growth jargon and a zeal to 
                                                          




"therapize" the Army, resulted in negative reactions from their commanders, clients, or 
potential clients.13 
 Spehn was also vocal about the constant turmoil OETC experienced as senior 
officers flexed their political and power muscles over the center's jurisdiction and 
mission. In addition to the TRADOC–FORSCOM wrestling match during the time DePuy 
and Rogers commanded those organizations, DePuy's and ADMINCEN's numerous 
attempts to move OETC to Indiana "often diverted the energies of OETC from its 
primary mission." In addition, Spehn wrote that  
even the missions kept changing. The early mission was on OD with an 
emphasis on human resource development (HRD) activities. By 1980, the 
mission was to "develop, train, and evaluate the systemic military 
application of OE and related advanced management and behavioral 
science skills in the Army." These may seem similar missions with merely 
different terms used. However, with the change of eight commandants in 
ten years at OETC and the direct involvement of dozens of very senior 
leaders in the program during these same years, the interpretation of 
these words varied widely. And almost always these well-intentioned 
interpreters introduced personal bias with the argument that his approach 
was meeting "the Army's real needs."14 
 
 Spehn concurred with the findings of many studies that the program required an 
evaluation system that could prove return on investment. What troubled Spehn more 
than a lack of an evaluation system was his belief that OE was proving its value, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. The problem was that OETC and the OESOs did a poor 
job of marketing those results. In fact, a cost benefit analysis conducted in 1980 
determined that the estimated activity level of 3,743 OE operations produced the return 
of $85 million. Yet, this and other cost benefit analyses never proved useful. Instead,  
defense of OE continued to be mustered through the 'old boy' network that 
called upon senior officers to go to bat for the program simply because 






they liked it. Neither detractors nor defenders put their judgments into 
objective, debatable criteria. Likewise, OE was a matter of taste—one 
either swallowed it or spit it out.15 
 
 In retrospect, ROI for program managers differed significantly from ROI for 
commanders. Many commanders were a hard sell for a number of reasons. First, they 
had a very limited timeframe in which to command their units, but the Army's existing 
management culture expected a quantifiable list of achievements as officers departed 
their commands. Senior commanders expected their subordinate commanders to show 
improvements with hard, statistical data such as operational maintenance rates, 
reenlistment rates, physical fitness scores, etc. Consequently, commanders had little 
interest to invest themselves in OD activities that would exceed their command tenures. 
Unfortunately, that was how OD worked. Second, because the use of OE was optional, 
many read this to mean "nice to have" or a program of lower priority, especially in the 
face of extensive training and maintenance schedules. Third, because combat 
readiness was their top priority, commanders were never really clear about how OE 
contributed to preparation for war. Spehn admitted that "time ran out" before OETC 
could ever prove or show the relevance of OE to war. Finally, many if not most of the 
senior commanders simply objected to the fact that OE promoted participative decision-
making. OESOs continually heard the mutterings that the Army is not a democracy. This 
distaste directly contributed to the fear that OE was a threat to the authority of “the 
commander.” In retrospect, it is unclear if any degree of marketing could have 
eliminated such beliefs. 16 
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 Like Spehn, other OESOs took a critical view of the inner workings of the 
program and the behaviors of some in the OE community. Dick Deaner, an OESO who 
pursued a career in OD after leaving the Army, wrote in 1991 that "the OE program died 
of self-inflicted wounds."17 These wounds were a result of six factors: (1) the refusal to 
accept criticism and to change ourselves, (2) the failure to explain the purpose of OE, 
(3) poor management over the program, (4) poor marketing, (5) personal impropriety, 
and (6) self-destructive behavior. Deaner especially focused on the last two factors. He 
cited the relief of two commandants "for personal misconduct" and a number of 
regulation infractions that included "using Army resources for personal benefit, 
substance abuse, extramarital sexual activity, and disrespect for military law and 
customs." He believed that because the program embraced the Human Potential 
Movement, many converted "to this new gospel and may have overreacted to its 
elements of personal freedom and experimentation." Deaner, as well as many others, 
credit this behavior with creating the view that OE was a "beads and sandals" program 
(a phrase often cited throughout the length of the program). Overall, Deaner believed 
that all of these factors caused OE to "err primarily by disrespecting its larger system 
culture, and antagonizing key soldiers who valued that culture. This error outweighed 
much conceptual brilliance."18 
 Other OESOs shared Deaner's views. Mike Perrault believed that "too many 
OESOs got out of the mainstream Army and into strange behaviors. While these were a 
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minority of the OESOs, they created a larger than life [poor] image."19 Gary Richardson 
likewise believed that the poor behavior of some commandants and the "predilection of 
some in the OE community to adopt a counterculture mode of dress and talk" 
contributed to the decision to close down the program. "It was not a huge number of us 
but enough that the 'rap' on OE as 'different' didn't help us [win] clients. It would be the 
equivalent of me walking into a Silicon Valley high tech software firm wearing an East 
Coast, buttoned-down, three-piece suit."20 AI Wingus saw commanders reject OE 
because of its "New Age feel":  
We believed the decisive difference or combat multiplier was optimizing 
our human capability. Initially we looked to behavioral science, leadership 
theory and the human potential movement and it was both a blessing and 
a curse. The blessing was recognizing the transformational nature of 
designing and leading military units using a more empowering model. The 
curse was that much of this was seen as too "touchy-feely" by the 
mainstream Army.21  
 
 Ms. Kay Powers, an OESO at DA recalled: 
I think there are two things we did that hurt us in the long run in terms of 
the level of acceptance we got. One, we talked about the whole “we were 
different.” Not only were we different, we were a little stupid about it. We 
liked to exploit/enjoy that difference. We took pride in marching to the tune 
of the flute, if you will. 
 
 Eppler recalled that the "beads and sandals" label was more than a hippie-
referenced characterization. He remembered an important meeting at Fort Ord that 
several general officers attended from TRADOC or DA. The OETC commandant  
came into the meeting with Birkenstocks on. That's the Big Sur shoes. And 
he has some beads on. And these guys just looked at him, and they just 
about puked. He was almost oblivious; he was being himself. He was 
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being part of the culture here, part of the community. Well, he didn't last 
long.22 
 
A "Fall" or a Change? 
 Did the termination of the Army OE program constitute a "fall," or did the program 
achieve successes that positively changed the Army? In answering that question we 
must look at where the Army was then and where it is today. While that comparison—
largely a matter of context—is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is fair to say 
that many positive changes occurred because of the program's efforts between 1975 
and 1985. It is also fair to surmise, however, that OE failed to transform the leadership 
culture of the Army primarily because the program did not create a paradigm shift in 
how the Army views the relationship between the leader and the led. If anything, the 
Army fell back on the dominant use of management to govern and measure all of its 
activities. Whereas "management" was a dirty word in the 1970s, it became the term of 
choice in the following decade. With the information age exploding during the 1980s and 
the Army's heavy use of information technology to improve workflows and bureaucratic 
processes, the heavy reliance on statistics in the 1980s more closely resembled 
McNamara's "systems analysis" system of the 1960s than of any other time. Since then, 
the Army has muddied the waters between the worlds of leadership and management. If 
anything, the Army's short definition of leadership for the last thirty years has been 
"ethical management." 
 While the Army OE program may have failed to transform the leadership culture 
of the institution, it did succeed  in changing the Army by incorporating a number of new 
methodologies and processes that endured over time. In terms of methodologies, the 
                                                          




Army OE program introduced a number of innovative ideas, processes, tools, etc. that 
have since become institutionalized. There are many examples, such as surveys. The 
OE program made the use of surveys a routine practice and, more importantly, 
introduced attitudinal surveys as a way of accurately gauging the state of morale in an 
organization. Indeed, the term "climate" arose from these efforts. Today, the term has 
morphed into the term "command climate." Command climate surveys are now routine 
assessments in all Army organizations. 
 The Army OE program also taught the Army how to revamp its counseling 
methodology. Prior to OE, counseling was purely a negative term. Sergeants constantly 
threatened their soldiers with “counseling statements” as a form of punishment. Largely 
through the four-step process and feedback sessions, the OESOs turned that attitude 
around and, in the process, introduced the power of mentoring and coaching. 
 OE taught the Army to embrace rather than tolerate or avoid change. Their 
methodological approach to change management has endured over time. The term 
“change agent” is now widely used and well understood. OE work with "open systems," 
for example, led to the methodology of strategic planning. In short, open systems 
addressed how an organization effectively deals with its environment, especially with 
external pressures and demands.23 
 Finally, OE and OETC significantly elevated the stature of the Army in the eyes 
of industry and academia, especially at a time when most of society held the Army in 
relatively low regard. Academia and many Fortune 500 companies were well aware that 
the Army was implementing state of the art OD. Over time, many of these people 
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passed through the school either as guest speakers or as observers of the program. In 
fact, by 1977, the center had established one of the best OD libraries in the country. 
Under the direction of Ms. Lynn Herrick—the “matriarch” of the Army OE community—
the extensive collection of resources served both the center and the OESOs in the 
field.24 At the same time, OETC began publishing a scholarly journal, the OE 
Communique which, with a circulation of 3500, found its way to subscribers in industry 
and universities.  
Leadership and Management Revisited: What Could "Right" Look Like? 
 The 1970s were indeed a Camelot moment because the Army's emergence from 
the dark days of Vietnam into the realities of an AVF compelled the Army to look inward 
at human relations. The Progressives saw this window of opportunity as a way to shine 
a bright light on the nature of behavioral interaction between the leader and the led. In 
their minds the "holy grail" was the achievement of highly effective organizations. 
Unfortunately, the Army never again came as close to understanding the nature of 
leadership as it did during that decade. 
 As discussed in the Preface, people today have a difficult task in defining the 
term "leadership." An even more difficult task is to describe the differences between 
leadership and management. Many have tried, such as Mike Malone who, at the time, 
was extremely interested in living systems and extensively reflected on the differences. 
In a 1981 interview, Malone expressed his view that  
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[i]f you get into the Living Systems Theory, leadership pertains to the 
information-processing system, while management refers to the materiel 
processing system. I've got a feeling that despite all of the ways we define 
leadership and all the ways we define management—the two seem to fit 
into those two critical processes the best. Management sort of runs 
modern energy subsystems. Leadership pertains to people and 
management to things—put the two together to get a job done. . . . People 
with experience in the leadership field . . . could be the translators [of 
theories]—that would be their main job. The developers and instructors 
could take the concept from these leadership guys and, in three or four 
more years, change the matrix to competency and learn more about that. 
At the end of about five years, we will begin knowing enough about 
systems and processes to deal with information. We can then make a 
clear separation between leadership and management, and in about ten 
years beyond that, I can see leaving all this stuff for a general systems 
comprehensive theory, such as Dr. Miller's Living Systems Theory.25 
 
Others, such as Brigadier General Mick Zais (a student in the first OESO course), were 
clear on the distinctions from the beginning. Dr. Zais, today the Superintendant of 
Education for the State of South Carolina, believes that "leadership is all about feelings. 
. . . Of course, transformational leadership is totally about feelings. That’s what 
leadership is. It’s human motivation. And human motivation is based on what’s in the 
human heart.”26 Jim Looram felt the same way as Zais: 
We were raised as combat arms officers to care for the troops. No doubt 
about that. Take care of the troops, and they will take care of you. Well, 
when I teach leadership, particularly one-on-one leadership, the first step 
of the dance for any care value person is I’ve got to care about your 
career, I’ve got to care about how you get along with other people, I have 
to care about you, and I can’t fake it. If I have 20 people working for me, I 
might not like all of you, but I’ve got to care about every one of you. And 
you are going to know that. That is leadership. That’s the first place to 
start. I might get tough with you, but eventually you know that we got a 
relationship—a relationship!. Management is a role, leadership is 
developing this one-on-one relationship with you. I don’t ever see that 
having existed in the Army. Their version of it is [simply] “taking care of the 
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troops;” I am not relating to you personally. And there is this sense of 
removal.27 
 
 TRADOC, under Starry, attempted to quantify the differences between leadership 
and management by insisting that leadership is competency- or skill-based and differs 
for each level of rank or position. This is evident in the 1983 release of the Army's 
leadership doctrine that articulated leadership within the framework "Be, Know, Do." 
However, I take a different view. I believe that the work of James MacGregor Burns has 
given us insight into the true nature and essence of leadership. For me, Burns's 
publication of Leadership allows us to insightfully study leadership, just as Karl von 
Clausewitz's publication of On War permits the profession of arms to study war. In short, 
Burns's Transformational Leadership should be the basis of behavior for all people who 
hold power and authority over others. There is no such thing as a position of leadership. 
There are only positions of management that come with authority and power. Whether a 
person demonstrates leadership while holding such a position is an entirely different 
matter. Leadership is not something you do but rather something you live. 
 While the challenge to redress current poor leadership behaviors may appear 
daunting, one solution would be to bring back the Army OE program. Such a program 
could take advantage of a plethora of research that has transpired in the behavioral 
sciences since the 1970s. To succeed, the new program would need significant 
influence over the Army's leader development programs and "ownership" over Army 
leadership doctrine. In retrospect, Rogers's greatest oversight was his failure to take 
ownership over FM 22-100, Leadership. With DePuy's success in making doctrine 
                                                          




paramount in the institution, an OE "flavored" FM 22-100 may have made 
institutionalization a bit easier.28  
 The architecture of a modern program of organizational effectiveness, leadership 
and leader development would look something like this: 
The Education 
1. All leadership and leader development education would include a thorough 
survey of the primary leadership theories that have evolved over time. The 
education of leadership theory would become more advanced and intellectual as 
officers advance in rank, to include the general officer ranks. The curricula at the 
Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College would 
include required courses in leadership and change or social or organizational 
psychology.  
2. At the core of the program is transformational leadership because it 
undergirds and permeates everything. Transformational leadership requires 
moral and ethical values (which the Army already possesses). Officer education 
is well-steeped in the work of James MacGregor Burns and his successors in the 
field of transformational leadership. 
3. Situational leadership is key to the program because it acts as a filter by 
which the commander initially assesses the problem or change at hand.  
4. Transactional leadership is an important part of the program mainly because 
that Army has already utilized it to a large degree under the AVF. Much of what 
the Army has already accomplished in this regard remains valid today. 
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5. Advances in the management sciences are also important so that officers can 
understand proven "best practices," and so that intellectually the students can 
compare and contrast managerial activities with leadership behaviors. 
 
Figure 5.1. By placing transformational leadership theory into practice, undergirded with 
the OE process, an organization becomes more effective not only because all members 
feel valued but because important communication and ideas flow equally in all 
directions. This only happens based on the commander’s understanding of different 
leadership theories, an understanding of organizational psychology, and the 





 As the diagram illustrates, change is a dynamic condition that occurs rapidly all 
around us at all times. How we handle change makes or breaks an effective 
organization. In our new Army OE program, commanders are already educated to 
behave as transformational leaders; therefore, they have a solid system of 
communication in place. They are accustomed to receiving "unvarnished" information, 
especially from the bottom up. As commanders face problems and challenges, they 
utilize situational leadership as a filter to discern whether the.problem is technical or 
adaptive. If it is technical, that is, they can easily identify the problem and easily 
anticipate the solution, then they employ managerial or transactional methods to reach 
a solution. If the problem or challenge is adaptive, they draw upon their knowledge of 
transformational leadership to address the challenge. As part of their continuing 
education, officers are already well-versed in Ronald Heifetz's work on adaptive 
leadership. 
The Evaluation and Advancement of Leaders 
 As mentioned, leader development is a career and life-long endeavor. As officers 
advance through the ranks, they receive leadership education built around or upon the 
work of four people. These are: James MacGregor Burns (Leadership); Ronal Heifetz 
(Leadership without Easy Answers); and Robert Kegan and Lisa Laskow Lahey, 
(Immunity to Change).29 The latter two authors are important because they 
                                                          




operationalize the work of the former two. The ultimate goal of our leader development 
program is to produce adaptive leaders with self-transforming minds.30 
 As officers advance through the Army school system, those attracted to the 
behavioral sciences are carefully "groomed" to occupy key positions in the new Army 
OE program. Priority of assignment for the "new OESO" is within the Army education 
system. The best and the brightest eventually become instructors at CGSC and the 
AWC. Also, the officer promotion and assignment system would not penalize officers for 
specializing in OE. This is not inconceivable, given the trends in recent years toward 
officer specializations. 
 To determine the best and the brightest, the Army's evaluation system must be 
overhauled. Our new Officer Evaluation Report (OER), while it resembles the current 
report in appearance, contains two major modifications. The first is an evaluation on the 
moral and ethical behaviors of the rated officer. Unlike today, where the rater checks a 
block beside the trait that best describes the officer, the new OER would require 
examples of demonstrable ethical behaviors. Such examples could come from the 
second change: the use of 360-degree evaluations. Unlike the experiments underway 
today where the 360 is used to provide an officer with an awareness (i.e., information 
only), the new system would grant the 360 evaluation as much if not more weight than it 
currently gives the senior rater narrative. 
 To establish a new Army OE program as superficially outlined above, the Army 
would need an empowered champion at the top who could drive these changes 
downward over an extended period of time. To truly change the leadership culture of the 
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Army, this person must sit above the CSA and initiate activities that would endure 
beyond his or her tenure. Real transformation takes time and may require the retirement 
of the institution's oldest generation. As we saw with the Traditionalists, the Healers, 
and the new soldiers of the AVF, generational differences are real. They are largely 
defined by social and cultural values and views. While older generations may not 
approve of the behaviors of younger generations, they must, however, engage in 
productive dialog to avoid becoming irrelevant—despite their authorities–if, for nothing 
else, then for preserving the health and vibrancy of the institution. 
The Primary Legacy of the Army OE Program 
 The greatest enduring achievements of the Army OE program were the changes 
in how the Army views human relations and the impact of the program on the lives of 
many people. The narrative thus far has addressed the former. The debate between the 
Healers and the Progressives resulted in an extensive exploration of the behavioral 
sciences by both groups. This debate spurred the Healers to look beyond the 
management sciences to see, in their view, what might be adaptable to advancements 
in training and doctrine. While they chose older, leader-centric theories and some 
elements of transactional leadership, the examinations nevertheless forced them to 
think about human relations to a greater extent than ever before. Unlike the Army OE 
program, this thinking did not die out in the 1980s. Many officers from that time forward 
would continue to reflect on advancements in the behavioral sciences and debate or 
write about those reflections at CGSC and the AWC.31    
 By far, the best legacy of the Army OE program was its impact on the lives of 
many people, not only those who participated in OE operations (and found officers 
                                                          




willing to listen), but more importantly on the OETC faculty and staff, and the 1702 
OESO the program produced. For the latter, the school and their OE experiences were 
so rewarding that they pursued second careers as consultants after leaving the Army. 
Jim Looram was one: “[OE was] the most important thing I did ever. It was that 
powerful. Powerful enough so that I had a career in it for 30 years and made a ton of 
money with it just by doing the same thing after I took my uniform off. The stuff was that 
huge.”32 Likewise, Gary Richardson stated that 
The first thing I do every day when I awake is to give thanks for the OE 
program. The OE schooling and experience (as well as the contacts made 
there) have enabled an economic life that I doubt would have been 
remotely possible without that training. Although my bosses at the time I 
applied (I was an artillery battalion executive officer in Germany) were 
appalled that I would take myself out of competition for [command] for the 
OE track, it proved to be well worth whatever (really unknown) sacrifice I 
made to the combat arms track. My personal opinion is that the OE 
schooling would have made me a much better battalion commander but 
the army didn't see things that way. But, absolutely zero regrets on my 
part.33 
 
 Librarian Lynn Herrick, who worked at the school for ten years, reflected that 
[OETC offered] work I enjoyed in a place I really loved, and I don’t know 
anybody who can say that they had much better. It was a place that 
valued its library, and by association it valued me. I did what a lot of 
people did who worked there. I worked at home and I didn’t turn off my 
mind. On Monday morning I came in with four more ideas about what I 
could do to help support the program.34 
  
 For others, the experience was extremely rewarding and fundamentally life 
changing. Carol Johnson, one of the few women to become OESOs and who served on 
the staff at OETC said, “I drank the Kool-Aid. I thought we were doing something 
important. . . .We had been given a new "language." It was a very big deal to us. I think 
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were open to new experiences. Everything I learned there was beneficial—both 
professionally and personally.”35   As Jerry Eppler recalled, “It changed my life. We were 
being authentic in what we were doing. We were being genuine. As a result, strangers 
learned to trust us pretty quickly and to lower their defenses and to look at themselves 
and make some pretty serious changes.” For Kay Powers, OE gave her a professional 
career. She began as a secretary in the OE office at DA and eventually became a 
qualified OESO. In reflecting on those days, she was humbled by her experiences. 
The ultimate outcome of that, for me, was in terms of how I began to see 
myself over time. I was sitting in a 2-star general’s office one day, 
discussing some problems he was having in his organization. And it was 
like all of a sudden, my whole system went into kind of default mode, and 
my brain is going, what the hell do you think you are doing? What makes 
you think you know enough to . . . yes, all this is going on in my mind. I got 
back to the office, and I told a couple of guys about what had happened. 
And I said, the only way I could think of it was, I’m a long way from home 
for a country girl. . . . It was rather heady stuff. I mean, we could walk into 
2- and 3-star generals’ offices where nobody else could get in to see 
them. That was powerful.36 
 
Herrick’s experience was similar.  
The ten years I had at the OE school [helped] formulate who I am. Just 
how I look at life, and how I live it. I do not want to think what I’d be like 
without that experience. I really don’t. And I predict you’ll hear that over 
and over again. And I’m sorry more people didn’t have the opportunity I 
did to be connected with the program.37      
 
 None of this, of course, would have been possible without Bernie Rogers. From 
both his papers and his actions it is clear that he was a true believer in the primacy of 
human relations. While many observers of that time may remember him as President 
Carter’s CSA and his stewardship over the “hollow force” of the late 1970s, others who 
knew him recognized and appreciated his intellectualism. In fact, Rogers may be the 
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most intellectual CSA the Army has ever known, which, in itself, is remarkable given the 
anti-intellectual climate that has consistently permeated the senior ranks of the officer 
corps. In any case, his guardianship over the Army OE program changed the lives of 
many soldiers in many positive ways. Throughout it all, Rogers valued soldiers as 
individuals and wanted their voices heard. As Johns remembered, 
[with] General Rogers there was no substitute for understanding human 
behavior—leadership behavior—unless you study it systematically. There 
is no question [that he wanted the officer corps to become more 
humanistic in how it dealt with people]. No question. His primary use of 
OE was something akin to the councils [that he started at Fort Carson]. He 
wanted upward communication. And he wanted commanders to 
understand that. . . . I remember . . . a 2-star infantryman, that to me was 
a Neanderthal. But he was a major general, and he was in a meeting—I 
was there with General Rogers—in which he said, “Well, maybe I’m old-
fashioned, but if I want to know what the troops are thinking, I’ll just go out 
and talk to them.” General Rogers said, “The next person that tells me he 
has that kind of connection, I’m going to fire him.” He could be blunt like 
that. But . . . it’s the Marie Antoinette view, that you’re out of touch with 
them, but you think you know. Just go out and talk to the troops, as if they 
were going to tell you. You need systematic feedback. And that was 
Rogers’s point. He kept emphasizing to me, right up to the point I retired, 
“the one thing I want commanders to learn, is to receive constructive 
criticism from how they’re perceived by their subordinates.”    
 
General Bernard W. Rogers died October 27, 2008, at Inova Fairfax Hospital in 
Falls Church, Virginia. He was 87 years old.  
Epilogue 
 Sometime in 2001, as I neared the eighth or ninth month in command of a 
battalion, my command sergeant major approached me one day and asked to have a 
heart to heart talk. 
 “Sure sergeant major, anytime.” 




 I acted a bit surprised, although I knew where this conversation was going. “What 
do you mean, sergeant major? What soldiers? 
 “Well sir, they see Major P [the S3] making decisions. They see Sergeant Major 
H [the administrative sergeant major] making decisions. As well as Major C [the 
Executive Officer]. They want to know who has the hands on the steering wheel?” 
 I knew damn well who “they” were. I moved a bit closer to him, looked him 
closely in the eye, and said, “Sergeant Major, I hope EVERY soldier in this battalion has 
their hands on the steering wheel.” 
 He walked away, shaking his head, and retired from the Army two months later. I 
walked away with a huge grin on my face.  





A Co.: “Alpha” Company, one of the companies in Hotel” Battalion, the battalion 
involved in Phase Three of Fort Ord’s pilot program 
ADMINCEN: Administration and Personnel Center 
AMC: Army Materiel Command 
ARI: Army Research Institute 
ASA: Army Security Agency 
AUSA: Association of the United States Army 
AVCSA: Assistant Vice Chief of Staff 
AVF: All-Volunteer Force 
B Co.: “Bravo” Company, one of the companies in Hotel” Battalion, the battalion involved in 
Phase Three of Fort Ord’s pilot program 
BSWG: Behavioral Science Working Group 
CAC: Combined Arms Center 
CANOE: Capital Area Network for Organizational Effectiveness 
CCG: Cambridge Communications Group 
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CDC: Combat Developments Command 
CINC: commander in chief 
CINCUSAREUR: Commander in Chief US Army Europe 
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DOD: Department of Defense 
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Field-grade officer: middle-grade officer with a rank of major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel 
FORSCOM: Forces Command, the Army’s highest-level command for all operational 
forces 
General officer: officer with the rank of general—brigadier general (1 star), major general 
(2 stars), lieutenant general (3 stars), general (4 stars) 
Healer: a member of the post-Vietnam Army who wanted to reform the Army through 
force modernization and reorganization 
H Bn.: “Hotel” Battalion, the battalion involved in Phase Three of Fort Ord’s pilot 
program 
HHC: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 
HRD: Human Resources Development 
HumRRO: Human Resources Research Organization, a nonprofit corporation that 
served as a significant behavioral science research asset for the Army 
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LBDQ: Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire, a survey conducted by the AWC for 
the Study on Leadership as a follow-up to the AWC Study on Military Professionalism 
LZ: landing zone 
MACV: US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam 
MDP: Motivational Development Program 
MILPERCEN: Military Personnel Center of the Army 
MVA: Modern Volunteer Army 
MVAP: Modern Volunteer Army Program 
NATO: North American Treaty Organization:  
NCO: non-commissioned officer; enlisted soldier in a leadership position 
NCOPP: Noncommissioned Officer Professionalism Program 
OCSA: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army 
OD: organizational development 
ODCSPERS: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
ODD : Organizational Development Directorate 
ODCSOPS: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
OE: organizational effectiveness 
OEEC: Organizational Effectiveness Executive Course 
OEI: Organizational Effectiveness Institute 
OESO: Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer 
OETC: Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center 
Operation Steadfast: program name for the creation of TRADOC and FORSCOM 




OSAT:  Office of the Special Assistant for Training 
POI: Program of Instruction, name for curricula at Army schools 
PMO: Provost Marshal’s Office 
Progressive: a member of the post-Vietnam Army who believed that the behavioral 
sciences were key in modernizing the Army 
PROVIDE: Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation, an internal Army study on the 
creation of an all-volunteer army 
PSYOPS: psychological operations branch 
ROTC: Reserve Officers' Training Corps 




SAIC: Science Applications International Center 
SAMVA: Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army 
SDC: System Development Corporation, contractor who conducted an OD pilot project with 
ODO 
TMEC: Training Management Evaluation Committee, established at Fort Ord in 1969 
Traditionalist: a member of the post-Vietnam Army who generally accepted time-honored 
conventions and practices 
TRADOC: Training Command, the Army’s highest level command for training 
USAIS: US Army Infantry School 
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Appendix A  
US Army Doctrinal Definitions of Leadership1 
1948:  "Leadership is the art of influencing human behavior through ability to directly 
influence people and direct them toward a specific goal."  
DA Pam 22-1, Leadership, 28 Dec 1948, p. 44, signed by Gen Omar N. Bradley, Chief 
of Staff 
1951:  "Military Leadership. Military leadership is the art of influencing and directing men 
to an assigned goal in such a way as to obtain their obedience, confidence, respect, 
and loyal cooperation." 
FM 22-10, Leadership, March 6, 1951, p. 3, signed Gen J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff 
1953:  "Military leadership, simply stated, is the proper exercise of command by a good 
commander."  
FM 22-100, Command and Leadership for the Small Unit Leader, February 26, 1953, p. 
3, signed by Gen J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff 
1958:  "Military Leadership. The art of influencing and directing men in such a way as to 
obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation in order to 
accomplish the mission." 
FM 22-100, Military Leadership, December 2, 1958, p. 7, signed by Gen Maxwell D. 
Taylor, Chief of Staff 
1961: "Military Leadership. The art of influencing and directing men in such a way as to 
obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation in order to 
accomplish the mission." 
                                                          
 1. Source: predominantly from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/cmd-hdbk-appa.pdf. 





FM 22-100, Military Leadership, June 6, 1961, p. 3, signed by Gen G. H. Decker, Chief 
of Staff 
1965:  "Military Leadership. The art of influencing and directing men in such a way as to 
obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation to accomplish 
the mission."  
FM 22-100, Military Leadership, November 1, 1965, p. 3, signed by Gen Harold K. 
Johnson, Chief of Staff 
1973:  "Military leadership is the process of influencing men in such a manner as to 
accomplish the mission."  
FM 22-100, Military Leadership, June 29, 1973, p. 1-3, signed by Gen Creighton W. 
Abrams, Chief of Staff 
1983:  "Military leadership - the process by which a soldier influences others to 
accomplish the mission."  
FM 22-100, Military Leadership, October 31, 1983, p. 304, signed by Gen John A. 
Wickham, Jr., Chief of Staff  
1986:  "Leadership. The process by which an individual determines direction and 
influences others to accomplish the mission of the organization."  
AR 600-100, Army Leadership, May 27, 1986, p. 7, signed by Gen John A. Wickham, 
Jr., Chief of Staff  
1987:  "Leadership. The process by which an individual determines direction and 
influences others to accomplish the mission of the organization."  
AR 600-100, Army Leadership, May 22, 1987, p. 7, signed by Gen John A. Wickham, 




1990:  "Leadership is the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by 
providing purpose, direction, and motivation."  
FM 22-100, Military Leadership, July 31, 1990, p. 1, signed by Gen Carl E. Vuono, Chief 
of Staff 
1992:  "Leadership. The process of influencing others to perform a task through 
providing purpose, direction, and motivation."  
AR 5-1, Army Management Philosophy, June 12, 1992, p. 3, signed by Gen Gordon R. 
Sullivan, Chief of Staff 
1993:  "Leadership. The process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by 
providing purpose, direction, and motivation."  
AR 600-100, Army Leadership, September 17, 1993, p. 8, signed by Gen Gordon R. 
Sullivan, Chief of Staff 
1999: “Leadership is influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and 
motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” 
FM 22-100, Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do, August 31, 1999, p. 1-22, signed by Gen 
Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff 
2006: “Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, 
and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the 
organization.”   
FM 6-22 (formerly 22-100), Military Leadership, Competent, Confident, and Agile, 
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Table A.1. The Evolution of US Army Leadership Doctrine: Summary of Analysis 
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Note: This snapshot reveals a “cherry picking” approach to doctrinal development over 
time. Although the Army moved away from the Great Man theory, doctrine advanced 
only as far as transactional leadership.   
 
The First Generation of Doctrinal Manuals 1946 to 1973 
The 1946 to 1961 Publications 
 The first doctrinal manual— FM 22-5, Leadership, Courtesy, and Drill—correctly 
defined the essence of leadership using the term “influence.”  However, it is obvious 
from the title as well as size and length (4 by 6 inches and 18 pages) that it lacked 




manual offered 23 “qualities of leadership” that would appear again in future versions 
entitled as values (courage and loyalty) or leader attributes.2 
 In 1948, the Army issued two “interim” publications that elaborated on the basic 
concepts of the first FM.  The first was issued on July 19, 1948, as Training Circular 
Number 6, entitled Leadership.  Though its origins remain unclear (some believe that it 
was a product of senior officers gathered “in a smoke-filled room at Fort Leavenworth”), 
the primary content of this circular listed 11 “Principles of Leadership.”  Supposedly 
based on their own experiences, the authors believed these principles to be 
fundamental and universal in their application at any level of command.3  The second 
publication, entitled DA Pamphlet 22-1 Leadership, was issued on December 28, and 
expanded the definition of military leadership to emphasize influencing people and 
human behavior toward specific goals.  The substance of both documents would 
provide the baseline for the first doctrinal leadership manual solely dedicated to 
leadership.4      
 While the Army was at war in Korea, the Department of the Army released FM 
22-10, Leadership.  It was published in March 1951 and officially superseded the two 
1948 documents.  The contents of this small, 35-page manual retained the 1948 
circular’s 11 principles and officially made them doctrine.  Although the utility of these 
principles has been questioned and debated over time, the principles themselves are 
still considered sound practices by Army leaders today.  The authors also listed 19 
                                                          
2. US War Department, FM 22-5, Leadership, Courtesy and Drill (Washington, DC: US Department of 
the Army, 1946), 8–9, http://www.armyoe.com/Page_5.html. 
3. R. A. Fitton, Development of Strategic-Level Leaders, Executive Research Project S23, 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993), 7. 
4. Ibid., 7. Also, Jeffrey Horey, Jon J. Fallesen, Ray Morath, Brian Cronin, Robert Cassella, Will 
Franks, Jr., and Jason Smith, Competency Based Future Leadership Requirements, Technical Report 
1148 (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, July, 2004), 




individual traits that effective leaders should possess.  Especially noteworthy is Section 
8, “Role of Ethics.”  Here, ethics is defined as “the science of moral duty.”  Slightly 
different from all future focuses, ethics at this time is not viewed as the nucleus of 
leadership but rather as a close ally.5   
 Changing titles again from “Principles” to “Leadership Traits,” the March 1953 
doctrinal manual used the nomenclature FM 22-100 that would henceforth remain in 
place until 2006.  Entitled FM 22-100, Command and Leadership for Small Unit 
Commanders, the manual acknowledged that the traits were not all inclusive but 
“served as a guide for self-assessment and self-improvement.”6  Planting the seeds of 
consistency, two of the manual’s traits would later become values (courage and 
integrity).7   
 Five years later, in 1958, the next revision of FM 22-100 was released under the 
name Military Leadership, a title it would keep until 1999.  Sticking to the “leadership 
traits” approach, the manual added two more traits to its content for a total of 14.8  One 
of the two—loyalty—would remain and later become an Army value.  Other than that, 
this manual offered little by way of improvement or the further progression of leadership 
doctrine. 
 The 85-page 1961 release began FM 22-100’s trek down the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences road with the inclusion of a chapter entitled “Human Behavior” 
                                                          
5. US Department of the Army, FM 22-10, Leadership (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US 
Department of the Army, March 1951), http://armyoe.com/uploads/FM_22-10___Leadership__.pdf, 8–9 . 
6. Fitton, Development of Strategic-Level Leaders, 6. Also Horey, Future Leadership  
Requirements, 8.  
7. US Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Command and Leadership for Small Unit Commanders 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Department of the Army, February 1953), http://www.armyoe.com/ 
uploads/FM_22-100___Command_and_Leadership_for_the_Small_Unit_Leader__.pdf. 
8. US Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of 




(Chapter 3).  This narrative stressed the roots of behavior as derived from psychologist 
Abraham Maslow’s well-known 1943 model on the “hierarchy of needs.”  But 
undergirding the entire manual are the two pillars of Leadership Traits (Chapter 4) and 
Leadership Principles (Chapter 5).  Compared to the manual released a decade earlier, 
this version listed 11 traits, dropping 6 off the original list and adding one (knowledge).9     
 In characterizing the nature of leadership doctrine from the end of the Second 
World War to the new John F. Kennedy Administration’s focus on unconventional and 
counterinsurgency warfare, it is fair to say that the contents of the six publications 
released during this time frame remained consistent in the primary definitions of 
leadership.  All six manuals lacked bibliographies, and the publications contained no 
discussions related to other leadership source material.  While the manuals became 
more detailed and grew more thorough and voluminous, Trait Theory clearly dominated 
the scope and structure of all 6 publications.  In many ways, the Trait Theory-based 
chapters were offshoots of the Great Man Theory which had dominated leadership 
thought throughout the many preceding decades.10   
 In keeping with the prevailing preference for Trait Theory, the focus in every 
manual was on “who” leaders should be (in contrast to “what” they should be or “how” 
they should lead).  This “who to be” approach offered little in way of structure.  Missing 
in the first 6 manuals was a framework in which to house the content.  Interestingly, no 
historic heroes were presented as specific examples, which would suggest that the 
                                                          
9. US Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of 
the Army, June 1961), http://armyoe.com/uploads/FM_22-100_1961.pdf, 17–18. It dropped alertness, 
force, humility, humor, intelligence, and sympathy.  
10. For a good, ground level view of officership and how officers led soldiers since the 1780’s, see 
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898 (New 




authors were probably influenced by Ralph M. Stogdill’s extensive work throughout the 
1950s at The Ohio State University.  Stogdill had previously studied naval leaders and 
was familiar with military leadership, posited that effective leadership may vary from 
leader to leader based on different situations.11   
 Much more apparent in the 1961 FM, though, is the work on Leader-Power 
Bases conducted by John French and Bertram Raven in the late 1950s.  French and 
Raven looked specifically at power itself and suggested five forms of power that help to 
define leadership.  These were: coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, 
referent power and expert power. While the manual included various dimensions of both 
Position Power and Personal Power (the two pillars of Leader-Power Bases), the 
manual suggests that the Army preferred the former.  Most likely, French and Raven 
validated the prevailing views of the senior leaders who, at that time, typically led from 
strong authoritative positions of power.12  
The 1965 Publication 
 Coming at a time when the Army was heavily influenced by civilian management 
theories and practices, especially the field of Systems Analyses, the November 1965 
release of the 59-page FM 22-100 emphasized the criticality of “supervision” as a 
primary focus of effective leadership.13  Influenced by the worldwide increase in 
communist-inspired insurgencies and the entire Army’s embrace of counterinsurgency 
warfare, the manual touched upon interpersonal skills that leaders must possess due to 
                                                          
11. I believe this is an anomaly. Offering fewer examples of famous leaders did not diminish the 
emphasis on Trait Theory. The focus of these authors was on varying situations, not people to emulate.  
12. Northouse, 7–9. 
13. Ushered in by President John Kennedy, systems analysis was viewed at the time as the most 





the likelihood of interaction and contact with indigenous civilian populations.  However, 
despite this emphasis and the mention of the term counterinsurgency for the first time, 
the manual was essentially a recycled version of its predecessor.  It is difficult to explain 
the shallowness of this revision, given the state of strong managerial practices so 
pervasive in the Army at that time.  Missing was any indication of the work done by 
Robert Blake and Jane Mouton.   Pioneers in the field of organizational training and 
development, their model—The Management Grid—was used extensively by many 
organizations at that time to understand goals and purposes through “concern for 
production” and “concern for people.”14  One conjecture is that similar to its overt 
preference for Position Power, the Army likewise may have viewed itself as already 
practicing within the optimum performance quadrant of Blake and Mouton’s grid (“Team 
Management”).  In sum, this FM changed very little in format and content over the 1961 
version, and the “who to be” approach continued to offer a weak structure.15 
The 1973 Revision 
 In the interlude between the 1965 and the 1973 releases of FM 22-100, the 
United States entered, escalated, de-escalated, and lost the war in South Vietnam.  The 
1973 release of FM 22-100 discarded the old manila-colored covers and presented a 
cover with artist-drawn sketches of various troops embedded in the large silhouette of a 
helmeted soldier.  This lengthy manual was more than double the contents of its 
predecessor and included many cartoon-like sketches to illustrate chapters and key 
sections of the FM.  Behind this cover’s liberal makeover was a robust, detailed 
                                                          
14. Northouse, 72–74. This model was used extensively and was later renamed the Leadership Grid. 




doctrinal re-write that hinted at the unprecedented transformation of the Army just then 
underway.  Special sections on drug abuse and race relations made this point clear. 
 In an obvious response to the 1960s over-emphases on management, the 
manual clearly separated and subordinated management to effective leadership, thus 
demoting management to only an “important element of Command.”  A return to an 
emphasis on leadership over management corrected the most glaring reason for the 
defeat in Vietnam.16   
 Issued in June, which coincidentally marked the end of conscription and the 
beginning of the All-Volunteer Army (one that would require a radical change in 
leadership styles and methodologies), the manual contained, for the first time, an 
impressive bibliography.  At first glance, many of the authors listed in the bibliography 
would suggest that the authors consulted numerous leadership theorists and theories of 
that time.  However, like in all the other FMs, no citations or footnotes ever appear to 
attribute sources. 
 Overall, the 1973 release strongly embraced Situational Leadership theories by 
which to prescribe new leadership styles and practices.  However, in terms of 
prescription and application, this FM failed to adequately make the leap from theory to 
practice.  Remaining predominantly conceptual despite its volume, the overwhelming 
emphasis throughout several key chapters was on the Situational Approach.  Here, one 
theory clearly stood out--Fred Fiedler’s work on Contingency Models.  This FM 
redressed the overemphasis on leader traits in the previous editions (which never 
proved to have universal application) in favor of looking to the context in which 
                                                          
16. Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command. See Preface: they were the first to offer a thorough 
critique of the war’s poor leadership due to rampant careerism and management mentality.  Historians 




leadership occurs.  Obviously influenced by the numerous failures in leader behaviors 
during the war in Vietnam (the My Lai massacre being the most infamous), the doctrinal 
authors appear to have consulted Fiedler’s work that suggested the need for different 
types of leadership for different types of situations.  In essence, Fiedler believed that 
within a given context, situational control (what he called “favorableness”) was 
determined by the alignment of commitment, structure, and power.17    
 It is also conceivable that the authors may have adopted the Situational Theory 
work of Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton. Their Normative Decision Theory, though 
similar to Fiedler’s, prescribed conditions in which different leadership styles could be 
appropriate.  In short, this theory suggests that leaders should utilize autocratic styles 
when tasks are familiar, consultative approaches when tasks are unclear, and 
participative strategies when the commitment of followers is questionable.  The 1973 
FM dedicated a special section (Situational Studies) to paint different situations that 
illustrated these differing leadership theories and styles.      
 Hints of Path-Goal Theory also ran through the FM, although there is no clear 
connection to the work of Robert House.  While situational theories provided an overall 
framework in this FM, House’s view that leaders should assist followers in overcoming 
shortfalls in their abilities, support the tone of this doctrinal revision.  However, a clear 
embracing of House’s work would have required the Army to adopt components of 
Path-Goal Theory (specifically, the participative elements of House’s theory) that were 
most likely too liberal for the Army at that time, even with the elimination of a conscript 
Army and the adoption of an all volunteer force.  Conspicuously missing, as well, were 
                                                          




any hints or suggestions that the authors considered Transformational Leadership and 
Servant Leadership; most likely for the same reasons.   
 In summary, the content of each release continued to bolster the fundamental 
nucleus of leadership that placed values, ethics, and beliefs above all else.  Those 
attributes of character remained consistent throughout all revisions but, to be fair, may 
have lacked clarity to junior leaders who were forced to sort through new or shifting 
titles and traits as subsequent manuals were released.  In terms of structure, the seven 
doctrinal manuals essentially took the same form.  Each resembled a type of “who to 
be” handbook.  Although the contents became more detailed over time and then 
sprinkled with recent leadership theories in the 1973 release, these descriptive “who to 
be” handbooks failed to show developing leaders how to practice leadership in the real 
world.  
 Interestingly, the “who to be” approaches in the first seven editions excluded 
some important “who’s,” namely minorities and women.  Certainly, the styles and 
narratives of all of these revisions spoke loudly to white men.  Even the primary 
definitions of leadership, which specified the term “men” in all but two revisions, made 
this clear.  These omissions are hard to explain or excuse since desegregation of the 
Army occurred  in July 1948 and the fact that women had occupied an integral role in 
the institution since the Women’s Army Corps’ (WAC) creation in May 1942.  In regard 
to the latter, women had been serving in the Army since 1901, when the Army 
established the Nurse Corps as part of the regular Army.18  Rich historical references 
sprinkled throughout the various revisions overtly excluded the rich contributions made 
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by minorities and women in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.  The 
inference in these doctrinal manuals was that army leadership primarily applied and 
would continue to apply to the historical core of the Army Officer Corps, namely white 
men.  
 Ten years would pass before the Army again would upgrade its leadership 
doctrine.  In that decade, the Army underwent a transformation on a scale never before 
seen in American military history.  In coming to grips with the trauma endured by 
American society from political turmoil at home to the defeat in Vietnam, the Army “re-
invented” itself by revolutionizing the ways in which it would recruit and train soldiers.  
Above all, an Army that would consist of only volunteers, especially drawn from a pool 
of citizens who were shaped by the aforementioned events, would require a new 
approach to leadership doctrine and practice.  
The Second Generation of Doctrinal Manuals 1982 to 2006 
The 1983 Publication: First Round of “BE, KNOW, DO” 
 In the decade of transformation leading up to the 1983 edition of FM 22-100, the 
Army had successfully healed itself.  Drug abuse and racial strife were largely problems 
of the past.  Through the incentives of higher wages and subsidies in educational 
opportunities, the All-Volunteer Army had succeeded in filling all manning requirements.  
The Army had returned to the Cold War environment with a new operational doctrine 
(Air-Land Battle) and sought advanced technologies to provide a military edge over its 
potential enemies.  Unfortunately, the soldiers manning advanced technology systems 
would be led by officers who would come to confuse technical management with 




that leadership doctrine took a nostalgic step backwards to re-embrace management 
practices as effective leadership and “great men” as effective leaders.  
 Where content lacked progression and modernization, structure took a significant 
leap forward.  The 1983 doctrine adopted a solid structural framework that would 
properly house the contents of leadership doctrine for years to come.  This new 
structure would transform the previous FMs from “who to be” leadership handbooks to 
“how to lead” references.  Beginning with the 1983 addition, the Army stated that all 
aspects of leadership fall within three dimensions.  Labeled as “BE, KNOW, DO.”  This 
framework identified BE as values and attributes, KNOW as skills, and DO as 
leadership actions.  Unfortunately, BE would immediately take a back seat to KNOW 
and DO, both of which facilitated the technological management elements of the Army’s 
new and widely accepted operational doctrine (the 20 August 1982 release of FM 100-
5, Operations). 
 By 1983, the Army succeeded in restoring a professional force that was well-
trained, well-manned, and combat ready.  The new BE, KNOW, DO structural 
framework of the 1983 revision of FM 22-100 housed much doctrinal content that looked 
vaguely familiar.  The authors jettisoned the leadership traits that had fluctuated in 
number among the previous editions in favor of 8 “values” and 4 “factors.”  The factors 
were essentially 4 generalized conditions labeled “the led,” “the leader,” “the situation” 
and “communications.”  This manual abandoned the nebulous “-ships” of the 1973 
release (i.e. Leadership and Leadership Development) and replaced them with more 
descriptive chapters on unit and leader development.19 
                                                          




 With an undisguised re-embrace of Trait Theory, the manual began with a 
detailed account of Civil War Colonel Joshua Chamberlain’s gallant and heroic fight at 
the Battle of Gettysburg.  The FM then utilized Chamberlain, as well as other non-
fictional and fictional personalities, to illustrate key doctrinal points.  Interspersed with 
appropriate action sketches, the manual was pleasant to read and the content was well 
organized. In contrast to previous doctrinal releases, this FM flowed logically, and each 
chapter built upon and complimented the previous section.20    
 Overall, Trait Theory, managerial skills and the Situational Approach were the 
overarching themes of the 1983 doctrinal release.  Abandoned were the more “socially 
problematic” considerations of leadership, such as race relations and drug abuse.  The 
tone here was more overtly masculine and authoritative.  For example, while the FM 
was illustrated with more than 30 sketches showing the faces of soldiers, only 2 each of 
minorities and women were included and all pronouns were masculine.      
 In addition to bringing the situational theories forward, only the work of one new 
leadership theorist was apparent in this FM.  Reaching back more than a decade to 
adopt the work of T. O. Jacobs, the authors bought in heavily to Jacob’s Social 
Exchange Theory.21  In trying to be a “how to lead” reference manual, this FM focused 
in every chapter on the interactions between leaders and followers.  Jacobs’ research 
had been funded by the Navy and looked extensively into influence processes that 
occur within formal organizations.  In seeking situational variables in the Trait Approach, 
Jacobs found value in some aspects of Transactional Leadership Theory to help 
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understand motivations in the leader-follower relationship. This FM was the first to 
include many elements of Transactional Leadership Theory.22 
 Also missing from the 1983 FM was a wealth of leadership research that had 
evolved since 1973.  Absent were House’s advanced work on Path-Goal Theory and his 
interesting “8 Classes of Leadership Behaviors.”23  Missing as well was the work of 
Jeffrey Pfeffer, who defined leadership in terms of influence within organizations.24  The 
work of both theorists would have certainly been welcomed, given the close alignment 
of both substance and relevance to the Army’s existing doctrinal views.  Not 
surprisingly, the two “biggies” of the 1970’s, Robert K. Greenleaf and James MacGregor 
Burns, were ignored.  Greenleaf’s Servant Leadership and Burn’s Transformational 
Leadership must have been viewed as threatening, given the degree of empowerment 
that each theory proposed for followers (and the necessity for leaders to lighten up on 
control and to be more comfortable in their vulnerabilities).25    
 Finally, in terms of promoting character, this FM introduced the Ethical Decision 
Making Process (Chapter 4).  In fact, the BE, KNOW, DO structure relied heavily on 
character throughout the content of most chapters.  Certainly, the depth of discussion 
on values, ethics, and beliefs throughout the entire manual made this FM vastly superior 
to anything adopted up to that time.  Still, although it saw itself as a practical “how to” 
reference, nothing concrete was offered in terms of demonstration, practice, and 
evaluation. 
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1990 – The Second Round of “BE, KNOW, DO” 
 In the seven years that transpired before FM 22-100 was again revised, the 
United States fought two minor wars, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.  More 
importantly, the United States and its western NATO allies had also “won” the 44-year-
old Cold War.  The aftereffects of the latter would soon have serious impacts on the 
contents of the new manual.   
 Under the Administration of Ronald Reagan, the 1980s was a booming period for 
the US Armed Forces.  Taking advantage of huge advances in technology, the Army 
had expanded and modernized its conventional forces and had gained enormous 
confidence it refining the 1982 Operational Doctrine--Air-Land Battle (FM 100-5).  In 
terms of modernizing leadership doctrine, this infatuation with technology further pushed 
BE well below KNOW and DO.       
 The authors clearly delineated the BE, KNOW, DO structure with separate, 
distinct chapters focused on the elements of each doctrinal pillar.  More importantly, this 
leadership manual had a very clear and more direct connection to the realm of combat.   
In diminishing the emphasis on the Situational Approach, which was central to the 
previous FM, the authors shifted weight back to Trait Theory and, in addition to “Great 
Men,” the authors used famous battles to illustrate leadership examples as well.  The 
bibliography, which listed almost 50 sources, led readers to believe that the authors 
were very familiar with the most prominent leadership theories being explored at that 




Burns.26  Upon closer examination, it is clear why these prominent theorists were 
attractive to the doctrinal authors.  Bass, Bennis, and Nanus, especially, were looking at 
that time at the validity of specific traits in improving effective leadership.  Their research 
was specifically focused on Visionary and Charismatic Leadership.27  While neither 
theory stood out overtly in the FM, the narrative proposed simplistically that effective 
military leaders were both charismatic and visionary.  
 The 1990 release also carried forth a more concise structural framework of BE, 
KNOW, DO.  One-third the length of its predecessor, this FM targeted leader 
development and assessment as advocated by Stephen D. Clement and Donna B. 
Ayres.28  Their research, more than 15 years old, attracted the attention of the authors 
because it focused on leadership competencies. 29  The COS, General Carl Vuono, as 
the approving authority, believed that this FM would allow leaders to apply “leadership 
theory at all organizational levels to meet operational requirements.”30    
 Clement and Ayres proposed 9 leadership competencies, which the Army 
adopted and formalized as official doctrine.  However, this centerpiece, which appeared 
in this FM as Appendix A:  “Leadership Competencies,” was disappointingly shallow in 
that it simply repackaged leadership principles that we saw in earlier FMs.  Though 
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each was succinct and well-written, they remained descriptive, contrary to Vuono’s 
remarks in the preface to the FM.  
 Overall, the structure of the 1990 BE, KNOW, DO was much stronger and the 
entire work was well edited.  Yet, beyond an initial embrace of core competencies, 
which would improve in later releases, this FM was very similar in content to the 1983 
version.  The same rich leadership theories, which had been refined and greatly 
explored by the corporate world at that time, remained absent: Transformational and 
Servant Leadership.  
1999 – The Third Round of “BE, KNOW, DO” 
 In the nine years leading up to the 1999 revision of FM 22-100, the Army was 
forced to reform itself again on par with the 1970s transformation.  Unlike the defeat in 
Vietnam, which served as a catalyst for change in 1973, this transformation followed on 
the heels of the overwhelming victory of US forces in the First Gulf War (Operation 
Desert Storm) in 1991. In this case, US Armed Forces followed suit to previous victories 
by downsizing the armed services.  What exacerbated this large reduction in force, 
however, was the noticeable, voluntary exodus of junior officers from the Army.    
 By 1996, the Army had reduced its active-duty size from a pre-Gulf War 770,000 
to 495,000 personnel.  The officer corps was reduced by 25 percent from 91,000 to 
69,000 officers.31  Many “survivors” of this reduction in force opted to leave as well due 
to their belief that careerism was out of control.  Citing extreme micromanagement from 
their bosses to “zero defect” command climates, captains especially were attuned to an 
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institutionalized “resume building” career path that was clearly counter to Army values.32  
Looked at in this context, almost the entire officer corps was in violation of all that the 
BE had stood for in the previous two FMs (1983 and 1990).  The current COS, 
seemingly acknowledged this, saying “. . . [t]he state of ethical conduct is abysmal. . . “33 
 While the transformation of the late 1990s has been well documented, a 
thorough examination of its impact on leadership and the shrinking force structure is 
well beyond the scope of this essay.  In short, the senior leaders struggled with 
transformation in the downsized post Cold War Army while trying to visualize potential 
threats of the fast approaching 21st century.  With so many captains leaving the Army, 
the stewards finally took a hard look at individual motivations in order to halt this 
hemorrhage of talent.       
 The result was a revision of FM 22-100 that would make all previous versions 
look simple and shallow.  While the vestiges of the Trait Theory and the Situational 
Approach remained quite apparent, this FM built on the previous introduction of core 
competencies to a sophisticated extent.  This FM listed 39 components that detailed out 
the competencies that “leaders of character” must BE, KNOW and DO. Articulating what 
it had never quite described before, the BE category of this FM laid out 7 values, 3 
attribute categories, and 13 attributes. 34    The depth of these core competencies 
allowed the authors to abandon the rudimentary descriptive lists of methods and 
activities that were promoted in previous FMs and never really effective in practice. 
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 The Army clearly intended this FM to be its capstone manual on leadership and 
to encapsulate the multitude of complexities in modern warfare that had resulted in a 
more globalized, post-Cold War world.  In doing so, this manual was voluminous as it 
included leadership for senior commanders operating at the operational and strategic 
levels of war.35  Junior leaders, looking for practical methodologies at the tactical level, 
however, probably found less utility in this manual than should have been the case.36   
 The quality of this FM, with consistent sound structure and rich content, clearly 
reflected the research and thought of knowledgeable authors.  Keeping in mind that this 
doctrinal release appeared to be the “fix plan” for the dysfunctional state of officer 
leadership that had been the impetus for the recent junior officer exodus, it was not 
surprising that traces of more progressive leadership theories appeared.  However, they 
were interwoven throughout the familiar conservative theories and styles that had 
always characterized FM 22-100.  The Army’s strong preference for Trait Theory and 
the Situational Approach still provided the backbone.  Great men and battlefield 
victories were still highlighted.  Returning as well was the emphasis on self-
development and core competencies that had made their debut six years earlier.  
However, core competencies were much matured in this release, with the inclusion of 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), then gaining popularity in the corporate sector of 
the United States.  
 The extensive bibliography contained the names and works of many 
contemporary leadership theorists.  Tracing their work through the manual’s content, 
though, requires thorough examination.  On close inspection, it appears that the authors 
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considered more progressive theories but inevitably “cherry picked” several that would 
compliment the traditional Trait Theory and Situational Approach.  In looking for 
leadership theories that would support the caring, but authoritative, officer who places 
followers at the forefront of his or her leadership style, the authors dug deep into the 
1976 work of George B. Graen’s Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) Theory.  Clear 
connections in chapter 3, 4, and 5 showed the authors’ interest in the dyadic 
relationships between leaders and followers as explored by Graen and others in the 
1970s and 1980s.37  Also present in the chapters on Direct Leadership were Ronald 
Heifeitz’s advocation of leaders helping followers with personal growth and change.  
Conspicuously absent, though, was any of Heifeitz’s emphasis on the real 
empowerment and commitment of followers.38 
 At first glance, this FM appeared to finally embrace Transformational Leadership.  
Indeed, the bibliography suggested a heavy emphasis in that direction, and for the first 
time, Transactional and Transformational Leadership theories received attention by 
name.  In Chapter 3, Human Behavior, the authors presented both theories as “styles,” 
describing Transformational Leadership as a style “which focuses on inspiration 
and change,” and the Transactional Leadership style as one of “rewards and 
punishments.“39  Unfortunately, the narrative was brief and never offered any substance 
beyond descriptions.  In regard to this shallow treatment, the reader was warned to 
avoid Transformational Leadership “when the mission allows little deviation from 
                                                          
37. See Northouse, Chapter 8. 
38. Heifetz, Leadership without Easy Answers. 
39. US Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do (Washington, DC: 




accepted procedures.”40  The impression here is that the authors felt more comfortable 
with the Transactional Leadership traits.   
 Very little trace of Transformational Leadership Theory was found elsewhere, 
even in the chapters on Direct Leadership.  This is unfortunate because that was the 
section that pertained to leaders operating below battalion level of organization and had 
been the preponderance of all preceding manuals since 1946.  “Cherry-picking” was at 
work again as some elements were extracted to support the Great Man and Trait 
theories.  In fact, Gary A. Yukl’s criticism that too much emphasis is placed on leaders 
motivating followers is very apparent in this FM where Transformational Leadership was 
narrowly viewed as one way to achieve “heroic leadership.”41        
 However, the authors clearly drew on Transformational Leadership Theory for 
the sections dealing with operational and strategic levels of leadership.  In these 
sections, the primacy of vision underscoring strategic leadership was made apparent.  
The authors used Jerry Hunt’s work on Charismatic Leadership to underscore the 
criticality of vision leading to trust.42   Boas Shamir’s work on expert and referent power 
were seen in Chapter 7 (Strategic Leadership), which made the point that senior leaders 
will both lead and become members of diverse teams, civilian and military.43  
 By far the most impressive standout from this FM was the thorough treatment 
ethics and character received.  In clear terms, the authors described the proper 
relationships of ethics, values and character.  This clarity, missing in the previous 
                                                          
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid, see especially Chapter 6: Organizational Leadership, Also Northouse, 193. 
42. Ibid, see Part Two.  Also, James G. Hunt and Robert L. Phillips, 1996 Army Symposium: 
Leadership Challenges of the 21st Century Army, ARI Research Note 96-63, (Washington DC: US Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, May, 1996), DTIC accession number: 
AD-A312092, A-3.  




manuals, essentially stated nothing new but rather placed the terms within the context 
of leadership styles that readers could truly understand.  Here, the reader had no doubt 
that character was the centerpiece.44  Further, two noteworthy annexes were included in 
this FM.  Annex E: “Character Development” and Annex D: “A Leader Plan of Action 
and the Ethical Climate Assessment.”  The latter marked the first time that doctrine had 
ever offered an actual tool to perform an act of leadership.                   
 By far, the least impressive treatment in this FM was the omission of any 
discussion or examples of women and leadership.  Following on the heels of the most 
widespread, highly publicized sexual harassment cases in the Army’s history, this FM 
largely ignored the topic and continued with a heavily masculine tone.45   
 In sum, the 1999 release of FM 22-100 was an impressive, giant step forward in 
terms of structure and content, especially with the latter’s greater utility and the adoption 
of more progressive leadership theories.  Unfortunately, neither elevated the BE far 
enough.  The situation was far too broad and encompassing for younger practitioners 
and addressed too much descriptive narrative directed more toward senior leaders.  
The content flirted with Transformational Leadership but overall fell back into the 
comfort zone of Trait Theory, the Situational Approach and Transactional Leadership 
Theory.   
 In looking back on the last decade of the 20th Century, the Army had once again 
squandered an opportunity to reform the officer corps.  Just as it had failed to do so 
following the loss of the Vietnam War, the Army was faced with an adaptive problem 
which it did not recognize.  In both cases, people and leadership were at the heart of 
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each crisis. 46 Yet, the stewards never once considered that the primary practitioners, 
the center of mass of Army leadership—the officer corps—might have been the root of 
the problem.  The culture of conformity continued to exclude proven leadership 
methodologies that could have yielded a more effective Army.  One that would have 
been better prepared for the dark times ahead, only two years later, when terrorists 
would kill more than 3000 people in September 2001.  That event ushered in a higher 
complexity of warfare that Army leaders were ill-prepared to meet.   
2006 – The Fourth Round of “BE, KNOW, DO” or a Third Generation?  
 No sooner had the ink dried on the 1999 release of FM 22-100 than the new 
Army COS, General Erik Shinseki, convened “an Army panel to review, assess and 
provide recommendations for the development and training of 21st century leaders.”47  
Known as the Army Training and Leader Development (ATLD) Panel, members 
released the survey-based report (the Officer Study portion) to the Army on May 25th, 
2001.  The ATLD Panel began its work by utilizing the official Army Vision of Readiness, 
Transformation, and People, as a framework for analyses.  From the beginning, the 
ATLD Panel assumed a primary focus on Transformation but soon discovered that the 
real scope of its efforts was fundamentally about People.  For the officer corps 
especially, this meant getting at the essential elements of training and developing 
leaders.48  
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 The work of the ATLD was first rate.  The right people came together to form 
effective partnerships with Army researchers, private industry, academia, and 
policymakers. The end-state was the formulation of a process by which doctrine could 
be improved based on the comprehensive inclusion and adaptation of numerous best 
practices.49  In examining past and current leadership theories, research personnel 
specifically consulted theorists who had examined competencies in both individuals and 
organizations.  In terms of looking at the “BE,” the competency of “Exemplifying Sound 
Values and Behaviors” was derived from the work of four key theories.  These were: 
Trait Approach (Stodgill, 1948 and 1974), Leadership Attribution Theory (Lord, 1985), 
Transformational Leadership (Avolio & Bass, 1991 and 2002), and Charismatic 
Leadership (House, 1976).50  The result was a research effort that drilled down 
extensively on core competencies.  The authors essentially dissected multiple 
dimensions of BE, KNOW and DO and came up with an extensive compilation of 
competencies for each of the 3 leadership pillars.51   
 The 2006 FM, the current doctrine, is undoubtedly the most thorough and content 
rich of all leadership manuals ever produced.  The authors reshaped the numerous 
chapters of the previous manual into four logical parts: Part One: “The Basis of 
Leadership”; Part Two: “The Army Leader: Person of Character, Presence and 
Intellect”; Part Three: “Competency-Based Leadership for Direct Through Strategic 
Levels”; and Part Four: “Leading at Organizational and Strategic Levels.” This 
organization sets up an internal framework for content that is well written and 
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compartmentalized. While part one serves as a primer of sorts to place doctrine within 
the larger context of civil-military relations and the Constitution, the concept of 
competencies is introduced early on as the core of leadership excellence.  It is clear, 
though, that despite the change in the name of the title, BE, KNOW, DO is still very 
much alive as the structural framework for the entire manual’s content. 
 Part Two finally elevates BE (character) to its highest level to date.  Values, 
ethics, and beliefs are all here and well-described.  Quality narrative describes the link 
of ethics to character development better than any previous FM.  Surprisingly, the 
authors eliminated the Ethical Climate Assessment Survey (ECAS) and replaced it with 
an appendix focused on personnel counseling.   This was an unfortunate omission.  The 
scenario that the 1999 authors used to explain the ECAS centered around the fictional 
Second Lieutenant Christina Ortega, who correctly identified and properly addressed a 
growing ethical dilemma in her platoon.  This storyline was rich in both overt and subtle 
leadership examples.  It painted a minority woman working hard within a stressful, 
dynamic male dominated environment to influence her soldiers to do the right things, 
both by doctrine (the ECAS) and by her demonstrated behaviors.  Because 
opportunities for robust examples are few within the structure of doctrinal writing, the 
2006 authors eliminated an important means of illuminating numerous leadership, race 
and gender examples.     
 Unfortunately, an improved emphasis on character, good organization, and 
quality authorship do not make this FM more progressive or modern.  Indeed, in some 
important ways, this FM takes a step backward.  In addition to dropping the ECS, the 




Transactional leadership, terms that were included straight from theoretical work in 
academia.  Very light flirtations with transformational elements appear in Chapter 8, 
within very short and broadly descriptive paragraphs entitled “Fairness and 
Inclusiveness,” “Open and Candid Communications,” and “Learning Environment.”  
Other than these cursory moments, this FM remains firmly entrenched in the same 
conservative construct that has always been rooted in Trait Theory and the Situational 
Approach.52   
 Given the thorough exploration of progressive leadership theories that the ATLD 
panel undertook from 2001 to 2004, especially in defining core competencies against 
prominent theoretical works, the final product is disappointing.  Compared to the 
previous FM, there was no further development of Transformational Leadership despite 
the ATLD’s thorough and deliberate look at the work of Avolio and Bass.  The same 
shallowness occurred with House’s Charismatic Leadership.  Both were “cherry-picked” 
to compliment the foundation of Trait Theory and the Situational Approach.  In 
continuing the strong preference for Trait Theory, the authors included more than 25 
vignettes of courageous leaders throughout the manual.  With the skillful interweaving of 
these historical examples in the FM, the authors succeed in tying Army values to 
tradition in order to enrich Army culture.        
 In sum, the “core competency” approach is the closest that the Army has come 
thus far to truly inculcate core values into actionable traits.  However, this current FM 
still falls short because the Army has not yet overcome the primary obstacle to effective 
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doctrine: translating theory into practice and then requiring a demonstration of such 
behavioral skills.  Once in practice, values and character behaviors could be observed, 
assessed, and evaluated as the components of KNOW and DO have always been.  As 
the architects of the competency framework noted as far back as 2000, “. . . evidence of 
a competency is demonstrated by actions that can be observed and assessed to allow 
one to distinguish the levels of performance in that competency.”53  This could easily be 
accomplished if officers were required to demonstrate the doctrinal leadership behaviors 
in their annual efficiency reports (personal evaluations).  Forcing rating officers to record 
observed demonstrable behaviors with written narratives as the KNOW and DO 
sections require, would finally make the BE pillar the strongest of the three, not the 
weakest.  Until this occurs, however, the BE will always be more espoused than 
practiced. 
  
                                                          





Structures of Army Ranks and Organizations  
for Non-Military Readers 
Organizational Levels 
 It is critical that the reader is familiar with Army organizational structure in order 
to understand the work of the Army OESOs, and their levels of assignment. The 
following is a basic, generalized description, although many exceptions exist. 
Historically, the Army has organized itself as a pyramidal system of “threes” (although 
variations often exist at all levels). 
 The first significant level of command is the company. Companies are comprised 
of three or four platoons.  The company commander (a captain) supervises and 
evaluates his/her platoon leaders (lieutenants).  Company sizes vary from 100 to 250 
personnel. 
 Moving up the organizational pyramid, battalions are the next level. Battalions 
generally have three companies, although some specialized battalions may have four or 
five companies. Lieutenant colonels command battalions. Battalions are the first 
organizational level that have officially organized, dedicated staffs. Battalion sizes vary 
from approximately 500 to 800 personnel, although historically, the average size is 
about 650. 
 The next level of command is the brigade (note that regiments and groups are 
also organizations at this level). Brigades typically have three or more battalions and are 




 Within the general officer grades, we have two higher primary levels of 
command. The first is the division. Major generals (two stars) command divisions. 
Divisions are comprised of three brigades or more, and several large, specialized 
organizations. Division personnel strengths range from 12,000 to 18,000.  Above a 
division is the corps. Corps usually consist of two to four divisions and are commanded 
by a lieutenant general (three star). Like divisions, corps are also augmented with 
several specialized organizations. 
Staffs 
 Beginning with battalions, every level of command has both a primary staff and a 
special staff. Special staffs can be extensive, especially at higher organizational levels. 
For this study it is important for the reader to understand the primary staff. 
 The primary staff consists of four sections. These are: personnel (S1/G1), 
intelligence (S2/G2), operations (S3/G3), and logistics (S4/G4). Consistently throughout 
history, the operations section (the “3”) has been the most powerful, influential staff in 
an army organization. At battalion and brigade levels they are known as “S” staffs and 
at higher levels, as “G” staffs. Staffs are supervised by executive officers (XOs). With 
the exception of the commander, the S3/G3 and the XO are the two most senior officers 
in the organization.  At the battalion level, they are almost always majors while the other 
primary staff officers are frequently company grade officers. 
 Historically, the army staff sections were headed by non-specialists. For 
example, in an infantry battalion, they were all infantry officers.  New captains, hoping to 
compete for a company command within the battalion, filled the S1, S2, and S4 




captains into the S4 position while the S1 and S2 have held relatively minor positions of 
influence. 
 The Army has worked hard to correct this latter trend in modern times. In 1971, 
the Army established the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAICS) at Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona, in order to provide extensive training to dedicated intelligence 
officers. These officers began filling S2 positions throughout the Army soon thereafter. 
Note that while specialized branches for logistics and personnel existed, they did not 
follow the intelligence model, meaning that logistics and personnel officers were 
primarily utilized in specialized organizations during the 1970s. In the 1980s, branch 
qualified officers began filling S1 and S4 positions.54      
Enlisted Members (EM), Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and Commissioned 
Officers: 
Enlisted ranks:  
 The enlisted corps has 9 ranks. The first four are enlisted personnel on their first 
term of service, grades E-1 through E-4 (private through specialist-4).  Some E-4s in 
leadership positions are corporals (two stripes) and are considered the most junior of 
the NCO corps. 
 E-5 through E-9 grades comprise the NCO corps (sergeant, staff sergeant, 
sergeant first class, master sergeant, and sergeant major). The latter two can hold key 
leadership positions. The “top” sergeant of a company who has direct authority over all 
Ems in that company is called a First Sergeant.  Sergeant Major (E-9) positions can be 
                                                          
54. I served as a battalion S2 from 1984 to 1986 in the 2nd Battalion, 508th Infantry of the 82nd 
Airborne Division. As a military intelligence-branched officer, I was the only primary staff officer who was 
not infantry-branched (i.e. the personnel and logistics officers were infantry). Note that on the eve of the 
AVF, the Army came to a realization that the personnel branch had been the most neglected over time. 




either administrative or command. If the latter, they are called command Sergeants 
Major. One exists at each level of command from battalion to DA level. They serve as a 
close advisor to the commander and wield enormous influence within an organization. 
They are always addressed as “sergeant major.” 
Officer Ranks: 
 There are four categories of officer ranks: warrant officers, company grade 
officers, field grade officers, and general officers. 
 There are five grades of warrant officers: WO1, CWO2-CWO5. Levels 2-5 are 
addressed as “Chief.” In general, they hold extensive, specialized knowledge and 
experience in specified occupations.  They do not command troops although they may 
supervise sections of an organization. 
 Company grade officers are officer position grades O1 through O3. These are: 
second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain.  While all three levels often fill staff 
positions, they serve predominantly in command positions as platoon leaders 
(lieutenants) and company commanders (captains).  Officers remain at the company 
grade for approximately the first ten years of service. 
 Field grade officers are comprised of grades O4 through O6. These are: majors, 
lieutenant colonels, and colonels. While all three levels predominantly fill staff positions, 
the O5s and O6s hold critical command positions as battalion commanders (lieutenant 
colonels) and brigade commanders (colonels). Officers remain within the field grade 
group for the remainder of their careers. Historically, only one percent of the entire 
officer corps becomes general officers. Therefore completing twenty years of service 




 There are four levels of general officer ranks, O7 through O10. These are: 
brigadier general (one star), major general (two stars), lieutenant general (three stars), 
and general (four stars). There are various command positions for all general officer 
ranks although major general and lieutenant generals hold the two most critical—


























A Sample of the OE Process 
Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Process 
The following sequence is normally followed in conducting the OE process: 
STEP 1: Commander requests assistance of the OESO.  
STEP 2: Initial meeting of OESO and commander. 
a. OESO explains OE Process and his capabilities and limitations. 
b. Commander discusses unit needs and his expectations. 
c. Agreement on how OESO can support the unit. 
STEP 3: Meeting of OESO with commander and his chain of command and/or staff. 
a. Familiarization on OE Process. 
b. Explain and clarify requirements and expectations. 
c. Agreement on initial OE activities. 
STEP 4: Select and design an appropriate organizational assessment techniques with 
the commander and the chain of command. 
STEP 5: Conduct organizational assessment using one or more of the following 
techniques: 
a. Standardized survey. 
b. Individual interviews. 
c. Group interviewing sessions. 
d. Historical information. 
e. Direct observation. 




STEP 7: Present assessment results to commander and determine extent to which 
results will be presented to others in the organization. 
STEP 8: Presentation of assessment results to chain of command. 
STEP 9: Command Action Planning - based on organizational assessment; develop 
objectives and strategy for adapting and implementing OE activities. 
STEP 10: Design OE activities in support of the Command Action Plan. Such as: 
a. Organization-wide OE activities, e.g. 
 Survey feedback 
 Management Improvement conferences 
 Management by Objectives 
b. Chain of Command and Team Development Activities (on-the-job), e.g. 
 Facilitating staff meetings, planning, and goal setting 
 Facilitating team building sessions 
c. Skill Development Workshops, e.g. 
 Performance counseling 
 Group problem solving 
 Communication skills 
 Time management 
STEP 11: Obtain and coordinate resources and additional expertise to support OE 
activities. 
STEP 12: Implement OE activities. 





STEP 14: Revise Command Action Plan, as required, and conduct follow-on OE 
activities, as appropriate.55
                                                          





Message from General Rogers to General Wickham Reference Termination of the 
Army OE Program 
Pentagon, Telecommunications Center, Unclassified FOUO message dated 311645Z 
May 85 
 
May 1985  
NATO Supreme Allied Headquarters 
Shape, Belgium 
 “Having been the CSA, I am fully aware of the difficulties the chief faces as he 
tries to develop recommendations to you to reduce programs/budgets to fit under 
directed monetary and manpower ceilings.  I'm also aware that different chiefs do 
different programs/activities from different perspectives.  Having this background— and 
having had my turn at bat—has kept me from commenting over the past six years about 
anything the Army was doing.  However, OE and the benefits which have and will 
continue to accrue from it are simply too important to permit my remaining silent. 
 When the Army set a ceiling of 781,000 and committed itself to the formation of 
additional units/new types of units, and with many active CSS [combat service support] 
units already far below C-1 manning levels, it was inevitable that spaces would have to 
be found in other areas.  But I submit that to tear down the OE structure to find these 
spaces would be wrong.   
 The Army has invested about 14 years of effort in OE since the then Vice Chief 




some of the tools of behavioral science (especially “organizational development” which 
we call OE) which industry have been using so effectively for years.  As one of those 
originally charged with applying OD/OE, I quickly became convinced of its value.  In the 
late 70s some of us thought—and still do—that of all the things the Army might do to 
improve itself in the future, nothing could have the impact that OE would—if it were 
done right.  OE provides a proven, systematic means to drive towards customer 
satisfaction and organizational improvement without compromise of values, discipline, 
standards, commitment or the authority-obedience hierarchy.  OE can be a valuable tool 
for leaders it is done right, if it is not feared (as some “leaders” do). If it is left to function 
as designed and if its objectives remain undiluted and not expanded beyond the 
intended scope of OE by trying to achieve too many objectives with it (as I believe has 
been the case with OE in the Army over the past several years). To do it right requires 
the OE Center and school with trained OE specialists placed at the appropriate places 
in our Army structure. 
 Whenever OE is discussed, one will always hear the remark that “it's nothing but 
good old leadership.”  That's true for small percentage of our leaders—such as some of 
the senior military leaders of the Army hierarchy—for whom the use of the features of 
OE just comes naturally (or second-nature after three decades of service).  But what 
about the other 90 to 95% of our leaders at the battalion/brigade/division/corps level 
who are not so naturally gifted; more important, what about their troops?  Why shouldn't 
they have the advantage of being in an outfit in which OE is practiced properly? 
 OE makes sense.  It is partly a response to the needs of both individuals and 




organizational objectives together.  It is one of the best answers to the interdependent 
problems of improving an organization and enhancing individual worth.  It assumes that 
most officers and soldiers (of whatever grade) have drives toward personal growth and 
development if provided an environment which is both supportive and challenging.  That 
is, most soldiers want to become more of what they are capable of becoming; they want 
to be all they can be.  The second assumption is that most soldiers desire to make and 
are capable of making a greater contribution to the goals of their outfit than most 
organizational environments will permit.  There is great constructive energy waiting to 
be tapped if the commanders recognize these assumptions, even if all they were to do 
was merely ask for and act on suggestions from their troops. 
 The leader who practices is OE, brings certain attributes to his unit: a set of 
values; a set of assumptions about soldiers, organizations, and interpersonal relations; 
a set of goals for his outfit, its soldiers and himself; and a set of tested structured 
activities that are the means to implementing his values, assumptions and goals.  The 
benefits of OE can be both stability as well as managed change if it is done right.  I 
repeat: to do it right means keeping the center/school, training the OE specialists to 
assist commanders, and providing manpower spaces for the OE system.  It also means 
not overloading the OE system with objectives OE is not designed to achieve.  Let OE 
be all that it can be, but let it be solely OE. 
 In my opinion eliminating OE would be tantamount eating our seed corn. 
The proposed alternatives suggested in the referenced message would not permit the 
Army “to do it right,” something of greatest importance for OE. (Rather than see the 




requisite sized active unit to find the spaces that eliminating we would provide, as tough 
as such an inactivation would be to handle, both militarily and politically, on both sides 
of the Atlantic). 
 One final thought: wouldn't it be ironic if the Army of Excellence , it's” Year of 
Leadership” were to destroy the OE system, an activity with perhaps the greatest 
potential for the enhancement of leaders’ skills and for raising the level of excellence in 








A Note on Sources 
 I have heavily relied on government sources throughout the length of this project. 
My primary sources come from several important archival collections, namely, the 
papers of General Bernard Rogers that are housed in the archives of the National 
Defense University in Washington, DC, and the collection covering the USAWC 
curriculum at the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
 The bibliography also includes a large number of master theses and dissertations 
from students attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. These are 
important resources for two reasons: first, these two schools—attended by the highest-
rated officers in the upper ranks of the officer corps—predominantly shape and 
influence Army culture. Second, collectively, their works represent the attitudes and 
viewpoints of the Army officer corps in the years following the war as changes and 
reforms occurred. Not surprising, these students most often wrote about doctrine, 
training, and force modernization and reorganization. While many of these writings 
examined technical aspects of those broad subject areas, some students chose 
“leadership” topics for their masters theses or research papers. It is telling that most of 
these students confused “leadership” with the management of training or force 
modernization. Although rare, some students produced insightful writings that 
sometimes challenged conventional wisdoms about human relations, management, 
professionalism, and leadership.  Interestingly, those students who did were usually 




attended their second year at Leavenworth as a part of the SAMS program were 
required to complete a research paper. Although they often refer to those papers as 
“monographs,” I have used the term “research paper.” Students at the Army War 
College were required to complete a research project—sometimes individually and 
sometimes as a team. Their work is termed “research project” in the bibliography. 
 Although the Preface and Chapter 1 heavily rely on secondary sources to explain 
the context of the period, the oral histories cited in the bibliography provide the 
strongest foundation for this work. The experiences of this tight-knit group of former OE 
participants allow us to understand the feelings, emotions, and personal humanistic 
viewpoints of the people who were committed to this program. While they sought to 
transform the “people” culture of the Army, they, in turn, were transformed themselves. 
This is evident by the vast amount of documents that they retained in their homes for 
decades and by their choice of second careers after retiring from the Army—working 
within the OD field. Much of this research is based on these official documents that 
most likely do not exist in archives and libraries. The bibliography cites these collections 
by the last names of the owners. This project would not have been possible without their 
assistance. 
 Readers will see that the US Government has now digitized a large number of 
documents. I obtained many sources from the Defense Technical Information Center 
(DTIC). Where possible, I have included the DTIC accession numbers for readers 
wishing easy retrieval. Please see http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/. 
 Finally, the Organizational Effectiveness School produced a professional journal 




articles were almost all practicing OESOs writing about various subjects, some 
pertaining to their experiences in the field, and others writing about more intellectual 
aspects of Army OE. The reader will be impressed with the quality and caliber of these 
articles—they are as good as any found in academic peer-reviewed journals. To the 
best of my knowledge, they are not found in any library databases. I am grateful to Ms. 
Lynn Herrick—the consummate librarian of the Army OE school—for retaining all 
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